Opinion
Civil Action No. 5:02-CV-130-C
April 16, 2003
ORDER
On this date the Court considered Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Frontier Dodge and AutoInc. ("Defendants") on January 29, 2003. Clinton D. Hobdy, Jr. (pro se "Plaintiff") filed Plaintiff['s] Response to Defendants['] Motion for Summary Judgment on March 21, 2003. Defendants' Objections to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Evidence and Reply Brief to Plaintiff's Summary Judgment Response was filed April 7, 2003. After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a black male, was employed by Defendants as a new and used car salesman from October 25, 1999, until June 17, 2000. As best this Court can determine, Plaintiff claims (1) that he suffered disparate treatment based on his race; (2) that he was retaliated against for making complaints to Defendants about Defendants' racially discriminatory conduct; and (3) that he was subjected to a hostile work environment, which included racial slurs, verbal harassment, and intimidation by non-black employees of Defendants. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and costs of court.
Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot establish all the essential elements for any of his claims. Rather, Defendants contend that Plaintiff voluntarily resigned his position with Defendants after receiving a written disciplinary warning for violating Defendants' mandatory sales meeting policy. Contrary to Plaintiff's claims, Defendants argue that two non-black employees also received written warnings for missing the same mandatory sales meeting and that a third non-black salesperson received similar written disciplinary warnings for missing, or being late to, other sales meetings. Defendants also deny that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work environment, that Plaintiff suffered severe or pervasive harassment which affected Plaintiff's work environment, or that Defendants failed to take appropriate remedial action, if and when necessary, to promptly correct any discriminatory conduct brought to Defendants' attention. Because Plaintiff cannot satisfy his prima facie burden with respect to any of his claims, Defendants pray for summary judgment as to all claims.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248. In making its determination, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 255. Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward, after adequate time for discovery, with significant probative evidence showing a triable issue of fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are not adequate substitutes for specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993). To defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
First, Plaintiff complains that, even though non-black employees were not disciplined for missing a mandatory sales meeting, Plaintiff received a written disciplinary warning for the same conduct. Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him "for complaints of racial slurs." Third, Plaintiff argues that he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment which included repeated verbal harassment, racial slurs, and intimidation. Plaintiff argues that Defendants' discriminatory conduct was based on Plaintiff's race in violation of Title VII.To the contrary, Defendants argue that personnel records show that non-blacks were also disciplined for missing, or being late to, mandatory sales meetings; that Plaintiff's race played no factor in Plaintiff's disciplinary warning; that Defendants took no adverse employment action against Plaintiff; and that the alleged harassment, if any, did not in any way adversely affect a term or condition of Plaintiff's employment.
Title VII
Title VII creates a private right of action against employers who engage in unlawful employment practices and provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(2000).
A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by using either direct evidence of discrimination, statistical proof, or circumstantial evidence. Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998). Absent direct evidence of discrimination based on race, Plaintiff may establish unlawful race discrimination under the basic framework articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under McDonnell Douglas, the order of progression for proving a Title VII claim of discrimination is controlled by the following well-established tripartite framework:
1. The plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination;
2. If the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's termination;
3. Should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons but were a pretext for discrimination.Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2000). See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores (No. 471), 891 F.2d 1177, 1178 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)).
Disparate Treatment
Plaintiff must prove a prima facie case of race discrimination by establishing that he was (1) a member of a protected group; (2) qualified for the position held; (3) discharged from the position; and (4) replaced by someone outside the protected group or otherwise terminated because of his race, Pratt v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d 601, 606 (5th Cir. 2001) and Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2001), or treated less favorably than employees not in the protected class. See LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1996) (explaining that "[t]he elements of a plaintiff's prima facie case necessarily vary according to the facts of the case and the nature of the claim").
Retaliation
To establish retaliation under Title VII, Plaintiff must show (I) that he engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) that an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action. Green v. Admin'rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 657 (5th Cir. 2002). The burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas also applies to retaliation cases under Title VII. Montemayor v. City of San Antonio, 276 F.3d 687, 692 (5th Cir. 2001).
Hostile Work Environment
A prima facie case of racial harassment alleging hostile work environment normally consists of five elements: (1) the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 484 (5th Cir. 2002). Where the harassment is allegedly committed by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the harassment victim, the employee need only satisfy the first four elements. Id.
As a threshold matter more or less consistent with each of the prima facie claims alleged by Plaintiff, Plaintiff must prove that he was "discharged from the position," that he suffered "an adverse employment action," or that Defendants' conduct "affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment." Significantly, however, Plaintiff testified in his deposition as follows:
Q So you missed the training meeting and then you were written up. Then what happened?
A And then I quit.
With regard to Plaintiff's claim of disparate treatment, it is apparent to this Court that Plaintiff was not "discharged from the position." With regard to Plaintiff's claim of retaliation, it is equally clear to this Court that Defendant did not take "an adverse employment action" against Plaintiff Simply put, Plaintiff quit. Thus, Plaintiff cannot satisfy his prima facie burdens related to disparate treatment and retaliation.
With regard to Plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment, it is well established that "[a] hostile work environment requires the presence of a work environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." Mota v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 523 (5th Cir. 2001). Whether an environment is hostile or abusive depends on the totality of circumstances, focusing on factors such as "the frequency of the conduct, the severity of the conduct, the degree to which the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, and the degree to which the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. at 523-24. See also Weller v. Citation Oil Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII was meant to bar severe and pervasive conduct that destroys a protected classmember's opportunity to succeed at work). For harassment on the basis of race to "affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, as required to support a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Felton, 315 F.3d at 485.
Also with regard to Plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment, Plaintiff raises for the first time in his Response that the allegedly hostile work environment caused Plaintiff to "resign under pressure." The Court construes Plaintiff's assertion as a claim for constructive discharge.
In order to establish constructive discharge, Plaintiff must establish that "working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign." Brown v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 237 F.3d 556, 566 (5th Cir. 2001). "Constructive discharge requires a greater degree of harassment than that required by a hostile environment claim." Id. (emphasis added). "Discrimination alone, without aggravating factors, is insufficient for a claim of constructive discharge." Id.
Here, Plaintiff has offered no evidence of intolerable working conditions or any degree of harassment sufficient to support his claim of constructive discharge or less stringent claim of hostile environment. Indeed, Plaintiff testified that he experienced his two best sales periods during the last two months of his employment with Defendants. Plaintiff also testified that, although he had on several occasions overheard racial comments used by his coworkers, Plaintiff acknowledged that the comments were never directed at Plaintiff personally. Moreover, Plaintiff has offered no evidence of conduct of Defendants or Plaintiff's coworkers which was physically threatening or humiliating to Plaintiff or so severe and pervasive as to alter the conditions of his employment or interfere with Plaintiff's work performance.
Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendants' conduct "affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment" or that Plaintiff was constructively discharged. Thus, Plaintiff cannot satisfy his prima facie burden for a claim of hostile work environment.
Because Plaintiff has failed to establish the prima facie elements relevant to each of his claims, the Court need not discuss the remaining arguments made by the parties or address the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework set forth supra. Rather, the Court finds that summary judgment is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
After considering all the relevant arguments and evidence, this Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.