Opinion
A149326
04-28-2017
In re T.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. HUMBOLDT COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. B.M., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Humboldt County Super. Ct. No. JV150021)
T.M. was detained by the juvenile court because her parents were unable to safely care for her and their drug abuse put her at risk of serious harm. Following 12 months of reunification services, T.M.'s father, B.M. (Father), continued to use drugs and was unable to show he could properly care for her, despite his desire to reunify with his daughter. The juvenile court terminated reunification services and set a Welfare and Institutions Code Section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. Prior to the hearing, Father filed a section 388 modification petition requesting reinstatement of reunification services. The court denied the modification request and terminated Father's parental rights, finding the permanent plan of adoption appropriate. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights and the denial of his section 388 petition. Because neither order was erroneous, we affirm.
All further statutory citations are to the Welfare & Institutions Code.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In February 2015, the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) initiated dependency proceedings for T.M., then 11 months old. The petition alleged T.M. had suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm from exposure to various drugs—methamphetamine, codeine, morphine, heroin, and marijuana—used by her parents. Her hair follicles tested positive for methamphetamine, heroin, and other drugs. T.M.'s parents admitted to smoking heroin in motel rooms while with her, which exposed T.M. to harmful substances and put her at risk of harm. The petition also alleged her parents were either unwilling or unable to provide T.M. with safe shelter and their long-term drug abuse impaired their ability to provide safe care for their daughter. The juvenile court removed T.M. from her parents and placed her with her maternal great-grandmother, who was a willing and able relative suitable to care for T.M.
In March 2015, at the uncontested disposition hearing, T.M. was declared a dependent of the court. She remained with her great-grandmother, while her parents were ordered to comply with a case plan. The Department was ordered to provide family reunification services.
T.M.'s mother is not a party to this appeal. Reunification services were terminated as to her in October 2015. --------
The September 2015 six-month status review report showed Father had made little progress addressing his drug problems. Shortly after T.M. was detained, Father entered a detox facility but left after three days, and his substance abuse remained untreated. In addition, during the initial six-month reunification period, Father had been arrested three times for possession of controlled substances, assault with a deadly weapon, and a DUI hit and run. At the time of the six-month report, he was incarcerated and awaiting sentence. During this period, he completed three visits with T.M. but missed five due to his incarceration.
The six-month report noted T.M.'s placement with her great-grandmother "continues to be an appropriate placement for her." Further, her great-grandmother, who was also caring for T.M.'s three-year-old half-sister, "indicated a commitment to [T.M.]" and wanted to "move forward with the adoption process for [T.M.] and her half-[sister]."
The February 2016 12-month status report showed Father's ongoing struggle to meet his case plan objectives, with some positive steps towards treatment. He entered a treatment program in October 2015, on the same day he was released from jail. He tested clean and kept off drugs for at least a two-and-a-half-month period for his longest period of sobriety in years. He maintained regular visits with T.M., during which he demonstrated proper parenting. Unfortunately, his progress stalled. In November 2015, he was removed from his treatment program for violating curfew. The following month, he was arrested on multiple warrants, at which time he was found with heroin and in relapse.
In the report, the Department expressed its appreciation for the "authentic desire [Father] has expressed to reunify with [T.M.]" but found "his ongoing involvement with law enforcement, continued substance abuse and lack of housing, . . . to be unresolved barriers to appropriately provide for [her]." The Department recommended reunification services be terminated for Father and a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing be set.
Meanwhile, the status report stated that T.M.'s placement with her great-grandmother continued to be appropriate. The great-grandmother reported that "[T.M.] is thriving in her care" and "is very bonded" to her half-sister. The great-grandmother continued to express her desire to care for both children on a permanent basis and to be their adoptive parent.
At the 12-month review hearing in March 2016, Father informed the court that he had completed over 30 days of a 90-day residential treatment program and was attending narcotics anonymous and alcoholics anonymous six days a week. He expressed his recommitment to sobriety and his treatment program. He discussed his progress and the improvements he made in learning to control his impulsive decision-making. On his ongoing treatment, he reflected, "[I]t just made me realize the good things about being sober and bettering myself to have a life, really. I want—I want a lot of things, a lot of it to be a dad. And I know I have to better myself before I can be a father . . . . I just really don't want to lose my daughter."
