Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-2347, SECTION "C" (3)
December 2, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Paula Cino, a third year law student at Tulane University School of Law, contributed significantly to the research and preparation of this decision.
Before the Court is Defendants', Gary Angelo, Robert P. Roth, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development, Motion to Dismiss Complaint as Frivolous, for Failure to State a Claim on which Relief may be Granted, and/or because the Plaintiff seeks Monetary Relief against Defendants who are Immune from such Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),(ii), and (iii) and FRCP Rules 12(b)(1) and (6). Also, before the Court is Defendant's, David Knight, Motion to Dismiss and for Award of Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
After a thorough review of the law, the record, the motions, and the memoranda filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Complaint as Frivolous, for Failure to State a Claim on which Relief may be Granted, and/or because the Plaintiff seeks Monetary Relief against Defendants who are Immune from such Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),(ii), and (iii) and FRCP Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Defendant's, David Knight, Motion to Dismiss and for Award of Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) is GRANTED IN PART and DENTED IN PART.
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jo Jo Holden (hereinafter referred to as "Holden"), was employed by Defendant, State of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (hereinafter referred to as "DOTD"), since December 11, 1978. On October 16, 2001, a workplace altercation occurred between Holden and another DOTD employee, the defendant, David Knight (hereinafter referred to as "Knight"). Subsequent to an internal investigation, DOTD personnel gave Holden the choice of resigning or being fired for violation of a zero tolerance policy concerning workplace altercations. Holden resigned and his employment with DOTD was terminated, effective November 8, 2001.
On October 16, 2002, Holden brought suit against Defendants in the twenty-first judicial district court, Parish of Tangipahoa, State of Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 10, exhibit 1). Holden filed this suit, which is almost identical to his state court suit, on August 19, 2003, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983, La. R.S. 23:332, and state law claims of vicarious liability and battery.
Defendants, Gary Angelo, Robert P. Roth, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development, argue that Holden's claims against them should be dismissed because (1) Holden's claims have prescribed, (2) the Department of Transportation and Development is immune to suit in federal court pursuant to the eleventh amendment, (3) Holden is not entitled to damages against Defendants Gary Angelo and Robert P. Roth in their official capacity, and (4) Gary Angelo and Robert P. Roth are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Defendants, Gary Angelo, Robert P. Roth, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development, also move for an order requiring Holden to amend his complaint to plead with particularity all material facts on which he contends his right to recovery will be established, including detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity cannot be sustained, pursuant to Elliot v. Perez, and/or an order requiring Holden to file a Rule 7 Reply tailored to meet the defendants' defense of qualified immunity.
Defendant, David Knight, argues that Holden's claims against him should be dismissed because he was not acting "under color of law", Holden's claims against him have prescribed, Holden failed to exhaust federal administrative remedies, and this Court should dismiss the state law claims against him after the Court dismisses the federal claims against him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Defendant, David Knight, also argues that he is entitled to attorneys' fees because Holden's action is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A) The Department of Transportation and Development
The Plaintiff has no opposition to the dismissal of its claims against the Department of Transportation and Development.
B) Plaintiff's Official Capacity Claims for Damages against Gary Angelo and Robert P. Roth
The Plaintiff has no opposition to the dismissal of his claims for damages against Gary Angelo and Robert P. Roth. However, State agents may be sued in their official capacity where the plaintiff seeks injunctive or prospective relief. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). As such, if any of the plaintiff's claims can be interpreted as seeking "prospective injunctive relief they will remain viable against Angelo and Roth. In this case, the plaintiff has sought to "enjoin" the DOTD from engaging in future unlawful practices. Rec Doc. 1, p. 14. Further, the plaintiff seeks reinstatement, which is construed as permissible, injunctive relief. Berrigan v. Louisiana Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1998 WL 2359, 5 (E.D. La.), citing Handler v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, aff'd per curiam on rehearing, 522 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1975).
C) Plaintiff's Claims against David Knight
The Plaintiff has no opposition to the dismissal of all its claims against David Knight, except the state law battery claim.
