Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC379704. William F. Fahey, Judge.
Law Office of Ken I. Karan and Ken I. Karan for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Law Offices of Larry W. Weaver, Larry Salyer and Susan C. Watts for Defendants and Respondents.
CHAVEZ, J.
Jack and Teresa Horak (collectively “appellants”) appeal from a final judgment entered after a bench trial. Appellants pursued six causes of action against South Shores Development Corp. doing business as Lanikai Lane Mobilehome Park (South Shores) and Jed Robinson (collectively “respondents”). The trial court found that appellants had failed to carry their burden of proof as to each cause of action. A verdict was rendered on the merits in favor of the defense, and respondents’ motion for attorney fees in the amount of $85,000 was granted.
Jack Horak and Teresa Horak will be referred to individually as Jack and Teresa, for ease of reference.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
CONTENTIONS
Appellants contend that: (1) the trial court erred in determining that Teresa’s tenancy was properly terminated by respondents based on the actions of Jack; (2) substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding that the actions of Jack amounted to a “substantial annoyance” under Civil Code section 798.56 (section 798.56); (3) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the alleged potential buyers of appellants’ mobilehome; (4) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of respondents’ treatment of other allegedly offending residents of the mobilehome park; and (5) the trial court erred by denying sanctions in the form of attorney fees after granting appellants’ motion to compel discovery.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellants are a married couple. Pursuant to a rental agreement entered into on or about July 1, 1997 (lease), respondents rented to appellants a mobilehome space in Lanikai Lane Mobilehome Park (the park), located at 6550 Pronto Drive, Space No. 108, Carlsbad, California (the property). Appellants purchased the mobilehome, in which they resided with their two sons, at the park in 1997. Jack and Teresa each signed the lease as a separate “homeowner.” The lease is explicitly governed by the Mobilehome Residency Law (MRL) (Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.).
In addition, every provision of the lease requiring the homeowner’s initials was initialed by both Jack and Teresa, with the exception of four such provisions which were initialed by Teresa alone.
On May 9, 2006, appellants gave notice to respondents of their intent to sell their mobilehome in the park. The notice informed respondents that appellants were selling because of breaches by respondents in their duties to properly maintain the park and preserve the quiet enjoyment of the property.
On June 8, 2006, a confrontation between Jack and Jerry Offstein (Offstein), another resident of the park, took place. Jack testified that Offstein had a history of making threats against appellants. Jack testified that the incident on June 8, 2006, was instigated by Offstein, who said “I’m going to kick your ass, ” and demanded that Jack get out of his car. Jack further testified that he struck Offstein’s vehicle with a three foot long metal pipe. At the time he struck the vehicle, Offstein was in his vehicle. Jack then shouted obscenities at Offstein and threatened to kill him. After Jack left the scene, he called the police, who chose to arrest him rather than Offstein. Charges were filed and then dismissed.
Teresa was not involved in the altercation.
On June 19, 2006, respondents’ counsel prepared a “Sixty (60) Day Notice to Terminate Possession” which was addressed to “Jack Horak and All Residents in Possession” of the property. The notice stated:
“California Civil Code section 798.56 provides, in part, that a tenancy in a mobilehome park may be terminated for:
“(b) Conduct by the homeowner or resident, upon the park premises, that constitutes a substantial annoyance to other homeowners or residents.”
“You have failed to abide by and conform to those provisions of the California Civil Code set out above as of this date. Specifically, the said violation by you results from the following:
“On or about June 8, 2006, at approximately 5:30 p.m., you were observed driving into the Park, stopping your vehicle, and walking back to another vehicle driven by Jerry Offstein. You were overheard yelling at Mr. Offstein and were observed leaning into the open window on the driver’s side of Mr. Offstein’s vehicle and striking Mr. Offstein in the face with an approximately 3 ½ foot long pipe or stick. You then withdrew from Mr. Offstein’s vehicle and were heard yelling “I’ll kill you if you ever fuck with me.” The police were called and responded to the Park whereupon you were taken into custody and removed from the Park by the police. Mr. Offstein was thereafter treated at a local hospital for injuries sustained from this attack.”
The notice further provided, “For all the above-described reasons, the management and residents of the Lanikai Lane Mobilehome Park have found your conduct totally undesirable and a substantial annoyance to every resident of the Park.” The notice further provided:
“THEREFORE, DUE TO THIS VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE AS STATED ABOVE, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT WITHIN (60) DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THIS NOTICE UPON YOU, YOU ARE REQUIRED TO QUIT THE SAID PREMISES AND, AT YOUR ELECTION, EITHER SELL YOUR MOBILEHOME TO AN APPROVED PURCHASER OR REMOVE IT FROM THE PREMISES AND DELIVER UP POSSESSION THEREOF....”
The notice was served on appellants on June 24, 2006.
On June 29, 2006, appellants sent a letter to respondents requesting that the 60-day notice “be taken back on the grounds of discrimination and breach of contract by South Shores Development.” Appellants stated that Mr. Robinson was “fully aware that our home is on the market as of 5-18-06 for breach of contract by South Shores Development.” Appellants indicated that they would be moving out of the home in July 2006, but that “we will still be a mobile home owner as well as an active member of the HOA and a Board of Director until our home is sold.”
Respondent Jed Robinson was the chief executive officer of South Shores Development Corp.
Appellants moved out of the park while they marketed the property for sale. They tendered rent every month. However, respondents never cashed any of those checks. Appellants also continued to pay property taxes from May 2006 through the time of trial.
