Opinion
No. 1D21-1425
12-28-2022
Rebecca HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Appellee.
Larry Allan Karns of Spink, Shrouder & Karns, P.A., Cooper City, for Appellant. Kristen Larson, Megan S. Silver, Rebekah A. Davis, Gayla Grant, and Nikita S. Parker of Department of Management Services, Tallahassee; and William Chorba of Department of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Larry Allan Karns of Spink, Shrouder & Karns, P.A., Cooper City, for Appellant.
Kristen Larson, Megan S. Silver, Rebekah A. Davis, Gayla Grant, and Nikita S. Parker of Department of Management Services, Tallahassee; and William Chorba of Department of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Tanenbaum, J.
This administrative appeal requires us to consider the meaning of "contribution" as the term is used throughout the Florida Retirement System Act. We must do so to answer the following question, on which the outcome of the appeal turns: If a participating employee (i.e. , a "member" ) transfers from the investment plan side of the FRS to the pension side and then dies before vesting, which of her "contributions" as a member of the FRS count as the "member's accumulated contributions" payable as a death benefit to the deceased employee's designated beneficiary? See § 121.091(7)(a), Fla. Stat.
The act is codified in chapter 121 of the Florida Statutes. We refer to the Florida Retirement System as "FRS" throughout this opinion.
See § 121.021(12), Fla. Stat. (2018) (defining "member" as an officer or employee who becomes covered under the FRS). All statutory references herein are to Florida Statutes (2018).
In the case of Rebecca Hernandez's deceased mother (for whom she is the designated beneficiary under the FRS), the Department of Management Services rendered a final order that answered this question by determining the death benefit to be a mere $2,654.17. This is the sum of deductions taken as contributions from her mother's paychecks only after she transferred to the pension plan; it does not include any of the same deductions taken while she was in the investment plan. As we explain below, when the act requires that a non-vested, deceased "member's accumulated contributions" be paid to a beneficiary as a death benefit, it means all the contributions to the FRS taken as payroll deductions required by section 121.71(2), Florida Statutes, regardless of the FRS plan in which the employee was participating at the time the deductions were taken. Based on this conclusion, we find that the department's final agency action relies on an erroneous interpretation of the act. Correctly applied, the act requires that Hernandez be paid $16,042.58 as a death benefit. The department's order on review cannot stand.
See § 121.091(8), Fla. Stat. (providing for "designation of beneficiaries" for benefits payable under the FRS).
This sum is comprised of $2,654.17 in payroll deductions, made while the mother was a participant in the pension plan, and $13,388.41 in payroll deductions, made while the mother was a participant in the investment plan.
I
To set the table, we first explain briefly how the FRS is structured and funded. The FRS "is a single retirement system" consisting of two plans: a pension plan and an investment plan. § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat.; cf. § 121.021(12), Fla. Stat. (defining a "member" to be "any officer or employee who is covered or who becomes covered under this system in accordance with this chapter" (emphasis supplied)). The act that establishes the FRS, as it is set out in chapter 121, is divided into three parts. Part I governs the FRS pension plan. See § 121.091(1), Fla. Stat. (defining normal monthly retirement benefit); see also § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. (defining the FRS as "the general retirement system established by this chapter," including "the defined benefit program administered under" Part I and called the "pension plan"); § 121.4501(2)(h), Fla. Stat. (referring to Part I as the "pension plan"); § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat. (referring to Part I "as the pension plan"). It also contains "general provisions" that apply to Parts II and III "to the extent such provisions are not inconsistent with, or duplicative of, the provisions" in those other parts. § 121.012, Fla. Stat. Part II governs the FRS investment plan. See § 121.021(3), Fla. Stat. (defining the FRS as also including "the defined contribution program administered under part II" and known as the "investment plan"); § 121.4501(2)(g), Fla. Stat. (defining "Florida Retirement System Investment Plan" and "investment plan" to mean "the defined contribution program established under" Part II); § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat. (referring to Part II "as the investment plan"). Part III sets out the "uniform system for funding benefits provided" under both plans based on payroll rates, as we already described. § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat.
