Opinion
01-14-1905
HUNT v. HUNT.
J. P. Harned, for complainant.
Action by William Hunt against Hannah L. Hunt for divorce. Denied.
J. P. Harned, for complainant.
BERGEN, V. C. The bill of complaint alleges that the complainant and defendant were married April 21, 1861; that they lived together as husband and wife from the day of their marriage until the 2d day of May, 1899, when the defendant deserted the complainant, leaving his house, and taking up her abode with their son; and prays for the dissolution of the marriage relation existing between them, based upon the alleged desertion. No answer was filed by the defendant, and the cause proceeded ex parte, resulting in an order of reference to a master, with his report advising the decree prayed for. After a very careful examination of the testimony submitted with the report, I find myself unable to agree with the conclusions reached by the master. The complainant was sworn as a witness, and testified with reference to the desertion that on May 2, 1899, the defendant moved out of his house, and took what furniture she wanted, without giving him any reason for leaving; that she had never returned since she left, and would not receive any communication from him, nor would she let him in the house where she was living; that he went to see her, and sent the communication; that prior to his wife's leaving he had failed in business, and was not able to earn as much money for the support of his family as he had previously; that at the time of the desertion his son, Howard, was living with him, as was also his married daughter; that just prior to the separation his son, Howard, had bought a house, to which house the son and mother moved, the daughter remaining with the complainant; that the only reason the complainant could give for the desertion was that he had failed in business and the prospects of his son were more prosperous, but that he could never get any reason from his wife or son; that after his wife left he went to the house where she was living, but she would not let him in, and the communication he referred to was sent by the hands of Samuel Bender; that he tried to communicate with his wife through his daughter, and the answer brought to him by his daughter's husband, Mr. Ives, was, "Father, you have the answer already; mother says she would not live with you." This happened soon after the alleged desertion.
The difficulty with the complainant's case is that he has not offered the slightest corroboration. Neither Mr. Bender, who carried the communication, nor the daughter or her husband, who resided with the complainant at the time of the alleged desertion, were called as witnesses, nor is there any reason given for the omission to do so. In addition to the complainant, but two witnesses were called—Harry B. Dodamead and William H. Sparks. The first testifies that he knew the parties, and was a nephew of the defendant, and had lived in Camden with them for the past 20 years; that the defendant does not now live with Mr. Hunt; that he did not know when the defendant moved away from her husband; he only heard of it afterwards; that she went to live with her son, Howard, and has lived there ever since.The other witness—Sparks—merely testifies to the fact that the parties are living apart. As the testimony of the witnesses other than the complainant only show that these parties are living separate and apart, a decree for the complainant would necessarily rest entirely upon the testimony of the complainant as to the causes of the desertion, and the rule is well settled in this state that a decree of divorce will never be granted when the causes of the desertion relied upon to support it are proven by the uncorroborated testimony of the party seeking it. McShane v. McShane, 45 N. J. Eq. 341, 19 Atl. 465. It is also proper to say that the evidence does not show any earnest desire on the part of the husband to effect a reconciliation, and I have grave doubts whether any such effort was ever made by the complainant. On the contrary, the fact that the wife and son moved from the complainant's house, as he, the complainant testifies, "what furniture she wanted," without any apparent protest on his part, would seem to indicate that the separation was not of that character to warrant the finding that the desertion was and is willful, continued, and obstinate.
It therefore follows that this divorce must be refused, and the bill dismissed.