Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-9924.
January 20, 2010.
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Larry D. Card, Judge, Trial Court No. 3AN-04-166 Cr.
Cynthia L. Strout, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Talis J. Colberg, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Steven Michael Hinshaw appeals his convictions for manslaughter, two counts of third-degree assault, and tampering with evidence. Hinshaw's arguments on appeal all involve challenges to the validity of a Glass warrant — a warrant authorizing the police to electronically monitor and/or record a private conversation.
AS 11.41.120(a), AS 11.41.220(a), and AS 11.56.610(a), respectively.
See State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 879-881 (Alaska 1978) (holding that the Alaska Constitution requires the police to obtain a warrant before engaging in electronic monitoring or recording of a private conversation, even when one or more participants in the conversation consent to the monitoring or recording).
Hinshaw was suspected of having fired several gunshots into a car. One of the occupants of this car was killed, and the two other occupants were endangered. The police investigating this episode learned that Hinshaw had left Alaska after the shooting and was staying with his girlfriend and her relatives (an aunt and uncle) in Maryland. The police went to Maryland and interviewed the girlfriend, Dorian Dixon. Dixon acknowledged that she was a witness to the shooting; she gave the police a detailed account of the episode, and she identified Hinshaw as the shooter. Dixon then agreed to assist the police by wearing a recording device while she engaged Hinshaw in conversation about this episode.
After Dixon agreed to aid the police in this manner, the police obtained a Glass warrant to record her conversation with Hinshaw. This audio recording was introduced against Hinshaw at his trial.
In this appeal, Hinshaw asserts that the Glass w arrant is invalid because the warrant application contained intentional misstatements and omissions of material facts. For the reasons explained here, we uphold the superior court's conclusions that any misstatements or omissions in the warrant application were no more than negligent, and that (in any event) these misstatements or omissions did not affect the existence of probable cause to issue the warrant. We therefore affirm Hinshaw's convictions. Background facts
In November 2003, Levar Macon was dating Crystal St. Auburn. At the same time, Macon was maintaining an ongoing relationship with his ex-girlfriend, Regina Bibbs. This caused animosity between the two women. Bibbs and St. Auburn exchanged threatening telephone calls, and finally Macon and St. Auburn told Bibbs that they were going to come to her house on the night of November 24th (actually, the early morning of November 25th) to beat her up.
In anticipation of this violence, Bibbs asked her friend Steven Hinshaw to come to her house for protection. Hinshaw armed himself with a revolver and, together with his girlfriend, Dorian Dixon, he drove to Bibbs's apartment in Dixon's car.
Bibbs and another friend, Shameka Whidbee, met Hinshaw and Dixon at Bibbs's apartment at about 2:00 a.m., and the four of them waited for Macon and St. Auburn to arrive.
Macon, St. Auburn, and two other women, Chris and Seirosa Milo, drove to Bibbs's apartment. From outside the apartment, they contacted Bibbs by telephone, but Bibbs would not come out of her apartment. Macon and St. Auburn finally decided to leave.
Meanwhile, the four people in Bibbs's apartment (Bibbs, Whidbee, Hinshaw, and Dixon) decided to leave the apartment. They all got into Dixon's car. As they were pulling away, they saw the car containing Macon and St. Auburn. The Macon / St. Auburn car then turned around to follow the Bibbs party.
On Lake Otis Parkway, the St. Auburn party caught up with, and then passed, Dixon's car. As the St. Auburn car was passing Dixon's car, Hinshaw told Dixon (who was sitting in the front passenger seat) to roll down her window and lower her seat back to a reclining position. Hinshaw then shot his revolver several times into the St. Auburn car as it passed. One of the bullets hit St. Auburn in the neck, and she later died from this wound.
The Anchorage police interviewed the surviving occupants of the St. Auburn vehicle and learned of Regina Bibbs's involvement in this altercation. The police obtained a warrant to search Bibbs's residence and to obtain her telephone records. The police also interviewed Bibbs and Whidbee.
On December 4, 2003 (that is, nine days after the shooting), the police sought additional warrants based on their further investigation. At that time, the police had statements from Bibbs and Whidbee; both women identified Hinshaw as the shooter. (Hinshaw's girlfriend, Dixon, was still unknown to the police.) The police obtained warrants for additional phone records, including the records of Hinshaw's phone and the records of Bibbs's employer's phone (the phone that she used when she called Hinshaw originally).