While the juvenile court commended Father's efforts, his love for his daughter and desire to be a good father, the court heeded the Department's recommendation and terminated reunification services. By a preponderance of the evidence, it found Father had not demonstrated he could complete his case plan or provide for T.M.'s safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being. Nonetheless, the court encouraged Father to "double down on [his] commitment to get [himself] clean and continue with the case plan" with the knowledge that his only available remedy was to "at some point in time, demonstrate to the Court through a Petition under Section 388 that the Court should modify its plan because of . . . additional factors that have occurred between now and [the permanency hearing]." The court set a section 366.26 permanency hearing for July 2016.
The Department's reports for the section 366.26 hearing recommended termination of Father's parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption for T.M. The report observed that T.M., now two years old, had spent the majority of her life in her great-grandmother's care. Her great-grandmother continued to support and provide a loving home for her. T.M. was said to be "thriving in this environment" and appeared to show "a strong bond" with her great-grandmother during monthly visits. The great-grandmother was in the process of adopting T.M.'s older half-sister with whom T.M. was also "strongly bonded" and wanted to adopt T.M. The report submitted by the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) supported the Department's recommendation that Father's parental rights be terminated and the permanent plan of adoption with T.M.'s great-grandmother. The court also received three letters from T.M.'s maternal relatives urging the court to keep T.M. and her half-sister together.
On June 22, 2016, prior to the permanency hearing, Father filed a section 388 modification petition seeking to undo the court's order terminating reunification services. In his petition, Father reported that since the March 2016 twelve-month review hearing, he completed his residential drug treatment program, tested negative for drugs from December 20, 2015 to May 26, 2016; completed parenting, anger management, and moral reconation therapy programs; and acquired stable housing. He asserted that resuming reunification services would be better for T.M. because the two of them had good visits and she was attached to him.
On July 12, 2016, the juvenile court conducted contested hearings for both the section 388 petition and the section 366.26 permanent plan.
Levi Frisk, a social worker assigned to T.M.'s case for about a year, testified about Father's visits with T.M. He recalled that initial visits may have not have been comfortable for T.M. because she had not seen her father for a while. During that early period, Frisk recounted Father had several run-ins with the law that resulted in his absence which affected his bond with T.M., who was then a baby. During those first visits, T.M. threw tantrums, which were typical in child welfare cases, and had difficulty leaving her great-grandmother. However, as time went on, the tantrums subsided, and T.M. became more comfortable with Father and developed an attachment to him.
Frisk testified that Father was currently receiving two-hour supervised visits with T.M. twice a week, and he personally observed 10 of these more recent visits. Frisk thought Father's interactions with his daughter were positive. T.M. gave her father hugs and kisses. None of the visits were ever stopped because Father was under the influence, and he observed no improper behavior. Father brought T.M. snacks and toys and handled her bathroom breaks. Visitation logs indicated T.M. enjoyed the visits. However, Frisk acknowledged Father never transitioned to unsupervised visits. He attributed this to Father's residential drug treatment during the last six months of his reunification services.
Aware of Father's struggle with heroin addiction, Frisk commended him for his work in getting better and expressed hope for his long-term sobriety. However, he noted that Father was early in his recovery and needed more time to show he had a grasp on sobriety, having been sober for just five or six months following a four-year addiction. He knew Father was still on probation for another year and that he could be sent back to jail for any probation violations. Frisk also understood that Father had never been T.M.'s primary caregiver.
Frisk opined that T.M.'s home was with her great-grandmother, who "live[d] for the child." After 18 months of living with her great-grandmother, T.M. was "highly bonded" to her great-grandmother and to her half-sister. Frisk also notified the court that he conferred with T.M.'s great-grandmother on the importance of a biological parent to a child, and she was committed to facilitating visits between T.M. and her father as long as he remained clean and sober.
Father testified he wanted another chance to have his daughter in his life but also recognized T.M.'s great-grandmother was an "amazing person" who "has done amazing stuff for [T.M.]." Asked why he thought reinstating reunification was best for T.M., he responded that "every child deserves to have a father in their life . . . I want to be in my daughter's life. She deserves me to be in her life." He acknowledged he had used heroin for the last four years but was now committed to staying sober.