Appellants’ lease contained a provision requiring that any prospective buyer seek approval from the management of the park before appellants could actually sell the property. Thus, as appellants marketed the property, they sent prospective buyers to the management of the park for approval. At some point Teresa came to believe that management was blocking her ability to sell the property. When she attempted to address this issue, she was informed that she was no longer able to sell the property because her tenancy had expired after the 60-day notice had been given.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant filed suit against respondents on October 25, 2007. The first complaint was filed by a retained attorney. Appellants filed the second amended complaint (SAC) on July 24, 2008, in pro. per. The SAC became the operative complaint in the action. Appellants alleged six causes of action against respondents: (1) declaratory relief, seeking a declaration that the purported termination of their lease was a nullity and that the lease was still in full force and effect; (2) slander of title, based on respondents’ representations to third parties that appellants no longer had rights to the property; (3) breach of contract, based on respondents’ issuance of a false 60-day termination letter and refusal to authorize sales of the property; (4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage; and (6) negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.
On December 10, 2008, appellants filed a motion to compel further responses to inspection demands. The motion was granted, but the court denied appellants’ request for attorney fees incurred by them in connection with the motion.
On January 5, 2009, seven days before trial, an attorney substituted in to the case to represent appellants at trial. Trial commenced on January 12, 2009. Following trial, a decision was rendered on the merits in favor of respondents. A statement of decision was filed on February 9, 2009, and a judgment was filed by the court on March 17, 2009.
In its statement of decision, the trial court set forth its conclusion that appellants failed to carry their burden of proof as to each of the six causes of action. The court described the incident involving Jack and Offstein which took place on June 8, 2006. Based upon this incident, the trial court concluded that “the actions of the [appellants] constituted a substantial annoyance.” The court further stated that appellants “admitted” that they were served with the 60-day notice to terminate possession, and that 60 days after such notice, the appellants’ tenancy was terminated by operation of law. Finally, the court found that during the time period between May 2005 and August 2007, Teresa did not receive a bona fide offer from any of the people with whom she was negotiating to sell appellants’ mobilehome. For each of these reasons, the court concluded that judgment should be entered on behalf of respondents on all causes of action.
Respondents brought a motion for attorney fees, and on May 18, 2009, the court granted the motion in the amount of $85,000. Appellants filed their notice of appeal on June 3, 2009.
Appellants have not specifically addressed the propriety of this attorney fee award in their arguments to this court. However, our decision on the merits of this matter necessitates the trial court’s reconsideration of the award.
DISCUSSION
I. Teresa’s tenancy
Appellants argue that Teresa had an interest in the lease unique to her. As the lease confirmed, Teresa’s tenancy could only be terminated as authorized by the MRL. The notice of termination of tenancy that was delivered to appellants’ home identified the basis of the termination as “substantial annoyance” under section 798.56, subdivision (b). This was the only statutory basis cited for termination, and the notice described conduct carried out by Jack. However, in violation of the requirements for termination of Teresa’s tenancy, appellants argue, the notice did not describe any conduct by Teresa, let alone any conduct to justify termination of her tenancy under the MRL.
Because Teresa’s tenancy is not subject to termination on the basis of any reasons identified in the MRL, appellants argue, the judgment denying her declaratory relief and damages is contrary to law.
A. Teresa’s conduct did not constitute a substantial annoyance
First, we note that after considering the evidence the trial court determined that “the actions of the [appellants] constituted a substantial annoyance.” We must first determine whether the trial court’s finding that the actions of both Jack and Teresa constituted a substantial annoyance is supported by the evidence. We review this factual finding under the substantial evidence standard. If the trial court’s resolution of the factual issue is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.)
There is no evidence in the record that Teresa engaged in any conduct constituting a substantial annoyance. Teresa testified that she was not present at the scene of the altercation between Jack and Offstein. This testimony was not contradicted. Respondents point to no evidence of any conduct which could be described as a substantial annoyance, and no such evidence is described in the trial court’s statement of decision. We therefore conclude that substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s determination that the actions of Teresa constituted a substantial annoyance. That factual determination is reversed.
B. Jack’s conduct did not justify a termination of Teresa’s tenancy under the MRL
We have determined that Teresa did not engage in any conduct justifying termination of her tenancy. Next, we must look to the provisions of the MRL to determine whether, as respondents argue, the MRL authorizes termination of her tenancy based on the conduct of her husband.
No language in the lease reveals an intention to treat married couples as a single “homeowner” or to require termination of a homeowner’s right to use the mobilehome site based upon the action of the homeowner’s spouse. On the contrary, the requirement of one signature for each “homeowner, ” and both spouses’ initials on each provision for which initials were required, suggest that the lease intended to create a separate tenancy for each spouse.
The proper interpretation of statutory language is a question of law which this court reviews de novo, independent of the trial court’s ruling or reasoning. (Redevelopment Agency v. County of Los Angeles (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 68, 74.) In undertaking statutory interpretation, “‘“our fundamental task is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.” [Citation.]’ Statutory interpretation begins with an analysis of the statutory language. [Citation.] ‘If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no further.’ [Citation.]” (Olson v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1142, 1147.) Only if the statute’s language is ambiguous do we examine additional sources of information to determine the Legislature’s intent in drafting the statute. (Ibid.)
1. The background and purpose of the MRL
The intent of the Legislature in enacting the MRL was explained in Yee v. City of Escondido (1992) 503 U.S. 519, 523-524:
“The term ‘mobile home’ is somewhat misleading. Mobile homes are largely immobile as a practical matter, because the cost of moving one is often a significant fraction of the value of the mobile home itself. They are generally placed permanently in parks; once in place, only about 1 in every 100 mobile homes is ever moved. Hirsch & Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L.Rev. 399, 405 (1988). A mobile home owner typically rents a plot of land, called a ‘pad, ’ from the owner of a mobile home park. The park owner provides private roads within the park, common facilities such as washing machines or a swimming pool, and often utilities. The mobile home owner often invests in site-specific improvements such as a driveway, steps, walkways, porches, or landscaping. When the mobile home owner wishes to move, the mobile home is usually sold in place, and the purchaser continues to rent the pad on which the mobile home is located.
