Opinion
No. 07-245C.
May 10, 2007
ORDER
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed a complaint in the United States Court of Federal Claims on April 20, 2007. Plaintiff was allowed, by leave of the Judge, to file a "First Supplement to Complaint" on May 2, 2007, which the court treats as an amendment to the complaint. Plaintiff attempted to file yet another supplement to his complaint on April 30, 2007. The second supplement was not allowed to be filed because it added no additional allegations over which the court has jurisdiction. Additionally, plaintiff failed to pay his filing fee and has not filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The court will allow plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis for the sole purpose of filing this lawsuit.
It is the court's obligation to assure itself that is has jurisdiction before addressing the merits of any complaint.Hambsch v. United States, 857 F.2d 763, 765 (Fed. Cir. 1988),cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1054 (1989). "A court may and should raise the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at any time. . . ."Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For the reasons set out below, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Background
Plaintiff's first, unamended complaint makes a number of allegations: mistreatment of prisoners; violations of the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, along with violations of the "Slavery Act" and Emancipation Proclamation; various torts, including fraud, false imprisonment, and defamation; and that he has suffered "constitution and mental and physical pain." Compl. at 1. Plaintiff also invokes the Federal Tort Claims Act. In his amendment to the complaint, plaintiff claims violations of the Seventh and Fourteenth amendments, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4282 and 4285, the "Speedy Trial Act," the "Privacy Act," and other rights described by plaintiff such as "due process," "search and seizure," "violating jurisprudence," and "retaliation." The complaint and subsequent amendment, however, include almost no specific factual allegations and rest only on blanket assertions of violations. We surmise that plaintiff seeks damages for his indictment, conviction, and imprisonment for a "capital crime," as well as mistreatment by a physician allegedly employed by the Department of Justice.
Discussion
Complaints filed by pro se litigants are held "to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). Nevertheless, while "[t]he fact that [a plaintiff] acted pro se in the drafting of his complaint may explain its ambiguities, but it does not excuse its failures, if such there be." Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Pro se status "does not relieve a pro se plaintiff from meeting jurisdictional requirements." Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499 (2004), aff'd, 98 Fed. Appx. 860 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (unpubl. table); see also Ledford v. United States, 297 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming dismissal of a pro se plaintiff's complaint seeking unpaid tax refund). While we are mindful of plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant, no amount of leniency in the application of the rules of the court could solve the obvious jurisdictional defects present in the complaint.
Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000), the court is authorized to "render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." Id. This jurisdiction extends only to claims for money damages and must be strictly construed. See United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). "[J]urisdiction under the Tucker Act requires the litigant to identify a substantive right for money damages against the United States separate from the Tucker Act." Todd v. United States, 386 F.3d 1091, 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Though the complaint is nearly completely devoid of any specific factual allegations, if its allegations amount to any cause of action, it is in tort. The Tucker act specifically precludes this court from jurisdiction over tort claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (granting jurisdiction over various types of cases "not sounding in tort."). See Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims sounding in tort.
Plaintiff also cites to Title 18 of the United States Code. However, neither section cited by plaintiff can be interpreted to mandate the payment of money for their violation. Rather, both sections deal with the release of persons arrested, but not convicted of federal crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 4282 (dealing with the release of arrested, but not indicted persons); 18 U.S.C. § 4285 (dealing with persons released pending further proceedings). This court has no jurisdiction over any claims based on the provisions of 18 U.S.C. sections 4282 and 4285.
Plaintiff also alleges that his constitutional rights were violated. Aside from the fact that the complaint contains no specific factual allegations to support these claims, none of plaintiff's cited constitutional provisions provide any jurisdiction here. Neither the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, nor Fourteenth Amendments can be read to mandate the payment of money for their violation. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1983) ("Not every claim invoking the Constitution . . . is cognizable under the Tucker Act. . . . [T]he claimant must demonstrate that the source of substantive law he relies upon `can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.'") (citing Testan, 424 U.S. at 400). Nor can any of the other sources listed by plaintiff be read to mandate the payment of money for their violation.
Conclusion
It is clear that plaintiff's complaint and amendment fail to allege any claim over which the court has jurisdiction. Accordingly, the clerk is directed to dismiss the complaint without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.