Opinion
No. 4-426 / 03-2061.
August 11, 2004
Appeal from the District Court for Lee (South) County, Cynthia H. Danielson, Judge.
Jeraine Hofer appeals the district court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of Catfish Bend Casinos. AFFIRMED.
Jeraine Hofer, Fort Madison, appellant pro se.
Robert Reding of Gary L. Hoyer Law Firm, Fort Madison, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Catfish Bend Casinos delivered a letter to Jeraine Hofer excluding him from its properties. Hofer disclosed the contents of the letter to friends. He later sued the casino for libel, but lost on summary judgment.
Hofer also alleged other causes of action not at issue on appeal.
On appeal, Hofer contends he created a genuine issue of material fact on whether he was compelled to disclose the letter's contents. See Theisen v. Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc., 636 N.W.2d 74, 78 (Iowa 2001) ("Summary judgment is appropriate only if the entire record, viewed as a whole, reveals no genuine issues of material fact and establishes that the district court correctly applied the law."). In his view, this fact issue mandates reversal of the summary judgment ruling on his libel claim.
Libel is the "malicious publication, expressed either in printing or in writing, . . . [of material] tending to injure the reputation of another person or to expose that person to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." Delaney v. Int'l Union UAW Local No. 94 of John Deere Mfg. Co., 675 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Iowa 2004) (brackets in original omitted). A "key element" of a libel claim is proof that the material was communicated by the defendant to a third party. Theisen, 636 N.W.2d at 83; see also Belcher v. Little, 315 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1982).
Generally, plaintiffs cannot create a cause of action for libel by disclosing the contents of a writing originally transmitted only to them. Theisen, 636 N.W.2d at 83. There is an exception "where the subject is under `strong compulsion' to repeat the allegedly defamatory statement." Id.; see also Belcher, 315 N.W.2d at 738. "What constitutes strong compulsion must of necessity be decided by the finder of fact under the circumstances in each case when substantial evidence of such compulsion is introduced." Belcher, 315 N.W.2d at 738.
Although compulsion is a question for the fact-finder, Hofer did not create a genuine issue of material fact on this question. Preliminarily, he admitted there was no evidence that the casino disseminated the exclusion letter to anyone other than him. He also admitted that third parties who became aware of his exclusion from the casino were informed by him personally. Finally, Hofer testified by deposition that he disclosed the letter's contents only because acquaintances were asking him why he was no longer coming to the casino. We agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, this reason did not amount to "compelled" disclosure. Cf. Thompto v. Coborn's Inc., 871 F. Supp. 1097, 1108, 1128 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether former employee was under strong compulsion to disclose to prospective employers former employer's allegedly defamatory reasons for termination); Belcher, 315 N.W.2d at 738 (holding, in suit for slander of title, that jury could have found compelling reason for plaintiffs to tell third-party bank and potential lender why defendant continued to assert interest in certain property despite court order stating otherwise).
We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the casino on Hofer's libel claim.