Opinion
8:20-cv-01020-TMC-JDA
03-24-2021
Alissa Hill Individually and as personal Representative of the Estate of Troy Hill Estate of Troy Adam Hill Plaintiff, v. Anderson County, Anderson County Detention Center, Anderson County Sheriff's Office, B. Heath Davis in his individual and professional capacities, G. Smith in his individual and professional capacities, Southern Health Partners Inc., Dr. James Walker, Nurse Krystal Jones in her individual and professional capacities Nurse Ashley Wilson in her individual and professional capacities, Nurse Lorie Shedd in her individual and professional capacities, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on a motion for partial dismissal filed by Defendants Jones, Shedd, Southern Health Partners Inc., Walker, and Wilson (“the Medical Defendants”). [Doc. 39.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Troy Adam Hill (“Hill”), represented by counsel, filed this action in the Anderson County Court of Common Pleas on April 20, 2018, asserting various claims against Defendants Anderson County Sheriff's Office, Officer B. Heath Davis, and Deputy Stephen Widerman, arising out of his arrest in May 2016 and subsequent detention at the Anderson County Detention Center (“ACDC”) until mid-March 2017 on a charge of attempted murder. [Doc. 1-1; see also Doc. 34.] On January 8, 2020, Hill filed an amended Complaint (“the Second Complaint”) in which he named largely the same Defendants-he did not name Defendant Widerman-but also added as new Defendants Anderson County, ACDC, G. Smith, and the Medical Defendants and asserted new allegations and claims concerning the medical care he received during his detention. [Doc. 1-2.] Hill specifically alleged that he had an injury to his left eye that he had sustained several weeks prior to his arrest, during the altercation for which he was arrested, and the injury included several broken bones around his eye. [Id. ¶¶ 64, 82, 84.] Hill alleged that while he was at ACDC, he requested medical treatment for the injury and for infected wounds/abscesses that developed during his detention. [Id. ¶¶ 83-110.] Hill alleged that the Medical Defendants failed to provide sufficient medical care to him for those issues. [Id.] Hill alleged claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and two civil rights violation claims pursuant to § 1983. [Id. ¶¶ 117-72.] He alleged that, as a result of Defendants' conduct, he had “experienced . . . significant and lasting injuries.” [Id. ¶ 163.] On March 12, 2020, the Medical Defendants removed the action to this Court based on federal-question jurisdiction. [Doc. 1.]
Hill titled this document the “Second Amended Complaint” even though it does not appear that he had filed a prior amended complaint.
On June 15, 2020, Hill died as the result of a drug overdose. [Docs. 30-1; 34 ¶¶ 128-30.] On September 10, 2020, the Medical Defendants filed a suggestion of death. [Doc. 23.] On December 4, 2020, Hill's counsel also filed a suggestion of death and a consent motion to have Alissa Hill, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Troy Adam Hill (“Plaintiff”), be substituted as plaintiff and submitted a proposed Third Amended Complaint. [Docs. 30; 30-3.] The same day, the Court issued an Order granting the consent motion for substitution of party but noting that the substitution did not require the amendment of the Second Complaint and thus that the new proposed complaint would not be filed. [Doc. 31.] The Order noted that Plaintiff could file a motion to amend if she wished. [Id.]
On December 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed a consent motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, attaching the proposed amended complaint. [Doc. 32.] The Court granted the motion [Doc. 33], and Plaintiff filed the amended complaint (“the Third Complaint”) on December 12, 2020 [Doc. 34]. The Third Complaint adds a negligence per se and wrongful death claim against Defendants and alleges, for the first time, that the false arrest/imprisonment and insufficient medical care provided during Hill's time at ACDC proximately caused his drug use and ultimate overdose and death in 2020. [Doc. 34 ¶¶ 119-35, 141, 148, 152-55, 167-68, 190-94.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, after Hill was released from ACDC in March 2017, he could not afford medical treatment for his injuries, which led to his “self-medicating with prescription pain medication he was able to get from others.” [Id. ¶¶ 124-27.] This self-medication resulted in an accidental overdose, which caused him to suffer irreparable cardiac damage and death. [Id. ¶¶ 128-30.]
