Howarth v. Angle

Full title: LEONARD HOWARTH, as Receiver of the TRADERS' BANK OF TACOMA, Respondent, v…

Court: Court of Appeals of the State of New York

Date published: Feb 27, 1900

162 N.Y. 179 (N.Y. 1900)

56 N.E. 489

Opinion

Argued January 18, 1900

Decided February 27, 1900

Horace McGuire for appellant.

Porter M. French for respondent.

VANN, J.

The appeal book contains but three exceptions, two of which relate to findings of fact, and cannot be here considered because the affirmance was unanimous. The third relates to the conclusion of law, and hence the sole question presented is whether the facts found authorize the judgment directed. None of the evidence is returned, except certain extracts from the Constitution and statutes of Washington and an abstract of the testimony of a lawyer, practicing in that state, relating to the construction placed by its highest court upon them.

The findings show that the judgment of the trial court is not founded simply upon the judgment of the Washington court appointing a receiver and the assessment made pursuant thereto, for the organization and insolvency of the Tacoma bank, the amount of the deficiency and defendant's proportion thereof, are found as independent facts, which are presumed, from the state of the record before us, to have been established by common-law evidence. The defendant's liability and the amount thereof do not depend upon the Washington judgment, the only necessary function of which, in this action, was to establish the title of the plaintiff and his right to sue.

While the plaintiff is called a receiver, the name does not measure his power, for he represents all the creditors and stockholders of the insolvent corporation, and is authorized to maintain such actions as are necessary to recover the assets, among which is included the cause of action set forth in the complaint. He is not a mere custodian, but "a quasi assignee * * * invested with the title to all rights of action possessed by his principals," and entitled to bring "any and all actions involving the property, funds and effects in his hands as receiver, or concerning the persons represented by him, including the creditors of such corporation." The statutory liability of stockholders is an asset of the insolvent bank, "the title to which was in said receiver as a trust fund for the purpose of satisfying the claims of" creditors.

While a foreign receiver cannot sue in this state, as a matter of right, "still our courts uphold the title of a foreign assignee or receiver upon the principle of comity. If the title is by virtue of a voluntary conveyance or transfer, it is sustained as against all, including even domestic creditors, but if it depends on a foreign statute or judgment, it is sustained against all except domestic creditors. * * * Every remedy to gather in the assets is afforded, unless it would interfere with the policy of the state or impair the rights of its own citizens." ( Mabon v. Ongley Electric Co., 156 N.Y. 196, 201.) This is made very plain by the learned opinion of the Appellate Division, which leaves nothing to be said upon the subject. ( Howarth v. Angle, 39 App. Div. 151.)

It was not necessary that all the stockholders should be before the Washington court, when the order was made appointing the plaintiff receiver and giving him authority to sue, any more than when a decree in bankruptcy is made, which binds all who are not parties the same as those who are. ( Sanger v. Upton, 91 U.S. 56.) That judgment may be regarded as a proceeding in rem, binding upon all the world so far as title to the assets of the corporation is concerned, and, according to the decisions of the highest court of the state where it was made, the so-called statutory liability of stockholders is part of the assets.

The defendant took stock in the Tacoma bank subject to the burden of the law, which he impliedly agreed to bear, as he could not otherwise have become a stockholder. ( Lowry v. Inman, 46 N.Y. 119.) That burden is an asset, vested in the receiver, and can be enforced in this state the same as a promissory note, not because the laws of Washington are in force here, but because the defendant voluntarily assented to the conditions upon which the bank was organized. As was said in the case last cited, "a personal liability of stockholders for the debts of a corporation, in virtue of the charter, is not in the nature of a penalty or forfeiture, and does not exist solely as a liability imposed by statute. It is not enforced simply as a statutory obligation, but is regarded as voluntarily assumed, by the act of becoming a stockholder. * * * It is like other obligations, assumed in the form prescribed by the laws of the place where made, and, being valid there, is enforceable everywhere. Its validity, interpretation and effect are to be determined by the lex loci; but the remedy is governed by the lex fori." While the liability is, for convenience, frequently called statutory, because the statute, which is the constitution of the bank, affixed the obligation to the ownership of stock, it is in fact contractual and springs from an implied promise. There is no substantial difference between the liability for an unpaid balance on a stock subscription, which is an express contract to take stock and pay for it ( Stoddard v. Lum, 159 N.Y. 265), and the liability for the unpaid deficiency of assets assumed by the act of becoming a member of the corporation through the purchase of stock, from which a contract is implied to perform the statutory conditions upon which stock may be owned. ( Richmond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27, 55.) The fact that the former is the promise of a principal, and the latter of a surety, does not affect the question. The express promise runs to the corporation and may be enforced by it, while the implied promise runs to the creditors, and may, according to the common law of the state where it was made, be enforced for the benefit of creditors by a receiver of the corporation appointed to wind up its affairs. The latter promise is not a part of the capital stock of the bank, but is a substitute, required by statute, for the personal liability of a partner at common law, and has the same object, which is the protection of creditors.

