Opinion
5:23-cv-00001-MTT-MSH
08-11-2023
MICHAEL DAVID HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER WARD, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
STEPHEN HYLES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
This case is currently before the United States Magistrate Judge for screening as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pro se Plaintiff Michael David Holloway, a prisoner confined in Macon State Prison in Oglethorpe, Georgia, filed a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) which was denied due to Plaintiff's ability to pay the filing fee (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff was ordered to pay the filing fee (ECF No. 8). On January 18, 2023, this Court conducted a preliminary review of Plaintiff's complaint and found many deficiencies including time-barred allegations, shotgun pleading, respondent superior claims, and improperly joined claims. See Order, ECF No. 4. Thus, Plaintiff was ordered to recast his complaint and provided with instructions on how to do so. Id. Plaintiff's complaint was later dismissed on March 27, 2023, for failure to pay the filing fee and failure to submit a recast complaint as ordered. See Order of Dismissal, ECF No. 11. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration (ECF No. 15). Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration was granted because Plaintiff had indeed paid the filing fee prior to the dismissal of this action. See Order, ECF No. 16. Because Plaintiff had still not submitted a recast complaint, he was once more ordered to submit a recast complaint and provided instructions on how to do so. Id. Plaintiff then submitted his recast complaint. Recast Compl., ECF No. 17. However, Plaintiff failed to include a statement of claim within his recast complaint. See id. On July 20, 2023, Plaintiff was provided one more opportunity to submit a sound complaint to this Court and he was given fourteen days to do so. Order, ECF No. 18. The time to submit another amended complaint has passed. This civil action is now ripe for preliminary review. On such review, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
I. Standard of Review
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner complaint “which seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” Section 1915A(b) requires a federal court to dismiss a prisoner complaint that is: (1) “frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;” or (2) “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.”
A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are “clearly baseless” or that the legal theories are “indisputably meritless.” Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” and that the complaint “must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (explaining that “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Additionally, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim when an affirmative defense, such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies or the statute of limitations, appears on the face of the complaint. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215-16 (2007).
In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). In order to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. See Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a § 1983 complaint because the plaintiff's factual allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the standard in § 1915A “shall” be dismissed on preliminary review).
Plaintiff was specifically advised that an amended complaint supersedes an original complaint, and the amended complaint will take the place of the original pleading. Order 5, Jan. 18, 2023; see also Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007); Schreane v. Middlebrookst 522 Fed.Appx. 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (noting that generally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts the original complaint).
Plaintiff states that “thru discovery, Plaintiff will expose the Defendants' failures that shame them and the state agency they manage.” Recast Compl. 4. He further states he “intend[s] for a jury to hear [his] case and thereupon the two defendants be held accountable.” Id. at 5.
A. Plaintiff's Claims
It is unclear why Plaintiff has brought this civil action and named Commissioner Ward and Warden Smith as Defendants. Plaintiff does not provide any allegations or present any claims regarding the Defendants other than simply naming them as Defendants and inferring that, through discovery and trial, he will prove that these Defendants have wronged him in some unspecified way. See Recast Compl. A district court properly dismisses a complaint when the plaintiff, other than naming the defendant in the caption of the complaint, fails to state any allegations that connect the defendant with an alleged constitutional violation. Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Pamel Corp. v. P.R. Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1980)) (“While we do not require technical niceties in pleading, we must demand that the complaint state with some minimal particularity how overt acts of the defendant caused a legal wrong.”); Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986); Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (stating there must be proof of an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular person ‘under color of state law' and the constitutional deprivation”).
If Plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim based solely upon either Defendant's supervisory roles as Commissioner or Warden, his claim still fails. It is well-settled in the Eleventh Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. See, e.g., Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, a prisoner must allege facts showing either that a supervisor personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation or that there is a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation to state a claim against a prison official based solely on their supervisory position. See Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999); Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 995 (11th Cir. 2003); Hendrix v. Tucker, 535 Fed.Appx. 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“The standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nowhere in Plaintiff's complaint is there any allegation that would plausibly support an inference that these named Defendants had direct or indirect involvement in any violation of the Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Asad v. Crosby, 158 Fed.Appx. 166, 170-72 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court's dismissal of supervisory liability claims against two defendants because the record failed to show that they “personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations, or that there was a causal connection between the supervisory defendants' actions and an alleged constitutional violation”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure “to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with Judge Marc T. Treadwell, United States District Chief Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
SO RECOMMENDED.