Opinion
C/A No. 6:19-3593-BHH-KFM
01-06-2020
Latrice Hudgens, Plaintiff, v. Greenleaf Management, Defendant.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, removed the present action from the Greenville County Magistrate Court (doc. 1), asserting a claim here alleging a federal question arises from an eviction action against her for non-payment of rent. The docket number for the state court action was Case No. 2019cv2310305069 (id.). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from a state eviction action (2019cv2310305069) filed against the plaintiff by the defendant Greenleaf Management. A Rule to Vacate or Show Cause for nonpayment of rent was issued against the plaintiff by the state magistrate on December 18, 2019 (doc. 1-1). On December 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed her notice of removal of the action from the state court, alleging the eviction proceedings occurred "in violation of the Uniform Commercial Code [UCC]," and that the landlord is "attempting to collect a debt in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act [FDCPA]" (doc. 1). The plaintiff maintains that these alleged violations give rise to federal jurisdiction, thus, making this action removable. The undersigned disagrees.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction, however, does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The plaintiff removed the present action to this court based upon federal question jurisdiction (doc. 1). "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognize that courts must have the authority to control litigation before them." Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, "constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Since federal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction, there is no presumption that the court has jurisdiction. Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 337 (1895)). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, "and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears." Bulldog Trucking, 147 F.3d at 352; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) ("If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.").
Any civil action brought in state court may be removed to federal court if the district court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal question jurisdiction, as alleged herein, arises when the case arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In her notice of removal, the plaintiff alleges that federal question jurisdiction exists over this eviction action because this case involves violations of the UCC and the FDCPA. The Rule to Vacate or Show Cause Order by the state magistrate, provided by the plaintiff, however, contains nothing to suggest that the state proceedings arose out of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (see doc. 1-1). Further, the plaintiff cannot manufacture federal question jurisdiction in the present matter by referencing the UCC or the FDCPA. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936) (noting that "[t]he basis of federal question jurisdiction [ ] must appear upon the face of the state court complaint, and it cannot be supplied by reference to the answer or petition"); In re Blackwater Sec. Consulting, LLC, 460 F.3d 576, 585 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that "actions in which [state court] defendants merely claim a substantive federal defense to a state law claim do not raise a federal question"). Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to accept removal from the state court to consider the plaintiff's UCC and FDCPA claims, and the case should be remanded.
Moreover, this case may not be removed based on diversity of citizenship because the plaintiff fails to demonstrate the parties are diverse, or that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount. Federal court jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship requires complete diversity of citizenship of the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00). 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 & nn.13-16 (1978). Here, the plaintiff indicates that she is a resident of South Carolina, and that the defendant is a business registered and headquartered in the state of Georgia (docs. 1; 1-1). However, the plaintiff has failed to provide any facts that would indicate the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount. Therefore, to the extent the plaintiff seeks removal based on diversity of citizenship, removal is barred by § 1441(b)(2). Accordingly, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to accept removal from the state court to consider this action, and the case should be rem anded.
Frivolous Filings
Of note, this is the third time the plaintiff has sought to remove an eviction action in which she was named the defendant, and her notice of removal is all but identical to the ones filed in her prior case. See Hudgens v. L&R Properties, C/A No. 6:19-cv-00791-BHH, at doc. 1 (D.S.C.); Hudgens v. Crescent Landing Apartments, C/A No. 6:18-cv-856-AMQ, at doc. 1 (D.S.C.). In those cases, the plaintiff, who proceeded in forma pauperis, was informed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her eviction proceeding and her cases were dismissed. Hudgens v. L&R Properties, at docs. 8, 11; Hudgens v. Crescent Landing Apartments, at docs. 6; 11; 16.
Despite the dismissal of her prior actions, the plaintiff returns to this court asserting the same type of claim that was dismissed previously. In essence, the plaintiff is using this court's procedure of removal to defraud her landlords in an attempt to manipulate the eviction process. The screening of the plaintiff's case requires the court to expend additional judicial resources in order to repeatedly inform the plaintiff that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. Moreover, the plaintiff was specifically warned that the continued filing of frivolous allegations or notices of removal could lead to the imposition of sanctions by the court. See Hudgens v. L&R Properties, at docs. 8, 11. Thus, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the undersigned recommends that the plaintiff be required to pay a sanction of $400.00 and be enjoined from filing additional actions unless the sanctions have been satisfied and the court finds the action is not frivolous.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court sua sponte REMAND this case to the Greenville County Magistrate Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is further recommended that the United States District Judge assigned to this case require the plaintiff to pay a sanction of $400.00 and order that the plaintiff be enjoined from filing additional actions unless the sanctions have been satisfied and the court finds the action is not frivolous. The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge January 6, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).