Opinion
May 6, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Stuart C. Cohen, J.).
The IAS Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's first cause of action alleging defendant law firm's breach of an oral agreement to compensate plaintiff for services rendered in effectuating the merger of defendant's two predecessor firms, and second cause of action for recovery in quantum meruit based on such services, on the ground that both seek to recover a finder's fee, and, as such, are barred by General Obligations Law § 5-701 (a) (10), which voids an oral agreement "to pay compensation for services rendered in negotiating * * * a business opportunity", with the term "negotiating" specifically defined to include "procuring an introduction to a party to the transaction or assisting in the negotiation or consummation of the transaction" (see, Freedman v Chemical Constr. Corp., 43 N.Y.2d 260, 267, citing Minichiello v Royal Bus. Funds Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 521, 527). As for the third cause of action alleging breach of an oral agreement to compensate plaintiff for services rendered in individually placing a partner in one of the predecessor firms with the other predecessor firm, and the fourth cause of action for recovery in quantum meruit based on such services, the motion for summary judgment was properly denied, since General Obligations Law § 5-701 (a) (10) does not apply to the services of employment agencies (Hunt Personnel v Hemingway Transp., 105 Misc.2d 626, 628), and a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the alleged oral agreement contemplated the payment of a fee as a result of the partner's being employed by the newly-merged firm.
Concur — Milonas, J.P., Rosenberger, Ross and Kassal, JJ.