D) Prescription
It is well-established that § 1983 actions are not governed by specific statute of limitations and tolling rules, when brought in federal court. See Board of Regents of University of New York v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483 (1980) ("Congress did not establish a statute of limitations or a body of tolling rules applicable to actions . . . under § 1983-a void which is commonplace in federal statutory law."). To remedy this statutory silence, the Supreme Court has looked to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a gap-filler. Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S.42, 47-48 (1984). Section 1988 instructs federal courts hearing a § 1983 action to borrow the forum state's law of limitations and tolling, which would govern an analogous state cause of action, as long as that law is not inconsistent with federal law. Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S., at 483-85; See also Jacobsen v. Osborne, 133 F.3d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1998). Similarly, claims brought under § 1981 are governed by the most closely analogous limitations period provided under state law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); See also White v. United Parcel Service, 692 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1982). However, this does not clarify which state statute of limitation law should apply, given that particular § 1983 actions could be analogized to more than one state-law cause of action. In the interests of uniformity, predictability, and judicial economy, the Supreme Court adopted one cause of action to be applied to all § 1983 claims, for limitations purposes. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 (1985). As such, the Court held that § 1983 actions "are best characterized as personal injury actions." Id. at 280.
Section 1988 provides in relevant part:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this [chapter and Title 18], for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. . . .
In Louisiana, personal injury claims are governed by La. Civ. Code Art. 3492, which provides for a prescriptive period of one year from the date of injury or damage. For purposes of calculating the limitations period, a § 1983 cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which forms the basis of the action. Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998). While the defendants correctly identify the proper state law-governing the prescriptive period for this action, they fail to recognize the effect of the state's tolling or interruption of prescription statutes. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S., at 485, quoting Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. at 463-464 ("Any period of limitation . . . is understood fully only in the context of the various circumstances that suspend it from running against a particular cause of action.").
La. Civ. Code Art. 3462 provides that "[p]rescription is interrupted . . . when the obligee commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue." Further, "interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit in a competent court and in the proper venue . . . continues as long as the suit is pending." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3463. Finally, under both Louisiana and federal law, an action 'commences' when it is filed. La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 421 ('A civil action is a demand for the enforcement of a legal right. It is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction.'); Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 ('A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.')." New York Life Insurance Co. v. Deshotel, 142 F.3d 873, 884 (5th Cir. 1998).
In this case, the plaintiff filed his complaint in the federal district court on August 19, 2003 (approximately 9 months after his claims would have prescribed under Art. 3492 alone). However, the plaintiff's federal complaint was filed subsequent to the filing of a state suit on October 16, 2002. Plaintiff's state suit alleged the same causes of action and named the same parties as his federal complaint. Further, it was filed within one year of the October 16, 2001 altercation, which prefaced plaintiff's termination. As of October 21, 2003, the plaintiff's state suit was still pending in the 21st Judicial District Court of Louisiana. Finally, since § 1983 actions are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, plaintiff's state suit was filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. Therefore, prescription was interrupted by the filing of plaintiff's state suit on October 16, 2002, and continued to be interrupted at the filing of his federal suit.
2) State Claims
This court is empowered to hear the plaintiff's state law claims through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Both parties agree that Louisiana state law provides the applicable statute of limitations. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As such, the above analysis of Louisiana's law of prescription and interruption is equally applicable here. Therefore, since the plaintiff's state suit mirrors the state claims brought in his federal complaint, prescription was effectively interrupted.
E) Qualified Immunity
The defendants seek dismissal of the complaint against Angelo and Roth based on the doctrine of qualified immunity. When government officials perform discretionary functions, they "generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory and constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). However, the qualified immunity defense does not apply in a suit for prospective injunctive relief, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), and qualified immunity protection is only available to defendants sued in their individual capacity. See Matherne v. Wilson, 851 F.2d 752, 759 (5th Cir. 1988), citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 87-88.
On its' face, the plaintiff's complaint only asserts claims against Angelo and Roth in their "official capacities." Rec. Doc. 1, p. 13. And, other than the mention of "in solido" liability in the prayer for relief, the plaintiff failed to specify that he sought damages directly from Angelo and Roth. On the other hand, the complaint names the defendants separately from the DOTD and does not reference their respective titles. Further, it consistently refers to the defendants' individual actions and motivations, apart from the established policy of the DOTD. Finally, the plaintiff seeks punitive damages, which are not recoverable from a governmental entity.
