Opinion
Record No. 0543-92-4
February 2, 1993
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Cecil A. Creasey, Jr.; Sands, Anderson, Marks Miller, on brief), for appellants.
(Peter C. DePaolis; Kenneth D. Bynum; Koonz, McKenney, Johnson DePaolis, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Barrow, Moon and Bray
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission. Rule 5A:27.
Holly Farms Poultry and its insurer contend that the commission erred in finding that Shirley A. Thomas met her burden of proving she sustained a compensable occupational disease.
Thomas worked for Holly Farms for twenty years. She testified that in her job as a trimmer she was required to use metal clippers which she gripped with her right hand to cut chickens at a rate of approximately 70 chickens per minute. At times the clippers were dull and she had to apply a great deal of pressure to cut the chickens. Sometime in late 1989 and into the Spring of 1990, Thomas noticed that her hands were hurting and swelling. She brought this to the attention of her supervisor and the Holly Farms' medical personnel.
Thomas was referred to Dr. Bond, the company physician. He examined her, ran nerve tests and prescribed Advil for her symptoms. The nurses' notes indicate that on December 30, 1989, Thomas complained of pain and soreness in the right wrist, stated that it had been hurting for several years, that the condition bothered her when she had to cut with scissors or a knife, and that she had a pulling sensation up her wrist and arm.
Thomas' pain persisted and became worse. Thus, she scheduled an appointment with Dr. Kennedy S. Daniels, orthopedic surgeon, in April, 1990. Dr. Daniels treated Thomas and she ultimately underwent carpal tunnel release surgery.
In a letter dated June 20, 1991, which is part of the record, Dr. Daniels stated that it was his opinion that Thomas' carpal tunnel syndrome was directly related to her occupation, as an overuse type syndrome leading to tendonitis at the wrist and subsequent median nerve entrapment or carpal tunnel syndrome. He found no evidence that Thomas' symptoms were related to any activities outside of her employment or any other medical conditions. His impression was that Thomas was not suffering from an ordinary disease of life, but rather her problem was secondary to repetitive activity. In his de bene esse deposition, Dr. Daniels stated that Thomas' repetitive work clipping chickens with the hand gripper is "the only definable cause" of her occupational disease.
In order for a disease to be compensable under Code § 65.1-46 (now Code § 65.2-400), each of six conditions must be met, as set out by this Court in Merillat Industries, Inc. v. Parks, 15 Va. App. ___, ___, 421 S.E.2d 867, 868 n. 2 (1992). A 1986 amendment to Code § 65.1-46(4) (now Code § 65.2-400(B)(4)), requires a claimant to meet a more rigorous standard of proof, as set out in Code § 65.1-46.1 (now Code § 65.2-401), where a claimant's occupational disease may have resulted from substantial exposure outside of the employment. However, where, as here, there is no suggestion that Thomas' condition resulted from exposure outside of her employment, we need not look beyond the four corners of Code § 65.1-46 (now Code § 65.2-400).
In order to establish her claim as compensable, Thomas must prove an injury. Code § 65.1-7 (now Code § 65.2-101) defines an injury as either an injury by accident or an occupational disease "arising out of and in the course of the employment," but not including "a disease in any form, except when it results naturally and unavoidably from either of the foregoing causes." Here, the claimant's condition is not an injury by accident.See Morris v. Morris, 238 Va. 578, 385 S.E.2d 858 (1989) (holding that injuries from repetitive trauma are not injuries by accident). We reject appellants' argument that Thomas sustained a noncompensable injury. See Merillat, 15 Va. App. at ___, 421 S.E.2d at 871.
In its February 28, 1992 opinion, the full commission reviewed the history of this case and found that, based on evidence satisfying each of the six conditions set out in Code § 65.1-46 (now Code § 65.2-400), Thomas' disease was an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of her employment. The full commission stated:
We find that the medical evidence in the record specifically rules out the employee's carpal tunnel syndrome as an ordinary disease of life and names specific external conditions (other than work) which are absent in this case and which could produce carpal tunnel syndrome. Further, the medical evidence specifically relates the claimant's condition to injury which had its origin in the workplace. see Knott v. Blue Bell, Inc., 7 Va. App. 335, 373 S.E.2d 481 (1988).
The burden of proof necessary to establish an occupational disease pursuant to Code § 65.1-46 (now Code § 65.2-400), preponderance of the evidence, has been met.
"Whether a disease is causally related to the employment and not causally related to other factors is . . . a finding of fact." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 12, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988) (citation omitted). When there is credible evidence to support it, such a finding is "conclusive and binding" on this Court. Id. Nothing in the evidence undermines the commission's conclusion that Thomas' condition flowed from her employment as a natural consequence. Dr. Daniels' records and testimony provide credible evidence to support the commission's finding that the six factors set out in Code § 65.1-46 (now Code § 65.2-400), were met by a preponderance of the evidence.
For the foregoing reasons, the commission's decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.