Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-2110, SECTION "A" (2).
June 5, 2003.
MINUTE ENTRY
On this date the Court held a status conference with the following counsel/parties in attendance: Plaintiff Brian Herrington pro se (by phone); Frank Liantonio for Helmerich Payne International Drilling Co. ("H P"); Sal Pusateri for BP; Richard Cozad for Berry Contracting/Bay Offshore ("Bay"); Ralph Kraft for Mega International, Inc. (by phone). The status conference was held in lieu of the pre-trial conference due to Plaintiff's failure to submit a pre-trial order, to file witness and exhibit lists, and to oppose dispositive motions. Plaintiff contacted the Court prior to the conference and requested a continuance of the trial date as well as an extension of time to oppose H P's pending motion for summary judgment.
At the conference Plaintiff informed the Court that he is diligently attempting to retain new counsel. The Court informed Plaintiff that he would have 45 days from entry of this order to retain new counsel. In the interim the Court advised Plaintiff that the matter would be closed administratively without prejudice to Plaintiff's right to move to reopen the matter when counsel timely enrolls. The Court further advised Plaintiff that if the 45 day period expires without counsel enrolling for Plaintiff, the Court will then entertain a motion to dismiss by any remaining defendants.
Plaintiff's former counsel withdrew on March 27, 2003.
Likewise, any defendant can move to reopen the matter for purposes of adjudicating the various cross claims should settlement negotiations fail.
Plaintiff advised the Court that an opposition to H P's motion for summary judgment was en route to the Court. The Court advised Plaintiff and H P that the opposition would be considered and that the Court would rule on the motion if the Court were to determine that an any opposition prepared by Plaintiff's future counsel would not likely affect the outcome of the ruling.
After reviewing H P's motion and conducting independent research of the applicable law, the Court concludes, based upon the evidence submitted by H P, that Plaintiff has no claim against H P under applicable law.
H P's Motion
Herrington was allegedly injured on April 18, 2001, while working aboard the Pompano platform located in Block 989 of the Viosca Knoll area in the Gulf of Mexico. At the time of his injury, Herrington was employed by defendant Bay Offshore as a crane operator. BP owned the platform. Bay Offshore and H P were both contractors aboard the platform pursuant to contracts with BP. Bay Offshore and H P had no contractual relationship.
The accident occurred after Herrington's supervisor "Jimmy," also a Bay employee, instructed Herrington to assist with moving some pipe in the "hot work area." H P Exhibit 2, at 126. According to Herrington, his supervisor directed the entire task. Id. at 154. While lowering the pipe, one of the Bay employees dropped his end allegedly causing Herrington to injure his back. Id. at 166. Herrington testified that an H P safety man was in the work area at the time and saw the Bay employees moving the pipe.
Another Bay employee was also in the area and Plaintiff thought that he too might be some sort of safety man.
Herrington sued Bay Offshore, BP, and H P. Herrington asserts that H P is liable because its safety man had a duty to intervene in the unsafe operation. H P now moves for summary judgment arguing that Louisiana law imposes no such duty on its employee.
H P argues that it had no duty to intervene in the operations of another independent contractor aboard the platform. H P points out that it had no contractual relationship nor any other type of "special relationship" with Bay Offshore and therefore had no duty to act on Herrington's behalf. In sum, H P asserts that independent contractors working on the same job site owe no duty to protect the employees of unrelated independent contractors from their own negligence.
Under Louisiana law, the elements of a cause of action are fault, causation and damage. Seals v. Morris, 410 So.2d 715, 718 (La. 1982). The existence of a legal duty coupled with a breach of that duty are prerequisites to any determination of fault. Id. Whether a legal duty is owed by one party to another depends on the facts and circumstances of the case and the relationship of the parties. Id. In all cases, duty can be stated generally as the obligation to conform to the standard of conduct of a reasonable person under like circumstances. Id. (citing Roberts v. State, Through Louisiana Health and Human Resources Administration, 404 So.2d 1221 (La. 1981); Straley v. Calongne Drayage Storage, Inc., 346 So.2d 171 (La. 1977)). Louisiana law generally imposes no affirmative duty to intervene in the unsafe acts of another absent some special relationship between the parties. See Strickland v. Ambassador Ins. Co., 422 So.2d 1207, 1209 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1982).
To the Court's knowledge no party has ever argued that any law other than Louisiana's should apply to this dispute. Pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, the law of the state adjacent to the portion of the seabed where the injury occurred will govern. Thomas v. Burlington Resources Oil Gas Co., 2000 WL 1528082 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2000) (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1333(2)(A)).
Herrington asserts that he might have avoided injury had the H P safety man intervened. This assertion may or may not be true but Louisiana law does not impose liability merely because someone's intervention might have prevented injury to another. Rather, defendant's inaction is only actionable where the law imposes a legal duty to affirmatively act.
Under the facts of this case the Court concludes that H P had no duty to intervene in Bay Offshore's attempt to move the pipe. H P was merely another contractor aboard the platform and the evidence points to no "special relationship" between H P and Herrington or Bay Offshore. Nor has the Court found any authority to suggest that the H P employee had a duty to intervene in Bay Offshore's task due solely to his status as a "safety man" for another contractor. Nor is there any evidence to support Plaintiff's contention that H P's safety man was "overseeing" the operation as opposed to just standing around watching. Plaintiff's deposition recounts the entire scenario of the accident in detail and in no way suggests that H P's safety man was directing the operation in any way. Given that the legal duty issue is a fact-intensive inquiry, the Court does not suggest that under an appropriate set of facts a safety man in H P's position could not be subject to a legal duty to intervene. The Court merely concludes that under the facts of this case the H P employee had no such duty.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 36) filed by H P should be and is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against Helmerich Payne International Drilling Co. are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED while Plaintiff attempts to enroll new counsel. Should Plaintiff fail to enroll new counsel within forty-five (45) days of entry of this order, the Court will entertain a motion to dismiss by the remaining defendant(s).