Opinion
Argued September 11, 1974
October 25, 1974.
Motor vehicles — Suspension of motor vehicle operator's license — Scope of appellate review — Findings of fact — Sufficient evidence — Error of law — Abuse of discretion — Credibility — Conflicting evidence — The Vehicle Code, Act 1959, April 29, P. L. 58 — Unlawful arrest — Civil proceeding — Leaving the scene of an accident.
1. In a motor vehicle operator's license suspension case review by the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is to determine whether findings of fact of the lower court are supported by competent evidence and to correct errors of law, and the reviewing court will not disturb the order of the lower court in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. [508]
2. In a motor vehicle operator's license suspension case, questions of credibility and the resolution of evidentiary conflicts are for the trial judge conducting a hearing de novo following the suspension action and are not for the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. [508]
3. Questions relating to the legality or illegality of an arrest for an alleged violation of The Vehicle Code, Act 1959, April 29, P. L. 58, and other matters involving criminal procedure are inapplicable to a motor vehicle operator's license suspension proceeding which is civil in nature. [508-9]
4. One who knowingly causes damage with his automobile to another's unattended property and who leaves without giving proper notice to the owner as required by The Vehicle Code, Act 1959, April 29, P. L. 58, is guilty of more than a technical violation of such statutory provisions, and a court does not commit an error of law or an abuse of discretion in sustaining action suspending the motor vehicle operator's license of such driver. [509]
Argued September 11, 1974, before Judges CRUMLISH, JR., WILKINSON, JR. and ROGERS, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 1634 C. D. 1973, from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County in case of In the Matter of the Appeal of Lyman Willis Hunt from the Action of the Secretary of the Department of Transportation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in Suspending his Motor Vehicle Operating Privileges, No. CPPD No. 3 November Term, 1973.
Suspension of motor vehicle operator's license by Secretary of Transportation. Licensee appealed to the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County. Appeal dismissed. BREENE, J. Licensee appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Affirmed.
John A. Burkhiser, for appellant.
John L. Heaton, Assistant Attorney General, with him Anthony J. Maiorana, Assistant Attorney General, Robert W. Cunliffe, Deputy Attorney General, and Israel Packel, Attorney General, for appellee.
Lyman Willis Hunt (Hunt) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County which dismissed his appeal from the suspension of his motor vehicle operator's license by the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary), for a period of two months for a violation of Section 1027(d) of The Vehicle Code.
Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1027 (d).
The relevant facts are as follows: In the early evening of December 15, 1972, Hunt, in the midst of a light snowstorm, lost his way while driving to a company Christmas party at a local country club. Seeking enlightenment, he steered his automobile onto what he believed to be the driveway of a residential property. The ground was covered by a wet snow. His course having been plotted by the accommodating resident, Hunt backed the vehicle out onto the road, feeling as he progressed what he described to be a "little" spinning of his studded snow tires. The spinning, in fact, left two ruts eight inches deep and thirty-one feet long in the front lawn of the property. When Hunt went on without stopping to inform the owners of the indent, they immediately called the police, and a state trooper, in pursuing the clues, traced Hunt to the club. When he was confronted by the trooper who dutifully read his Miranda rights, Hunt admitted that he had left the tire tracks. He was thereafter arrested and charged with a violation of Section 1027(d) of The Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1027(d), which provides in part as follows: "The operator of any vehicle . . . which is involved in an accident with any . . . property which is unattended, shall immediately stop, and shall then and there either locate and notify the . . . owner or custodian of such unattended property, of the name and address of the operator and owner of the vehicle involved in such accident with the unattended . . . property, or shall leave in a conspicuous place, in or upon the unattended . . . property, a written notice, giving the name and address of the operator, and of the owner of the vehicle involved in such accident, and a statement of the circumstances thereof, and also shall, within twenty-four (24) hours, forward to the department a similar notice regardless of the amount of the damage done to such unattended . . . property."
In response to a summons and complaint, Hunt pleaded guilty to the statutory offense and paid the prescribed fine and costs. The conviction was thereafter reported to the Secretary, who suspended Hunt's operator's privileges for a period of two months pursuant to Section 618(b)(2) of The Vehicle Code, 77 P.S. § 618(b)(2). Hunt appealed this suspension to the court below which, after granting a supersedeas, conducted a de novo hearing, dismissed the appeal and reinstated the suspension. We affirm.
Our review in appeals of this nature is limited to a determination of whether or not the factual findings of the court below are supported by competent evidence and to correct erroneous conclusions of law, and we will not disturb the order of the court below on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Jula, 12 Pa. Commw. 140, 316 A.2d 681 (1974). And, of course, it is for the trial judge hearing an appeal de novo, and not this Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve all conflicts in the evidence. Lindenmuth v. Bureau of Traffic Safety, 12 Pa. Commw. 134, 316 A.2d 141 (1974); Commonwealth v. Toole, 9 Pa. Commw. 202, 304 A.2d 177 (1973). Considering our review function, we dismiss Hunt's initial argument that there is no competent evidence to support the trial court's finding that he knew that his vehicle had damaged the lawn at the time of the accident. Scienter is a necessary element in the proof of violation of Section 1027(d). Hunt testified that: "I thought my tires did spin a little, and I got into the street and thought I had better come back the next morning and check into this . . . ." The state trooper testified that Hunt admitted to him that "he (Hunt) knew he damaged the yard when he was leaving the lawn and that he was going to return later and advise the property owner." Although Hunt objected to the admissibility of this testimony on the grounds that it was the fruit of an illegal arrest, the alleged illegality of an arrest or other procedural defects relevant in a criminal proceeding do not apply to a license suspension proceeding which is civil in nature. Civitello v. Bureau of Traffic Safety, 11 Pa. Commw. 551, 315 A.2d 666 (1974).
Hunt did, in fact, return the next day and paid the owners the agreed $50.00 for the damage.
Hunt's final argument is that the court below erred as a matter of law by its strict, technical construction of Section 1027(d) of The Vehicle Code so as to reach an absurd result. This also is without merit. He cites our holding in Commonwealth v. Stamoolis, 6 Pa. Commw. 617, 297 A.2d 532 (1972). Stamoolis, however, is clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the driver in that case, in the darkness of night struck two brick pillars situated at a point in a narrow road where had he remained in that position he would have blocked oncoming traffic. Using good judgment he moved his automobile from the immediate scene to "the nearest spot available for parking," until the police arrived. Here, Hunt proceeded to a club party without advising the owner of the damaged property of the incident, leaving to chance his possible apprehension. We are hard put to classify this violation of Section 1027(d) as "technical." Accord, Diamond v. Bureau of Traffic Safety, 12 Pa. Commw. 260, 315 A.2d 881 (1974).
There was neither an abuse of discretion nor an error of law in sustaining the two-month suspension.
Affirmed.