Hilgenberg v. Sprint Communications Company

Full title: PEGGI HILGENBERG, Plaintiff, v. SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LP, and…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Date published: Nov 29, 2000

No. 99 C 2837 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2000)

Opinion

No. 99 C 2837

November 29, 2000

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

GETTLEMAN, Judge

Peggi Hilgenberg (plaintiff) filed a first amended complaint against Sprint Communications Company L.P. ("Sprint") and its general partner U.S. Telecom, Inc.¹, alleging employment discrimination based upon her sex and age pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C.S 2000e, and the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. S 621. Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. For the following reasons, the court grants defendants' motion.

1 Although the identity of plaintiff's employer is unclear from the current record, the parties do not dispute that both defendants are properly named. For convenience, the court will refer to the employer as "Sprint".

Facts

Sprint is a company providing telecommunications services to the public. In late September 1995, Sprint hired plaintiff to work at its Rosemont, Illinois facility. Specifically, Sprint hired plaintiff to manage the Rosemont Small 1 branch, one of three smallmarket focused branches in the Great Lakes sales region. Sprint had six other branches in the region focused on middle and major market sales. Throughout plaintiff's tenure, all nine branches, including plaintiff's branch, reported to Bob Shaw, defendants' regional sales director from 1995 through February 1997.

During plaintiff's employment, Sprint set monthly sales quotas ("quotas") for all branch managers, including plaintiff, and the sales representatives working for the branch managers. Under company policy, Sprint took corrective action toward branch managers or sales representatives who did not meet their established quotas. For sales representatives, corrective action took shape as a four-step process called Personal Success Path ("PSP"). Sprint required all branch managers to implement PSP as needed to improve he performance of their sales representatives. The first stage of PSP involved verbal coaching and counseling by the branch manager. If performance did not improve, the subsequent states of PSP were a written warning, a final written warning, and finally termination. Sprint used a similar four-step corrective action process towards branch managers under the guidelines of Sprint's employee handbook, which plaintiff received on her first day of work. Later, Sprint instituted the Sprint Management Process ("SMP"), which became effective on November 1, 1996.

Before and during plaintiff's employment with Sprint, any branch managers failed to meet their established monthly sales quotas. When this happened, Shaw typically started the corrective action process towards these managers. Shaw gave verbal warning to Pete Zaccariello, plaintiff's predecessor at the Rosemont Small 1 branch, for failing to meet his quota in 1995. Zaccariello shortly afterwards left management for a sales representative position in one of Sprint's major markets. Shaw similarly gave two verbal warnings to Mike Kilian, manager of the Rosemont Small 2 branch, for failure to meet his quota in 1996. Kilian left his job shortly afterwards.

For failure to meet a quota in 1996, Shaw gave two verbal warnings to John Boardman, manager of the Rosemont Mid branch. Shaw also gave two verbal warnings to John Boyce, manager of the Indiana Mid-Major branch, for failure to meet his quota in 1996. After receiving these verbal warnings, Boardman and Boyce improved performance and were removed from the corrective action process.

Throughout her employment, plaintiff consistently failed to meet her quota. Although Shaw attempted to work with plaintiff to improve her performance, as of July 1996, plaintiff's actual revenue was 61% of her quota, lower than the performance level of any other branch manager. By September 1996, plaintiff's estimated revenue had dropped to 24% of her quota, again the lowest of any branch manager. Shaw then issued plaintiff a verbal warning. In October 1996, plaintiff reached only 45% of her estimated revenue quota, and Shaw issued plaintiff a written warning.

Shaw then gave plaintiff training sessions and other assistance, but in November 1996, plaintiff reached but 14% of her November quota, and Shaw issued plaintiff a final written warning. This final written warning advised plaintiff that "failure to meet the branch estimated quota of $36,000 for the month of December, 1996 will result in termination." Plaintiff resigned before the results of her December 1996 performance were known. Later, the December 1996 results showed that plaintiff reached only 20% of her quota for that month.

Discussion Summary Judgment Standard

A movant is entitled to summary judgment when the moving papers and affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Unterreiner v. Volkswagen of America. Inc., 8 F.3d 1206, 1209 (7^th Cir. 1993). Once a moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Becker v. Tenenbaum-Hill Assoc., Inc., 914 F.2d 107, 110 (7^th Cir. 1990). The court considers the record as a whole and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc. 979 F.2d 1239, 1242 (7^th Cir. 1992).