On December 8, 2003, the police sought a Glass warrant to record planned telephone conversations between Bibbs and Hinshaw. Bibbs appeared and testified at the search warrant hearing; she told the court that Hinshaw was the one who shot St. Auburn, and that she (Bibbs) was in the car with Hinshaw at the time. Bibbs expressed her willingness to allow the police to record phone conversations between her and Hinshaw, and the court issued the Glass warrant to authorize this — but Hinshaw had already left Alaska, and the police were never able to execute this warrant.
Then, through a CrimeStoppers tip, the police learned that Dixon was Hinshaw's girlfriend. When the police contacted Dixon's foster mother, she told them that Dixon had recently left Alaska, that she was living with her aunt and uncle in Maryland, and that Hinshaw was likely staying there, too. The police contacted the aunt and uncle in Maryland, and they confirmed that Dixon and Hinshaw were staying with them.
With the cooperation of local law enforcement, Anchorage Police Detective Rodney Ryan flew to Maryland and interviewed Dixon on December 16, 2003. Dixon confirmed that her car was involved in the shooting and that she was in the car at the time of the shooting. Dixon gave Ryan a detailed account of the incident, including the fact that Hinshaw was the shooter and that, immediately before the shooting, Hinshaw instructed Dixon to roll down her window and recline her seat.
At Ryan's request, Dixon agreed to wear a recording device so that the police could record conversations between her and Hinshaw. Ryan then contacted the Anchorage district court by telephone and applied for a Glass warrant.
In his testimony in support of the warrant, Ryan summarized the most recent results of the ongoing investigation, as well as his interview with Dixon. Ryan offered to have Dixon testify telephonically, but the district court judge concluded that probable cause for the warrant was already established and thus he did not need to hear Dixon's testimony.
Following the issuance of this Glass warrant, Dixon contacted Hinshaw, and Hinshaw made several incriminating statements while they conversed. The State used these statements against Hinshaw at his trial.
The interview between Detective Ryan and Dorian Dixon that preceded the Glass warrant application, and the ensuing application for the warrant
In his appeal to this Court, Hinshaw attacks the Glass warrant by arguing that when Detective Ryan applied for the warrant, he misled the magistrate concerning the kinds of inducements or promises that he offered to Dixon to obtain her cooperation. We therefore must describe that interview in some detail, and we must also describe Ryan's testimony during the ensuing application for the warrant.
Ryan interviewed Dixon in the late afternoon of December 16, 2003. Dixon's aunt, Sherice Garvin, attended the interview at Dixon's request.
Ryan began by telling Dixon that she was facing criminal charges, and that she was about to make the most serious decision of her life. When Dixon asked if she was going to jail "no matter what", Ryan told her, "No. . . . [Y]ou're in a hole[, but] [t]hat doesn't mean you can't dig your way out."
Ryan told Dixon that he could not make any deals with her — that it was the district attorney who would decide who would face charges, and who would go to jail, who would be a witness, and who would be a co-defendant. But Ryan did assure Dixon that, no matter what she told him, he was not going to arrest her that day. Ryan then advised Dixon of her Miranda rights (even though she apparently was not in custody). Ryan also offered to let Dixon or her aunt call Dixon's foster mother and seek her advice. Dixon accepted this offer, and the interview was interrupted for ten minutes while Dixon spoke with her foster mother.
When the interview resumed, Dixon gave Ryan a detailed description of the events leading up to the shooting and Hinshaw's actions after the shooting.
After Dixon described these things, Ryan asked Dixon if she would be willing to wear a monitoring device and gather evidence against Hinshaw. Dixon told Ryan that she was willing to wear a wire and "try my best".
Dixon then asked Ryan, "If I do this, do I still go to jail?" Ryan answered, "I'm not saying you're going to jail either way. . . . [But] [y]ou're taking the right steps — `cause I'm gonna go to the district attorney and I'm gonna tell them [that] you're willing to cooperate. We need witnesses also, not just co-defendants." But Ryan also reiterated, "I can't make a deal [with you]. . . . [T]he district attorney is the one [who] will decide that." A few moments later, Ryan added, "I can't guarantee [that] everything will go away. But you're a juvenile, [and] you're cooperating."
Ryan and Dixon then discussed possible strategies that Dixon might use to induce Hinshaw to talk to her about the shooting. Toward the end of this discussion (and the end of the interview), Ryan told Dixon that he was getting ready to call a judge in Anchorage and apply for the warrant to authorize the electronic monitoring. Ryan alerted Dixon that the judge would probably want to talk to her. Dixon stated that she was prepared to do this, but she told Ryan that she had one more question: she asked Ryan when she would be able to talk to the district attorney handling the case. Dixon's question led to the following colloquy:
Dixon: [W]hen do I get to talk to this lady?
