Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-1796 (ESH).
February 18, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Rodney A. House, a federal prisoner, has brought this pro se action against D. Gutierrez and W. Smith, case and unit managers respectively at the United States Penitentiary located in Lee County, Virginia ("USP Lee"). Plaintiff contends that defendants improperly assessed his custody classification based on allegedly inaccurate information in his prison records, thereby preventing him from transferring to a lower security facility. (Pl.'s Compl. at 1.) He has asserted claims under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a ("Act"), and requests that USP grants his petition to transfer. This matter is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for summary judgment. They argue that because plaintiff's custody classification records are part of his Inmate Central File, which is part of the Inmate Central Record System, they are exempt from the Privacy Act's amendment provisions. (Defs' Mot. at 10.) Further, they move to dismiss because plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Act that would entitle him to monetary damages. ( Id. at 11.) Having considered defendants' motion, plaintiff's response, and the entire record of this case, the Court will grant the motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff arrived at USP Lee County on April 23, 2002, to serve 46 years to life. (Pl.'s Opp'n ¶ 11.) At his seventeen-month evaluation on September 15, 2003, USP indicated that his points decreased 2 units and his conduct was considered satisfactory. (Pl.'s Compl, Attach. 1 "Inmate Request to Staff".) In response to his request for a transfer to a lower security penitentiary within a 500-mile radius from his legal residence, USP denied this request because his life sentence classified him as a "Public Safety Factor of Greatest Severity Offense and Sex Offender." (Pl.'s Compl., Attach. 2.) As such, USP was required to house him in a high security level institution. Plaintiff alleges that this classification did not originally appear on his initial referral form to the Lee County facility. (Pl.'s Compl. at 3.) He alleges this classification was a pretext to deny his request to transfer. ( Id. at 1.) Further, USP rejected his transfer because he failed to maintain clear conduct during the last eighteen months in accordance with USP rules. (Pl.'s Compl., Attach. 2.) Plaintiff, however, contests this allegation. (Pl.'s Opp'n ¶ 15.)LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. BOP is the Only Proper Defendant
Plaintiff's complaint names Diana Gutierrez and Wayne Smith, case and unit managers, respectively at USP, as defendants. His motion to file an amended complaint also lists Harrel Watts, General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Prisons as a defendant. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 2.) Under the Privacy Act, an individual "may bring a civil action against the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1). According to the Federal Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5800.09, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") is the sole agency responsible for creating and maintaining the Inmate Central File for all inmates confined in federal prisons. Armstrong v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 976 F. Supp 17, 23 (D.D.C. 1997) (quoting Bureau of Prisons, United States Department of Justice, Program Statement No. 5800.09, Inmate Central File, Privacy Folder, and Parole Mini-Files (1993), at ¶ 1). Since plaintiff alleges that his prison record is inaccurate, the Court finds that BOP is the only proper defendant. In addition, the Privacy Act also does not permit a person to seek civil remedies against individuals, Armstrong, 976 F. Supp at 23, and therefore, this Court substitutes the Department of Justice (the executive department in which the BOP is located) for all individual defendants.
II. The Records At Issue Are Exempt From the Amendment Provisions of the Privacy Act
An agency may promulgate regulations to exempt any system of records within the agency from any part of the Privacy Act, except subsections (b), (c)(1) and (2), (e)(4)(A) through (F), (e)(6), (7), (9), (10), and (11), and (i), if the system of records is:
maintained by an agency or component thereof which performs as its principal function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws, including . . . correctional, probation, pardon, or parole authorities, and which consists of . . . reports identifiable to an individual compiled at any stage of the process of enforcement of the criminal laws from arrest or indictment through release from supervision.5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2). Pursuant to this authority, the Federal Bureau of Prisons exempted the Inmate Central Record System (JUSTICE/BOP-005) from the Privacy Act. See 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(a)(4). Records maintained in BOP's Inmate Central Record System, are exempt from the Privacy Act's amendment provisions. See White v. United States Probation Office, 148 F.3d 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (exemption from Privacy Act amendment provision barred plaintiff from seeking amendment of presentence report); Sellers v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 959 F.2d 307, 309 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Plaintiff requests that the Court order his transfer to a less secure facility closer to his legal residence, which entails changing the custody classification on his records. Plaintiff's custody classification records are a part of his Inmate Central File, which is part of the Inmate Central Record System. (Defs' Mot. at 10.) Plaintiff's claim for amendment of the records is therefore barred. White, 148 F.3d at 1125.
III. Plaintiff Cannot State a Claim Under the Privacy Act
Pursuant to the Privacy Act, an agency must:
maintain all records which are used by the agency in making any determination about any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is reasonably necessary to assure fairness to the individual in the determination.5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5). An individual may bring suit against an agency which fails to meet this standard. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C). In order to recover monetary damages under the Privacy Act, "a plaintiff must assert that an agency failed to maintain accurate records, that it did so intentionally or willfully, and, consequently, that an `adverse' `determination [wa]s made' respecting the plaintiff." Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576, 583 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C)). Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the agency's actions in violating the Privacy Act were intentional or willful. Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d 181, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1984); 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(4). To meet his burden, plaintiff "must prove that the offending agency acted `without grounds for believing [its actions] lawful' or that it `flagrantly disregarded' the rights guaranteed under the Privacy Act." Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Albright v. United States, 732 F.2d at 189).
With respect to the calculation of plaintiff's custody classification level as a Public Safety Factor ("PSF"), BOP relied on plaintiff's sentence length in making its determination. Bureau of Prisons, United States Department of Justice, Program Statement No. 5100.07 provides: "a male inmate with more than 30 years remaining to serve . . . shall be housed in a High security level institution unless the PSF has been waived." Plaintiff does not contest that he has more than 30 years remaining on his sentence, rather he argues that BOP made this PSF classification as pretext in order to deny him a transfer to a less secure institution. His challenge, then, is to BOP's use of the information, not to its accuracy, relevance or completeness. A challenge to the professional judgment of BOP officials in assessing points for purposes of establishing a prisoner's custody classification is not properly the suit of a Privacy Act suit. See Kleiman v. Dep't of Energy, 956 F.2d 335, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Thus, plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Privacy Act, since there is no inaccurate record; rather, he is only challenging a decision. See McCready v. Principi, 297 F. Supp. 2d 178, 190 (D.D.C. 2003) (citing and quoting Peller v. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1986) (the Privacy Act "allows for correction of facts but not correction of opinions or judgments, no matter how erroneous such opinions or judgments may be."); see also Doyon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 304 F. Supp 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2004).
Plaintiff also alleges that it was improper for defendants to use his criminal history in determining his classification. Sentence length, however, is not part of plaintiff's history of prior bad acts.
Plaintiff also alleges that he has maintained clear conduct for 18 months, while BOP records indicate that he committed the prohibited act of Being Absent from an Assignment on June 12, 2002. Although this is a disputed issue of fact, the Court still lacks any basis upon which to require BOP to amend their records under the Privacy Act.
Alternatively, plaintiff's claim fails because he cannot satisfy the requirement of an intentional or willful violation of his rights. Plaintiff has not shown that the agency acted "so patently egregious and unlawful that anyone undertaking the conduct should have known it unlawful". Deters v. United States Parole Comm'n, 85 F.3d 655, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1996). It cannot be unlawful to rely on the length of plaintiff's sentence, as accurately set forth in the Judgment and Commitment Order, to determine his Public Safety Factor pursuant to BOP regulations, as set out in their Program Statement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.