On January 7, 2021, the Medical Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's wrongful death claim as well as the other claims to the extent that they sought damages for injuries related to Hill's drug usage and death. [Docs. 39; 39-1.] On January 20, 2021, Defendants Anderson County, ACDC, Anderson County Sheriff's Office, B. Heath Davis, and G. Smith filed a response supporting the motion, and Plaintiff filed a response opposing the motion. [Docs. 42; 43.] On January 27, 2021, the Medical Defendants filed a reply, and on February 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed a sur-reply. [Docs. 45; 50.] The motion is now ripe for review.
APPLICABLE LAW
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court should “accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). However, the court “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts” nor “accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Eastern Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). Further, for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may rely on only the complaint's allegations and those documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. See Simons v. Montgomery Cty. Police Officers, 762 F.2d 30, 31 (4th Cir. 1985). If matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion is treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d).
With respect to well-pleaded allegations, the United States Supreme Court explained the interplay between Rule 8(a) and Rule 12(b)(6) in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly:
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (footnote and citations omitted); see also 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-36 (3d ed. 2004) (“[T]he pleading must contain something more . . . than a bare averment that the pleader wants compensation and is entitled to it or a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion that the pleader might have a legally cognizable right of action.”).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)-the pleader must plead sufficient facts to show he is entitled to relief, not merely facts consistent with the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”'” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). Accordingly, the plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff has stated a claim that makes it plausible the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
DISCUSSION
“Under [South Carolina's] Survival Statute, causes of action relating to ‘any and all injuries to the person or to the personal property' shall survive to the personal representative of the decedent.” Hurd v. United States, 134 F.Supp.2d 745, 775 (D.S.C. 2001) (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-90). “The general rule [is] that any cause of action which could have been brought by the deceased in his lifetime survives to his representative under the Survival Act.” Layne v. Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers, 247 S.E.2d 346, 349 (S.C. 1978).
Additionally, South Carolina's Wrongful Death Act provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-10. Unlike with a Survival Statute claim, the damages recoverable for a claim under the Wrongful Death statute are not the decedent's damages, but those of the decedent's statutory beneficiaries. Boyle v. United States, 948 F.Supp.2d 577, 580 (D.S.C. 2012). Those recoverable damages include the beneficiaries' “(1) pecuniary loss, (2) mental shock and suffering, (3) wounded feelings, (4) grief and sorrow, (5) loss of companionship, and (6) deprivation of the use and comfort of the intestate's society.” Id.
In the Third Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a wrongful death claim [Doc. 34 ¶¶ 190-94], and the remainder of her claims appear to be asserted under authority of the Survival Statute for damages for Hill's injuries. The Medical Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the wrongful death claim as well as the other claims to the extent that they claim damages for injuries related to Hill's drug usage and death. [Doc. 39-1.] The Court will address these arguments seriatim.
Plaintiff's Wrongful Death Claim
The Medical Defendants first argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the wrongful death claim because Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements of the Wrongful Death Statute. [Id. at 4-6.] They maintain that the statute of limitations applicable to each of Hill's claims was three years and that because, at the time of Hill's death, more than three years had passed since the wrongful conduct alleged in the Third Complaint, any attempt by Hill to add a claim for injuries arising from his self-medication would have been time-barred. [Id.] The Court does not agree with the Medical Defendants' analysis.
