COLLINS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is an appeal by Julius Hoffman, from an order of the Baltimore City Court affirming the decision of the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals, (the Board), which denied a permit to use a portion of the lot, zoned residentially, located at 3420 Fourth Street in Baltimore City, for the storage of building materials.

The appellant is a part owner, with others, of the lot of ground here in question, which is zoned partly for industrial use and partly for residential use. The total lot has a frontage of 299 feet on Fourth Street. It is bounded on the north by the right-of-way of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, on the west by a vacant lot, zoned industrially, and on the south by a vacant lot, zoned residentially, and Arsan Avenue. South of Arsan Avenue are seven dwellings fronting on Maude Avenue with their rear toward Arsan Avenue, zoned residentially. Across Fourth Street there is another vacant lot, zoned residentially and, according to the testimony, a very poor location for houses. It already fronts on this lumber yard. The appellant has a legal existing use and actually uses the north portion of this lot, consisting of 32,450 square feet and fronting 179 feet on Fourth Street for the storage of building materials with an office building located thereon. The remaining part of the lot, containing 43, 350 square feet, sought to be re-zoned, fronting on its east side 120 feet on Fourth Street and running back westerly 363 feet 2 inches to a vacant lot in the Industrial Zone, is vacant and zoned residentially. It is bounded on the south by a vacant lot, zoned residentially, and Arsan Avenue. South of Arsan Avenue are the seven houses fronting on Maude Avenue, zoned residentially. It is bounded on the north by the remaining part of the lot, zoned industrially, and on the west by a vacant lot, zoned industrially. Appellant, when he purchased this whole lot in question in 1948, was informed at the City Hall Zoning Division, and the Use District Map showed, according to the testimony, that the part of the lot here sought to be zoned second commercially, was "all right to use for the storage of building materials". Consequently, appellant signed the contract of sale and paid one thousand dollars on the purchase price. Before settlement, he found out that part was zoned residential and rather than forfeit the deposit, he completed the purchase. This part of the lot had actually been zoned residentially since the Baltimore City Zoning Ordinance No. 1247 was adopted, effective March 30, 1931. On February 8, 1949, the appellant appealed to the Board for a permit to construct a six foot fence around the part of the lot zoned industrially and that part now sought to be zoned second commercially. This permit was approved and the fence has been built.

The appellant previously appealed to the Board for permit to use the Residential Use portion of the lot for the storage of building materials. On December 6th, 1949, appellant dismissed the appeal for that permit. On February 23, 1950, the appellant made application to the Building Inspection Engineer of Baltimore City for a permit to use the area of the lot in question which is zoned residentially for the storage of building materials in connection with the existing storage of building materials on the remainder of the lot. The Zoning Commission rejected the permit and the appellant appealed to the Board for an order authorizing an exception to the requirements of the Zoning Ordinance. At the meeting of the Board, three members voted to grant the permit and two members voted to deny it. As the Zoning Ordinance requires the vote of four members to reverse the action of the Zoning Commissioner, his disapproval of the permit was approved and the permit denied. On appeal from the decision of the Board to the Baltimore City Court the case was heard on the transcript of the record of the proceedings before the Board and no additional testimony was taken. However, by agreement of counsel, Zoning Ordinance No. 1247, effective March 30, 1951, with the amendments thereto, was offered in evidence. From the order of the Baltimore City Court sustaining the decision of the Board and denying the permit, the appeal comes to this Court.