Ryan: The district attorney?
Dixon: Yeah. . . . I just, I don't want to go to jail.
Dixon's aunt: He [ i.e., Ryan] [has] to take it to the district attorney.
. . .
Ryan: I don't know if she'll talk to you directly right now.
Dixon: Okay.
. . .
Ryan: But like I said, I'm gonna go back there. She has been on this case from the beginning. I have a lot of input.
Dixon: Okay.
Ryan: Okay? I can't guarantee anything. Like I said, I don't know if you're gonna walk away Scot free, lesson learned. . . . Part of what you did, you may have to answer for. But it's not gonna be anything like conspiracy to commit murder, or the aiding — you know, it's not gonna be the 99 years.
Dixon: Okay.
. . .
Ryan: People [who] cooperate, you know, [the] district attorney knows that we have [to], we need witnesses, also. You were in the car, you took some steps, you helped, which — you were in the car, and you're helping us now. I mean, that's gonna count for a lot. So I don't want you worrying that . . . you're gonna go to jail forever. . . . I can't make deals; I can't guarantee [that] nothing's gonna happen. But this is the right step, of being a witness.
About half an hour after Detective Ryan completed his interview with Dixon, Ryan testified (by telephone) in support of the Glass warrant application. In his testimony, Ryan explained that the police had learned that Dixon was Hinshaw's girlfriend, and that she was the owner of the car that was used in the shooting. Ryan also explained that he had traveled to Maryland to interview Dixon, because Dixon and Hinshaw had left Alaska and had gone to stay with Dixon's relatives in Maryland.
Ryan told the magistrate that, during his interview with Dixon, Dixon verified that Hinshaw was the one who fired the shots into the other car, and that she was present in the car with Hinshaw when he did this.
The assistant district attorney who was handling the Glass warrant application asked Ryan if he had made any promises to Dixon regarding the charges she would face, or regarding any benefit that she might receive from the district attorney's office or the Anchorage Police Department. Ryan answered, "I have not. I [told] her . . . that the district attorney is the one that does all the filing of the charges, and [that] she could be facing possible criminal charges."
The prosecutor then offered to have Dixon personally testify in support of the warrant, but the magistrate replied, "I don't think it's necessary for probable cause. If you want to preserve her testimony, that's fine; but as far as probable cause [to issue the warrant] is concerned, certainly Detective Ryan's statements are adequate." The magistrate then issued the Glass warrant authorizing the police to electronically monitor and record Dixon's conversations with Hinshaw.
The litigation of this issue in the superior court, and the superior court's ruling
Following Hinshaw's indictment, his defense attorney filed a motion seeking suppression of the recorded statements obtained under the Glass warrant.
Hinshaw's attorney argued that Ryan had either intentionally or at least recklessly given a false answer when the prosecutor asked him if he had made any promises to Dixon to gain her cooperation — i.e., to induce her to openly discuss the shooting and, specifically, "to obtain her statements implicating Hinshaw". The defense attorney further argued that Detective Ryan's answer (his statement that no promises were made to Dixon) undermined the validity of the Glass warrant by depriving the magistrate of the information he needed to perform his judicial function of independently evaluating Dixon's credibility as an informant.
In its response, the State agreed with Hinshaw that the issue of whether Ryan had promised anything to Dixon was relevant to the search warrant application because this information was pertinent to the question of whether Dixon was a credible informant. But because Dixon's credibility as an informant was the underlying question, the State argued that the assistant district attorney's question to Ryan about "promises" had to be viewed in that context.
Specifically, the State argued that, given this context, the aim of the assistant district attorney's question was clearly to find out whether Ryan had promised Dixon any charging or sentencing concessions "to secure her cooperation" — that is, to induce her to cooperate with the investigation — as opposed to promises that may have been made to Dixon in response to her already-rendered cooperation.
The State pointed out that Ryan's promises that Dixon would not be charged with conspiracy to commit murder, and that she would not be facing a 99-year prison sentence, were made " after Dixon [had] given a complete recount[ing] of the events that occurred [on] the night [of the shooting]" (emphasis added) — after "[s]he had already given a statement that . . . she was present in the vehicle, [that] she knew Hinshaw had a gun, and [that] she rolled down the window[,] allowing him to shoot out of it." The State further pointed out that Dixon had already agreed to wear a wire and assist the police in executing a Glass warrant before Ryan made these promises to her.