“In 1978, California enacted its Mobilehome Residency Law, Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 798 (West 1982 and Supp. 1991). The legislature found ‘that, because of the high cost of moving mobilehomes, the potential for damage resulting therefrom, the requirements relating to the installation of mobilehomes, and the cost of landscaping or lot preparation, it is necessary that the owners of mobilehomes occupied within mobilehome parks be provided with the unique protection from actual or constructive eviction afforded by the provisions of this chapter.’ § 798.55(a).
“The Mobilehome Residency Law limits the bases upon which a park owner may terminate a mobile home owner’s tenancy. These include the nonpayment of rent, the mobile home owner’s violation of law or park rules, and the park owner’s desire to change the use of his land. § 798.56. While a rental agreement is in effect, however, the park owner generally may not require the removal of a mobile home when it is sold. § 798.73. The park owner may neither charge a transfer fee for the sale, § 798.72, nor disapprove of the purchaser, provided that the purchaser has the ability to pay the rent, § 798.74.”
Thus, the purpose of the MRL is to protect mobilehome owners from actual or constructive eviction except under the strict rules set forth therein. The lease acknowledged that the MRL was controlling on the issue of termination, providing: “[t]his agreement, at the sole option of the Owner, may be declared forfeited and/or the tenancy may be terminated... in accordance with the provisions of the Mobilehome Residency Law....” Thus, any “tenancy” created by the lease could only be terminated in accordance with the MRL.
2. Teresa was a tenant and homeowner
Teresa was identified in the lease as a “homeowner.” She signed her name as a homeowner independently of her husband, and independently initialed every paragraph for which “homeowner’s initials” were required. Thus, she individually took on all the obligations and rights under the lease agreement.
The lease contains no specific definition of “homeowner.”
Under the MRL, a homeowner is defined as “a person who has a tenancy in a mobilehome park under a rental agreement.” (Civ. Code, § 798.9.) Teresa, an independent signatory to the lease, was a person with a tenancy in a mobilehome park under a rental agreement. As a homeowner and tenant, she was entitled to the protections of the MRL.
3. The plain language of the MRL does not reveal an intent to terminate the tenancy of a homeowner for the actions of a different homeowner
Section 798.56 provides the only authorized reasons for termination of a tenancy. A “tenancy” is defined under the MRL as “the right of a homeowner to the use of a site within a mobilehome park on which to locate, maintain, and occupy a mobilehome.” (Civ. Code, § 798.12.) As set forth above, Teresa was identified as a “homeowner” in the lease and fit the definition of “homeowner” set forth in the MRL. Teresa’s right to use of the property on which her mobilehome was located could only be terminated for one of the reasons specifically enumerated in section 798.56. Those reasons include:
“(a) Failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a local ordinance or state law or regulation relating to mobilehomes within a reasonable time after the homeowner receives a notice of noncompliance from the appropriate governmental agency.
“(b) Conduct by the homeowner or resident, upon the park premises, that constitutes a substantial annoyance to other homeowners or residents.
“(c)(1) Conviction of the homeowner or resident for prostitution, for a violation of subdivision (d) of Section 243, paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), or subdivision (b), of Section 245, Section 288, or Section 451, of the Penal Code, or a felony controlled substance offense, if the act resulting in the conviction was committed anywhere on the premises of the mobilehome park, including, but not limited to, within the homeowner’s mobilehome.
“(2) However, the tenancy may not be terminated for the reason specified in this subdivision if the person convicted of the offense has permanently vacated, and does not subsequently reoccupy, the mobilehome.
“(d) Failure of the homeowner or resident to comply with a reasonable rule or regulation of the park that is part of the rental agreement or any amendment thereto.
“[¶]... [¶]
“(e)(1) Nonpayment of rent, utility charges, or reasonable incidental service charges....
“[¶]... [¶]
“(f) Condemnation of the park.
“(g) Change of use of the park or any portion thereof....”
Respondents’ notice of termination cited section 798.56, subdivision (b), as authority for terminating the tenancy of “Jack Horak and All Residents in Possession.” It then described conduct of Jack which was alleged to constitute a substantial annoyance. The notice did not name Teresa, nor did it describe any conduct which could be attributed to her.
To the extent that respondents’ notice to terminate possession purported to terminate the tenancy of Teresa, it was not authorized by the MRL.
4. Respondents’ interpretation of the MRL contradicts its plain language
Respondents claim that it is irrelevant that Teresa did not engage in any substantially annoying conduct. Respondents argue, “there is no requirement that all of the residents or homeowners engage in the conduct constituting a substantial annoyance. The mere fact that the substantial annoyance occurred at the premises is sufficient to terminate the tenancy as to all homeowners of the premises pursuant to... Section 798.56(b).”
On the contrary, the plain language of the statute does not suggest any intent to permit termination of a homeowner’s tenancy based on the actions of another homeowner. The statutes in question use only the singular and refer back to “the homeowner or resident” carrying out the substantially annoying activity. The tenancy threatened by the activity of the homeowner or resident is the tenancy pursuant to which that individual resides at the park.
Section 798.56 explains, “A tenancy shall be terminated by the management only for one or more of the following reasons.” (Italics added.) The statute thus contemplates that each separate tenancy carries its own rights. As explained above, Teresa and Jack each separately signed the lease, thus they each individually took on the rights and obligations of that lease. By signing the lease, they each contracted for the “right of a homeowner to the use of a site” within the mobilehome park. Thus, they each had a tenancy. (Civ. Code, §798.12.) Jack’s tenancy alone was subject to termination on the basis of his actions. Teresa’s tenancy could only be terminated for one of the reasons specified in section 798.56, and no such reason was proven as to her.