In the testimony before the Board, Mr. Magee, engaged in the real estate business and also an appraiser, testified that the part of the lot in question here was most suitable for industrial purposes and that he considered it unreasonable for it to be zoned for residential use. He also said that someone could build a house thereon as there was enough area, but it would be unwise and wasteful use of the land. He said in his opinion zoning this portion of the lot for residential use takes away between $3,500.00 and $3,600.00 from the value of the property sought to be rezoned. He also said that zoning it for industrial use and making the lumber yard larger would not have any substantial effect on the value of the residences on Maude Avenue and would not in any way jeopardize the health and safety of the surrounding property. Another witness offered by the appellant, Mr. Cox, a real estate broker and a member and a director of the Real Estate Board of Baltimore, testified that the most suitable use of the area in question would be for industrial or second commercial purposes. He said the whole neighborhood tends to industrial uses in spite of the fact that there are residential properties on Maude Avenue, which in his opinion are "mis-located" and have already been depreciated in value by the industrial activities in the neighborhood. He said houses could be built there but "no right minded speculative builder would dare build a house there because his market price would be less perhaps actually than his cost." He said the use of the area for storage of building material would not jeopardize the safety or welfare of the immediate community and that the present zoning was injurious to the owners of the lot. He said he did not think industrial zoning of this lot would injure the residences on Maude Avenue. Testimony was also offered that the value of the whole lot including the part zoned as industrial and residential is $10,730.00 and, if the whole lot was zoned as industrial, the value would be $14,250.00.

On the other hand, Mrs. Lewis Yerka, one of the protestants who lived on Maude Avenue said: "Why wouldn't a home on the residential ground of the junk yard why should that be depreciated if the property on Maude Avenue would not be depreciated?" Mr. Freburger, one of the City Councilmen from Baltimore City, who protested the application, testified that they had tried "to change some of the areas so there may some day be a buffer between the residential and the industrial sections. This is one of those particular cases where we had hoped something may develop there." He further indicated that the pictures offered in evidence were misleading. Mr. Hammerman, a member of the Board, replied: "Mr. Freburger, we have seen the property, the pictures do not fool anybody, we have seen it." The evidence further shows that there are no schools nearby, that there is a fire hydrant immediately in front of the lot, a fire engine house four or five squares away. There is adequate police protection. The Board found: "Considering all the testimony on both sides, the argument of counsel and the provisions of the Ordinance applicable to this case, the Board finds that the portion of the lot in the Residential Zone appears to be a buffer between the Industrial Zone and the industrial uses to the north of the Residential Zone and the dwellings to the south, and dwellings and land to the east; that the facts do not warrant making the exceptions which the Board is authorized to make by authority of Paragraph 12; that the facts which have been described tending to classify this lot as one limited as to location are not of the degree sufficient to justify permitting an Industrial use in a Residential District immediately to the rear of the lots in the latter district already developed with dwellings, and therefore it sustains the action of the Zoning Commissioner in disapproving the permit." (Italics supplied).

Of course, the mere fact that the present zoning makes the property less profitable, is not sufficient ground alone to change the zoning. Easter v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 395, 400, 73 A.2d 491, 492. In Francis v. MacGill, 196 Md. 77, 84, 75 A.2d 91, 94, the owners had knowledge of the zoning regulations and completely ignored them. It was said in that case: "We cannot say, from the evidence in the case at bar, that the action of the Commissioners, in drawing the line where they did, was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. If where they drew the division line in this case is fairly debatable, their action must be sustained." It was said in Board of County Com'rs of Anne Arundel County v. Snyder, 186 Md. 342, at page 346, 46 A.2d 689, at page 691, in sustaining residential zoning: "We cannot say that the restriction to residential use is arbitrary and unreasonable; at most the question seems `fairly debatable'. Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 47 S.Ct. 594, 71 L.Ed. 1074."

It was recently said in the case of Northwest Merchants' Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 187, 60 A.2d 743, 751, "Lines between use districts must be drawn somewhere. It is common knowledge that, long before zoning and ever since, residential neighborhoods have bordered on commercial or industrial neighborhoods. Sometimes the borders of restricted neighborhoods are protected from undesirable adjoining neighborhoods by landscaping or architectural plans. If a residential neighborhood desires protection by a border of unused property, necessarily it must provide its own property, not appropriate its neighbors' for this purpose. `In order to impose restrictions some valid exercise of the police power must be proven. But such power is invoked for the protection of the property restricted and not to give protection to surrounding property.' Chayt v. Maryland Jockey Club, 179 Md. 390, 395, 18 A.2d 856, 858. Property owners in a Residential district cannot create a `no man's land' at the border of their own district by forbidding one property owner in an adjoining district from making any use at all of his property, or any use for which it is `peculiarly suitable' — especially when the adjoining district has been zoned for different suitable uses for fifteen years."

