Opinion
(4241)
The plaintiff sought to recover a real estate commission allegedly owed him by the named defendant, P, and his defendant wife, L, on the sale of their house. Although the referee to whom the matter had been assigned found that P and L had never signed the listing agreement as required by statute ( 20-325a), he concluded that they were estopped from challenging the listing agreement because P had signed a later document terminating that agreement, thus acknowledging its existence. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, from which P and L appealed. Held: 1. Because L never signed the later document, there was no basis for a judgment against her. 2. There was nothing in the record to support application of the doctrine of estoppel as to P, there being no finding that the plaintiff relied to his detriment on the later document.
Argued February 7, 1986 —
Decision released April 8, 1986
Action to recover damages for breach of contract, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford and referred to Justin J. Donnelly, Sr., attorney state trial referee, who recommended judgment for the plaintiff; thereafter, the court, N. O'Neill, J., rendered judgment accepting the referee's report, from which the defendants appealed to this court. Error; judgment directed.
The appellee filed a motion for reargument which was denied.
Ronald T. Murphy, with whom, on the brief, was Richard P. Weinstein, for the appellants (defendants).
Eliot B. Gersten, for the appellee (plaintiff).
The defendants appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered upon an attorney referee's report. The principal issue involves the propriety of the referee's finding that the defendants were estopped from denying liability under a real estate listing agreement which did not comply with General Statutes 20-325a. We find error.
The plaintiff sued the defendants for a real estate commission, claiming breach of an exclusive sales agreement which allegedly complied with General Statutes 20-325a. That statute requires, inter alia, that a real estate listing agreement "be signed by the seller. . . ." General Statutes 20-325a (b)(5). The case was referred to an attorney trial referee. See Ruhl v. Fairfield, 5 Conn. App. 104, 496 A.2d 994 (1985).
The referee found the following facts: The plaintiff is a licensed real estate broker and the defendants, Paul W. Friedman and Leslie A. Friedman, are a married couple who owned a residence in East Hampton. There was a written document, purporting to be signed by the defendants, which, if effective against them, obligated them to pay the plaintiff a commission on any sale of their house during the period set by the terms of the document. The house was sold within that period.
The referee specifically found that the plaintiff did not establish that the defendants signed the document. Therefore, one of the necessary conditions of General Statutes 20-325a was not established. The referee also found, however, that the named defendant did sign a subsequent document which stated, in part: "I hereby terminate the listing contract for the sale of my house, 203 Clark Hill Rd., East Hampton, Connecticut." He found that this document indicated Friedman's acknowledgment that the purported listing agreement was in effect. On this basis alone, the referee concluded that both defendants were estopped by this second document from denying the validity of the first document, and that they were both liable to the plaintiff for the claimed commission.
The trial court overruled the defendants' objections to the referee's report and rendered judgment for the plaintiff. This appeal followed.
As to the defendant Leslie Friedman, there is no finding that she signed the second document purporting to "terminate" the first document. Whatever effect, if any, her husband's letter may have as to him, it cannot be attributed to her. Bolmer v. Kocet, 6 Conn. App. 595, 507 A.2d 129 (1986). There is no basis for a judgment against the defendant Leslie Friedman.
The judgment against Paul Friedman is, moreover, equally without foundation, but for a different reason. We need not decide in this case whether the doctrine of estoppel can operate to permit recovery on an agreement which does not comply with General Statutes 20-325a. Even if we assume without deciding that the doctrine of estoppel can so operate, there is no finding in this record to support the application of that doctrine.
Estoppel "require[s] proof of misleading conduct by one party resulting in detrimental reliance by the other." Latimer Point Management Coloration v. Anderson, 1 Conn. App. 310, 313, 471 A.2d 670 (1984). Even if we consider the document signed by Paul Friedman as misleading to the plaintiff, there is no finding of detrimental reliance by the plaintiff resulting from that document. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of what the plaintiff could have done in detrimental reliance on that document, which in effect told him to do nothing with respect to the defendants' property.