Opinion
DBDCV186027468S
03-20-2019
Hilario’s Truck Center, LLC v. Transit Tech Logistics, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh):Kowalski, Ronald E., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE Motion to Strike (#110.00)
Kowalski, J.
The issue before the court is whether count three of the plaintiff’s amended revised complaint, filed on October 19, 2018, claiming breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary, is legally sufficient. In its motion to strike, the defendant, Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich"), asserts that the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a cause of action because the allegations of count three fail to sufficiently allege that it is an intended third-party beneficiary to the insurance contract at issue, between Zurich and the defendant Quality Carriers, Inc. ("Quality"). The plaintiff argues that due to the circumstances of the service it provided and the nature of the vehicle insurance, it is "deemed" a third-party beneficiary of the contract. Because the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that the parties to the insurance contract intended that Zurich would assume a direct liability to the plaintiff; see Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 195-96, 441 A.2d 81 (1981), the third-party beneficiary claim is insufficient, and the motion to strike count three is granted.
The plaintiff filed a second amended revised complaint (#120.00) on February 21, 2019. The analysis in this decision, however, is applicable to the allegations against Zurich in the second amended revised complaint. The revisions to count three do not appear to rectify the deficiencies that this court has identified herein.
I. BACKGROUND
The amended revised complaint alleges as follows. This case arises out of an accident occurring on or about June 2, 2012 on Interstate 84 in Newtown, where an employee of the defendant Quality was driving a tractor trailer, trailing a tanker owned by the defendant Transit Tech Logistics, Inc. ("Transit Tech"). The vehicle was involved in a roll-over accident, sustaining heavy damage. After responding to the scene, the Connecticut State Police called the plaintiff, Hilario’s Truck Center, LLC, to recover and clear the accident scene. The plaintiff did so, using heavy equipment to safely recover and preserve the tractor trailer, trailer and the materials contained in the trailer. Zurich insured the cargo that was being hauled by Quality at the time of the accident. The plaintiff further alleges that Zurich has failed to adequately compensate the plaintiff for the services that benefitted its insured and for which Zurich "was obligated to pay pursuant to its policy of insurance between it and Quality Carriers, Inc." Paragraph 21 of the third count of the amended revised complaint alleges, "[t]he Plaintiff is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract between Defendant, Zurich American Insurance Company and Quality Carriers, Inc."
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard Governing Motion to Strike
The governing standards applicable to a motion to strike are well settled. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "The role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the plaintiffs, to determine whether the [pleading party has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997). "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint ... If facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). Thus, the court must assume the truth of both the specific factual allegations and any facts provable thereunder, and in doing so must read the allegations broadly, rather than narrowly. See Milton v. Robinson, 131 Conn.App. 760, 784, 27 A.3d 480 (2011), cert. denied, 304 Conn. 906, 39 A.3d 1118 (2012). "A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged." Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc., 224 Conn. 210, 215, 618 A.2d 25 (1992). In ruling on a motion to strike, the court may also rely on reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the pleaded facts. Lawrence v. O&G Industries, Inc., 319 Conn. 641, 649, 126 A.3d 569 (2015).
B. Liability to a Third-Party Beneficiary
At issue is whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged its claim for breach of contract as a third-party beneficiary. In support of its motion to strike, Zurich argues that the allegations in count three are merely conclusory, and are insufficient to support a claim that the plaintiff is an intended third-party beneficiary. The plaintiff asserts that its third-party beneficiary claim is sufficient and alleges facts that establish that both Quality and Zurich intended that Zurich should be held responsible for bills for services made necessary due to a vehicular accident of the insured.
In addition to the contracting parties, a third-party beneficiary may also have a right of action under the contract. See Rapaport & Benedict, P.C. v. Stamford, 39 Conn.App. 492, 497, 664 A.2d 1193 (1995) ("a third-party beneficiary ... may sue the obligor for breach [of contract]" [internal quotation marks omitted]). "[T]he ultimate test to be applied [in determining whether a person has a right of action as a third-party beneficiary] is whether the intent of the parties to the contract was that the promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third-party [beneficiary] ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knapp v. New Haven Road Construction Co., 150 Conn. 321, 325, 189 A.2d 386 (1963). In Stowe v. Smith, supra, 184 Conn. 196, our Supreme Court stated that "a third party seeking to enforce a contract must allege and prove that the contracting parties intended that the promisor should assume a direct obligation to the third party ." (Emphasis added.)
In count three of the amended revised complaint, the plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a factual basis to support the legal conclusion in paragraph 21 that it "is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract" at issue. Specifically, the plaintiff does not allege that the parties to the insurance contract intended to assume a direct obligation to it, nor does it allege sufficient facts from which the court could draw that conclusion. Therefore, even construing the allegations of the amended revised complaint broadly and assuming the truth of the pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, as required, the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a third-party beneficiary claim. Therefore, the motion to strike count three is granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to strike (#110.00) is granted.