Opinion
No. 1456 C.D. 2013
02-06-2014
Evelyn Hernandez, Petitioner v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Farmer's Pride, Inc.), Respondent
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Evelyn Hernandez (Claimant) petitions for review of the August 1, 2013, order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB), which affirmed the decision of a workers' compensation judge (WCJ) granting in part and denying in part Claimant's petition to review workers' compensation benefits (review petition). We affirm.
Claimant started working for Farmer's Pride, Inc. (Employer) in 2005 deboning chickens. (WCJ's Findings of Fact, 9/22/10, No. 1.) Claimant developed a bilateral wrist sprain/strain from the constant cutting. (Id., No. 2.) On May 9, 2008, Employer acknowledged the work-related injury in a temporary notice of compensation payable (NCP).
On May 14, 2008, Claimant had surgery on her left wrist. (Dr. Yams's Report, 9/9/09, at 10.) On August 25, 2008, Employer suspended Claimant's workers' compensation benefits, and Claimant returned to work. On February 4, 2009, Claimant had surgery on her right wrist, (WCJ's Findings of Fact, 9/22/10, No. 7), and compensation benefits resumed pursuant to a supplemental agreement, (Supp. Agreement, 2/4/09, at 1).
On May 25, 2009, Employer again suspended compensation benefits. Claimant returned to work in a modified-duty position from May 25, 2009, through June 20, 2009. (WCJ's Findings of Fact, 9/22/10, No. 42; N.T., 2/22/10, at 25.) Thereafter, Claimant took vacation time and returned to work on August 2, 2009. (WCJ's Findings of Fact, 9/22/10, No. 32.) Claimant stopped working on September 23, 2009. (Id., No. 17.) Compensation benefits did not resume after Claimant stopped working. (Id., No. 21.)
On August 13, 2009, Employer filed petitions to suspend, modify, and terminate Claimant's compensation benefits (together, termination petitions). On September 23, 2009, Claimant filed a petition to reinstate her compensation benefits (reinstatement petition) under section 413(a) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). On February 24, 2010, Claimant filed the review petition seeking to expand the description of injury. These petitions were consolidated.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §772.
Employer presented the deposition testimony of John Perry, M.D., who examined Claimant on May 5, 2009. (WCJ's Findings of Fact, 9/22/10, No. 62.) Dr. Perry opined that Claimant had fully recovered and could return to work without any restrictions. (Id., No. 65.)
Claimant presented the deposition testimony of Lance Aaron Yarus, D.O., who treated Claimant on several occasions. (Id., No. 67.) Dr. Yarus saw Claimant on September 9, 2009, when Claimant indicated that she had bilateral hand and neck pain that developed during the course of her job deboning chickens. (Id.) After a visit on December 9, 2009, Dr. Yarus added a diagnosis of complex regional pain syndrome (CRPS). (Id., No. 70.) Dr. Yarus noted that the care for CRPS is palliative, and surgery is not appropriate. (Id., No. 71.) Dr. Yarus advised Claimant not to return to work. (Id. No. 73.)
On September 22, 2010, the WCJ issued an order granting Claimant's reinstatement petition and denying the termination petitions. The WCJ noted that "[Employer] is responsible for medical bills related to treatment of [C]laimant's wrist and hands." (WCJ's Order, 9/22/10, at 1.) Both parties appealed to the WCAB. The WCAB remanded because the WCJ failed to address the review petition and directed the WCJ to address the review petition and explain why the WCJ credited Dr. Yarus's testimony.
On December 19, 2011, the WCJ issued a second decision, granting in part and denying in part the review petition. The WCJ did not change the work-related injury description but required Employer to cover medical expenses related to Dr. Yarus's treatment. Both parties again appealed to the WCAB. On August 1, 2013, the WCAB affirmed the WCJ's second decision. Claimant now petitions this court for review.
Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether the adjudication is in accordance with the law, and whether necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §704.