Father expounded on his progress. He completed a 90-day residential treatment program and was continuing in its aftercare program twice a week. He completed a parenting course. He was attending narcotics anonymous meetings and was regularly drug testing as part of his probation requirements. He was also meeting weekly with a sponsor. He credited his sobriety to his drug treatment program and his ability to learn from past mistakes and remember his active addiction. He stated, "Every day I was using I just knew something wasn't right ... and every day I was under the influence I wanted to change. And progressively it got worse. I realized that the only thing I could do to change is give myself to the change. Like actually surrender to my addiction, and finally learn the tools that it takes to maintain sobriety."
Father also explained he had a four-year, eight-month suspended sentence and had one year remaining on his 18-month probation. He was living in his mother's house, where he was responsible for paying for certain utilities. Since he was not employed and had no income, his father helped pay those bills. He had registered for classes at the local community college, where he planned to pursue a business degree. He was also recently married.
Describing his visits and interactions with T.M., he stated, "[W]e do everything. She always wants to play and swing and go down the slides . . . . And we just talk about stuff . . . . She's just a really happy little girl." Father said he observed a "one hundred percent" change in T.M.'s reaction to him since he became sober.
Finally, T.M.'s maternal aunt testified briefly. She stated she personally saw Father driving a red Jeep Grand Cherokee in Fortuna in June 2016. Father acknowledged he did not have a have a driver's license; and when asked if he was in Fortuna in June 2016, he said he had been but was unsure if he knew anyone who owned a red Jeep Grand Cherokee.
The juvenile court denied Father's section 388 petition. While acknowledging Father had done well under supervision and had "presented well" and "made strides," the court attributed his progress more to his drug court supervision rather than T.M.'s interests. The court stated the steps Father had undertaken "have been at least, if not solely, to a great portion. . . , requirements of probation or prison." The court viewed his recent marriage and acceptance of his addiction as positive steps but whether he was on the way to redemption and a different life path was "yet to be seen." Referring to the testimony that Father drove and lacked a valid license, the court expressed concern that Father was still engaging in unlawful conduct in violation of probation. At this juncture, the court concluded T.M. was entitled to a permanent plan. It terminated Father's parental rights and found adoption to be in T.M.'s best interests, over Father's objection and request for a guardianship order that would have entitled him to continue his visits. Father's trial counsel never argued any statutory exceptions to the court's section 366.26 decision. Father now appeals both orders.
DISCUSSION
A. Modification Petition
Father argues the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying his section 388 petition through which he sought to reinstate reunification services.
"A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child." (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806 (Zachary G.).) "It is not enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of circumstances under the statute. The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child." (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529, italics in original (Kimberly F.).) A modification petition is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and its ruling will be disturbed on appeal only for clear abuse of that discretion. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.) Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's modification petition.
Even assuming Father demonstrated changed circumstances, he did not demonstrate that restoring reunification services was in T.M.'s best interests.
Generally, determining a child's best interests requires examination of a number of factors: (1) the seriousness of the problem leading to dependency and the reason that problem was not overcome; (2) the strength of the relative bonds between the dependent children to both the parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. (Kimberly F., supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.)
However, when dependency proceedings are at the section 366.26 hearing stage, the parent's interest in the care, custody and companionship of the minor is subordinate to the child's needs for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) At this point, the California Supreme Court stated, " 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability' [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interests of the child. [Citation.] A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child." (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.).)
In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503 (J.C.), is instructive. There, the court affirmed the juvenile court's denial of the mother's section 388 modification petition. (Id. at pp. 527, 534.) Relying on the factors delineated in Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-532, the mother argued she overcame her drug addiction, the most serious problem leading to dependency, and her child's return to her care would preserve their bond. (Id. at pp. 526-527.) But the J.C. court declined to apply Kimberly F. and "instead follow[ed] the direction of our Supreme Court, holding that after reunification services have terminated, a parent's petition for either an order returning custody or reopening reunification efforts must establish how such a change will advance the child's need for permanency and stability." (Id. at p. 527.) The child was two and a half years old at the time of the section 388 hearing, had a loving and stable placement with her maternal aunt who had cared for her since birth and with whom she was strongly bonded. (Id. at p. 526.) The aunt was the only stable parent the child had ever known, and the child had become part of the aunt's family, which included two daughters. (Ibid.) Against this evidence, the mother failed to demonstrate the child's best interests in permanence and stability would be better served by her proposed modification. (Ibid.)
