Opinion
Civil Action No: 04-1487 Section: "R" (3).
August 6, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant's opposed motion to transfer the action to the Southern District of Alabama and plaintiff's opposed motion to dismiss without prejudice. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES defendant's motion and DENIES plaintiff's motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Tommie Holmes worked for Warrior Gulf and Navigation Company as a Jones Act Seaman aboard the M/V Mobilian. Holmes alleges that he injured his back at work on or about August 4, 2003. Holmes sued Warrior in this Court on May 27, 2004, alleging negligence, unseaworthiness, and unsafe working conditions. ( See Pl.'s Compl., at ¶ VIII.) Warrior moves the Court to transfer this action to the Southern District of Alabama under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Holmes opposes the transfer. Further, Holmes moves the Court to dismiss the action without prejudice because Holmes also sued Warrior in Louisiana state court on July 12, 2004, and would prefer to proceed there instead of in the Southern District of Alabama.
II. TRANSFER STANDARD
The defendant who brings a motion to transfer venue must demonstrate why the case should be transferred to an alternate forum. Trevino v. Louisiana-I Gaming, 2002 WL 27769, No. Civ. A. 00-3110, at *1 (E.D. La. 2002) (citing Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966)). Under Section 1404(a), the Court may transfer an action to any other district where the plaintiff could have filed suit for the convenience of parties and witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The defendant must first demonstrate that the plaintiff could have brought the action transferee court. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1960); In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004). The transferee forum must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Trevino, 2002 WL 27769, at *1. The defendant must then show that a transfer of venue will serve the convenience of the parties, the witnesses, and the interests of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
In weighing a possible transfer, the district court must consider both the private interests of the parties and the public interest. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947). In considering the private interests of the parties, the Court looks at (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the situs of material events; (3) the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses and other trial expenses; (4) the place of the alleged wrong; and (5) the possibility of delay and prejudice if the court grants the transfer. See Laitram Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 120 F. Supp. 2d 607, 608 (E.D. La. 2000). Public interest considerations include (1) the administrative difficulties resulting from court congestion; (2) the relationship of the community from which jurors will be drawn to the litigation; (3) the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; and (4) choice of law issues. See id. The plaintiff's choice of forum is usually entitled to deference. Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1436 (5th Cir. 1989). As a general rule, if the balance of public and private interest factors does not strongly favor the movant, "the district court will not disturb a plaintiff's choice of forum." Trevino, 2002 WL 27769, at *2 (citing In re McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 647 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1981)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Jurisdiction
The Court must first determine whether Holmes could have sued Warrior in the Southern District of Alabama. The Southern District of Alabama has personal jurisdiction over Warrior because Warrior maintains its offices and principal place of business in the district. (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Transfer at 1.) Further, venue is proper in the Southern District of Alabama. Holmes sues under the Jones Act. The Jones Act provides for venue in the district where the defendant resides or where its principal office is located. 46 App. U.S.C. § 688; see also Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 203 (1966) (noting that "although [46 U.S.C. § 688] is framed in jurisdictional terms, the Court has held that it refers only to venue"). The defendant "resides" in any judicial district that has personal jurisdiction over it at the time the action commenced. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). See also Pure Oil Co., 384 U.S. at 204 (applying the definition of residence in § 1391(c) to the Jones Act venue provision). Since Warrior both "resides" and has its principal office in the Southern District of Alabama, venue is proper there as well. Hence, the Court finds that Holmes could have sued Warrior in the Southern District of Alabama.
B. Private and Public Interest Factors
The Court must next determine whether a transfer will serve the convenience of the parties, the witnesses, and the interests of justice. The parties do not dispute the following facts:
1. Holmes is a resident of Creola, Alabama.
2. The alleged incident occurred on the lower Mississippi River in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
3. Holmes was treated at the Chalmette Medical Center emergency room in Chalmette, Louisiana.
4. Holmes's other treating physicians practice in Mobile, Alabama. Holmes also received physical therapy in Mobile, Alabama and Saraland, Alabama.
1. Private Interest Factors (a) Plaintiff's Choice of Forum
Holmes decided to sue Warrior in the Eastern District of Louisiana, where both jurisdiction and venue are proper. Holmes argues that the Court should defer to his choice of forum. There is a "strong presumption" in favor of plaintiff's choice of forum. Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 672 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 (1981)). Therefore, the Court will not disturb plaintiff's choice unless the balance of the private interests and the public interest strongly favors the movant. See In re McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 647 F.2d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1981); Int'l Truck and Engine Corp. v. Quintana, 259 F.Supp.2d 553, 558 (N.D. Tx. 2003); Antley v. Aries Marine Corp., 2001 WL 6727 at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 2, 2001); Continental Ins. Co. V.I.T.O. Corp., 200 WL 777909, at *1 (E.D. La. 2000).