In addition, we must assume that in setting forth the authorized reasons for termination of a tenancy, the Legislature set forth all such reasons. Indeed, the statute specifies that a tenancy may be terminated “only” for one or more of the reasons set forth within section 798.56. (Italics added.) If the Legislature had intended a homeowner’s tenancy to be susceptible to termination for the acts of another homeowner, the Legislature would have set forth such intention within the statute.
Respondents argue that it is the “plain intent” of section 798.56, subdivision (b), “that the conduct which constitutes a substantial annoyance can be the conduct of any person who occupies the mobilehome, a homeowner or a resident. There is no requirement that the conduct be the conduct of all the occupants, of all the residents, or even any signatory to the rental agreement.” We do not dispute this statement. The statute does contemplate that the individual who carries out the annoying conduct may be a mere resident, rather than a homeowner. Under that circumstance, an issue could arise as to whose “tenancy” should be terminated, since, as respondents point out, a resident does not have tenancy in a mobilehome park unless that resident is also a homeowner. (See Civ. Code, §§ 798.11 [“‘Resident’ is a homeowner or other person who lawfully occupies a mobilehome”] and 798.12 [“‘Tenancy’ is the right of a homeowner to the use of a site within a mobilehome park....”].)
In other words, if Jack was not a homeowner, but was a resident living at the park under Teresa’s tenancy, then her tenancy indeed may be threatened by his substantially annoying activity. However, we need not decide this question, as it is not before us.
However, that is not the situation we face. Here, homeowner and tenant Jack carried out conduct constituting a substantial annoyance. There is simply no authority in the MRL for respondents’ position that homeowner and tenant Teresa, an individual with her own contractual right to tenancy, can have her tenancy terminated on the basis of Jack’s actions. Under the statutory scheme, the only tenancy subject to termination for the actions of Jack is the tenancy of Jack. (§ 798.56.)
In its statement of decision, the trial court emphasized that both Jack and Teresa admitted that they were served with the 60-day notice to terminate possession. The court found that 60 days after such service, the tenancy was terminated by operation of law. However, because the 60-day notice did not set forth an authorized reason for termination of Teresa’s tenancy, it did not operate to terminate her tenancy upon passage of the 60-day period. (See, e.g., Keh v. Walters (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1530-1533 [termination of tenancy at mobilehome park unlawful where notice to terminate was based on unauthorized change of use].)
5. The relevance of Jack’s departure from the premises
Both parties address a portion of section 798.56, subdivision (c), although this subdivision was not the basis for the notice to terminate possession served on Jack in this matter. We briefly address this provision to analyze its relevance to the issue before us.
Section 789.56, subdivision (c)(1), permits termination of a tenancy due to:
“Conviction of the homeowner or resident for prostitution, for a violation of subdivision (d) of Section 243, paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), or subdivision (b), of Section 245, Section 288, or Section 451, of the Penal Code, or a felony controlled substance offense, if the act resulting in the conviction was committed anywhere on the premises of the mobilehome park, including, but not limited to, within the mobilehome owner’s mobilehome.”
Thus, conviction of a homeowner or resident of certain crimes justifies termination of a tenancy. However, section 798.56, subdivision (c)(2) provides protection to the tenant in the event that the person convicted of the crime permanently vacates the premises:
“However the tenancy may not be terminated for the reason specified in this subdivision if the person convicted of the offense has permanently vacated, and does not subsequently reoccupy, the mobilehome.”
Appellants argue that “partial termination, ” as contemplated in section 798.56, subdivision (c)(2), is permissible so long as the person at fault permanently vacates the premises. Further, appellants argue, it does not make sense that the person innocent of a crime would be given greater protection than a person innocent of a lesser event such as a “substantial annoyance.” Because Jack permanently vacated the premises, appellants argue, there is no reason that the tenancies of both Jack and Teresa should be terminated.
Respondents disagree. Simply put, their argument is that this termination of tenancy was not brought under subdivision (c) of section 798.56. If the Legislature had wanted to extend the protection set forth in section 798.56, subdivision (c)(2) to cases brought under subdivision (b), it could have provided the same provision in subdivision (b). Thus, respondents argue, Jack’s permanent absence from the property is irrelevant.
We agree with appellants that it seems unreasonable to allow special protection for a tenancy where the wrongdoing individual has been convicted of a crime, but not where the wrongdoing individual has merely engaged in annoying activity. However, as respondents point out, this matter was not brought under section 798.56, subdivision (c), therefore we need not contemplate the effect of Jack’s permanent departure from the premises. As explained above, Teresa had her own individual tenancy under the lease agreement, thus her right to use the mobilehome park was not dependent upon Jack’s actions. Thus, the special protection provided in section 798.56, subdivision (c)(2) is unnecessary.
We note that the special protection provided in section 798.56, subdivision (c)(2) would be particularly applicable where the individual convicted of the crime was merely a resident, not a homeowner. For example, if the adult child of a homeowner and tenant engaged in the criminal activity and was subsequently convicted, the parent homeowner and tenant could take advantage of the protection in subdivision (c)(2) and remain on the premises if the individual convicted of the crime permanently vacated the premises. Again, this is not the situation before us. Jack was a homeowner and resident, thus his actions threatened his own tenancy, not the tenancy of Teresa.
II. Substantial annoyance
Appellants next argue that substantial evidence did not exist to support the finding that the actions of Jack constituted a substantial annoyance. First, appellants argue that the term “substantial annoyance” does not encompass single incidents such as the one which occurred between Jack and Offstein. Further, appellants argue that there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings as to what took place during that incident.