A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Stewart v. McGinnis, 5 F.3d 1031, 1033 (7^th Cir 1993). This standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where issues of intent and credibility often dominate. See Sarsha v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 3 F.3d 1035, 1038 (7^th Cir. 1993). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmoving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

Title VII and ADEA Discrimination Standards

Because plaintiff's Title VII and ADEA claims are both subject to theMcDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the court addresses the claims together. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). To set forth an individual case of intentional discrimination, plaintiff has two options: she may offer direct evidence of discriminatory intent; or she may demonstrate such intent indirectly by following theMcDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. Under this framework, plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was doing her job well enough to meet her employer's legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated differently than members of the unprotected class. See Hughes v. Brown, 20 F.3d 745, 746 (7^th Cir, 1994).

If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, she creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision. If the employer is successful, the presumption of discrimination dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the employee to prove that the employer's proffered reasons are a pretext for discrimination. See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7^th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff can satisfy the pretext burden by showing "either a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Robinson v. PPG Industries, 23 F.3d 1159, 1163 (7^th Cir. 1994). At all times, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her. See Hughes, 20 F.3d at 747.

In the instant case, plaintiff has not presented any direct evidence of discriminatory treatment based on her age or gender. Therefore, she must demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. It is undisputed that plaintiff is a member of two protected classes, because she is a woman over 40 years of age. This satisfies the first element of McDonnell Douglas. Sprint argues, however, that plaintiff cannot meet the second, third, or fourth elements because: (1) plaintiff did not do her job well enough to meet defendants' legitimate expectations; (2) plaintiff did not suffer an adverse employment action; and (3) plaintiff was not treated differently from members of the unprotected class of employees.

With respect to the first element, it is undisputed that plaintiff consistently failed to meet her quotas. In fact, plaintiff consistently under-performed compared to every other branch manager in the region. See Skouby v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 130 F.3d 794, 798 (7^th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff's "performance was dismal compared to the performance of others" in that plaintiff was the lowest producer in her district); Fortier v. Ameritech Mobile Communications. Inc., 161 F.3d 1106, 1113 (7^th Cir. 1998) (company's negative evaluations of plaintiff employee preclude prima facie showing that plaintiff met employer's legitimate expectations; employee received "the lowest rating possible" combined with "repeated warnings and counseling" before being terminated).

Plaintiff argues that even though she performed poorly, defendants' quotas were not legitimate because the quotas were too hard to meet, given the high-pressure nature of the small markets, plaintiff's difficulty recruiting and retaining qualified sales representatives, and the fact that only four of 37 small market managers consistently met or exceeded their quotas in 1996.

The court's inquiry into whether the employer's expectations are legitimate is limited to determining whether the employer communicated the expectations to the employee and whether the expectations were unreasonable. See Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 463 (7^th Cir. 1986). In the instant case, the record clearly establishes that the quotas were communicated to plaintiff long before she was disciplined. Moreover, there is no evidence that defendant created unreasonable quotas as a pretext for discrimination.

Plaintiff's argument does not succeed because plaintiff knew what her quotas were each month, and she received similar quotas as any other branch manager. Defendants did not single out plaintiff for discriminatory quotas compared to the quotas of other branch managers. The court stops inquiry at this point. See Coco v. Elmwood Care, Inc., 128 F.3d 1177, 1179-1180 (7^th Cir. 1997) (the court in an employment discrimination case has no business deciding "whether an employer demands too much of its workers"). Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to establish that she was meeting legitimate expectations.

Plaintiff also cannot show that Sprint treated her differently than younger, male managers; who plaintiff alleges Sprint treated better than her, solely because of her sex and age.² Plaintiff makes several specific allegations in this argument, which the court addresses in turn. First, plaintiff alleges that defendants treated the younger, male managers more leniently when they failed to meet their quotas. Allegedly, Shaw gave these managers verbal warnings only, but plaintiff received one verbal and two written warnings. The evidence does not support her claim. Indeed, the record shows that Shaw applied the same procedure for corrective action towards both the younger, male managers and plaintiff. The younger, male managers either left employment with defendants, transferred to a different job in the company, or improved performance after Shaw gave them verbal warnings. After Shaw gave plaintiff a verbal warning, plaintiff did none of those things. She stuck to her job, continued to perform poorly, and was given written warnings when her poor performance compelled Shaw to do so.