The stockholders, however, may controvert in our courts all the essential facts, such as insolvency, the amount of the deficiency and the like, whether they are established by the judgment appointing the receiver or not. They may require strict common-law proof as to all the facts upon which the deficiency is based, and may contest any unreasonable expenditure in the conversion of assets and the collection of accounts, including extravagant allowances to attorneys or counsel. Upon all these questions the defendant has had his day in the courts of this state, and the united action of the courts below have conclusively determined them against him.

If the statute, upon which the personal liability of the stockholders is founded, had also provided a remedy for that liability, such remedy would have been exclusive and could not have been enforced in the courts of this state. It was said in Pollard v. Bailey ( 87 U.S. 520, 527), "the liability and the remedy were created by the same statute. This being so, the remedy provided is exclusive of all others. A general liability created by a statute without a remedy may be enforced by an appropriate common-law action." The statute of Washington, however, provided no remedy, but left that subject to the courts, to be worked out according to the common law. The learned counsel for the appellant recognizes the distinction between foreign statutes, which create a liability and provide a remedy, and those which create a liability but do not provide a remedy. He admits that, according to the law of this state, in the former class only the remedy provided by the foreign statute can be pursued, while in the latter it depends upon interstate comity. He insists, however, that the procedure against resident stockholders of a foreign corporation must be in substantial accordance with the practice established in the state where the action is brought, and this is true to the extent that no departure from that practice is permitted, which results in injustice to the citizens of that state, or is against the public policy thereof. He relies upon the case of Marshall v. Sherman ( 148 N.Y. 9), where the action was not brought by a receiver, but by a creditor of an insolvent bank in Kansas, to recover the amount of a deposit after a receiver had been appointed in that state. The action was founded upon a local statute, which not only created the liability, but also provided a peculiar and complicated remedy unknown to our courts, and which could not be entirely enforced in this state. ( Lowry v. Inman, 46 N.Y. 119; Christensen v. Eno, 106 N.Y. 97, 103.) The liability was neither contractual, in the general sense, nor penal, but the statute charged the property of the stockholder with the debts of the insolvent corporation to the extent of the stock held by him. It was the case so aptly described by Judge ALLEN in Lowry v. Inman ( supra), where the intent of the legislature "was not to create a general, personal or property liability, but to charge the property of the stockholders, and that not generally, or by the usual and ordinary process, but conditionally, and by a peculiar and unusual procedure, only available in the courts of that state, not only limiting and prescribing the security and rights of the creditor, and the obligation and liability of the stockholder, but prescribing the remedy, going with it and as a part of the right." The assets had not been marshalled or appropriated for the benefit of creditors and there was no way to determine, with any degree of accuracy, the amount of the deficiency or how much the defendant ought to pay. The action, if it had not been arrested by the demurrer interposed to the complaint, would naturally have resulted in the appropriation by one creditor, alone, of that which belonged to others equally with himself. Under these circumstances we declared that "when the courts of this state are asked to administer the statutes of Kansas, and we can see that the case is surrounded by such complications, and the circumstances are such that it cannot be done without injustice to our own citizens or that it will be impossible to do full and complete justice to all the parties in interest, it is reasonable and just to decline to administer them at all."

In that case the amount of the deficiency was not ascertained in any way by a court or otherwise; the action was not brought by a receiver; the remedy sought was that provided by the foreign statute, which created the liability; that remedy could not be wholly enforced in this state, and, to the extent that it could be enforced, might result in injustice to our citizens. In this case the action is brought by a receiver, who, according to the decisions of the Washington courts, has the title to the right of action, and the amount of the deficiency has been definitely ascertained both by the courts of that state and of this. It does not appear that there is any other stockholder or any creditor in this state, or that injustice will be done to any citizen of this state by sustaining the judgment appealed from. The reasons given by the court for denying relief in Marshall v. Sherman are met by the facts of this case, which distinguish it in many essential respects and permit a recovery under the principles sanctioned, but not applied in that case because the necessary facts were wanting.