Warrior points out that Holmes is a resident of Alabama, not the Eastern District of Louisiana. Although Holmes is not from the forum, this is not a case where the plaintiff has selected a forum with no connection to the action at all. Indeed, the accident occurred in the waters of the Eastern District of Louisiana. Therefore, despite his Alabama residence, the Court will accord deference to Holmes' choice. Compare Roulston v. Yazoo River Towing, Inc., 2004 WL 1687232 (E.D. La. July 26, 2004) (according little deference to plaintiff's choice of forum when both parties resided outside the chosen forum and the accident likewise occurred outside the chosen forum); with Williams v. Southern Towing Co., 2004 WL 60314 (E.D. La. Jan. 8, 2004) (deferring to plaintiff's choice of forum when the accident occurred within the chosen forum but neither party resided there).
(b) Situs of Material Events
The location of the alleged accident is a significant factor in venue determinations. Chretien v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 169 F.Supp.2d 670, 675 (S.D. Tx. 2001); Dupre v. Spanier Marine Corp., 810 F.Supp. 823, 827 (S.D. Tx. 1993) (noting that the court "possesses a compelling interest in ensuring that individuals who are injured within this district receive prompt and fair compensation for their injuries"). As the Court has stated, the alleged accident here occurred in the Eastern District of Louisiana, and Holmes underwent his initial treatment in Chalmette, Louisiana. Therefore, Holmes' choice of forum has a relationship to the place where the facts of the dispute occurred. See Williams, 2004 WL 60314, at *3 (emphasizing the relationship between accident at issue in the lawsuit and the chosen forum).
(c) Convenience of the Witnesses and Location of Documents and Records
Warrior argues that the Southern District of Alabama is more convenient for the witnesses. The Southern District of Alabama is more convenient for Warrior because its offices are in Chickasaw, Alabama. The convenience of non-party witnesses, however, is more important than the convenience of party witnesses. Tig Insurance Co. v. Nafco Ins. Co., 177 F.Supp.2d 561, 568 (N.D. Tx. 2001); Sargent v. Sun Trust Bank, N.A., 2004 WL 1630081, at *3 (N.D. Tx. July 20, 2004).
The movant must make a specific showing that the witnesses are necessary and what their testimony will be to justify a transfer on the basis of the convenience of non-party witnesses. Clark v. Moran Towing and Transp. Co., Inc., 738 F.Supp. 1023, 1031 (E.D. La. 1990); United Companies Life Ins. Co. v. Butler-Phillips Mgmt. Services, Inc., 741 F.Supp. 1244, 1246 (M.D. La. 1990). Bald assertions alone do not satisfy the movant's burden. Clark, 738 F.Supp. at 1031. Warrior identifies only two potential fact witnesses who live in the Southern District of Alabama: the vessel master and a member of the crew. Although Warrior identifies one as an eyewitness and the other as the vessel master, Warrior does not outline their testimony with any specificity. Warrior has not met its burden to justify a transfer of the action based on these two witnesses. See Tig, 177 F.Supp.2d at 569 (noting that a brief phrase summarizing likely testimony is inadequate); S J Diving Inc. v. Doo-Pie, Inc., 2002 WL 1163627, at *5 (S.D. Tx. May 30, 2002) (noting that the movant must specifically identify the witnesses and outline their testimony); cf. Nations AG II, L.L.C. v. The Hide Co L.L.C., 2004 WL 1496312, at *5 (N.D. Tx. June 30, 2004) (denying transfer because movant provided only testimony that witnesses outside of the forum were necessary to the case, but did not provide evidence as to how or why they were relevant). Warrior also identifies a third crew member who may be called as a witness, but it offers no evidence to indicate that he has any information relevant to this accident. Warrior's bare assertion that such a crew member may be called as a witness is likewise insufficient to justify a transfer. See Antley, 2001 WL 6727, at *2 (declining to transfer the action in part because there was no evidence that the witnesses the movant identified would be required). Additionally, these witnesses are Warrior's employees. Warrior will be able to compel their testimony at trial. Thus, their convenience is entitled to lesser weight. See Tig, 177 F.Supp.2d at 569 (noting that the court gives less consideration to the convenience of employee witnesses of the movant because the movant can compel their testimony at trial); Doo-Pie, 2002 WL 11627, at *6 (same).