In South Carolina, the residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is three years. S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530. Additionally, ?[t]he statute of limitations for section 1983 causes of action arising in South Carolina is three years.” Hamilton v. Middleton, No. 4:02-1952-23, 2003 WL 23851098, at *4 (D.S.C. June 20, 2003), aff'd, 81 Fed.Appx. 770 (4th Cir. 2003). On that basis, the parties appear to agree that the statute of limitations for each of Hill's claims in the Second Complaint was three years. [Docs. 39-1 at 5; 43.] The Medical Defendants argue that the statute of limitations began running on his claims no later than March 2017-the end of his detention at ACDC-and that the period expired prior to his death in June 2020 because he had not yet alleged that he had been self-medicating or become drug dependent. [Doc. 39-1 at 5.]
First, it appears that the Medical Defendants misread the Wrongful Death Statute. The statute contains only two requirements: (1) that “the death of a person . . . be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another” and (2) that “the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-51-10. When those requirements are satisfied, the statute provides that “the person who would have been liable[ for his act, neglect, or default], if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.” Id.; cf. Fowler v. Fowler, 130 S.E.2d 568, 569 (S.C. 1963) (“The only limitation placed by the Legislature in the [Wrongful Death] statute upon the right to bring an action for wrongful death is that the ‘act, neglect or default' must be ‘such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof'”). Here, the Third Complaint plainly alleges that Hill's death was caused by Defendants' wrongful acts, neglect, or default [Doc. 34 ¶ 191], thereby satisfying the first requirement. And it is undisputed that, at the time of his death, Hill was maintaining an action to recover damages for the wrongful acts, neglect, or default in question, thus satisfying the second requirement. With both requirements satisfied, it follows, under the plain meaning of the statute, that Defendants are “liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding” Hill's death.
This reasoning notwithstanding, the Medical Defendants appear to argue that the statutory requirements are not satisfied here because Hill, had he survived, would have been barred from recovering damages for any injury arising out of his self-medication, because, when he died, he had not yet specifically alleged that he had suffered that injury.[Doc. 39-1 at 5-6.] However, neither of the Wrongful Death Statute's two requirements pertain to the types of injuries that the decedent could have sought damages for had he survived; rather they focus on the defendant's alleged wrongful acts, and particularly, the wrongful acts' causal relationship with the decedent's death and whether decedent would be barred for suing for damages based on those wrongful acts. In support of their argument for a contrary interpretation, the Medical Defendants cite Quattlebaum v. Carey Canada, Inc., 685 F.Supp. 939 (D.S.C. 1988), and Estate of Stokes ex rel. Spell v. Pee Dee Family Physicians, L.L.P., 699 S.E.2d 143 (S.C. 2010), but these cases do not support the Medical Defendants' reading. In both of these cases, the wrongful death claims were barred as against defendants because the statute of limitations regarding any claim based on the defendants' actions had expired before the decedent's death. Quattlebaum, 685 F.Supp. at 940, 942; Stokes, 699 S.E.2d at 144, 146. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Medical Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of the wrongful death claim on the basis that the statutory requirements have not been satisfied.
The Medical Defendants also note that “Hill was deposed on January 25, 2019, and made no mention of an issue with continuing severe pain or drug use to alleviate same.” [Doc. 39-1 at 5.]
The Court notes that Plaintiff appears to argue that even if Hill would have been barred from seeking damages related to his drug use had he survived, Plaintiff's wrongful death claim would not be barred. [Doc. 43 at 3-4.] Because the Court concludes that the wrongful death claim is not barred for the reason discussed, the Court declines to address this alternative argument.
In addition to their argument that the statutory requirements are not satisfied, the Medical Defendants also contend that they are entitled to dismissal on the wrongful death claim because Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that Defendants' actions proximately caused Hill's death insofar as Hill's death, as a matter of law, was not a foreseeable result of Defendants' actions. [Doc. 39-1 at 6-7.]