Participation in the FRS "is compulsory," and as a condition of employment, an employee "becomes a member of the system on the date of employment." § 121.051(1)(a), Fla. Stat. The system is funded through "contributions" from employers and employees based on percentages of payroll. See § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat. ("Employees and employers participating in the [FRS] collectively shall be responsible for making contributions to support the benefits provided under both plans ." (emphasis supplied)); see also § 121.061(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring that employers "withholding contributions required of members ... budget, set aside, and pay over to the administrator ... matching payments for retirement and social security contributions as required by this chapter"); § 121.071(1), Fla. Stat. (providing for "contributions to the system" based on set percentages of an employee's gross compensation); § 121.4501(5), Fla. Stat. (providing for funding of the investment plan through employee and employer contributions "based on a percentage of the employee's gross monthly compensation," with employee contributions paid "as provided in s. 121.71"). Those contributions, required to be made across the FRS regardless "of the retirement plan in which the individual employee is enrolled," are set by "a uniform contribution rate system." § 121.70(1), (2), Fla. Stat.
Contributions by employees "are mandatory, and each employee is considered to have consented to payroll deductions" at the uniform rate. § 121.71(2), Fla. Stat. "Beginning July 1, 2011, each employee shall contribute the contributions required in subsection (3)," which, for the time period relevant here, sets the "[r]equired employee retirement contribution rate[ ] ... for both retirement plans " at three-percent. § 121.71(2), (3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied); see also id. (4) (setting the "[r]equired employer retirement contribution rates ... for both retirement plans"). "The employer shall deduct the contribution from the employee's monthly salary, and the contribution shall be submitted to the" department's Division of Retirement. § 121.71(2), Fla. Stat.; see also § 121.78(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring that the required employer and employee contributions "be paid by the employer ... to the Division of Retirement by electronic funds transfer no later than the 5th working day of the month immediately following the month during which the payroll period ended").
For certain tax treatment purposes that do not matter here, these "contributions" are treated as "employer-paid employee contributions ... in lieu of contributions by the employee." § 121.71(2), Fla. Stat. Still, the employee is deemed to accept her monthly wage or salary, "less the contribution," as full payment for services rendered. Id. The amounts nevertheless are "designated as employee contributions" to be "credited to the account of the employee." Id. Under either plan, the employee, as a member of the FRS, has an immediately vested claim to her own designated contributions. See § 121.4501(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (providing that an employee "is fully and immediately vested in all employee contributions paid to the investment plan as provided in s. 121.71"); cf. § 121.091(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (providing for return of an employee's contributions if she "is terminated for any reason other than death or retirement before becoming vested" in the pension plan); id. (5)(c) (providing for "refund of all contributions [the employee] has made to the pension plan" if the employee terminates employment "for any reason other than retirement"); § 121.091(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (providing for return of an employee's contributions in the form of a death benefit if she dies before becoming vested in the pension plan).
Even though the entire FRS is funded through payroll-based contributions, the retirement benefits available to a member differ depending on whether she has elected to participate in the pension plan or in the investment plan. If the member participates in the pension plan, her "normal retirement benefit" will be based on a formula that factors in years of "creditable" service and "average final compensation." See § 121.091(1), Fla. Stat. Someone like Hernandez's mother would be subject to a retirement-age requirement and an eight-years-of-creditable-service vesting period. See id. (providing for benefit upon member's attainment of "normal retirement date"); see also § 121.021(29), Fla. Stat. (defining "normal retirement date" in terms of both age and vesting); id. (45)(b) (defining "vesting").
