Opinion
May 27, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Barbara Kapnick, J.).
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the trial court properly determined to submit to the jury only her claim for battery and not her claim for assault. To sustain a claim for assault there must be proof of physical conduct placing plaintiff in imminent apprehension of harmful contact ( Hassan v. Marriott Corp., 243 A.D.2d 406, 407; see also, Charkhy v. Altman, 252 A.D.2d 413). Here, there was no such proof. The complained of conduct, an impulsive reaching motion in plaintiff's direction by her supervisor promptly avoided by plaintiff as she briskly left the supervisor's office, cannot have engendered in plaintiff the requisite imminent apprehension of harmful contact. Nor, contrary to plaintiff's argument, was there error in the trial court's charge upon the submitted battery claim.
Plaintiff also contends that the court should not have permitted her character to become an issue at trial and should not have allowed testimony from defendants' psychiatric expert. However, apart from plaintiff's failure to object to this evidence, rendering her present claim of error unpreserved ( see, John v. City of New York, 235 A.D.2d 210; Smith v. City of New York, 217 A.D.2d 423), her argument is without merit since, by alleging in her complaint that she had been so traumatized by defendants' conduct as to suffer ensuing psychological fears, stress and depression, plaintiff placed her mental condition at issue.
We have considered plaintiff's remaining arguments and find them to be unavailing.
Concur — Nardelli, J. P., Tom, Mazzarelli, Lerner and Buckley, JJ.