Opinion
G062524
05-08-2024
HOT RODS, LLC, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NORTHROP GRUMMAN SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &Smith, R. Gaylord Smith, Ernest Slome and James A. Geocaris for Defendant and Appellant. Jackson Tidus, A Law Corporation, Michael L. Tidus, M. Alim Malik and Kathryn M. Casey; Horvitz &Levy and John Barrow Sprangers for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 30-2009-00118853 Ann L. Kough, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art VI, § 21.) Reversed and remanded.
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &Smith, R. Gaylord Smith, Ernest Slome and James A. Geocaris for Defendant and Appellant.
Jackson Tidus, A Law Corporation, Michael L. Tidus, M. Alim Malik and Kathryn M. Casey; Horvitz &Levy and John Barrow Sprangers for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT: [*]
The procedural and factual history of this long-running dispute is set forth in this court's recent related opinions. (Hot Rods, LLC v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. (Jan. 25, 2024, G061449) [nonpub. opn.]; Hot Rods, LLC v. Northrop Grumman Systems Corp. (Jan. 25, 2024, G062150) [nonpub. opn.].)
The instant appeal is from an award of $550,000 in attorney fees and costs to respondent by a referee. The referee's decision was filed in the trial court on March 10, 2023. The referee's decision explicitly stated that its ruling "may be reconsidered" if the Court of Appeal were to reverse its prior ruling, which was at issue in case No. G062150.
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal from the referee's decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2) [postjudgment order is appealable]; Michael S. Yu, A Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 636, 641 [trial court may not review referee's decisions following a stipulated general reference].) No briefs have yet been filed in this appeal. This court stayed the appeal pending resolution of the related appeals in case Nos. G061449 and G062150.
After our related decisions reversing the trial court and referee became final, the parties filed letter briefs in this case. Appellant requested that "the postjudgment award of attorneys' fees in favor of [respondent] be reversed." Respondent similarly indicated: "Appeal G062524 should be remanded to the referee for further consideration in light of this Court's two unpublished decisions." This court issued an order providing the parties an opportunity to address whether this court should summarily reverse the order on appeal based upon the stipulation of the parties and order the parties to bear their own costs. Neither side responded.
This court has "inherent authority" to summarily reverse. (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2016) ¶ 5:82, p. 5-36.) This power may be exercised when the correct outcome of an appeal is clear, making further appellate proceedings a waste of time. (Melancon v. Walt Disney Productions (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 213, 215 [motion granted because recent Supreme Court case on same issue compelled reversal].)
Stipulated reversals of judgments are specifically addressed by the Code of Civil Procedure. "An appellate court shall not reverse or vacate a duly entered judgment upon an agreement or stipulation of the parties unless the court finds both of the following: [¶] (A) There is no reasonable possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. [¶] (B) The reasons of the parties for requesting reversal outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and the risk that the availability of stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement." (§ 128, subd. (a)(8).) The parties stipulate to reversal. But the parties do not address any of the factors included in section 128, subdivision (a)(8). Nor do the parties comply with our local rule requirements for stipulated requests for reversal. (See also Ct. App., Fourth Dist., Div. Three, Internal Practices and Proc., V C, Stipulated Requests for Reversal.)
Of course, this statute purports to apply to a "duly entered judgment"; no mention is made of appealable orders. (§ 128, subd. (a)(8).) Does section 128, subdivision (a)(8), apply to a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees and costs, given the text of the statute and policy considerations underlying this statute? (See Muccianti v. Willow Creek Care Center (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 13, 15 [final judgments belong to the public, not the parties].) There is no final judgment at issue in this appeal. The parties are correct that reversal of the order here is inevitable in light of the reversals in case Nos. G061449 and G062150. (See In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 380-382 [indisputable error supports reversal of judgment based on stipulation].) There is no possible res judicata or precedential value of the referee's order for the public at large. (§ 128, subd. (a)(8)(A).) It is hard to imagine how "public trust" in the courts could be eroded by facilitating the prompt resolution of the inevitable reversal of the referee's order. (§ 128, subd. (a)(8)(B).)
In sum, it is unclear whether the presumption against stipulated reversals applies to a postjudgment order awarding attorney fees. But even if the presumption applies, it is overcome on this record because it is clear that the reversal of the underlying judgment also requires the reversal of the postjudgment order awarding attorney fees.
DISPOSITION
The parties' requests for summary reversal are granted. The March 10, 2023, referee decision awarding attorney fees and costs to respondent is reversed. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)
The parties may stipulate to early finality of this decision and to immediate issuance of the remittitur. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1).) But they have not done so yet. Absent a further stipulation for early finality and immediate issuance of the remittitur, the remittitur shall issue once the time allotted by the Rules of Court has passed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.264(b), 8.272.)
[*] Before O'Leary, P.J., Moore, J., and Gooding, J.