A. The meaning of “substantial annoyance” under the MRL
The first issue we must address is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (Redevelopment Agency v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 74.)
Appellants admit that the term “substantial annoyance” is not defined in the statute and its meaning has not been addressed by the courts. However, appellants point to landlord/tenant law as providing some guidance as to the meaning of the term. Under landlord/tenant law, courts have recognized a tort duty to evict tenants only where the tenant’s behavior made violence toward neighbors highly foreseeable. (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1219-1220 (Castaneda).) In Castaneda, a resident of a mobilehome park sued the owners of the park after he was shot and injured while he was a bystander to a gang confrontation involving another resident of the mobilehome park. (Id. at p. 1209.) The plaintiff argued that the owners breached a duty not to rent to known gang members or to evict them when they harass other tenants. (Ibid.) The court determined that there was no duty on the part of the owners to evict the gang members, because such a tort duty only exists where the tenant’s behavior made violence toward neighbors or others on the premises highly foreseeable. (Id. at p. 1219.) Focusing on whether there had been prior incidents from which the owners could have predicted the third party crime, the court noted that no one had reported that the offending tenants had used, possessed or displayed a gun, and no one had identified a gang that those tenants were thought to be affiliated with. Under the circumstances, the court concluded that the shoot-out between two rival gangs was not highly foreseeable. (Id. at pp. 1221-1222.)
However, we note that the incident of violence between Jack and Offstein provided sufficient reason for respondents to expect that Jack might engage in future violence. Nothing in Castaneda suggests that a single incident of violence is insufficient to provide the high degree of foreseeability necessary to trigger a landlord’s duty to evict.
In Madhani v. Cooper (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 412 (Madhani), the plaintiff tenant sued the building owners for failure to protect her from an assault by another tenant. The plaintiff had reported to the building managers that the other tenant had used profanity and acted in a threatening manner towards her. The plaintiff had also reported this behavior to the police, who encouraged her to take the issue up with her landlord. (Id. at p. 414.) At the time she was assaulted, the plaintiff had complained to building managers at least six times. (Ibid.) Explaining that the “key issue” is foreseeability of harm (id. at p. 415), the court determined that summary judgment in favor of the building owners on the plaintiff’s claim of negligence was not warranted. While there had been several aggressive outbursts on the part of this other tenant towards the plaintiff, the case does not preclude a finding that the requisite foreseeability may be established with one violent incident.
We conclude that the single incident of violence by Jack against Offstein described in the trial court’s statement of decision is sufficient to qualify as “substantially annoying” conduct under the MRL. Using the Castaneda and Madhani cases as a guide, we find that Jack’s actions would have triggered the “foreseeability” required for eviction under landlord/tenant law. Although it was a single incident, it was sufficient to constitute a threat to the safety of other tenants. As such, it rose to the level of a substantial annoyance.
B. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s decision that Jack’s actions constituted a substantial annoyance under the MRL
The standard of review on issues of sufficiency of the evidence is the substantial evidence rule. (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) The review is not a question of whether there is a conflict in the evidence, but rather, whether the record as a whole demonstrates substantial evidence in support of the appealed judgment. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 872-873.)
The evidence regarding the June 8, 2006 incident between Jack and Offstein came from three sources. Mary Varrichio (Varrichio), a witness to the event, testified at trial. Jack also testified. In addition, the termination of tenancy notice, which described the alleged incident between Jack and Offstein, was a trial exhibit.
Appellants argue that, under cross-examination, the testimony of Varrichio was shown to be unreliable because of inconsistencies in her statements and a lack of credibility regarding her ability to recollect. Appellants claim that “[h]er testimony was not considered by the court.”
Appellants provide no citation to the record revealing a finding by the trial court that Varrichio’s testimony was not reliable or a statement that her testimony was not considered by the court. Her name was not specifically mentioned in the court’s statement of decision, but absent a specific finding that she lacked credibility, we assume the court considered her testimony.
Varrichio testified that she was at home in June of 2006 when an altercation occurred outside of her kitchen window. She heard Jack yell at Offstein, indicating an intent to harm him. She heard him yell, “I’m going to kill you, ” and observed him leaning into Offstein’s car with a long “tubular” instrument. Shortly thereafter, Varrichio was called by park management, who asked her if she had seen anything. She proceeded to the management office and observed Offstein to be “bloody all around the mouth.”
Jack attempted to portray the incident as having been instigated by Offstein, who “slammed on the brakes and tried to make me crash” as Jack entered the mobilehome park after work. Jack testified that he waited for Offstein to continue driving into the mobilehome park, but because he didn’t, Jack pulled up along side his car and asked him what the problem was. Offstein responded that he was speaking on the phone to “somebody that [Jack] ripped off.” Offstein proceeded to indicate that Jack ripped off “everybody” he works for, and further incited Jack by saying “get your fat ass out of your car, ” “I’m going to beat you up, ” or “I’m going to kick your ass.” Jack admitted that at that point, he got out of his car with a 30-inch piece of aluminum pipe, tapped the pipe on Offstein’s car, and threatened to kill him. Jack also reached into Offstein’s car, grabbed his shirt, and stated that if Offstein didn’t leave him and his family alone, he would kill him. Jack testified that Offstein then began to push his false teeth out of his mouth with his tongue. He did not see any blood. After that, Jack got in his car, drove to his home, and called the police.
Appellants argue that, based on the testimony of Jack, it was Offstein’s behavior that should be considered a substantial annoyance – not Jack’s. Because Jack was acting to “defend himself” against Offstein’s behavior, it was Offstein who created a risk to the community, not Jack.
