Opinion
No. WD 62328
November 4, 2003
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, The Honorable Ralph J. Haslag, Judge.
William Herron, Acting Pro Se, Mineral Point, for Appellant.
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Jefferson City, and David A. Johnson, Office of Attorney General, Jefferson City, for Respondent.
Before Paul M. Spinden, Presiding Judge, Thomas H. Newton, Judge, and Ronald R. Holliger, Judge.
A prison inmate seeks judicial review of prison administrators' decisions to segregate him from the prison population until he submits to a psychological evaluation. The inmate, William Herron, filed an injunction action seeking review of decisions by the director of the Department of Corrections, Gary Kempker, and the director of the Division of Adult Institutions, George Lombardi. The circuit court dismissed Herron's lawsuit, and Herron appeals. We dismiss Herron's appeal because the circuit court correctly dismissed Herron's lawsuit, given its lack of jurisdiction.
Herron asserts that the circuit court erred in dismissing his lawsuit because § 536.150.1, RSMo 2000, entitled him to file an injunction action seeking judicial review. He argues that the prison administrators' decision to continue his assignment to administrative segregation was a noncontested case subject to judicial review under § 536.150.
Section 536.150 says, "When any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by statute . . . shall have rendered a decision which is not subject to administrative review, determining the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person . . . and there is no other provision for judicial inquiry into or review of such decision, such decision may be reviewed by suit for injunction . . ., and in any such review proceeding the court may determine the facts relevant to the question whether such person at the time of such decision was subject to such legal duty, or had such right, or was entitled to such privilege, and may hear such evidence on such question as may be properly adduced, and the court may determine whether such decision, in view of the facts as they appear to the court, is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious or involves an abuse of discretion; and the court shall render judgment accordingly, and may order the administrative officer or body to take such further action as it may be proper to require; but the court shall not substitute its discretion for discretion legally vested in such administrative officer or body, and in cases where the granting or withholding of a privilege is committed by law to the sole discretion of such administrative officer or body, such discretion lawfully exercised shall not be disturbed."
In determining whether or not — and how — the judiciary can review the Department of Correction's decision, we first must determine whether Herron's case was contested or noncontested. The distinction is significant because the General Assembly has mandated two different paths for judicial review of administrative decisions, depending on whether the case is contested or noncontested.
In § 536.100, RSMo 2000, the General Assembly mandated that any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies and is aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to judicial review complying with §§ 536.100 to 536.140, RSMo 2000. The review in these cases is to be on the record mandated by § 536.130 and within the scope mandated by § 536.140.
In noncontested cases, in which the administrative body typically does not make a record of its decisions, the General Assembly provided in § 536.150 for the circuit court to review the administrative body's decision by first making a record. The statute says that the "decision may be reviewed by suit for injunction, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition or other appropriate action," and the circuit court is to, in effect, step into the shoes of the administrative officer or body by:
[D]etermin[ing] the facts relevant to the question whether [the petitioner] at the time of [the administrative officer's or body's] decision was subject to such legal duty, or had such right, or was entitled to such privilege, and may hear such evidence on such question as may be properly adduced, and the court may determine whether such decision, in view of the facts as they appear to the court, is unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious or involves an abuse of discretion[.]
After making a record and deciding factual issues, the circuit court is to "render judgment accordingly, and may order the administrative officer or body to take such further action as it may be proper to require[.]" Id.
The General Assembly declared in § 536.010(2), RSMo 2000, that the determining factor of whether a case is contested or noncontested is whether or not the law required the administrative agency to hold a hearing in the case. If it does, it is a contested case. All other cases are noncontested. The General Assembly defined a contested case as "a proceeding before an agency in which legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by law to be determined after hearing[.]" Section 536.010(2). In construing this definition, the Supreme Court has held that "§ 536.010(2) mandates that if a hearing is required by substantive law, it must be conducted according to contested case procedures." State ex rel. Yarber v. McHenry, 915 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Mo.banc 1995). The Supreme Court further instructed, "The `law' referred to in the contested case definition encompasses any statute or ordinance, or any provision of the state or federal constitutions that mandates a hearing." Id.
A host of cases issued after McHenry ignored McHenry's instruction by declaring that a determining factor in separating contested and noncontested cases was how much procedural formality attended to the administrative hearing. The cases reasoned that cases with much formality, such as the calling and cross-examination of witnesses, are contested cases and those which did not have much formality were noncontested cases. The Supreme Court specifically rejected this reasoning in McHenry:
These cases include Lipic v. State, 93 S.W.3d 839 (Mo.App. 2002); Kline v. Bd. of Parks Recreation. Comm'rs, 73 S.W.3d 63 (Mo.App. 2002); Legal Communications Corp. v. St. Louis County Printing Publ'g Co., Inc., 24 S.W.3d 744 (Mo.App. 2000); Mosley v. Members of Civil Serv. Bd. for City of Berkeley, 23 S.W.3d 855 (Mo.App. 2000); Cade v. State, 990 S.W.2d 32 (Mo.App. 1999); Hayward v. City of Independence, 967 S.W.2d 650 (Mo.App. 1998); State ex rel. Maynes Constr. Co., Inc., v. City of Wildwood, 965 S.W.2d 949 (Mo.App. 1998).
In Hagely [ v. Board of Education of Webster Groves School District, 841 S.W.2d 663 (Mo.banc 1992)], this Court, in dicta, stated:
A hearing that is not held pursuant to the procedural format necessary under MAPA [Missouri Administrative Procedures Act, or Chapter 536] does not qualify as a contested case, even though the hearing is required by law.