“In actions for wrongful death, as in the case of actions for personal injuries generally, it is essential to a recovery of damages that the wrongful act or default of the defendant shall have been the proximate cause of the death resulting therefrom.” Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, 48 S.E.2d 324, 325 (S.C. 1948); see also Land v. Green Tree Servicing, LLC, 140 F.Supp.3d 539, 545 (D.S.C. 2015) (“The standard tort principles that apply to causation in negligence cases apply to any action for wrongful death regardless of the basis of the underlying cause of action.”). “Proximate cause requires proof of cause-in-fact and legal cause.” Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co., 853 S.E.2d 329, 332 (S.C. 2020). In this context, “proximate cause” is the opposite of “remote cause.” Id. When the defendant's conduct “appears merely to have brought about a condition of affairs, or a situation in which another and entirely independent and efficient agency intervenes to cause the injury, the latter is to be deemed the direct or proximate cause, and the former only the indirect or remote cause.” Stone v. Bethea, 161 S.E.2d 171, 173 (S.C. 1968).
Regarding legal cause, “foreseeability is considered ‘the touchstone . . .,' and it is determined by looking to the natural and probable consequences of the defendant's act or omission.” Baggerly v. CSX Transp., Inc., 635 S.E.2d 97, 101 (S.C. 2006). “In most cases, foreseeability ends up being addressed as a question of fact for the jury.” Wickersham, 853 S.E.2d at 332. However, when only one reasonable inference is susceptible from the evidence, the question of legal cause becomes one for the court. Oliver v. S.C. Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 422 S.E.2d 128, 131 (S.C. 1992); see also Ballou v. Sigma Nu Gen. Fraternity, 352 S.E.2d 488, 493 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986) (“Only in rare or exceptional cases may the question of probable cause be decided as a matter of law.”).
The Medical Defendants argue that on the facts alleged in the Third Complaint, the only reasonable inference is that it was not foreseeable that their actions would cause Hill's death, but they have made no more than a conclusory argument on that point. In their memorandum in support of their motion, they simply define “proximate cause” without identifying a single case from South Carolina-or any other jurisdiction-that supports their position that Hill's death was unforeseeable as a matter of law. Given the dearth of any discussion of legal precedent, and considering the fact-intensive nature of the proximate-cause inquiry, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the proximate cause issue without prejudice to their right to raise the same issue on a more fully developed factual record in a motion for summary judgment, at which time they should share with the Court any case law that they believe supports their position. See Hayes v. Self-Help Credit Union, No. 1:13-CV-880, 2014 WL 4198412, at *2 (M.D. N.C. Aug. 22, 2014) (“It is not the role or the responsibility of the Court to undertake the legal research needed to support or rebut a perfunctory argument.”).
In their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss, the Medical Defendants' entire proximate-cause argument is as follows:
Finally, Plaintiff has not alleged (and cannot establish) legal causation as to the Medical Defendants for Decedent's drug dependency and death. Proximate cause requires proof of cause-in-fact and legal cause. See Wickersham v. Ford Motor Company, - S.E.2d -, 2020 WL 7234505 *3 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, December 9, 2020)(citing Baggerly v. CSX Transp., Inc., 370 S.C. 362, 369, 635 S.E.2d 97, 101 (2006)). With regard to causation, “proximate” is the opposite of “remote.” Id.; Stone v. Bethea, 251 S.C. 157, 162, 161 S.E.2d 171, 173 (1968)(“When the [conduct] appears merely to have brought about a condition of affairs, or a situation in which another and entirely independent and efficient agency intervenes to cause the injury, the latter is deemed the direct or proximate cause, and the former only the indirect or remote cause”). With regard to legal cause, foreseeability is the touchstone, and it is initially a matter of law, determined by looking to the natural and probable consequences of the defendant's conduct. Id. (citing Baggerly, 370 S.C. at 369, 635 S.E.2d at 101). The inquiry is whether the injury was a foreseeable consequence of the tortious conduct alleged. See Wickersham, 2020 WL 7234505 at *3.