However, the trial court expressed its position that it did not find Jack’s version of the story to be credible. The trial court had before it the testimony of Varrichio, described above, and the 60-day notice to terminate possession, which stated that Jack was observed “leaning into the open window on the driver’s side of Mr. Offstein’s vehicle and striking Mr. Offstein in the face with an approximately 3 ½ foot long pipe or stick.” In addition, the notice stated, and Jack admitted, that he was later arrested and charged as the aggressor in this incident. Based on this evidence, the trial court was entitled to conclude that Jack engaged in violent behavior which was a threat to the community.
The above evidence, taken as a whole, provides a sufficient basis for the trial court’s decision that Jack’s conduct constituted a substantial annoyance. It was uncontested that he expressed his intention to kill Offstein, and threatened him with a pipe. In addition, the testimony of Varrichio and the written termination notice suggested that Jack physically assaulted Offstein. This behavior made the possibility of future attacks and disturbances by Jack highly foreseeable and justified the park’s 60-day termination notice as it pertained to Jack.
III. Motions in limine
Appellants take issue with the trial court’s decisions on two motions in limine brought by respondents before trial. The first, motion in limine 2 of 2, sought to exclude any evidence “regarding the alleged potential buyers of the [appellants’] mobilehome that are alleged in paragraph 32 of the Second Amended Complaint.” This motion was granted by the trial court. The second, motion in limine 1 of 2, sought to exclude evidence “regarding the treatment of any tenant or resident at the [park] other than the treatment of [Jack and Teresa].” This motion was also granted by the trial court. The court’s decisions on these motions are discussed separately below.
A. Standard of review
We review the trial court’s rulings on these motions in limine under the abuse of discretion standard. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Sun Pacific Farming Co. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 619, 639-640.) A trial court’s “‘discretion is only abused where there is a clear showing [it] exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’” (Id. at p. 640.) On an appeal challenging a discretionary trial court ruling, the appellant has the burden to establish an abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331.)
B. Motion in limine 2 of 2
Motion in limine 2 of 2 sought to exclude evidence of potential buyers of appellants’ mobilehome on the ground that such evidence was irrelevant and because appellants failed to provide respondents with information regarding these potential buyers in discovery. Appellants argue that the exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial because appellants were not permitted to call Richard Shirek (Shirek) as a witness. Appellants claim that Shirek would have testified that appellants had a bona fide buyer who changed his mind about buying when respondents interfered by slandering appellants’ title. Thus, appellants argue, Shirek’s testimony would have proven a breach of the lease as well as evidence of damages.
1. Background on the trial court’s ruling on motion in limine 2 of 2
At the hearing on the motion, which took place on January 9, 2009, the trial court agreed that appellants failed to identify the potential buyers in response to written discovery. Appellants now claim that they in fact provided Shirek’s name to respondents in supplemental responses to discovery prior to Teresa’s deposition. However, appellants could not provide the trial court with this information at the hearing. Appellants’ attorney argued to the court that appellants had provided verified supplemental responses identifying the names of the potential buyers. However, upon the court’s inquiry, appellants’ attorney could not provide the exhibit in question. The trial court thus concluded: “I’m going to grant that motion... without prejudice. If you can show that contrary to the moving papers your clients submitted verified supplemental responses to this discovery identifying these buyers, then I’ll hear further argument during trial.”
Respondents’ specially prepared interrogatories, Nos. 187 through 270, asked appellants to provide an address for each of the potential buyers of their mobilehome listed in the SAC and to provide facts upon which their allegations regarding interference with the sale of the property were based. In their initial response to these interrogatories, appellants stated that they had no information or the question was not applicable.
On January 12, 2009, appellants filed a second supplemental opposition to respondents’ motion in limine 2 of 2. However, there were no exhibits attached to the motion. On January 13, the trial court addressed the supplemental opposition, but made it clear for the record that the matter was actually a “motion to reconsider a prior ruling of the court” on motion in limine 2 of 2. The trial court noted for the record that it had before it an “unfile-stamped document entitled declaration of Teresa Horak in support of [appellant’s] second supplemental opposition to [respondents’] motion in limine [2] of 2... and it refers to an exhibit 2, but I don’t have an exhibit 2.” However, the court informed appellants’ counsel that it would give him “one last opportunity to get [his] paperwork straight.”
Appellants’ first opposition had been filed when appellants were representing themselves in pro. per. Upon assuming trial duties just prior to trial, appellant’s counsel drafted and filed a first supplemental opposition. However, as the trial court pointed out, the supplemental opposition did not attach the supplementary interrogatory responses which appellants claimed set forth the information regarding the potential buyers that respondents sought.
Appellants did not dispute that the second supplemental opposition to respondents’ motion in limine was in fact a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s prior ruling on the motion. The court later reaffirmed: “[d]espite its caption, it’s really a motion for reconsideration is that not true?” Appellants’ counsel agreed: “If that’s the way the court will characterize it.” The court declared, “Well, I made a ruling, so it’s a motion for reconsideration.”
Appellants had miscaptioned this second supplemental opposition to respondents’ motion in limine 2 of 2 as the second supplemental opposition to respondents’ motion in limine 1 of 2.
The court took up the issue again later. At that time, the court had before it conformed stamped copies of Teresa’s declaration in support of appellants’ second supplemental opposition to respondents’ motion in limine 2 of 2; Jack’s declaration in support of appellants’ supplemental opposition to respondents’ motion in limine 2 of 2; and the amended response of Teresa to the specially prepared interrogatories propounded by South Shores.
In response to the court’s inquiry, appellants’ counsel indicated that the best evidence that the name and contact information for Shirek had been provided to respondents was found in Jack’s declaration in which he identified documents that were produced at his deposition on November 25, 2008. The first document produced was Shirek’s business card, with his name, phone number, and address. However, the business card was not an exhibit to Jack’s deposition, and the name never came up during the deposition. Respondents’ counsel disagreed, stating that Shirek was not identified in discovery as a potential buyer until respondents received the supplemental responses “which were mailed on the day before Christmas and received in the period between Christmas and New Year’s.”