The Fifth Circuit has established that a parties' capacity "need not be pled except to the extent required to show the jurisdiction of the court." Parker v. Graves, 479 F.2d 335, 336 (5th Cir. 1973), citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(a). In Parker, the court held that "the allegations in the complaint must be examined in order to determine the nature of the plaintiff's cause of action", and that the failure to allege capacity was "merely a formal error and not a fatal defect." Id. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit looks to the substance of the claim, the relief sought, and the course of proceedings to determine whether a suit has been brought against a state official in their "official" or "individual" capacity, Forside v. Mississippi State University, 2002 WL 31992181, n. 2 (N.D. Miss.).
A plaintiff is usually not required to designate under which capacity they are bringing suit against a defendant through particular words in the pleading. However, these cases allowing a court to infer "capacity" from the proceedings, arise from situations in which the plaintiff's complaint was ambiguous or uncertain as to whether the defendant was being sued individually or officially. See Id. at 3. The present case is therefore distinguished because, here, the plaintiff repeatedly specified that he was seeking relief against Angelo and Roth "in their official capacity." Rec Doc. 1, p. 13. As such, looking past the complaint's explicit recognition of plaintiff's intent to bring suit against defendants in their official capacity, has not been sanctioned by this court. Therefore, the defendant's discussion of qualified immunity and its respective heightened pleading requirement is misplaced.
At any rate, the Plaintiff has not objected to the dismissal of his claims for damages against Gary Angelo and Robert P. Roth.
Because the defense of qualified immunity cannot be sustained in a suit for injunctive relief against a state officer in his official capacity, the Defendants are not entitled to demand that the Plaintiff plead with particularity all material facts on which he contends his right to recovery will be established, including detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity cannot be sustained, pursuant to Elliot v. Perez, or to file a Rule 7 Reply tailored to meet the defendants' defense of qualified immunity.
F) Knight's Motion to Dismiss
In his opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the plaintiff stipulates that he is asserting no federal civil rights claims against the defendant, David Knight. The plaintiff further stipulates that the only claim asserted against Knight is a state law claim for battery. As such, the defendant argues that since there are no federal claims remaining against Knight, the plaintiff's supplemental state law claims should be dismissed.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court, in its discretion, may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction overstate claims, where the court has dismissed all federal claims. However, the Supreme Court has noted that "a court 'should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity' to decide whether to exercise pendent jurisdiction." Parker Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992), citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). In this case, the fact that the litigation is in its earliest stages cuts in favor of dismissal of the supplemental state claim against Knight. Further, such a dismissal would not unduly prejudice the plaintiff, since he has the same claim pending against Knight in state court (i.e. dismissal of the claim from federal court would not result in loss of the plaintiff's ability to litigate the claim). However, the court must also consider the effect of dismissal to the remaining defendants, whose state claims will still be pending in federal court. Presumably, the litigation of state claims against any of the defendants will necessitate the involvement of Knight. Therefore, the interests of judicial economy and convenience weigh in favor of continued jurisdiction over Knight's state claim.
G) Attorney's Fees
In Dean v. Riser, the Fifth Circuit established that attorney's fees for prevailing defendants are presumptively unavailable unless a showing is made that the underlying civil rights claim was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without merit. 240 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, the plaintiff's underlying civil rights claims were not frivolous, nor does it appear that they were brought in bad faith. Moreover, the plaintiff has stipulated that he has asserted no civil rights claims against Knight. Therefore, attorney's fees do not appear appropriate at this time.
III. CONCLUSION
The Defendants', Gary Angelo, Robert P. Roth, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development, Motion to Dismiss Complaint as Frivolous, for Failure to State a Claim on which Relief may be Granted, and/or because the Plaintiff seeks Monetary Relief against Defendants who are Immune from such Relief Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i),(ii), and (iii) and FRCP Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Defendant's, David Knight, Motion to Dismiss and for Award of Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development, are DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Plaintiff's claims for damages against Defendants, Gary Angelo and Robert P. Roth, are dismissed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all plaintiff's claims against Defendant, David Knight, except his claim for battery are dismissed.
The Court shall not issue either an order requiring Holden to amend his complaint to plead with particularity all material facts on which he contends his right to recovery will be established, including detailed facts supporting the contention that the plea of immunity cannot be sustained, pursuant to Elliot v. Perez or an order requiring Holden to file a Rule 7 Reply tailored to meet the defendants' defense of qualified immunity.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court shall retain jurisdiction of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant, David Knight, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no attorneys' fees shall be awarded to Defendant, David Knight.