Id. at 668-69. However, as pointed out in Weber v. Firemen's Retirement System, 872 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Mo.banc 1994), this language was used to indicate that certain procedural advantages provided to the agency by the MAPA may be lost by the agency if it failed to follow contested case procedures. Id. at n. 3. In the context of the case at hand, § 536.010(2) mandates that if a hearing is required by substantive law, it must be conducted according to contested case procedures. The relevant inquiry is not whether the agency in fact held a contested case hearing, but whether it should have done so.
. . .
The "law" referred to in the contested case definition encompasses any statute or ordinance, or any provision of the state or federal constitutions that mandates a hearing. Weber, 872 S.W.2d at 479; Byrd v. Board of Curators of Lincoln University of Missouri, 863 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Mo.banc 1993). The right to a hearing, in other words, is determined by substantive law outside the MAPA.
Id. at 328 (emphasis added). In McHenry, in which the issue was whether or not a school district's denial of a semester of high school credit hours because of a student's excessive absences was a contested case, the Supreme Court, without any consideration of how formal or informal the hearing was or should have been, decided that his case was a contested case under the definition of § 536.010(2) because the student's constitutional rights required a hearing.
Indeed, the McHenry court limited the dictum in Hagley in which the court had said that "[a] hearing that is not held pursuant to the procedural format necessary under MAPA does not qualify as a contested case[.]" Hagley, 841 S.W.2d at 668. The McHenry court declared that it had used this language in Hagley "to indicate that certain procedural advantages provided to the agency by the MAPA may be lost by the agency if it failed to follow contested case procedures." McHenry, 915 S.W.2d at 328. The McHenry court emphasized that what made a case contested or noncontested had nothing to do with whether or not the administrative agency held a hearing with the procedural formalities, but whether or not the agency should have held such a hearing. Id. That a hearing is formal or informal is irrelevant to whether or not the case is contested. The determining factor is whether or not the law requires that a hearing be held.
To hold otherwise is illogical, if not absurd, and thwarts one of Chapter 536's primary purposes: to mandate what procedures must be followed in contested cases. Holding that a contested case is determined by what procedures an agency used in holding a hearing renders the General Assembly's definition in § 536.010(2) meaningless. Defining a contested case as one in which formal procedures were employed leaves an individual demanding the procedures of Chapter 536 with a vacuous position. If a hearing's formality or informality determines whether a case is contested or noncontested, the court's response to a person demanding Chapter 536's procedures would be exasperating: "Only cases having formal procedures are contested cases. The agency did not give you formal procedures; therefore, your case is not a contested case, and you are not entitled to formal procedures." The absurdity of this is obvious. "The relevant inquiry is not whether the agency in fact held a contested case hearing, but whether it should have done so." Id.
Some contested cases may have limited procedural formality, and some noncontested cases may have some gratuitous procedural formality. The formality of the procedures followed by the agency is irrelevant. The classification of the case as contested or noncontested is not determined by the manner in which an agency conducts a hearing. Rugg v. City of Carrollton, 990 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Mo.App. 1999).
To the extent that these cases noted in Footnote 2 supra hold otherwise, we decline to follow them. A majority of the court en banc has reviewed and approves of this holding.
Kempker and Lombardi also assert that the individuals that conduct the hearings of inmates' grievances concerning administrative segregation are not an agency for the purposes of Chapter 536. The General Assembly has defined an agency in § 536.010(1) as "any administrative officer or body existing under the constitution or by law and authorized by law or the constitution to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases[.]" The General Assembly mandated in § 217.375, RSMo 2000, that someone in the department — it did not declare whom — must conduct hearings of inmates' grievances concerning administrative segregation. In its internal policies and procedures, the department designated the Administrative Segregation Committee to conduct hearings in fulfillment of the General Assembly's mandate. The department is an agency under § 536.010(1)'s definition, obviously. It necessarily follows that the unit to whom the department has delegated its obligation is also an agency. No one can doubt that Kempker and Lombardi would be acting as "administrative officers" and would, therefore, be subject to Chapter 536's requirements were they to conduct the hearings. That they have delegated the authority to the committee does not change anything of significance: The committee is acting as an agent of the department in conducting the hearings and is, therefore, acting as a state agency.
We decide, therefore, whether the hearing mandated by § 217.375 is a contested case. The statute says that, when a correctional facility's chief administrative officer or his designee places an offender in administrative segregation, "[a] review hearing shall be held concerning the incident within five working days." Section 217.375.1. An inmate detained in administrative segregation is entitled to a review hearing "thirty days after the initial period of confinement and every ninety days thereafter." Section 217.375.2.
Herron was entitled to a hearing concerning his administrative segregation pursuant to § 217.375. His case, therefore, was a contested case, as defined by § 536.010(2). He should have sought judicial review as a contested case pursuant to §§ 536.100 to 536.140. This he did not do. Instead, he sought review pursuant to § 536.150 as a noncontested case by filing a petition for review by injunction.
"A failure to comply with the statutory provisions regarding judicial review of administrative decisions deprives the [circuit] court of subject matter jurisdiction[.]" Wrenn v. City of Kansas City, 908 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Mo.App. 1995). Herron's petition did not invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court for judicial review of a contested case. Hence, because the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider Herron's petition, this court also lacks jurisdiction. We dismiss Herron's appeal.
Because we reach this conclusion, we need not address Herron's remaining contentions on appeal.
Thomas H. Newton, Judge, and Ronald R. Holliger, Judge, concur.