Claimant argues that the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision. Specifically, Claimant asserts that the WCJ required Employer to pay for medical bills related to CRPS while finding that Claimant failed to meet her burden of establishing this new, work-related injury. Such a determination, Claimant argues, is "illogical and internally inconsistent." (Cl. Br. at 7.) We disagree because the WCJ determined that Employer had to pay for medical bills related to the original, compensable injury, not the CRPS.
Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. §834, requires the WCJ to render a reasoned decision that contains findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the record as a whole. "[A] decision is 'reasoned' for purposes of [s]ection 422(a) if it allows for adequate review by the WCAB without further elucidation and if it allows for adequate review by the appellate courts under applicable review standards." Daniels v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Tristate Transport), 574 Pa. 61, 76, 828 A.2d 1043, 1052 (2003).
Section 422(a) of the Act states in part:
When faced with conflicting evidence, the [WCJ] must adequately explain the reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Uncontroverted evidence may not be rejected for no reason or for an irrational reason; the [WCJ] must identify that evidence and explain adequately the reasons for its rejection. The adjudication shall provide the basis for meaningful appellate review.77 P.S. §834.
Notwithstanding Dr. Yarus's diagnosis that Claimant suffered from CRPS, the WCJ determined that Claimant did not have CRPS. Nevertheless, the WCJ found that Dr. Yarus's treatment was related to the compensable bilateral wrist sprain/strain. We do not find this determination to be unreasonable or illogical. To the contrary, Dr. Yarus's credible medical testimony supports the WCJ's conclusion that Dr. Yarus's treatment was reasonably related to the bilateral wrist sprain/strain.
Specifically, Dr. Yarus testified:
Q. Is she still experiencing, in your opinion, the strain/sprain that she originally was diagnosed as having?(N.T., 2/19/10, at 29.) Dr. Yarus also testified:
A. There's a component of strain and sprain, if you want to look at the ligamentous and the soft tissue aspects of it.
Q. How did that new diagnosis change your plan for treating her, if it did at all?(Id. at 22.)
A. Well, it really doesn't change the plan, per se. The only thing you don't want to do is make the mistake of operating. And I agree with Dr. Perry on that issue. Otherwise, you're going to just precipitate more problems.
It's characteristically now a palliative care problem using therapy, medication, and perhaps some injection techniques to try and resolve some of the components of the constellation of symptoms.
The remand order directed the WCJ to address the review petition and set forth the reasons for finding Dr. Yarus's testimony credible. In response, the WCJ explained:
The Review Petition was, in a sense, addressed. It was not found that there was a diagnosis of [CRPS] established. It was found that disability from the consequences of the injury was established. Thus, the Review Petition would be expanded to find the defendant responsible for the care [by] Dr. Yarus but the description of injury would not be expanded.(WCJ's Opinion, 12/19/11, at 1.) Moreover, the WCJ addressed Dr. Yarus's credibility in Finding of Fact Number 3:
The previous decision found that Dr. Yarus felt that [C]laimant had actual symptoms and gave a diagnosis of complex regional pain syndrome. I found Dr. Yarus credible that [C]laimant continued to have symptoms that were started by the work duties. I noted [C]laimant was consistent in the examinations clinically done by Dr. Yarus. I found that Dr. Yarus's opinion was supported by the similar clinical findings of Dr. Perry. Deference was given to the opinion of Dr. Yarus. Claimant was found credible that she still had symptoms. Dr. Yarus was found credible that the symptoms were due to consequences of the work activity.(WCJ's Findings of Fact, 12/19/11, No. 3.) Thus, the WCJ issued a reasoned decision that complied with the remand order. See Harmon Mining Company v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Haas), 629 A.2d 312, 315 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (stating that a WCJ must confine his or her findings to the stated purpose of the remand order).
We note that, notwithstanding that Drs. Yarus and Perry disagreed as to the diagnosis of CRPS and Claimant's work capabilities, they did share several, similar clinical findings. (WCJ's Findings of Fact, 9/22/10, Nos. 56, 62, 67, and 69.) --------
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of February, 2014, we hereby affirm the August 1, 2013, order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge