Summary
holding that plaintiff failed to state a claim for wrongful eviction where he did not allege that he was defendant's tenant
Summary of this case from Association Casualty Insurance Co. v. Paragon Foods, Inc.Opinion
32991.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 14, 1950.
Action for damages; from Fulton Superior Court — Judge Shaw. January 24, 1950.
Hartshorn Forbes, for plaintiff.
Thomas B. Branch Jr., J. C. Tanksley, Allen E. Lockerman, for defendant.
Stripped of all immaterial and irrelevant matter the petition in this case, being apparently an action in tort, does not show that the defendant owed the plaintiff any duty either as a tenant or as an employee and contains no allegation of the violation of any such duty, and for this reason sets forth no cause of action. The trial court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer and in dismissing the action. A petition, in order to withstand a general demurrer should allege a duty owing to the plaintiff by the defendant, either by contract or as the result of some relationship between the parties, a violation of that duty and damages resulting therefrom. Vickers v. Georgia Power Co., 79 Ga. App. 456, 458 ( 54 S.E.2d, 152). The failure of the plaintiff to allege all of these fundamental elements with a degree of clarity sufficient to show, in some intelligible and logical manner, how the duty arose and to show wherein the defendant has violated it and how the damages resulted, is fatal to the cause of action.
Judgment affirmed. Sutton, C. J., and Felton, J., concur.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 14, 1950.
STATEMENT OF FACTS BY WORRILL, J.
The plaintiff filed suit against the defendants and alleged that he had been injured and damaged by them to the extent of $10,000. The petition, as amended, alleged substantially as follows: that the petitioner was a resident of the Y. M. C. A. until about January 22, 1949, when the defendant Larson made a written demand that he leave the premises; that said demand to vacate was wrongful in that the petitioner had not violated his duties to the Y. M. C. A., and had not failed to pay his rent and because of other facts alleged; that prior to this the petitioner had submitted to the Board of Directors of the Y. M. C. A. a request that he be granted a hearing concerning certain facts that had taken place as alleged in the petition; that the petitioner has never been granted an opportunity to present his case; that, while he was working at the Y. M. C. A., the petitioner was instructed to cover up for the absence of William Parker (one of the defendants) while he was on two trips out of the State; that the petitioner believed that such action on his part was improper and would have the color of dishonesty; that the acts set out in the petition were tortious and constituted a conspiracy for the purpose of having the petitioner discharged and forced to leave the Y. M. C. A.; that these acts were done within the scope of their employment and in the usual course of business; that the petitioner was entitled to a hearing before the Board of Directors of the Y. M. C. A. before being ordered to leave; and that the petitioner has been injured by the defendants as set out for the reason that the acts of the defendants are the direct and proximate cause of him losing his job and place to live, and the humiliation and wounded feelings.
By amendment the plaintiff added additional allegations that: the individual defendants entered into a conspiracy to wrongfully discharge and evict the petitioner from the premises of the defendant corporation and further did conspire to force the petitioner to leave the City of Atlanta, if it were possible; that an agent of the defendants unknown to the plaintiff called a representative of the Veterans' Administration and told the representative that the petitioner should be sent to a veterans' hospital or home, and this caused an embarrassing and humiliating situation to the petitioner when he next called for his physical examination at the Veterans' Administration; that in furtherance of the conspiracy, the defendant, Charles Younts told the petitioner that he should leave the City of Atlanta; that the defendants also called a staff meeting of the Y. M. C. A. for the purpose of discharging the petitioner and evicting him and he was not allowed to be present; that on or about January 7, 1949 one Parker called the plaintiff to his office and told him that he was going to run him out of the Y. M. C. A., and at this time in the said Parker's office one Dunkle threatened the petitioner with a Coca-Cola bottle; that an agent of the defendants called a representative of the Atlanta Police Department who came to the Y. M. C. A. to see the petitioner and this representative ordered the petitioner to come to the Police Department the following Tuesday and report to him, and the petitioner was thus ordered to report four or five more times all of which the petitioner did; and that on or about the 21st day of January, 1949, the petitioner was forced to leave the Y. M. C. A. at a time when the weather was cold, and it was raining; and that at that time the petitioner was in bad health and all this further endangered his health. Because of these facts the petitioner prayed for $10,000 actual, punitive, and vindictive damages.