Based on these facts, the State argued that Ryan's answer to the assistant district attorney's question was truthful, not false. Dixon's decision to cooperate with the investigation and to give a statement describing the shooting was not induced or influenced by any promise — because Ryan's promises about the charges or sentence that Dixon would face were made afterwards.
When Judge Card announced his ruling on Hinshaw's suppression motion, he did not explicitly declare that he was adopting the State's position concerning the context and correct interpretation of the assistant district attorney's question about "promises". However, based on the content of Judge Card's ruling, it is clear that he agreed with the State's argument.
That is, Judge Card's explanation of his decision shows that he agreed with the State that (1) the purpose of the assistant district attorney's question about "promises" was to find out whether Dixon's decision to give a statement about the shooting was induced by promises, and therefore (2) Ryan did not answer misleadingly, even though he failed to mention the two major promises that Hinshaw complained of (the promises that Dixon would not be charged with conspiracy to commit murder, and that she would not be facing a 99-year sentence) — because these promises were made later, after Dixon had already given her statement, and thus they could not have affected her decision.
Hinshaw's attorney had furnished Judge Card with a complete transcript of Ryan's interview with Dixon. In his decision, Judge Card went through that transcript and carefully noted everything that Ryan said to Dixon, up through the time when Ryan advised Dixon of her Miranda rights.
As we explained earlier in this opinion, just after Ryan advised Dixon of her Miranda rights, Ryan offered to let Dixon call her foster mother and seek her advice. Dixon accepted this offer, and the interview was interrupted for ten minutes while Dixon spoke with her foster mother. When the interview resumed, Dixon gave Ryan a detailed description of the events leading up to the shooting, and of Hinshaw's actions after the shooting.
In other words, Judge Card examined everything that Ryan said to Dixon before she made her decision to give a statement. The judge noted that Ryan had in fact made one promise to Dixon during this part of the interview: the promise that he would not arrest Dixon that day, no matter what she might say to him about her involvement in the shooting. However, Judge Card concluded that Ryan's failure to tell the magistrate about this promise did not affect the validity of the Glass warrant because Ryan's omission was "at most . . . negligent".
Judge Card concluded that Ryan had understood the assistant district attorney's question about "promises" to be an inquiry about "charges and bigger items that would be clearly outside the scope of what [Detective Ryan] could [properly] promise on behalf of the State of Alaska". Thus, when Ryan answered that he had made no promises to Dixon, he did not act intentionally ( i.e., with the intent to mislead the magistrate), or even recklessly ( i.e., with the subjective awareness that his answer might be misleading).
For the definition of "intentional" misstatements in the context of the suppression rule announced in State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986), see Lewis v. State, 862 P.2d 181, 186-87 (Alaska App. 1993), and Gustafson v. State, 854 P.2d 751, 756 (Alaska App. 1993) (holding that even when a police officer consciously misstates the facts or consciously omits pertinent facts, the officer's misstatement or omission is "intentional" for Malkin purposes only if the officer engaged in a "deliberate attempt to mislead" the magistrate into issuing a warrant that the magistrate would not otherwise issue).
For the definition of "reckless" misstatements in the context of the M alkin rule, see Davis v. State, 766 P.2d 41, 45 (Alaska App. 1988) (holding that, for purposes of Malkin, an officer who misstates or omits a material fact in a search warrant application acts "recklessly" only if the officer was aware of, and consciously disregarded, a substantial and unjustifiable risk that they were misstating or withholding information that was material to the magistrate's decision).
The fact that Judge Card ended his analysis at this point, without discussing Ryan's later promises to Dixon, demonstrates that the judge adopted the State's position that these later promises were irrelevant to the assistant district attorney's question, and were irrelevant to the assessment of Dixon's credibility as an informant.
Judge Card was clearly aware of Ryan's later promises to Dixon. Hinshaw's suppression motion contained repeated references to these promises, and Judge Card declared (when he issued his ruling) that he had reviewed the transcript of Ryan's interview with Dixon (where these promises are rendered verbatim). We therefore construe Judge Card's failure to mention these later promises as an implicit declaration that the judge found these later promises to be irrelevant to the issue before him. Hinshaw's arguments on appeal
On appeal, Hinshaw again argues that Ryan, acting either intentionally or recklessly, seriously mischaracterized his interview with Dixon when, in response to the assistant district attorney's question, he stated that he had not made any promises to Dixon concerning the charges she might face or the sentencing concessions she might receive.