If the member instead chooses to participate in the investment plan, unlike with the pension plan, her contributions will be "earmarked for [a] member account[ ]," to "be used to purchase interests in" member-specified "investment vehicles." § 121.4501(5)(c), Fla. Stat.; cf. § 121.72, Fla. Stat. (setting out, to fund the benefits under the investment plan, "allocations" in terms of percentage of each participant's gross monthly income as "contributions" to be deposited into "investment plan member accounts"); § 121.77, Fla. Stat. (allowing fees and charges to be deducted from "investment plan member accounts"). The sum of the member's retirement benefit, in turn, is not based on a formula, like with the pension plan. The member's benefit instead is based on the "vested accumulations" that "[a]ccrue in [an] individual account[ ] that [is] member-directed, portable, and funded by employer and employee contributions and earnings thereon." §§ 121.4501(7)(b), 121.591(1)(a), Fla. Stat.; see also § 121.4501(1), Fla. Stat. ("The retirement benefits [under the investment plan] shall be provided through member-directed investments ...."); § 121.72(3), Fla. Stat. ("Employer and employee contributions to member accounts shall be accounted for separately. Interest and investment earnings on contributions shall accrue on a tax-deferred basis until proceeds are distributed."); cf. § 121.4501(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (defining "member contributions" to include "the sum of all amounts deducted from the salary of a member [pursuant to section 121.71 ] and credited to his or her individual account in the investment plan"). Vesting is subject to a one-year-of-work requirement with respect to employer contributions. See § 121.4501(1), (6), Fla. Stat.; see also § 121.591, Fla. Stat. The death benefit payable under each FRS plan reflects this difference in the retirement benefit payable under each plan. Compare § 121.091(7), Fla. Stat., with § 121.591(3), Fla. Stat. Under the investment plan, because the employee is immediately and completely vested in her own contributions, those contributions—to the extent they have accrued and accumulated in her individual account—will be payable as a benefit, even if the employee has not yet vested in her employer's contributions. Cf. § 121.591(3), Fla. Stat. On the pension-plan side, even if the employee had not yet vested at the time of death, her designated beneficiary will be entitled to the "member's accumulated contributions" as a death benefit. § 121.091(7)(a), Fla. Stat.
To be sure, "[a]ccumulated contributions" is a defined term, but "accumulated" has an esoteric and likely anachronistic meaning. See § 121.021(26)(b), Fla. Stat. All it does is combine the "member's contributions, without interest" and a "single-sum amount the member would have received if he or she was covered by an existing system prior to December 1, 1970." § 121.021(26), Fla. Stat. Obviously, Hernandez's mother was not covered by a previously existing system, so as the term applies in this case, "a member's accumulated contributions" are the same as the "member's contributions."
II
Now that we have described the statutory set-up for the FRS, we turn to what happened that led to the agency order on review. Hernandez is the daughter and designated beneficiary of Darlene Rice, a former Broward County school teacher. The Broward County school system is a participating FRS employer, and on September 1, 2011, Rice elected to participate in the FRS investment plan. See § 121.4501(4)(a), Fla. Stat. Approximately five years into her employment, Rice elected to transfer from the investment plan to the pension plan within the FRS. See § 121.4501(4)(f), Fla. Stat. Shortly after Rice submitted her "second election" form, the department sent her a letter informing her that the cost to transfer into the pension plan—the "actuarial accrued liability" —was $58,366.00.
See § 121.4501(4)(f) 3., Fla. Stat. (requiring that an employee, like Rice, who elects to transfer from the investment plan to the pension plan "must transfer from his or her investment plan account, and from other employee moneys as necessary, a sum representing the employee's actuarial accrued liability"). Chapter 121 does not provide the exact formula used in computing the "actuarial accrued liability," which is the portion of the overall projected benefit that is attributed to service already performed. Although the actuarial formula is a black box of sorts, it appears that at a minimum, the computation includes factors such as the monthly annuity amount and the member's years of service, pay level, life expectancy, likely date of retirement, and age.
To complete the transfer into the pension plan, Rice liquidated her investment plan account (including $13,388.41 in payroll deductions, or "member contributions") and transferred the funds from that account to the pension plan to satisfy the actuarial accrued liability. Because these funds were not sufficient to cover the liability, Rice also had to make an out-of-pocket payment of $22,943.81. See § 121.4501(4)(f) 3., Fla. Stat. Rice made that payment, thereby completing the pension plan buy-in effective April 1, 2017. See id. (4)(f).
Less than one year later and prior to vesting in the pension plan, Rice passed away. As Rice's designated beneficiary, Hernandez was notified by the department that, because her mother had not vested, she was entitled to her mother's death benefit in the amount of only $2,654.17—the sum of her mother's employee contributions after she transferred to the pension plan. Hernandez contested the department's determination, and the case proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). In its recommended order, the ALJ disagreed with the department and found that Hernandez was entitled to all requested sums: $2,654.17 in pension plan contributions, $13,388.41 in investment plan contributions, and $22,943.81 in personal funds, plus interest, totaling $38,986.39. After reviewing the ALJ's recommended order, the department rendered a final order that accepted the ALJ's factual findings but rejected several of the ALJ's legal conclusions. Ultimately, the department found Hernandez was entitled only to the $2,654.17 in death benefits originally offered. It is this final agency action that we have for review.