In the case of Northwest Merchants' Terminal Inc. v. O'Rourke, supra, this Court quoted the following from the opinion of Judge Lehman (later Chief Judge) in the case of Arverne Bay Construction Company v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, at page 232, 15 N.E.2d 587, 117 A.L.R. 1110: "We have already pointed out that in the case which we are reviewing, the plaintiff's land cannot at present or in the immediate future be profitably or reasonably used without violation of the restriction. An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation, and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden."

In the case of Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 448, 72 L.Ed. 842, Nectow owned a lot in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Under the zoning ordinance part of the lot was zoned residentially and part was left unrestricted. The Master's report stated that no practical use could be made of any part for residential purposes and that such zoning would not promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed the Master. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and said: "It is made pretty clear that because of the industrial and railroad purposes to which the immediately adjoining lands to the south and east have been devoted and for which they are zoned, the locus is of comparatively little value for the limited uses permitted by the ordinance. * * * The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. * * * That the invasion of the property of plaintiff in error was serious and highly injurious is clearly established; and, since a necessary basis for the support of that invasion is wanting, the action of the zoning authorities comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and cannot be sustained."

In Ellicott v. Mayor and City Council of City of Baltimore, 180 Md. 176, 183-184, 23 A.2d 649, 652, this Court sustained an exception and allowed the erection of a filling station in a residential district because the nearest filling station was half a mile distant and to facilitate traffic. Chief Judge Bond said in that case: "Section 5 of the enabling act, Code, Art. 66B, provides that the zoning regulations, restrictions and boundaries for the districts with which the act deals may from time to time be amended, supplemented, changed, modified or repealed, under specific conditions. The change or modification of boundaries, properly construed, would not, in our opinion, include the cutting out of a single lot, unless perhaps the lot should stand at the boundary of the district, and the segregation might thus be a change of the boundary itself. But the power to change or modify a restriction applicable to a district must include the power to relieve a particular lot from it if the peculiar conditions of that lot or the public good requires it. If a lot should be susceptible of only a use different from that prescribed for the district, the special hardship of a prohibition of that use might justify an exception from the general restriction. * * * And a question of reasonableness of the municipality's exercise of the power under the enabling act might also present itself. State v. Gurry, 121 Md. 534, 541, 88 A. 546, 47 L.R.A., N.S. 1087, Ann. Cas. 1915B 957; Baltimore v. Hampton Court Co., 138 Md. 271, 113 A. 850, 15 A.L.R. 304; Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427, 86 A.L.R. 642. * * *

"In argument it has been urged that the invasion by one filling station will, according to the ordinary course, be followed by others, probably by one on each corner of the intersection, to the further reduction in character of the district, but that does not follow. A finding that one filling station may meet a public need does not mean that others would be justified, at least while the district continues zoned as a residential one." (Italics supplied.)

Of course, it is well established that the Court will not substitute its discretion for that of the Board. Heath v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 187 Md. 296, 304, 49 A.2d 799. In the case now before this Court three members voted to grant the permit and two members voted to deny it. This Court said in Mayor and City Council v. Biermann, 187 Md. 514, at page 522, 50 A.2d 804, at page 808: "We are inclined to agree that where disapproval rests upon a mere failure to obtain the concurring vote of four out of five members, the action cannot properly be described as that of a fact-finding body. In such circumstances it would be more accurate to say that approval is prevented by the exercise of a veto power. And negative action of this sort is clearly not entitled to the same weight, in considering the merits of a controversy as a positive determination."

