Summary
In Hornstein v. Lovett, 221 Ga. 279, 282 (144 S.E.2d 378), this court held that trailer parks are subject to regulation under the police powers of the county, and that an ordinance regulating trailer parks is not a zoning ordinance.
Summary of this case from Mayor c. of Richmond Hill v. GillOpinion
23047, 23048.
ARGUED JULY 12, 1965.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 1965.
Mandamus, etc. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Harrison.
Frank S. Cheatham, Jr., for plaintiff in error.
John W. Sognier, Peyton Hawes, Jr., contra.
1. By both Ga. L. 1919, p. 604, and the constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 1952, p. 617), the county governing authorities of Chatham County are empowered to exercise police powers, and the ordinance it adopted October 30, 1964, requiring trailer parks to be located more than 1,200 feet from any school ground or college campus was a proper exercise of such police power and is valid. The application for a license to operate a trailer park failing to show it was more than 1,200 feet from such school grounds did not comply with the law, and it was not erroneous to refuse the license and for the trial court to refuse to order its issuance.
2. The main bill excepts to a judgment overruling a motion for new trial where the trial court, without the intervention of a jury, refused to order the county authorities to issue a license to operate a trailer park, and being unrelated to the prior judgment ordering the county authorities to re-issue a building permit, the latter judgment must be reviewed by a direct bill and cannot be reviewed by the cross bill. Accordingly, the cross bill is dismissed.
ARGUED JULY 12, 1965 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 1965.
This is an equitable and mandamus action against the governing authorities of Chatham County seeking injunctive relief and to require the re-issuance of a building permit and a business license to build and operate a trailer park in that county. The allegations show the building permit was issued but thereafter revoked, and suit filed to require the re-issuance of same and in a different count to enjoin interference with its use if valid, but upon agreement of both parties, the petitioner then applied for a business license to operate the trailer park, and after the filing of the litigation and the application for a license, a licensing ordinance was adopted which would prevent the operation of a trailer park within 1,200 feet of any school ground or college campus, after which the licensing application was likewise denied, and the petitioner amended his petition to add an additional count to demand the issuance of the business license. The crux of the matter is the location of the proposed trailer park within 1,200 feet of Armstrong State College, a part of the University System of Georgia. The Board of Regents objected to the location of the trailer park and by intervention seek to prevent its licensing and construction, alleging it is in violation of the licensing ordinance requiring it to be more than 1,200 feet from any school ground or college campus, the ordinance being adopted to protect the safety, health, welfare and public morals of the citizens of Chatham County on October 30, 1964. The licensing ordinance is apparently adopted under and by virtue of the authority of Ga. L. 1952, p. 617 (constitutional amendment authorizing Chatham County to police said county and to levy occupational taxes) and Ga. L. 1919, p. 604 (authorizing Chatham County to adopt ordinances and regulations for the security and welfare of its inhabitants). The amended petition attacks the provisions of the ordinance requiring that trailer parks be more than 1,200 feet from any college campus as being unconstitutional, unlawful, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable and discriminatory in that the passage of same involved the petitioner's private property rights and was passed without proper notice, public or private, which is violative of the due process clauses of the State Constitution ( Code Ann. §§ 2-102, 2-103; Const. of 1945), the same being designed to specifically exclude petitioner from the use of his property. The case came on for a hearing before the court without the intervention of a jury, and after hearing evidence and consideration of the stipulation of facts, the court granted the mandamus as to the issuance of a building permit but denied the prayers for the granting of a business license. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial which was later amended, and after a hearing overruled. The main bill excepts to the final judgment on the motion for new trial as amended, and the cross bill excepts to the court order requiring the county to issue the building permit.
1. "Each county shall be a body corporate with such powers and limitations as may be prescribed by law." Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. I, Par. I ( Code Ann. § 2-7801; Const. of 1945). The General Assembly in Ga. L. 1919, p. 604, invested the governing board of Chatham County with power to adopt ordinances that appear to them "requisite and necessary for the security, welfare and convenience of Chatham County and its inhabitants, and for preserving the health, peace, good government within the limits of the same." By a later constitutional amendment (Ga. L. 1952, p. 617) Chatham County was further empowered to enact ordinances "for the policing of Chatham County." In Nichols v. Pirkle, 202 Ga. 372 (2) ( 43 S.E.2d 306), this court said: "The congestion of living conditions inherent in a trailer park, together with the uncertainties as to sanitary conditions, including water, sewerage, cooking, bathing and washing facilities, and the fact that the occupants of a trailer park may be to a large extent transitory, are all very patent reasons why such a business is so affected with a public interest as to make it a proper subject for legislative regulation under the broad police powers of the State."
Having thus been specifically adjudicated that trailer parks are subject to regulation under police powers, it cannot now be doubted that the ordinance of the county requiring that such parks not be located within 1,200 feet of any school ground or college campus, enacted October 30, 1964, is a valid exercise of the police powers conferred by both the 1919 Act, supra, and the 1952 constitutional amendment, supra. Thus we are here concerned with neither the 1945 Act (Ga. L. 1945, p. 482) which was repealed in 1964 (Ga. L. 1964, p. 499) nor the zoning law or regulations adopted pursuant thereto, discussed at length in the brief of counsel for plaintiff in error. The County of Chatham under the foregoing statutes and Constitution was given ample authority without resort to the general law of 1945. From what has been ruled it follows that application for a license which failed to show that the trailer park was more than 1,200 feet from any school ground or college campus was lawfully denied, and it was not error for the court to refuse to order the county authorities to issue the license.
2. But the cross bill excepts to an order of the court requiring the county to re-issue a building permit. Since the main bill has nothing to do with the judgment excepted to in the cross bill it is not permissible to review by cross bill the judgment therein excepted to. A reversal of the motion for new trial would not have affected the final judgment involved in the cross bill. Thus a direct bill to review that ruling would be necessary. Code Ann. § 6-901 (Ga. L. 1957, pp. 224, 232); Planters c. Fire Assn. v. DeLoach, 113 Ga. 802 ( 39 S.E. 466); Robinson v. Georgia Savings Bank c. Co., 185 Ga. 688 ( 196 S.E. 395).
Judgment affirmed on the main bill; cross bill dismissed. All the Justices concur.