III
The statutory analysis here is not a heavy lift. In this case, a "member's contributions" is the relevant part of the definition for the "accumulated contributions" specified as a death benefit on the pension plan side of the FRS. See §§ 121.021(26), 121.091(7)(a), Fla. Stat. All we must decide is whether a "member's contributions" just includes those three-percent payroll deductions taken while the employee is a participant in the pension plan, or also includes the three-percent deductions taken while the employee previously was participating in the investment plan. It is true that "member's contributions" is not expressly defined for the pension plan (like it is for the investment plan), but this does not leave us incapable of determining what the Legislature meant without scurrying to the pages of Scalia and Garner's tome for help. We already have set out how the act structures the operation of the FRS, and simply understanding how the relevant statutory text works together points us to the answer we seek.
Let us first take the term "contribution." The term, of course, is not statutorily defined, but in the context of the intricately designed act, the term does not need to be for its meaning to be clear. It is statutorily described and consistently used throughout the act in one specific way. We mentioned earlier that the act comes in three parts, and Part III governs how the benefits provided by both plans under the FRS will be funded. See § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat. (stating that Part III "provides for a uniform system for funding benefits provided under" both the pension plan and the investment plan within the FRS); § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat. In that part, the Legislature "declares that the Florida Retirement System is a single retirement system" and tells us what the lifeblood of the system will be: "Employees and employers participating in the [FRS] collectively shall be responsible for making contributions to support the benefits provided under both plans." Id. (emphasis supplied).
The Legislature then tells us exactly what those "contributions" are: the sums withheld from each employee's paycheck and paid over by the employer to the Division of Retirement along with the employer's own pay-in—all of which is calculated "as a percentage of the employee's gross monthly compensation," known as "uniform contribution rates." § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat.; see also § 121.061(1), Fla. Stat. (providing for "funding" of the system through requiring the employers to budget for and set aside amounts to be paid over to the FRS administrator as withheld "contributions required of members under [the act]," plus the employer's required "matching payments" for "retirement [ ] contributions as required by this [act]"). The next section sets those uniform rates as the "monthly contributions" required by section 121.061(1) to be paid to the Division of Retirement. § 121.71(2), Fla. Stat. It is in this sense that the term "contribution" is used over and over again throughout the act. See e.g., § 121.052(7), Fla. Stat. (providing the required contribution rates for members of the Elected Officers’ Class "in terms of a percentage of the member's gross compensation"); § 121.061, Fla. Stat. (discussing funding and the responsibility of employers regarding payment of members’ required contributions for retirement benefits); § 121.071, Fla. Stat. (explaining that "contributions" are a specific percentage of a member's gross compensation that are deducted each pay period); § 121.081, Fla. Stat. (referencing contributions as a percentage of an employee's gross salary in connection with past and prior service).
We, in turn, have most of the answer we have been looking for. What is an employee's "contribution"? It is the amount "each employee shall contribute [as] the contributions required in subsection (3)," that is, the as-of-now, three-percent deduction taken from each employee's gross wages or salary and submitted to the division. § 121.71(2), (3), Fla. Stat. Our conclusion is confirmed by the repeated citations to this provision when referring to an employee's "contribution" throughout the act. See, e.g. , § 121.051(2)(c) 1.c.–1.d., Fla. Stat.; § 121.052(7)(a)–(b), Fla. Stat.; § 121.055(3)(b), (6)(d), Fla. Stat.; § 121.071(1)(a) 2., (b)2., (c)2., (2)(a), Fla. Stat.; § 121.122(3)(h), Fla. Stat.; § 121.4501(1), (2)(j), (5)(b), (6)(a), Fla. Stat.; § 121.571, Fla. Stat. And we note that the Legislature modifies "contributions" by statutory definition (like "accumulated contributions" in Part I, or "member contributions" in Part II) only when it wants to expand the meaning of "contribution" to include amounts in addition to the payroll deductions we are discussing here. See §§ 121.021(26), 121.4501(2)(j), Fla. Stat.
In the face of this overwhelming textual support for our conclusion, the dissent fails to identify any statutory basis for its position that an employee's "contribution" can include something more than the three-percent payroll deduction, despite its consistent—if not exclusive—use in this sense throughout the act (unless specifically defined otherwise, as we just noted). It is worthy of note that in describing the process available to Rice for transferring from the investment plan to the pension plan, the act does not use the term "contribution" to refer to the "sum" she had to transfer out of her investment plan account and from other sources. See § 121.4501(4)(f) 3., Fla. Stat. Instead, the act refers to the sum as Rice's "actuarial accrued liability." The dissent makes no effort to explain how "contribution" nevertheless could be read to include this distinctly referenced sum.
