Opinion
1:01CV294-C
April 17, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER is before the court upon defendant Joseph Sickles's Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, was advised that Defendant Sickles has moved to dismiss the cause of action against him and argued, primarily, that as an arbitrator, he enjoys absolute immunity from suit for actions stemming from his quasi-judicial decisions. Plaintiff was further advised that he was obligated to file a response to the Motions to Dismiss not later than March 25, 2002, and therein show why, as a matter of law, Defendant Sickles is not entitled to the immunity he asserts. Plaintiff filed a timely response on March 21, 2002, in which he stated that he could not find any case law that would support making an arbitrator a defendant, but that he would like to be able "to challenge his decision unequivocally, based on the fact that he did not address all of the issues contained in my grievance."
Defendant Joseph Sickles has moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending that plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim. Rule 12(b) authorizes dismissal based upon a dispositive issue of law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1832 (1989); Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). As the Court discussed inNeitzke:
This procedure [for dismissal], operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and fact finding. Nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) confines its sweep to claims of law which are obviously insupportable. On the contrary, if as a matter of law "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts . . . a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on outlandish legal theory. . . . What Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance are dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations."Id., at 1832 (citation omitted). For the limited purpose of making a recommendation as to disposition of Defendant Sickles's motion, the undersigned has accepted as true the facts alleged by plaintiff in the complaint and will view them in a light most favorable to plaintiff.
In this case, plaintiff was terminated from his employment with defendant United States Postal Service. Apparently, plaintiff engaged in a fight with a fellow employee and was terminated under the postal service's "zero-tolerance policy." Plaintiff filed a grievance concerning his termination, which was referred to an arbitrator pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement governing his employment. In his grievance, plaintiff claimed that he was terminated in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Apparently, the arbitrator found little credence to plaintiff's theory of discrimination. Instead, the arbitrator found that plaintiff's alcoholism contributed to the fight and his termination. In this case, plaintiff assigns error to the arbitrator's decision, arguing that the arbitrator failed to give plaintiff's version of the facts the weight which plaintiff believed it deserved. Plaintiff does not allege that the arbitrator's decision was tainted by any racial or other discriminatory bias.
The case law is clear that no cause of action can be asserted against an arbitrator based on the issuance of an unfavorable decision.
[J]udicial immunity extended not only to public officials but also to private citizens (in particular jurors and arbitrators); the touchstone for its applicability was performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, at 499-500 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The doctrine of judicial immunity has been adapted into one of arbitral immunity, which has been uniformly recognized and consistently followed:
The doctrine of arbitral immunity is rooted in the doctrine of judicial immunity — because an arbitrator's role is considered the "functional equivalent" of a judge's role, courts have uniformly extended quasi-judicial immunity to individual arbitrators. The policies underlying arbitral immunity parallel those underlying judicial immunity — to protect decision makers from undue influence and to protect the integrity of the decision-making process.
* * *
Moreover, arbitral immunity attaches to "all acts within the scope of the arbitral process."Galuska v. New York Stock Exchange, 210 F.3d 374, 2000 WL 347851, **2 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). In Tamari v. Conrad, 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977), the district court explained why an aggrieved litigant cannot bring suit against an arbitrator, holding that "individuals . . . cannot be expected to volunteer to arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in the struggle between the litigants and saddled with the burdens of defending a lawsuit." Id., at 781. The undersigned, therefore, will recommend that defendant Joseph Sickles's Motions to Dismiss be granted for plaintiff's failure to state a cognizable claim as a matter of law, inasmuch as such defendant enjoys judicial and/or arbitral immunity from suit.
RECOMMENDATION
IT IS, THEREFORE, RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED that defendant Joseph Sickles's Motions to Dismiss (#4) be ALLOWED.
The parties are hereby advised that, pursuant to 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(C), written objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation contained herein must be filed within ten (10) days of service of same. Failure to file objections to this Memorandum and Recommendation with the district court will preclude the parties from raising such objections on appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), reh'g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984).