After hearing from both sides on the issue, the trial court determined that appellants did not fulfill their obligation to disclose the identity of the witness in a timely fashion. The court described its conclusion as follows:
“[Appellants] had within their collective knowledge a card that meant something to them, but meant nothing to anybody else who gets it in a stack of a bunch of documents. And he defers to his wife and says, in effect, ask her. She’ll tell you who the buyers are. And they never mention Shirek. And then for the first time, whether it’s because it was one of those oops moments or something else on December 24, they decide, well, we better mention Shirek even though we’ve had his business card for at least a month. That sounds like gamesmanship or hiding the ball. There’s a variety of other descriptions, but none of them are pretty.”
The court made a specific finding that “[Teresa Horak] did not disclose a name that she knew, the Shireks, ... and it could have been disclosed, should have been disclosed... in response to earlier written discovery.” This failure to disclose was a “violation of the discovery rules, ” and the court thus denied appellants’ request for reconsideration of its prior ruling on motion in limine 2 of 2. Shirek was not permitted to testify.
2. The trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion
As set forth above, the trial court made a finding that appellants willfully failed to respond to discovery. This factual finding is supported by the record, which showed that Teresa did not disclose the full identity of Shirek, and his significance to the case, until approximately the last week of December 2009. The trial court specifically found that Teresa could have, and should have, disclosed this information earlier. The court’s decision not to grant reconsideration of its prior ruling on motion in limine 2 of 2 resulted from its determination that appellants had engaged in “gamesmanship or hiding the ball.”
Motions for reconsideration are governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 1008. Under that section, such motions must present “new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” (§ 1008, subd. (a).) Here, the trial court granted respondents’ motion in limine due to appellants’ failure to provide respondents with the names of the potential buyers in response to discovery. At the time the motion was initially heard, appellants offered no evidence that they had provided such names. In their motion for reconsideration, appellants attempted to show that the names of the potential buyers were given to respondents in a timely fashion. The court was not persuaded by appellants’ supplemental arguments, and declined to modify its original order.
As set forth above, the court’s finding was supported by the record. It is not our place to recharacterize the events that took place during the discovery phase of the litigation. (See Johnson v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1061 [“Where there is a basis for the trial court’s [discovery] ruling and the evidence supports it, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court”].) A trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Jones v. P.S. Development Co., Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 707, 724.) The trial court was convinced that appellants had failed to disclose the names and contact information of potential buyers in discovery; appellants’ attempt to place different facts before the court did not succeed.
Appellants present several arguments as to why the trial court’s ruling should be reversed as an abuse of discretion. First, appellants argue that it was respondents’ lack of diligence in pursuing discovery which led to the failure of identification. However, the trial court found otherwise, and, as set forth above, it is not our place to revisit this finding. Next, appellants argue that the motion in limine was really a motion for evidentiary sanctions without violation of a court order or proof of a willfully false discovery response. Preliminarily, we note that a motion in limine can generally be made to exclude any kind of evidence that could be objected to at trial. (See Rufo v. Simpson (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 573, 608.) Thus, it was not improper for respondents to ask the court to consider appellants’ failure to disclose certain information in the form of a motion in limine. Even if motion in limine 2 of 2 could be considered a motion for evidentiary sanctions, the trial court specifically found that Teresa could have, and should have, disclosed Shirek’s information at an earlier time. This determination of willful nondisclosure supports such an evidentiary sanction. (See Thoren v. Johnston & Washer (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 270, 274 [where “falsity lies in the deliberate omission of the name of a witness, ” an order barring the testimony of the witness may be entered].)
Appellants further argue that the trial court wrongfully created a standard that a deponent is required to volunteer information at a deposition. The trial court did no such thing. On the contrary, the trial court specified that the name should have been disclosed in response to “earlier written discovery.” And finally, appellants claim that it was respondents’ own fault that they did not have the name or identity of Shirek earlier as respondents could have brought a motion to compel if respondents thought that appellants’ discovery responses were inadequate. Citing Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 333-334, appellants argue that the failure to timely file a motion to compel further responses to an evasive or incomplete answer constitutes a waiver of the right to a further response. Absent a failure to obey an order compelling further responses, appellants argue, an evidence sanction is unavailable. However, the court did not find that this was a situation where respondents should have realized that the answers provided were evasive or incomplete. Instead, the court implicitly found that respondents justifiably relied on appellants’ answers, or lack thereof, in assuming that no bona fide offers for the property were made. The court found that Teresa willfully and falsely withheld the witness’s name. Thus, as supported by the Saxena court, an order barring the witness’s testimony is appropriate. (Id. at pp. 331-332; see also Vallbona v. Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1545-1546.)
Appellants made a later attempt to seek reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling on motion in limine 2 of 2. The issue came up in reference to two additional witnesses that appellants wished to call regarding negotiations for the purchase of appellants’ property. The court expressed considerable frustration at the state of the documents filed by appellants. First, the court noted that a document it referred to as “amended response” was signed and filed “pro per.” Despite appellants’ attorney’s attempt to explain that “it was intended to be an exhibit, ” the court ordered the document stricken. That left “only the declaration of [Teresa] and the declaration of [Jack], ” which the court noted, were “not accompanied by [appellants’ counsel’s] signature as an officer of the court.” The court struck all the documents and denied appellants’ renewed motion for reconsideration. Appellants argue that there is no standard requiring an attorney’s signature on all documents filed and the court’s orders striking these documents were erroneous. We note that the court had given appellants’ counsel more than one chance to properly file documents in support of the supplemental oppositions to motion in limine 2 of 2. Writings filed in support of motions must generally be authenticated by declarations confirming that they are true and correct copies of what they purport to be. (Evid. Code, §§ 250, 1401.) In addition, as attorney of record, appellant’s counsel had sole authority to file documents on appellants’ behalf (People v. Merkouris (1956) 46 Cal.2d 540, 554 [where party is represented by counsel, counsel has the exclusive right to appear in court and control the court proceedings, so that neither the party himself nor another attorney can be recognized by the court in the conduct of the case].) The general rule is that a party represented by counsel may not file papers in pro. per. in the litigation. (Downey v. Johnson (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 775, 780.) The trial court’s decision to strike the documents that it considered to be improperly filed under these rules was supported by the law and did not constitute error.