Having in hand this clear understanding of what an employee's "contribution" is when it is mentioned throughout the act, we consider the department's conclusion that the death benefit required under section 121.091(7)(a) includes only those three-percent payroll deductions taken after Rice switched to the pension plan. For this analysis, we turn to the term "member" as it is used to modify "contributions" in paragraph (7)(a). As we mentioned in our overview of the FRS, there is but one, unified system, not two separate, independent ones. See § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat. It should come as no surprise, then, that "member" is defined generally to mean any employee participating in the FRS through either plan; it is not plan-specific. See § 121.021(12), Fla. Stat. (defining a "member" in terms of participation in the FRS, not in an individual plan). Recall also that employee participation is mandatory, and she automatically "becomes a member of the system on the date of employment." § 121.051(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied).
Simply put, the employee's status as a "member" remains constant as she moves from one plan to the other within the FRS. As we previously discussed, the Legislature has declared the same to be true regarding members’ contributions: There is to be no distinction between employees’ contributions based on which plan they are participating in. See § 121.70(1), Fla. Stat. (requiring employee contributions "based upon uniform contribution rates ... irrespective of the retirement plan in which the individual employee is enrolled"). In determining that Rice's death benefit included only her contributions while she participated in the pension plan, the department essentially limited the term "member" in a way that conflicts with how it is defined and used in the act.
We note that when the Legislature wants to distinguish between members participating in one plan or the other, it has shown in the act that it knows how to do so. See, e.g. , § 121.021(29)(b), Fla. Stat. (referring to "investment plan members" and "pension plan members"); § 121.591(4), Fla. Stat. (referring to "investment plan members"); § 121.72, Fla. Stat. (referencing "investment plan member accounts"). The Legislature makes no such distinction in paragraph (7)(a) between contributions made by a member while participating in the investment plan and those made while participating in the pension plan. Instead, paragraph (7)(a) references the return of the "member's contributions" as a death benefit, without limitation. Because of how "member" is used in the act, paragraph (7)(a) must be referring to all the payroll deductions paid into the system as contributions while the employee participated in the FRS , through both the investment plan and the pension plan sides of the system.
Returning to the case before us, there is no dispute that after beginning her employment with the Broward County school district in 2011, Rice remained a member of the FRS when she was a participant in the investment plan, when she elected to transfer into the pension plan, and when she was a participant in the pension plan. At all relevant times, then, Rice's three-percent payroll deductions (i.e. , her "contributions") were "member contributions" and necessarily had to be included within the "member's contributions" required to be provided as a death benefit to her designated beneficiary. See §§ 121.021(26), 121.091(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Stated another way: Hernandez is entitled to receive every monthly, three-percent payroll deduction Rice contributed to the FRS while she was a participant in the pension plan ($2,654.17) and every monthly, three-percent payroll deduction Rice contributed while she was a participant in the investment plan ($13,388.14). At the same time, Rice's $22,943.81 out-of-pocket payment to cover her "actuarial accrued liability" does not fit within the term "contribution" as it is used in the act. Hernandez is not entitled to that sum as part of her mother's death benefit.
IV
We now briefly address the department's reliance on article X, section 14, of the Florida Constitution, and chapter 112 of the Florida Statutes, to assert that this court cannot conclude that chapter 121 authorizes a refund of the $13,388.14 sum (representing the amounts Rice paid as contributions while in the investment plan). The department states that its actuarial calculations assume that pension plan buy-in costs are not at all refundable. As it sees the world, if we were to read the act our way (that is, the way the law is written) instead of the department's way, the result would be a benefit increase in violation of constitutional and statutory law. We are unpersuaded.
Article X, section 14 of the Florida Constitution provides: "A governmental unit responsible for any retirement or pension system supported in whole or in part by public funds shall not ... provide any increase in the benefits to the members or beneficiaries of such system ...." (emphasis supplied). Likewise, section 112.61, Florida Statutes, provides: "It is the intent of the Legislature ... relating to governmental retirement systems, that such retirement systems or plans be managed, administered, operated , and funded in such a manner as to maximize the protection of public employee retirement benefits." (emphasis supplied). These provisions place the onus for compliance on the government unit responsible for administration of the retirement system—not on the courts.