Warrior also submits that four of Holmes's treating physicians practice in Mobile, Alabama, and only one resides in the Eastern District of Louisiana. To begin with, simply because Holmes saw these physicians does not necessarily mean that they will testify in the action. Warrior submits some of Holmes's medical records with its motion to transfer, but Warrior does not indicate whether the doctors' testimony will be required. Warrior does not explain why and how their testimony relates to the action. Additionally, Warrior does not outline with specificity the substance of the doctors' testimony. See Doo-Pie, 2002 WL 1163627, at *5. Furthermore, the Court notes that doctors often testify by deposition, which is actually more convenient for them than waiting around to testify in court. See Abravanel v. Day, 2002 WL 32319057, at *2 (N.D. Tx. May 14, 2002) (noting that doctors often testify by deposition). Moreover, Holmes notes that Warrior selected most of his doctors and healthcare providers. Because Warrior-the party moving for the transfer-selected Holmes's doctors and healthcare providers, the Court will accord less weight to their convenience. See Williams, 2004 WL 60314, at *2 (noting that the defendant-employer selected plaintiff-employee's doctors, and therefore considering the location of the doctors in deciding a motion to transfer would invite forum-shopping on the part of employers); cf. Doo-Pie, 2002 WL 1163627, at *6 (according less weight to the convenience of parties who are the employees of the movant).
Warrior argues that the Southern District of Alabama is more convenient because all Holmes's employment records are there, and most of his medical records are also there. This factor is not compelling. "A personal injury action is typically not the type of action where the location of books and records is of paramount importance." Lebouef v. Gulf Operators, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 1057, 1060 (S.D. Tx. 1998) (according little weight to location of books and records in a Jones Act personal injury action); see also Chretien, 169 F.Supp.2d at 675 (noting that "in a simple tort suit . . . it is especially unlikely that a multitude of documents will be necessary"); compare Mobil Corp. v. S.E.C., 550 F.Supp. 67, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (transferring an action where over 7,000 documents were expected to be produced).
(d) Delay or Prejudice
A prompt trial is relevant to deciding a motion to transfer. Dupre, 810 F.Supp. at 827. Currently, trial in this action is set for January 24, 2005. Holmes asserts that because parties have already held a preliminary scheduling conference, transfer will delay his case. If this case is transferred, another conference will be required to set a new trial date. The trial date here is less than six months away. Warrior submits nothing to suggest that Holmes could get an equally early trial date in the transferee district.
(e) Convenience of Holmes' Lawyer
Holmes argues that because his lawyer is located in New Orleans, this Court should deny transfer. "The factor of `location of counsel' is irrelevant and improper for consideration in determining the question of transfer of venue." Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d at 434; see also In re Volkswagon AG, 371 F.3d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding reversible error where the district court considered the location of the parties' counsel in deciding a motion to transfer). The Court will not consider the location of Holmes's counsel in deciding the motion to transfer.
2. Public Interest Factors (a) Court Congestion
Court congestion is a relevant consideration in deciding a motion to transfer. As Holmes has pointed out, the Eastern District of Louisiana moves its docket expeditiously. Warrior has not rebutted Holmes' assertion. Retaining this action will not result in administrative difficulty or congestion in this Court. See Martin v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 2003 WL 328311, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 12, 2003) (retaining the action in part because this Court's docket is not congested). Moreover, Warrior has not demonstrated what impact, if any, transfer will have on the docket of the Southern District of Alabama. Cf. Howard v. Home Depot, 2003 WL 21435750, at *3 (N.D. Tx. June 16, 2003) (declining to transfer action in part because movant did not demonstrate how transfer would ease congestion of the court's docket).
(b) The Relationship of the Controversy to the Forum
Holmes was injured in the Eastern District of Louisiana. Thus, the controversy is local to the Eastern District of Louisiana. See Roulston, 2004 WL 1687232, at *3 (finding a controversy local to the district in which the injury occurred); Florida Marine Transporters v. Lawson and Lawson Towing Co., Inc., 2001 WL 1018364, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug 31, 2001) (finding that because the incident occurred in Missouri, the Eastern District of Missouri had a greater local interest in the case than the district where the defendant's office are located). Because the dispute is a local one, the jurors of this community have an interest in the resolution of the dispute.
(c) Choice of Law Issues
Holmes sues under the Jones Act and maritime law. Therefore, the same law applies regardless of which district court applies it. Accordingly, this Court is equally competent to evaluate Holmes's claims as any other district court. See Williams, 2004 WL 60314, at *2 (noting that where plaintiff sued under the Jones Act, the court was as competent as another federal district court).
3. Conclusion
Holmes's choice of forum is entitled to great deference. Warrior has not shown that either the private interests or the public interest weigh so heavily in favor of transfer to justify disturbing Holmes's choice of forum. Accordingly, the Court will not transfer the action to the Southern District of Alabama.
C. Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice
Holmes moved the Court to dismiss this action without prejudice if the Court decides to grant Warrior's motion to transfer. Because the Court decides that transfer is not appropriate, the Court denies Holmes's motion to dismiss as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Warrior's motion to transfer venue and DENIES Holmes's motion to dismiss.