Opinion
June 23, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Bergerman, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the appellants' contentions, in response to the plaintiff's prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the appellants failed to demonstrate the existence of any genuine issues of fact in support of their claimed affirmative defense of tender and payment. "`As a general rule, a tender must include everything to which the creditor is entitled, including interest to the time the tender is made, or else it is not legally effective'" ( National Sav. Bank v. Hartmann, 179 A.D.2d 76, 77, quoting 83 N.Y. Jur 2d, Payment and Tender, § 151, at 38). A valid tender requires an actual proffer of all mortgage arrears ( see, Bank of N.Y. v. Midland Ave. Dev., 193 A.D.2d 641). The tender of arrears will cure a default only prior to notice of acceleration ( Dime Sav. Bank v. Dooley, 84 A.D.2d 804; see also, Dime Sav. Bank v. Glavey, 214 A.D.2d 419, cert denied 517 U.S. 1221).
"The law is clear that when a mortgagor defaults on loan payments, even if only for a day, a mortgagee may accelerate the loan, require that the balance be tendered or commence foreclosure proceedings, and equity will not intervene" ( New York Guardian Mortgagee Corp. v. Olexa, 176 A.D.2d 399, 401). Once a default has been declared and a loan's maturity has been accelerated, a mortgagee is not required to accept a tender of less than full repayment as demanded ( see, Albertina Realty Co. v. Rosbro Realty Corp., 258 N.Y. 472; Albany Sav. Bank v. Seventy-Nine Columbia St., 197 A.D.2d 816). Once a loan has been accelerated, a mortgagor has no right to compel redemption of the loan by tendering only the arrears due ( National Bank v. Cohen, 89 A.D.2d 725).
Application of the foregoing rules to the facts of the instant case leaves no doubt that the appellants did not tender sufficient sums within the relevant time parameters so as to stave off foreclosure. Prior to the effective date of the notice of default and acceleration, they did not tender all arrears plus interest and late charges, and after acceleration they did not tender the entire balance due. Thus, clearly they have no defense of tender as would warrant denial of the plaintiff's summary judgment motion ( see, Farmingdale Realty Trust v. Real Props. MLP Ltd. Partnership, 225 A.D.2d 656; Bank of N.Y. v. Midland Ave. Dev., supra).
The appellants' remaining contentions are without merit.
Miller, J.P., Sullivan, Joy and Altman, JJ., concur.