So, too, here. At this late stage of T.M.'s dependency—following termination of reunification services and on the cusp of a permanency plan hearing for her adoption—Father needed to establish T.M.'s need for permanency and stability would be best advanced by an order reinstating reunification services. Acknowledging our focus on T.M.'s permanency and stability, he asserts the child "receives a significant benefit with a father in her life that is a parental figure." True. But this point fails to show how reinstating reunification services would advance T.M.'s need for permanency or stability.
In contrast, there was ample evidence that T.M.'s permanency and stability would be best advanced by adoption by her great-grandmother. Like the dependent child in J.C., T.M. had a loving and stable placement with her great-grandmother, who cared for her the majority of her life and with whom she shared a strong bond. It also showed she was part of a family with her older half-sister, with whom she also shared a strong bond. Further, her great-grandmother wanted to adopt her and provide her with a permanent home and family. When a child is adoptable, and her caretakers, with whom she has bonded, want to adopt her, the court's objective must be to provide her with stability and permanence as soon as possible through adoption. (See Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) At this point in the proceedings, T.M.'s interest in permanency and stability were the court's foremost concern, outweighing Father's interest in reunification. (See In re Case D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47 [observing a section 388 petition that would, if granted, delay the child's placement in a permanent home to see if a parent may someday be able to reunify with the child "does not promote stability for the child or the child's best interests"].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father's modification petition.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
Father also contends the court erred in terminating his parental rights under section 366.26. He argues the beneficial parent-child relationship exemption in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), applies. Alternatively, he says if the issue was not preserved on appeal, the case should be remanded to the juvenile court to consider the exception.
As a threshold matter, we consider this challenge forfeited. An appellant's failure to raise a statutory exception to termination at the section 366.26 hearing forfeits the issue for purpose of appeal. (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 292.) Father readily acknowledges that his "trial counsel did not explicitly raise the beneficial parent-child exception." Accordingly, Father has waived this argument. But since Father also asserts this failure denied him effective assistance of counsel, we consider the merits of the claim.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Father carries the burden of showing (1) his counsel "failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys practicing in the field of juvenile dependency law, and (2) the claimed error was prejudicial, that is, it is 'reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.' [Citation.]" (In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1667-1668.) Even assuming Father's counsel failed to act in a manner to be expected of reasonably competent attorneys practicing juvenile dependency law, Father cannot demonstrate he would have received a more favorable result even if he had raised the exception.
Adoption is the strongly preferred permanent plan for dependent children who have not reunified with their parents. "After reunification efforts have terminated, the focus shifts from family reunification toward promoting the best interests of the child. A child has a fundamental interest in belonging to a family unit, which includes a 'placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.' " (Zachary G., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 808.) At this point, the juvenile court must order adoption and termination of parental rights unless "one of the specified circumstances [in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)] provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child." (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
The beneficial parent-child relationship exception Father invokes authorizes the juvenile court to decline to terminate parental rights if it finds termination would be detrimental to the child because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) " 'To trigger the application of the parental relationship exception, the parent must show the parent-child relationship is sufficiently strong that the child would suffer detriment from its termination.' [Citation.] A beneficial relationship 'is one that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." ' " (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643 (Marcelo B.).) A parent asserting this exception has the burden of establishing it by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 998.)
Even if Father could establish his visits were sufficiently regular to satisfy the exception's first requirement, based on the record before us, Father cannot demonstrate that T.M. would gain the legally cognizable benefit from continuing the relationship.
As to this second requirement, the court in In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567 (Autumn) interpreted: "the 'benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship' exception . . . to mean the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural/parent child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated." (Id. at p. 575.)
"To meet the burden of proof, the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits. [Citation.] The parent must demonstrate more than incidental benefit to the child." (In re Dakota H., (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 229.) "Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. [¶] . . . The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent. . . . The exception must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, the 'positive' or 'negative' effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576.)
