Opinion
Appellate Case No. 2015-000159 Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-338
06-29-2016
HHH Ltd. of Greenville, Respondent, v. Randall S. Hiller, Robert E. Hiller, and Randall S. Hiller, P.A., Appellants.
Randall Scott Hiller, of Greenville, for Appellants. Randy A. Skinner, of Skinner Law Firm, LLC, John T. Crawford, Jr., of Kenison Dudley & Crawford, LLC, and M. Stokely Holder, of Holder, Padgett, Littlejohn & Prickett, LLC, all of Greenville, for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. Appeal From Greenville County
Letitia H. Verdin, Circuit Court Judge
APPEAL DISMISSED
Randall Scott Hiller, of Greenville, for Appellants. Randy A. Skinner, of Skinner Law Firm, LLC, John T. Crawford, Jr., of Kenison Dudley & Crawford, LLC, and M. Stokely Holder, of Holder, Padgett, Littlejohn & Prickett, LLC, all of Greenville, for Respondent. PER CURIAM: Appeal dismissed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Mountain Lake Colony v. McJunkin, 308 S.C. 202, 204, 417 2 S.E.2d 578, 579 (1992) (finding ordinarily, a decision granting or denying an order of reference is not immediately appealable); Williford v. Downs, 265 S.C. 319, 321, 218 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1975) (noting an exception to the general rule if the reference order's result will deprive a party of a mode of trial to which he is entitled); Verenes v. Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 15, 690 S.E.2d 771, 772 (2010) ("Whether a party is entitled to a jury trial is a question of law."); Wachovia Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Blackburn, 407 S.C. 321, 328, 755 S.E.2d 437, 441 (2014) ("Appellate courts may decide questions of law with no particular deference to the circuit court's findings."); Albertson v. Robinson, 371 S.C. 311, 315, 638 S.E.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 2006) ("An action to set aside a transfer as fraudulent pursuant to the Statute of Elizabeth is an action in equity."); Williford, 265 S.C. at 321, 218 S.E.2d at 243 ("In equity the parties are not entitled, as a matter of right, to a trial by jury."); Blackburn, 407 S.C. at 328, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("However, counterclaims-including those raised in equitable actions-may, at times, be entitled to a jury trial."); id. at 329, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("If the complaint is equitable and the counterclaim is legal and compulsory, the plaintiff or the defendant has a right to a jury trial on the counterclaim." (emphasis added)); id. at 328, 755 S.E.2d at 441 ("If the complaint is equitable and the counterclaim is legal and permissive, the defendant waives his right to a jury trial."); First-Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of S.C. v. Hucks, 305 S.C. 296, 298, 408 S.E.2d 222, 223 (1991) ("By definition, a counterclaim is compulsory only if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim."); N.C. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. DAV Corp., 298 S.C. 514, 518, 381 S.E.2d 903, 905 (1989) (adopting the "logical relationship test" to determine whether a claim is compulsory or permissive); Beach Co. v. Twillman, Ltd., 351 S.C. 56, 61, 566 S.E.2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Whether a counterclaim is logically related to the initial claim depends upon the facts of each case."). APPEAL DISMISSED. LOCKEMY, C.J., and WILLIAMS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.