Hinshaw does not challenge Judge Card's finding that Ryan was, at most, negligent in failing to apprise the magistrate of his promise not to arrest Dixon on the day of the interview. However, Hinshaw argues that Judge Card improperly ignored Ryan's other promises or threats to Dixon.
Hinshaw places particular emphasis on the fact that Ryan told Dixon that he had a "lot of input" into the district attorney's decision — and that, although he "[couldn't] guarantee anything, . . . [the charge is] not gonna be anything like the conspiracy to commit murder, or the aiding — you know, it's not gonna be the 99 years." Hinshaw further notes that Ryan told Dixon that her cooperation was "gonna count for a lot", and that he "[didn't] want [her] worrying that . . . [she was] gonna go to jail forever."
Hinshaw points to these statements as proof that Ryan did make significant promises to Dixon — and as proof that Ryan intentionally misled the magistrate when he declared that he had not made any promises. In his briefs to this Court, Hinshaw repeatedly expresses incredulity that Judge Card seemingly ignored these promises when he declared that Ryan had made only one promise to Dixon: the promise not to arrest her that day.
(Hinshaw also relies on some of Ryan's other statements to Dixon — statements which were not direct promises or threats, but which could conceivably be interpreted as such if they are viewed in the light most favorable to Hinshaw. We are obliged to view the record in the light most favorable to the superior court's ruling. These other challenged statements are susceptible of alternative reasonable interpretations, and they are no more than arguably promises or threats. We are therefore obliged to interpret them as not constituting promises or threats. Because of this, we do not mention these other statements further.)
Returning to Ryan's statements to Dixon that she would not be charged with conspiracy to commit murder, and that she would not be facing a 99-year term of imprisonment, we agree with Hinshaw that these statements were promises regarding charging concessions or related sentencing benefits that Dixon would receive from the district attorney's office in exchange for her cooperation. And if the record showed that Ryan used these promises as inducements to get Dixon to confess her involvement in the shooting and to identify Hinshaw as the shooter, we might view this case differently.
But as we explained above, and as the transcript of Ryan's interview with Dixon makes clear, all of these promises occurred at the conclusion of the interview — long after Dixon had given Ryan a detailed account of the shooting, and after Dixon had agreed to wear the wire. In other words, as Judge Card implicitly found when he issued his ruling, none of these promises influenced Dixon's decision to confess her knowledge of, and her participation in, the shooting and its aftermath.
As we have explained, we interpret Judge Card's ruling as an implicit finding that, when the assistant district attorney asked Detective Ryan if he had made any promises to Dixon regarding the charges she would face, or regarding any other benefit that she might receive from the district attorney's office, the aim of this question was to uncover information relevant to assessing Dixon's credibility as an informant. Specifically, the purpose of the question was to discover if Dixon's willingness to confess to the police, and her willingness to incriminate Hinshaw, had been influenced by promises of favorable treatment.
As Judge Card impliedly found when he issued his ruling, Ryan answered truthfully when he answered "no" to this inquiry. Ryan did not make the promises that Hinshaw complains of until after Dixon had given her account of the shooting, and thus these promises could not have influenced Dixon's decision to give her statement.
Ryan's post-statement promises to Dixon were irrelevant to the assistant district attorney's inquiry and irrelevant to the magistrate's assessment of Dixon's credibility as an informant. Thus, the record supports Judge Card's implicit conclusion that Ryan answered the assistant district attorney's question truthfully — that he did not misstate the situation, either affirmatively or by omission.
For these reasons, the superior court correctly rejected Hinshaw's argument that the Glass warrant was flawed by misstatements or omissions in the warrant application.
Whether the Glass warrant was supported by probable cause
Hinshaw's remaining argument is that even if the Glass warrant application is taken at face value, the Glass warrant was not supported by probable cause.
Hinshaw points out that when Ryan testified in support of the Glass warrant, he provided very few underlying facts.
Ryan explained to the magistrate that the police had learned that Dixon was Hinshaw's girlfriend, and that she was the owner of the car that was used in the shooting. Ryan further explained that Dixon and Hinshaw had left Alaska and had gone to stay with Dixon's relatives in Maryland — and, for that reason, Ryan had traveled to Maryland to interview Dixon. Ryan then told the magistrate that, during his interview with Dixon, Dixon stated that Hinshaw was the one who fired the shots into the other car, and that she (Dixon) was present in the car with Hinshaw when he did this.