" 'A biological parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child may not derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent.' [Citation.] Evidence that a parent has maintained ' "frequent and loving contact" is not sufficient to establish the existence of a beneficial parental relationship.' " (Marcelo B., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 643.) Only in extraordinary cases will preservation of the parent's rights prevail over the legislative preference for adoption. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
We cannot conclude this is one of those extraordinary cases. We recognize Father's affection for his daughter and the positive visits they have shared during which he met his daughter's needs, as well as the strides Father made following the 12-month status hearing as a testament to his devotion to his child. We also note that T.M. enjoyed her father's recent visits. She gave him hugs and kisses and called him "Dada." But these interactions do not demonstrate more than "frequent and loving contact" deemed insufficient to establish the exception. "[A] parental relationship is necessary for the exception to apply, not merely a friendly or familiar one." (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) Father has not been his daughter's primary caregiver since she was 11 months old. At the point of the section 366.26 hearing, T.M. had spent most of her young life with her great-grandmother and half-sister. In that time, Father had not been able to progress beyond supervised visits. For much of the reunification period, Father was unable to demonstrate the commitment to sobriety that he began to show after reunification services were terminated. After four years of substance abuse, he was sober for approximately six months. This was not enough to demonstrate the significant, positive, emotional attachment and parental relationship necessary to fulfill the exception.
Moreover, a child should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree but does not meet the child's need for a parent. It would make no sense to forgo adoption in order to preserve parental rights in the absence of a real parental relationship. (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.) T.M. was in a loving home with her great-grandmother and her half-sister with whom she was strongly bonded. In this environment, T.M. was thriving. Her great-grandmother was able to take care of her daily needs and committed to adopting both T.M. and her half-sister to provide both of them a permanent home and family. On balance, under these circumstances, preserving Father's parental rights does not outweigh the well-being T.M. would gain by a permanent placement with her great-grandmother. Accordingly, even if Father's trial counsel had raised and fully argued the beneficial parent-child relationship exception, it would not have prevented termination of Father's parental rights.
Father's reliance on In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102 (C.B.) to support the beneficial parent-child relationship exception here is misplaced. That case involved two children who were nine and ten years old who lived with their mother for several years before detention and who were "intellectually and emotionally aware of whom their parents [were]." (Id. at pp. 125-126.) The juvenile court had "no doubt that the children . . . would choose to be with their parents if at all possible." (Id. at p. 126.) The children also testified at the hearing that they would be "sad" and "mad" if they were unable to visit with their mother. (Id. at p. 125-126.) Here, T.M. was an 11-month-old baby when she was removed from Father and has spent most of her life in dependency in the care of her great-grandmother. There is no evidence in the record demonstrating T.M. had a preference for her Father or even anger or sadness at the conclusion of their visits.
Father also cites In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452 (Scott B.) and In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681 (Amber M.) as "clear signs that the appellate courts are not affirming orders terminating parental rights because the prospective adoptive home might be a better placement for the child" especially "when the child has a strong emotional attachment to the parent." But these cases, too, are distinguishable.
Scott B. involved a child who had spent nearly all of his life with his mother. (Scott B., supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 471.) He was nine years old when he was placed with a foster family and was 11 years old when his mother's parental rights were terminated. (Ibid.) The CASA repeatedly reported it would be detrimental for the parent-child relationship. (Ibid.) Also, because the child exhibited emotional instability and had a history of running away when stressed, the court saw a "very good chance that he will have a meltdown if his usual frequent visitation with his mother did not continue." (Id. at p. 472.)
Amber M. involved three siblings two of whom were two and a half and five years old and had lived with their mother most of their lives as well. (Amber M., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 689.) A bonding study psychologist had concluded that the mother and the eldest child had "a primary attachment" and a "primary maternal relationship" and surmised that it could be detrimental to sever that relationship. (Id. at p. 689.) There was also disagreement among the experts as to whether terminating parental rights for adoption was appropriate. (Id. at p. 690.)
T.M. was 11 months old when she was removed from her parents and had spent most of her life with her great-grandmother when Father's parental rights were terminated. There was no indication of any emotional instability that would be aggravated or any detriment that would result from the termination. Nor was there any disagreement by her social worker or CASA in their uniform recommendation that terminating parental rights and a permanent plan of adoption were in T.M.'s best interests.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
/s/_________
Siggins, J. We concur: /s/_________
McGuiness, P.J. /s/_________
Jenkins, J.