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged and cannot establish as a matter of law that prescription drug abuse and overdose in 2020 is a foreseeable, natural and probable consequence of the Medical Defendants' provision of medical care over three (3) years earlier to Mr. Hill, as a pre-trial detainee, for a preexisting eye/facial injury. It is not a foreseeable, natural and probable consequence that Mr. Hill would, over a period of multiple years, fail or be unable to ever follow up for medical care after his release in March 2017, especially since he had reported seeing doctors (and allegedly asked to continue seeing them) for the condition at the time of his booking. [ECF No. 34 ¶ ¶ 58-61, 79-87, 123-124]. Finally, it is not foreseeable that Mr. Hill would obtain prescription medications from others, illegally, and abuse them for years after his release to the point of death. [Id. ¶ 125-30]. Plaintiff's wrongful death claim and allegations of drug use and overdose are simply too attenuated, and should be dismissed for this reason as well.[Doc. 39-1 at 6-7.]
Plaintiff's Other Claims for Damages Related to Hill's Drug Use
As noted, Plaintiff's other claims are for injuries suffered by Hill himself, and Plaintiff alleges them in the Third Complaint pursuant to the Survival Statute. These claims correspond to claims Hill had alleged in the Second Complaint. The Medical Defendants argue that to the extent the Third Complaint alleges that Hill suffered injuries from self-medicating and becoming dependent on illegally obtained prescription medication, the claims are time-barred. [Doc. 39-1 at 5-6; see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-5-90.] They contend that the statute of limitations expired before the Third Complaint was filed and that the Third Complaint does not relate back to the date of Hill's pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. [Docs. 39-1 at 5; 45 at 2-4.]
Critically, defendants bear the burden of establishing an affirmative defense, such as a statute of limitations. Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc). The question of whether an amendment to a complaint filed after a case is removed relates back to the original pleading is governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Kirby v. Allegheny Beverage Corp., 811 F.2d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Rule 81(c) provides that the federal rules apply to civil actions removed to the United States district courts from the state courts and govern procedure after removal.” (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 15 provides, as is relevant here, that “[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . “(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out-or attempted to be set out-in the original pleading.” Fed R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). The Fourth Circuit has “focused upon two issues in determining whether an amended claim relates back to an earlier complaint.” Grattan v. Burnett, 710 F.2d 160, 163 (4th Cir. 1983). “First, to relate back there must be a factual nexus between the amendment and the original complaint.” Id. “Second, if there is some factual nexus an amended complaint is liberally construed to relate back to the original complaint if the defendant had notice of the claim and will not be prejudiced by the amendment.” Id. When a party “has been given fair notice of a claim within the limitations period and will suffer no improper prejudice in defending it, the liberal amendment policies of the Federal Rules favor relation-back.” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 471.
The Goodman court explained:
[A] motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of 12(b)(6), which tests the sufficiency of the complaint, generally cannot reach the merits of an affirmative defense, such as the defense that the plaintiff's claim is time-barred. But in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6). This principle only applies, however, if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense clearly appear on the face of the complaint. Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (alteration & internal quotation marks omitted).
The Medical Defendants do not appear to dispute that there is a factual nexus between the Second Complaint and the allegations regarding Hill's self-medication. Rather, they argue in essence that because Hill did not allege in the First Complaint or the Second Complaint that the Medical Defendants' actions caused him to self-medicate, they were not given fair notice of such claims and would suffer improper prejudice were Plaintiff allowed to add such claims via the Third Complaint. [Docs. 45 at 2-4.] The Court disagrees.
Hill's pleadings placed the Medical Defendants on notice that they could be liable for Hill's injuries that were proximately caused by their alleged failure to provide him adequate medical care. At this stage of the proceedings, the record is silent as to when Hill began to self-medicate with illegally obtained prescription pain medication, or at what point he had to increase the dosage of that medication. [Doc. 34 ¶¶ 124-27.] Without such information, the Medical Defendants cannot show that Hill unduly delayed in amending his pleadings to allege the facts concerning his self-medication and cannot show why any prejudice they might suffer from the addition of these facts now would be improper or unfair. At this point, therefore, the Medical Defendants have not shown that the self-medication allegations should not relate back to the date of Hill's pleading. See Wall v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 339 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (reversing the denial of a motion to amend filed after the statute of limitations had run when “the record . . . fails to disclose any prejudice or unfairness which would [have] result[ed] to the defendant if the amendments were allowed, ” the defendant would have had “ample opportunity to defend on the merits against the amended pleadings, ” “the facts alleged in the amended pleadings so closely relate[d] to the accident [at issue in the earlier complaint] that they could be said to grow out of that occurrence and properly relate back within the provisions of section (c)”). Accordingly, the Court recommends denying the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss as to the statute of limitations issue. As with the proximate-cause issue, the Court recommends that the denial of the motion to dismiss be without prejudice to the Medical Defendants' right to raise the same issue on a more fully developed factual record in a motion for summary judgment.