In the case now before this Court, the only residences possibly affected are the "mis-located" houses on Maude Avenue which back up to Arsan Avenue. These houses have already been depreciated in value by the industrial activities in the neighborhood. There is no evidence here that these residences will be injuriously affected if the permit is granted. It is admitted by a member of the City Council that the part of the lot in question was zoned as a "buffer" between the residential and the industrial sections and the Board so found. This is not a valid reason for residential zoning. Northwest Terminal, Inc. v. O'Rourke, supra, 191 Md. 187, 60 A.2d 743. The division line between the zones in this case is not "fairly debatable". Board of County Com'rs of Anne Arundel County v. Snyder, supra, 186 Md. 346, 46 A.2d 689; Francis v. MacGill, supra, All the testimony here shows that to build residences on the lot here in question would be an unwise and wasteful use of the land. Arverne Bay Construction Company v. Thatcher, supra. All the testimony here shows that if the permit here sought is granted the public health, safety, and morals or general welfare of the community or surrounding property will not be jeopardized. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842, supra. It appears that the zone division line here in question was wrongly laid down in 1931. The twenty years that have elapsed since that time have confirmed this. It has never been used for residential purposes and there is no evidence that it will ever be used for residential purposes. All the evidence points to the contrary. The Courts are not limited to the exceptions under the Zoning Ordinance. The special hardship in the prohibition of a use here justifies an exception from the general restriction. Ellicott v. Mayor and City Council of City of Baltimore, supra. Here the district is primarily industrial.

This case originated in an application to the Board of Municipal and Zoning Appeals for a permit, under provisions of the Zoning Ordinance for special "exceptions", to use for second commercial purposes certain property zoned as residential. Stated most simply, the question now presented is whether the Zoning Ordinance, as applied to this property, now is (i.e., originally was in 1931, or has since become) invalid. Such a question ordinarily may or must be raised by bill in equity, but it may also be raised on appeal from the zoning board, although (it is said) it may not be heard before the board. Ellicott v. Mayor and City Council of City of Baltimore, supra, 180 Md. 180, 181, 23 A.2d 649. Application for an "exception" is an appropriate way to raise such a question. This Court has never held that, in view of Sugar v. North Baltimore Methodist Protestant Church, 164 Md. 487, 165 A. 703, the provisions for "exceptions" in the present zoning ordinance are valid. We have several times held that, assuming the validity of these provisions, the facts did not warrant an exception by the board. In June, 1950, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held a provision for exceptions in a Pawtucket zoning ordinance invalid as too broad a redelegation of delegated power, but apparently held valid another provision not so broad. Flynn v. Zoning Board, R.I., 73 A.2d 808. Whether or not these provisions of the ordinance, especially those of paragraph 33(c) rather than 33(b), are in other respects wholly or partially invalid, they are valid at least to the extent of authorizing the board to make "exceptions" when the law itself would make exceptions by holding the ordinance pro tanto invalid. On appeal from the board, Ellicott v. City of Baltimore makes it unnecessary to consider "exceptions" as such, but permits the validity of the ordinance, as applied, to be determined.

An ordinance or administrative order or a statute may be valid at one time and place, under certain conditions, and invalid at another time and place, under other conditions. Kramer v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 166 Md. 324, 333, 171 A. 70; Baltimore Transit Co. v. Hessey, 196 Md. 141, 75 A.2d 76; Lincoln Gas Electric Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 268, 39 S.Ct. 454, 63 L.Ed. 968; Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165, 174, 42 S.Ct. 264, 66 L.Ed. 538. A zoning statute, ordinance or administrative order, like other action in the exercise of the police power, is presumed to be valid unless on its face or by extrinsic facts it is shown to be invalid. The mere fact that an exercise of the police power may cause expense or loss to an individual does not overcome the presumption of validity. But the duty of the courts not to substitute their judgment for the judgment of legislative or administrative authorities acting within their powers is no more imperative than the power and duty to set aside any purported exercise of such power which is in fact arbitrary, capricious or confiscatory. In this respect zoning can no more escape judicial review than any other purported exercise of the police power. The legal question is whether the legislative or administrative determination was "an unreasonable, arbitrary or unequal exercise of power". But when it is shown "that the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the inhabitants of the part of the city affected will not be promoted" by inclusion of land in a residential district, thereby inhibiting its use for commercial and industrial purposes to the serious damage of the owner, such zoning may be set aside. Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 48 S.Ct. 447, 72 L.Ed. 842, supra; Anne Arundel County v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 338, 46 A.2d 684, 165 A.L.R. 816; Northwest Merchants' Terminal v. O'Rourke, supra.

