Opinion
April 29, 1931.
July 8, 1931.
Unincorporated beneficial associations — Death benefits — Beneficiaries — By-laws of association — "Nearest relative or legal beneficiary" — Payment to wife and children.
In a bill in equity by a widow to compel the officers and members of an unincorporated beneficial association to pay to her individually certain death benefits, it appeared that the plaintiff's husband, a member of the association, died intestate leaving surviving him the plaintiff and four children. Under a provision in the by-laws of the association a benefit was payable on his death to "the nearest relative or legal beneficiary" and the widow demanded the entire fund.
In such case the word "relative" as used in the by-laws of the association, was intended to include the wife of a deceased member and distribution of the death benefit to the widow and children in accordance with the provisions of the Intestate Law will be affirmed.
Where the by-laws of an unincorporated beneficial association provided that on the death of a member, benefits will be paid to "the nearest relative or legal beneficiary," the widow of the deceased member is entitled to share in the fund as a relative in such proportions as she would take under the Intestate Laws.
Appeal No. 217, April T., 1931, by plaintiff from decree of C.P., Allegheny County, October T., 1930, in Equity, No. 3605, in the case of Mary Hulick v. A.C. Campbell et al.
Before TREXLER, P.J., KELLER, LINN, GAWTHROP, CUNNINGHAM, BALDRIGE and DREW, JJ. Affirmed.
Bill in equity to compel payment of death benefit. Before McNAUGHTER, J.
The court distributed the fund to the plaintiff and decedent's children in accordance with Intestate Law.
The facts are stated in the following opinion of the court below:
The plaintiff filed a Bill in Equity to compel the defendants, the officers and members of the Hawksworth Commandery No. 11, Patriotic Order Sons of America, an unincorporated beneficial association, to pay to her individually certain death benefits arising by reason of the death of her husband, Thomas M. Hulick, a member of the association who died intestate April 9, 1930. There were left to survive the decedent his widow, the plaintiff, and four children, all of age. As appears by stipulation of counsel filed of record there is a provision in the by-laws of the association providing that the fund is payable to "the nearest relative or legal beneficiary."
At the time of hearing on the Bill and Answer, it appearing to the court that all the parties in interest were not represented in the proceedings, it was directed that notice be given the heirs at law of decedent and thereafter counsel representing the heirs presented a petition asking that they be made parties of record and by order of court they were joined as parties defendant.
FINDINGS OF FACT.
First: Plaintiff, Mary Hulick, is the widow of Thomas M. Hulick, who died April 9, 1930, in the City of Pittsburgh, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
Second: Mary Hulick, the plaintiff, is also the administratrix of the estate of Thomas M. Hulick, deceased.
Third: At the time of his death Thomas M. Hulick was a member in good standing in the Hawksworth Commandery No. 11, Patriotic Order Sons of America.
Fourth: Hawksworth Commandery No. 11, Patriotic Order Sons of America, is an unincorporated beneficial association located in the City of Pittsburgh, and through its officers pays death benefits to those entitled, following the death of a member.
Fifth: The officers named in the Bill can fully and sufficiently represent the interests of all the members of the association in this proceeding.
Sixth: The beneficiary or beneficiaries of Thomas M. Hulick, are entitled to receive benefits from the defendant association in the sum of $125.
Seventh: The by-laws of the association provide that the person or persons to whom the fund shall be paid shall be "the nearest relative or legal beneficiary."
Eighth: Thomas M. Hulick left to survive him the widow plaintiff and four adult children who have been joined as defendants.
DISCUSSION
In this case we are called upon to interpret the meaning of the language of the by-laws of the association, "nearest relative or legal beneficiary," in order to determine to whom the fund in question is to be paid. The plaintiff, who is the widow of the former member of the association, claims the whole fund on the ground that she is the "nearest relative." The decedent's children maintain that the widow is not a relative at all and that they are entitled to the fund.
In Storer v. Wheatley's Executors, 1 Pa. 506, relied upon by defendants, the Supreme Court passing upon a phrase used in a will, "my nearest relations or connections, as directed by the laws of the Commonwealth," said: "A wife is not related to her husband in any respect. Of his connection with her family she is the link or commune vinculum; but so far is she from being connected with him as a relative, that her civil existence is melted into his, and they together form one person. A wife, therefore, is no more a relation or connection of her husband than the husband is a relation or connection of himself. ....."
Yet in other parts of that opinion, the court gave evidence of its effort to determine what was the testator's actual intention and it found in coming to its decision that he did not intend that his wife should be included.
Courts of other jurisdictions have given a broader interpretation to the word "relative" and have indicated that in given circumstances those related by affinity, as well as by blood, might share in distribution. See Tolson v. National Provident Union, 60 Misc. (N.Y.) Reports 461.
We are dealing in this case with a provision not of a will where frequently strict rules of law must be applied, but of the by-laws of a beneficial association. The nature of the fund makes reasonable the presumption, in the absence of specific language to the contrary, that the immediate family of the member, including the wife are to be provided for. In using the words "nearest relative" in their by-laws the association members ought not, unless some rule of law compels it, to be held to a strict legal interpretation where the manifest intention was to use the words in a popular sense. This principle holds even in the interpretation of a will. See Garrett's Estate, 249 Pa. 249. Here we know of no rule to the contrary and are of opinion that the word "relative" was intended to include the wife.
The next matter to be considered is whether the wife or children are to take the fund, the one to the exclusion of the other, on the basis that she or they are the "nearest relative." As the wife is related by affinity and the others by blood, it would be difficult to say which of the two is nearer in relationship. However, as the language of the by-laws is not merely "nearest relative" but "nearest relative or legal beneficiary" it is not necessary to interpret "nearest relative" as a separate phrase. "Nearest relative" and "legal beneficiary" may be taken to be used synonymously. In any event both the wife and children are legal beneficiaries of the decedent and, taking into account the general purpose for which the fund was created, distribution, we think, should be made to them in the proportions prescribed by our intestate laws.
A decree will be entered awarding one-third of the fund to the plaintiff and one-sixth to each of the four children.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
(1) The method of distribution of the fund is determined by the language of the by-laws of the association which provide that it shall be payable to the "nearest relative or legal beneficiary."
(2) "Nearest relative or legal beneficiary" includes the plaintiff and the four children of Thomas M. Hulick, deceased, and distribution should be made to them directly in the proportions provided by the intestate laws of Pennsylvania. The fund is no part of the estate of the decedent.
(3) The costs of the proceedings should be paid out of the fund.
DECREE.
And now, to wit, January 21, 1931, the above matter having been heard on Bill and Answer, and all parties in interest being represented by counsel, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed:
First: That the defendant association distribute the fund in its hands, amounting to $125, as follows: A one-third part thereof directly to the plaintiff, Mary Hulick individually, and a one-sixth part thereof directly to each of the four children of Thomas M. Hulick, deceased.
Second: That the costs of the proceeding be paid out of the said fund.
The court dismissed exceptions to the adjudication. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned, among others, was the order of the court.
Martin Croissant, for appellant.
No appearance and no brief for appellee.
Argued April 29, 1931.
The decree is affirmed on the opinion of the court below.
Costs on this appeal to be paid by appellant.