Hinshaw concedes that Ryan's description of Dixon's statements satisfies the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test — the requirement that the magistrate have a basis for concluding that the informant was speaking from personal knowledge or has otherwise obtained the information in a reliable way. But Hinshaw argues that the State failed to prove the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test — the requirement that the magistrate have a basis for concluding that the informant is a credible person.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). See also State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 324-25 (Alaska 1985) (holding that, as a matter of state law, the Aguilar-Spinelli test continues to govern the evaluation of hearsay information offered to support a search or seizure).
Hinshaw points out that Judge Card concluded that Dixon was a "police informant" for Aguilar-Spinelli purposes — that is, someone whose credibility is presumptively suspect and must be affirmatively demonstrated.
Judge Card further concluded that Dixon's motivation for incriminating herself and Hinshaw was the hope that she might receive favorable treatment because of her cooperation. As Hinshaw notes in his brief, this finding militates against any conclusion that Dixon's statements should be viewed as statements against her penal interest (and thus presumptively reliable).
See State v. Bianchi, 761 P.2d 127, 130-31 (Alaska App. 1988), holding that an informant's credibility can be bolstered by proof that their statements were against their penal interest. But compare Shakespeare v. State, 827 P.2d 454, 458-59 (Alaska App. 1992), holding that a confession to the police, naming the declarant and others as the guilty parties, is not a "statement against penal interest" for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) if the statement was given only after the police promised that the declarant would not be prosecuted.
Judge Card did find that Dixon's credibility was established by the fact that her description of the shooting was corroborated by the earlier statements and testimony of Regina Bibbs. But Hinshaw challenges this conclusion.
As we explained toward the beginning of this opinion, Bibbs was riding in the car with Hinshaw and Dixon at the time of the shooting. After the police determined that Bibbs was involved, they interviewed her, and she identified Hinshaw as the shooter.
On December 8, 2003 (eight days before the application for the Glass w arrant involving Dixon), the police sought a Glass warrant to record planned telephone conversations between Bibbs and Hinshaw. Bibbs testified personally at the search warrant hearing. She told the magistrate — the same magistrate who heard the later Glass warrant application involving Dixon — that Hinshaw was the one who shot St. Auburn, and that she (Bibbs) was in the car with Hinshaw at the time.
(As we explained earlier, the magistrate found probable cause to issue this first Glass warrant, but Bibbs was unable to make contact with Hinshaw to execute the warrant because Hinshaw had already left Alaska.)
Judge Card concluded that Dixon's description of the shooting dovetailed with Bibbs's description of the shooting, and that the congruence between Dixon's account and Bibbs's account was a sufficient demonstration of Dixon's credibility to satisfy the second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
On appeal, Hinshaw argues that Ryan's cursory description of Dixon's statements about the shooting was insufficient to justify the magistrate or Judge Card in reaching any conclusion as to whether Dixon's account dovetailed with Bibbs's. Specifically, Hinshaw points out that it was public knowledge that the shooting had occurred. According to Hinshaw, Dixon's out-of-court statement (as relayed by Detective Ryan) added only two unsupported assertions to this public knowledge: the assertions that Hinshaw was the shooter and that Dixon was in the car with him.
The record shows that there was corroboration for Dixon's assertion that Hinshaw was the shooter. In Bibbs's earlier testimony (the testimony she gave in connection with the prior Glass warrant application), Bibbs likewise asserted that Hinshaw was the shooter. But in any event, we conclude that the controversy over Dixon's credibility is moot.
Eight days before the State applied for the Glass warrant involving Dixon, the same magistrate heard the live testimony of Bibbs — and, based on that testimony, the magistrate concluded that there was probable cause to issue a Glass warrant to record Hinshaw's conversations with Bibbs about the shooting.
Hinshaw does not challenge the factual or legal underpinning of that first Glass warrant. Thus, for the State to obtain a second Glass warrant to record Hinshaw's conversations with Dixon, the State had only to show that there was reason to believe that Hinshaw's conversations with Dixon would yield evidence relevant to the same shooting investigation.
It is uncontested that Dixon was Hinshaw's girlfriend and that she was willing to assist the police in executing the Glass warrant. There was, accordingly, reason to believe that her conversations with Hinshaw would yield relevant evidence of the shooting.
For these reasons, we conclude that the challenged Glass warrant was supported by probable cause.
Conclusion
The judgement of the superior court is AFFIRMED.