It is not necessary that the procedure to enforce the liability in question should be that required by statute in this state in the case of domestic corporations, as that would frequently be impossible and would withhold the right of comity altogether. Any provision of our statutes which makes the recovery of judgment against the corporation and return of execution unsatisfied essential to the maintenance of an action against a stockholder cannot ordinarily be complied with in the case of a foreign corporation, because service of process cannot be had. (L. 1890, ch. 564, § 58; Hirshfeld v. Bopp, 145 N.Y. 84.) However, the provision of the Stock Corporation Law, above cited, did not apply even to a domestic banking corporation on the 18th of May, 1897, when this action was commenced, because, on the day before, section 52 of the Banking Law was so amended as to require the enforcement of liability against stockholders by action in the name of the receiver. (L. 1892, ch. 689, § 52; L. 1897, ch. 441, § 1.) Said amendment also answers the criticism of the appellant that if the right of action was in a creditor, instead of the receiver, the defendant would have had the benefit of the Statute of Limitations. (Code Civ. Pro. § 394.)

It is sufficient if the method of procedure in our courts is such that no injustice is done to the defendant, or to any citizen of this state, and the established policy of the state is not interfered with. ( Willitts v. Waite, 25 N.Y. 577, 585.) No injustice was done the defendant by the judgments below, because he was only required to pay his exact proportion of the deficiency, as duly ascertained by the courts of this state. The fact that the deficiency had also been ascertained by the courts in Washington and the same amount found to exist did no harm. There is no inequality, for one creditor is not paid in full, while others get less, but all are benefited equally, and no one gets more than his due. Justice is done to all and injustice to none. While only a single stockholder was made a party to the action, he was the only stockholder, so far as appears, who could be served in this state.

If some of the stockholders should prove insolvent, the defendant cannot be affected by it or his liability increased thereby. Under the Federal Banking Law, which contains the same provision as to the liability of stockholders, in the same words as the statute in question, it was held that there was no power to direct a second assessment to supply the deficit caused by the inability of the receiver to enforce payment from such stockholders as were insolvent or beyond the jurisdiction. It was also held that the effect of the words "equably and ratably and not one for another," was to make the liability several and not joint, and to protect each stockholder from liability for the default of another. It was distinctly announced "that the shareholders were not intended to be put in the relation of guarantors or sureties one for another, as to the amount which each might be required to pay," and that "the insolvency of one stockholder, or his being beyond the jurisdiction of the court, does not in any wise affect the liability of another." ( U.S. v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422. See, also, Matter of the Hollister Bank, 27 N.Y. 393; Crease v. Babcock, 10 Metc. 525, and Morse on Banking, 503.)

The defendant, therefore, cannot be made to pay more than once nor more than his share, whether others pay or not. No resident of this state is affected, except the defendant, from whom nothing is required except what he impliedly contracted to pay. The policy of the state is not contravened, for that policy requires the enforcement of the statutory liability of stockholders of insolvent cerporations by an action, in the name of a receiver, to recover the proper proportion of the deficiency from each stockholder for the benefit of all the creditors. As was said in Stoddard v. Lum ( supra): "The plaintiff does not come here seeking to remove assets from this state to the possible prejudice of domestic creditors, but asks that he be permitted to enforce against our own citizens the performance of contracts into which they have entered in another jurisdiction."

When an action by a foreign receiver to collect assets, under the authority of the court which appointed him, works no detriment to any citizen of this state, and is not repugnant to its policy, it would be a provincial and narrow view for our courts to refuse to extend the usual state comity. There is a close business connection between the citizens of the different states of the Union. Investments are freely made in other states by the citizens of this state, who need the aid of the courts of the jurisdiction where the investments are made. The comity which we expect to have extended to citizens of our state, we cannot, in justice, refuse to citizens of other states. State lines should not prevent justice from being done. Our courts should not close their doors to a receiver from another state, who comes here, armed with the title to a just claim against a citizen of this state and offers to establish by common-law evidence the liability of that citizen. While we should keep control of the subject, so as to see that no discrimination is practiced against our citizens, or injustice done them either as to the substance of the liability or the method of procedure, when the same result is attained in practically the same way as, under similar circumstances, would be attained in the case of a domestic corporation, there is no reason for withholding that aid which is now afforded by the courts of almost all enlightened countries.

The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.

PARKER, Ch. J., BARTLETT, HAIGHT, MARTIN and LANDON, JJ., concur; O'BRIEN, J., not voting.

Judgment affirmed.