In sum, the trial court’s denial of appellants’ motion for reconsideration of its prior ruling on motion in limine 2 of 2 did not exceed the bounds of reason. On the record before us, we conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred.
C. Motion in limine 1 of 2
Respondents’ motion in limine 1 of 2 sought to exclude evidence “regarding the treatment of any tenant or resident at the [park] other than the treatment of [Jack and Teresa] by [respondents] or anyone acting on behalf of [respondents].” As grounds for exclusion, respondents argued that such evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.
In granting respondents’ motion in limine 1 of 2, the court stated:
“No [appellants’] cause of action... implicates the [respondents’] conduct, vis-à-vis other residents, and there is no cause of action regarding an alleged violation of the Mobilehome Residency Law, so I don’t think we’re going to take up court time under Evidence Code 352 to litigate the actions of the [respondents] with respect to other residents.”
The court stated its position that “the case is about[] whether or not the contractual relationship between the parties was breached in some fashion. The rest of the four or five causes of action are just sort of icing on the initial cause of action.” The court felt that the allegations in the SAC regarding conduct of other residents, and respondents’ failure to control that conduct, were “spurious and irrelevant to the essence of this dispute.” The court granted respondents’ motion subject to reconsideration if appellants showed specific relevance at trial.
Appellants argue that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion. They contend that the evidence in question had a tendency to prove that respondents violated the lease, the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In addition, appellants argue that they could have presented evidence of a long history of selective enforcement of park rules and regulations in support of their position that the claims against Jack for “substantial annoyance” were pretextual and motivated by a desire to obtain the appellants’ land.
Appellants make much of the court’s statements that “there is no cause of action regarding an alleged violation of the Mobilehome Residency Law.” Appellants point out that later, the court agreed that because the MRL is incorporated into the lease, it was a subject of the lawsuit. Appellants argue that because the trial court granted the motion in limine in part on the irrelevance of the MRL, the ruling was an abuse of discretion. However, appellants do not sufficiently explain how the relevance of the MRL affects the relevance of the excluded evidence. In sum, appellants have failed to show that the court’s early statements regarding the lack of a cause of action under the MRL caused the ruling on the motion in limine to be an abuse of discretion.
Appellants claim that by granting the motion in limine, the trial court denied them the right to prove their case. However, appellants fail to cite to a point in the trial transcript where they made an offer of proof to attempt to “show some specific relevance, ” as the trial court offered. Absent such a specific showing, the trial court’s ruling cannot be said to be beyond the bounds of reason. As the court stated, the crux of appellants’ case was their breach of contract cause of action. The main issues were whether appellants had rights to their property under the lease, and whether respondents breached their obligations by issuing a false 60-day termination notice and by refusing to authorize sales of the property. The SAC did not set forth a cause of action for selective enforcement or retaliation, as the trial court pointed out. Appellants did not attempt to show that the respondents’ actions toward any other particular individual were relevant to their claims. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not commit an abuse of discretion.
IV. Attorney fees on discovery motion
Appellants’ final claim is that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award appellants attorney fees after appellants were forced to file a motion to compel further responses to inspection demands served with a notice of deposition. Appellants argue that they were entitled to monetary sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.450, subdivision (c)(1). That provision states:
Respondents argue that because this specific issue was not raised in appellants’ notice of appeal, it should not be considered by this court. We reject this argument. The notice of appeal need not specifically list each issue to be raised, and we may consider issues not specifically designated in the notice of appeal. (People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 860, fn. 4.)
“If a motion under subdivision (a) is granted, the court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) in favor of the party who noticed the deposition and against the deponent or the party with whom the deponent is affiliated, unless the court finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”
Imposition of discovery sanctions lies within the trial court’s discretion and is reviewed only for abuse. (Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 991.) In the minute order provided in the record, the trial court did not set forth its reasoning for its decision to deny sanctions. We find no basis in the record for disturbing the trial court’s implied finding that respondents acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances made the imposition of sanctions unjust. The record reveals no abuse of discretion, and appellants have failed to show that such an abuse occurred.
The reporter’s transcript of the hearing on appellants’ motion to compel is not part of the record on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The trial court erred in determining that Teresa Horak’s tenancy was terminated by operation of the 60-day notice to terminate. As to Teresa Horak’s cause of action for declaratory relief, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. As to her remaining causes of action, the matter is remanded for reconsideration in light of this opinion.
The judgment is affirmed as to Jack Horak, with directions to the trial court to reconsider the attorney fee award in light of this opinion.
Teresa Horak is entitled to her costs on appeal.
We concur, BOREN P. J. DOI TODD. J.
Further, neither party argues that California family law dictates that Teresa should be subject to eviction for the acts of her husband under these circumstances. In fact, as appellants point out, the Family Code provides that “A married person is not liable for any injury or damage caused by the other spouse except in cases where the married person would be liable therefor if the marriage did not exist.” (Fam. Code, § 1000, subd. (a).) Thus, Teresa’s eviction is not justified by the law unless a specific provision in the MRL permits it.