As for Howard, the complaints at issue in that case all concerned allegedly defective pajamas that caught on fire and caused the death of the child who had been wearing them. In the original complaint and an amendment thereto the child's mother sought damages (1) individually for the child's wrongful death under the state wrongful death statute, for the child's pain and suffering, (2) as personal representative of the child's estate for the child's pain and suffering and injuries prior to his death, and (3) as personal representative for her deceased husband's estate for grief and loss of the child's companionship that the husband experienced prior to the husband's death a few weeks after the child's. Howard, 601 F.2d at 135. When the mother attempted, nearly two and a half years after filing the case, to amend her complaint to add claims for her own burns she allegedly suffered attempting to rescue her child and for the mental shock she suffered by witnessing the accident, the district court ruled that the new complaint would not relate back and would therefore be time barred. Id. The court offered as an additional reason for the ruling that the mother's lengthy delay in attempting to add that claim was inexcusable. Id. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal, holding that the proposed amended cause of action could not relate back to the date of the earlier pleading because it “set[] forth an entirely new cause of action.” Id. at 136. The court also agreed that “the plaintiff was exceedingly tardy in asserting this new claim, known to her from the date of the fire three years earlier, ” and concluded that the district court would not have abused its discretion denying the amendment simply on that basis. Id. Two factors that were significant in the Howard decision are not present here. First, unlike in Howard, the injuries on which the “new claims” are based are those of the same party who had brought the claims in the earlier complaint. Second, also unlike in Howard, there has been no showing that Hill was “exceedingly tardy” in amending his complaint, as the Court has noted. In support of their suggestion that the new allegations should not relate back, the Medical Defendants cite Griggs v. Farmer, 430 F.2d 638, 639 (4th Cir. 1970), Holmes v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 757 F.2d 1563 (5th Cir. 1985), Worthams v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 994, 995 (6th Cir. 1976), and Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1979). [Doc. 45 at 2-3.] The Court notes that the first three are quite easily distinguishable from this case. In both Griggs and Holmes, unlike in the present case, the later complaint was held not to relate back to an earlier one because the alleged wrongs supporting the later complaint were different wrongs from those alleged in the first. Griggs, 430 F.2d at 639 (second suit based on a physical assault and first suit was based on breach of a promise to marry); Holmes, 757 F.2d at 1566 (the second complaint alleged that the defendant union engaged in arbitrary or capricious conduct or acted in bad faith while the first complaint alleged bias, fraud, or prejudice of an arbitrator). And in Worthams, also unlike this case, a second complaint was held not to relate back to an earlier complaint because the earlier complaint had already been dismissed before the second complaint was filed. Worthams, 533 F.2d at 996.
The Medical Defendants make the same proximate-cause argument with regard to Plaintiff's other claims as they do regarding the wrongful death claim. [Doc. 39-1 at 6-7; see also Doc. 39 at 1.] For the same reasons discussed regarding that claim, the Court recommends that the Medical Defendants' motion to dismiss these claims relating to Hill's drug use be denied without prejudice as well.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the Medical Defendants' motion for partial dismissal [Doc. 39] be DENIED without prejudice to the Medical Defendants' right to raise the proximate-cause and statute-of-limitations issues in a motion for summary judgment on a more fully developed record.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.