2 Plaintiff has raised sufficient disputed material facts with respect to her claim that she suffered an adverse employment action based on her argument that she was constructively discharged.

Second, plaintiff alleges that, contrary to company policy, defendants did not discipline the younger, male managers who failed to take corrective action towards their under-performing sales representatives. Specifically, plaintiff states that Kilian took corrective action towards just one of his sales representatives, when several others were also deserving of corrective action. Again, plaintiff has not demonstrated facts to support this claim. Shaw testified in his deposition that all of the branch managers under his supervision, including Kilian, took corrective action towards their sales representatives as required by company policy. Kilian says in his affidavit that he, too, took corrective action as required. Plaintiff's allegation is not corroborated by deposition testimony, affidavits, or personnel records, but rests solely on her personal opinion. Lacking corroborating evidence, plaintiff's personal opinion is not evidence showing a prima facie case of discrimination. See Doe v. R.R. Donnell Sons Co., 42 F.3d 439, 447 (7^th Cir. 1994) (holding that for purposes of defendant's summary judgment motion against plaintiff's Title VII claim, female plaintiff's opinion that a supervisor had witnessed a male co-worker's attempts to sexually harass plaintiff, absent corroborating evidence, did not present a prima facie showing under the statute).

Third, plaintiff alleges that defendants treated Kilian, one of the younger, male managers, with particular leniency compared to how defendants treated her. Plaintiff alleges that defendants allowed Kilian to close a profitable sale with Easy Call, a reseller account, in violation of company policy. Then, Shaw allegedly refused to allow plaintiff to close a similar deal. The record belies her claim. Although Kilian did close the Easy Call deal, the record reveals that Shaw disciplined him for doing so. Indeed, Kilian was given a written warning. Plaintiff's suggestion that she too should be "allowed" to violate company policy has no merit, and Sprint's refusal was not discriminatory.

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants gave Kilian expense money for sales team lunches, but did not give similar money to her. According to Shaw's deposition testimony, however, all branch managers, including plaintiff, were allowed to treat their sales team members to lunches during sales "blitzes," or concentrated sales efforts. Shaw denies giving Kilian any special or extra money for the particular purpose of sales team lunches. There is no evidence that contradicts Shaw's testimony.

Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendants favored Kilian in the recruiting process for hiring new sales representatives. To the contrary, the record shows that the human resources recruiter passed along whatever resumes she received to both plaintiff and Kilian, that defendants invited all managers to participate in campus recruiting, and that plaintiff in fact participated in campus recruiting. Plaintiff had the same opportunity as any other branch manager to hire her own sales representatives — in fact, that was part of her job — and it was her responsibility to select and retain good employees. It is not defendants' fault if plaintiff ended up being dissatisfied with the employees she picked for her sales team. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot establish that she was treated differently than her younger male counterparts.

As explained above, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. Even if she could, however, defendants have presented sufficient evidence to rebut a prima facie showing. Sprint has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for their actions towards plaintiff, specifically her poor performance, which shifts the burden back to plaintiff to prove that defendants' actions were a pretext for discrimination. Andersen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7^th Cir. 1994). In the context of employment discrimination, "pretext" means "a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action."Jackson v. E.J. Branch Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 983 (7^th Cir. 1999), quoting Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7^th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff meets her pretext burden by showing "either a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Robinson v. PPG Industries, 23 F.3d 1159, 1163 (7^th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff has not met her burden of demonstrating pretext. She cannot show that Sprint was motivated by a discriminatory reason in any of their action towards her. Rather, Sprint disciplined plaintiff because of her poor performance. This reason is non-discriminatory, supported by the record, and worthy of credence. Simply put, plaintiff cannot show any grounds for pretext, because the record is devoid of any support for a claim of pretext.

In sum, plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case of discrimination under either Title VII or the ADEA, because she cannot satisfy three of the four elements of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. Plaintiff did not meet defendants' legitimate employment expectations, and Sprint did not treat plaintiff differently from the members of the non-protected class of employees. Further, plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that Sprint's actions were a pretext for discrimination.

Conclusion

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.