The evidence in this case is not conflicting or hard to interpret. As hereinbefore stated, the only tangible reason given in support of the board's minority veto is the establishment of a "buffer" to protect the residences on Maude Avenue. This is no more lawful in original zoning than in re-zoning. Northwest Merchants' Terminal v. O'Rourke, supra. Photographs and the plat itself strongly support real estate testimony that the Maude Avenue residences were "mislocated" and thus indicate that the zoning of the locus now in question was originally invalid in 1931. We need not decide this question, but may assume that this original zoning was justified by hope that the locus might follow the use of the Maude Avenue property and not the use or non-use of the property adjoining on other sides. Any such hope has been blasted by time. The locus is surrounded on two sides by property zoned as residential. But there is no evidence that since 1931 any residence has been built on any side. On the southeast side of Fourth Street, above Arsan Avenue, the only use of any of the property zoned as residential is a nonconforming use. On Maude Avenue itself the gaps in the uncompleted row of houses have never been filled. Twenty years is enough to convert a trespasser into an owner. It is enough to demonstrate the futility of hope that the locus will be used for residential purposes, and that it is now arbitrary to zone it as residential. If the law had forbidden use for this purpose (instead of forbidding any other use) it could not have been more effective than natural economic forces have been. The sole attraction of Maude Avenue back yards as a residence neighborhood has not been sufficient to overcome the residential disadvantages in other directions.

In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Biermann, supra [ 187 Md. 514, 50 A.2d 808], we held that the property owner has "the heavy burden" of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality of legislative action in denying application for a filling station permit, and that this presumption attached to minority veto as well as to an unconditional legislative prohibition. We need not consider just how "heavy" this burden is in other cases as compared with filling station cases. In Benner v. Tribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 57 A.2d 346, we set aside a refusal of a filling station permit on the verdict of a jury that the refusal was arbitrary, supported by evidence of acts and statements by the municipal authorities which showed that they had acted not in the public interest, but to please neighbors and without any regard for the rights of the property owner. In Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Byrd, 191 Md. 632, 62 A.2d 588, and in Cassel v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486, as in Northwest Merchants' Terminal v. O'Rourke, supra, we held arbitrary and invalid ordinances amending the Zoning Ordinance. The instant case is different in its facts, but the question is not fairly debatable whether continued zoning of the locus as residential is arbitrary and invalid.

On the facts the instant case is the converse of Gleason v. Keswick Imp. Ass'n, 197 Md. 46, 78 A.2d 164. In that case the property in question had originally been zoned, reasonably we held, as residential, in accordance with actual use. It is still so used, and we set aside an order of the Board in effect re-zoning it as commercial. In that case time had confirmed the reasonableness of the original zoning, instead of demonstrating the contrary or a contrary change.

It has been asked what will be said with respect to other properties in the neighborhood and "where we are going to draw the line". As Mr. Justice Holmes said, "the last is a futile question, and we will answer the others when they arise". Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112, 31 S.Ct. 186, 188, 55 L.Ed. 112. As was said in Ellicott v. Mayor and City Council of City of Baltimore, supra [ 180 Md. 176, 23 A.2d 653], the granting of this permit does not mean "that others would be justified". The order must be reversed.

Order reversed, with costs.