The department may indeed have to amend the plan design or benefit structure of the FRS to comply with the requirements of the act as we have applied its text here, but that is the point. The department seemingly fails to properly understand what we do. Our sworn duty is to apply the act as written, and we have done that here. We have amended or altered nothing. It is nonsense, quite frankly, to suggest that a constitutional or statutory provision directed to executive functions would require us to contort our reading of the law in a way that is inconsistent with the text, just to avoid any resultant inconvenience of an agency's having to change course in order to comport with what the law has commanded all along.
V
We last turn to whether Hernandez is entitled to pre-judgment interest on the $16,042.58 sum. "[I]n the absence of specific statutory authority, interest is awarded only in those cases where some legal wrong (such as breach of contract or conversion) has been committed." Bank of Cent. Fla. v. Dep't of Banking and Fin. , 470 So. 2d 742, 745 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ; see generally Argonaut Ins. Co. v. May Plumbing Co. , 474 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985) (discussing nature of pre-judgment interest in tort context). This administrative proceeding is not that kind of case, and chapters 120 and 121 do not explicitly authorize the award of pre-judgment interest. Accordingly, Hernandez is not entitled to an award of pre-judgment interest on the sum that remains unpaid on the death benefit owed to her by the department.
* * *
In an administrative appeal, we have the authority, among other things, to "set aside agency action," to "decide the rights, privileges, obligations, requirements, or procedures at issue between the parties," and to order "such ancillary relief as the court finds necessary to redress the effects of official action wrongfully taken or withheld." § 120.68(6)(a), Fla. Stat. That is what we do here, based on our determination that the department "has erroneously interpreted a provision of law" and that "a correct interpretation compels a particular action." § 120.68(7)(d), Fla. Stat. As we have explained, the department incorrectly interpreted section 121.091(7)(a) regarding what is to be paid as a death benefit to Hernandez. A proper application of "member's accumulated contributions," as we have read paragraph (7)(a) in the context of the entire act, compels the department to award Hernandez her mother's death benefit in the amount of $16,042.58. We remand this matter to the department to render an order to this effect.
SET ASIDE AND REMANDED .
Roberts, J., concurs; Makar, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
Makar, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part. Beyond the total monthly contributions that Darlene Rice made toward her pension as an FRS member (including those rolled over from her investment plan), she also made a lump-sum contribution of $22,943.81, such that her total "accumulated contributions" into the system—her monthly and lump-sum contributions—were payable to her daughter, Rebecca Hernandez, upon Rice's death prior to vesting.
That's because the plain language of the applicable statute says that "accumulated contributions" include "[a] member's contributions, without interest, subsequent to December 1, 1970[.]" § 121.021(26)(a) Fla. Stat. (2022). The Legislature did not define the scope of what constitutes a "contribution" in this context, but it is evident under plain language principles that Rice's lump-sum contribution of $22,943.81 was no less a contribution than was her monthly contributions and rollover. Either way, Rice made contributions of funds that accumulated to her benefit and to which Hernandez is entitled as the death beneficiary; no ambiguity of meaning exists.
The absence of a statutory definition of what constitutes a "contribution" leaves room for interpretation based on a "fair reading" of the text in its context and with legislative purpose in mind. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (2012) ("The interpretive approach we endorse is that of the ‘fair reading’: determining the application of a governing text to given facts on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued."). By this standard, a reasonable reader of the statutory text and structure is entitled to conclude that a member's monthly financial contributions are no different from other financial contributions such as Rice's lump-sum contribution; both are contributions within the plain and obvious meaning of the word "contribution" in the context presented. Id. at 69 ("Words are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.") and 101 ("General terms are to be given their general meaning.").
The Legislature neither defined what constitutes a contribution nor did it enact an exclusive statutory list of permissible contributions. For this reason, although one type of contribution—such as a periodic monthly contribution—can be implicitly gleaned from a review of applicable statutes, that interpretative exercise neither logically nor textually precludes other types of contributions, such as Ms. Rice's lump-sum contribution toward her pension. Had the Legislature intended that members’ financial contributions be limited to only those made via monthly payroll deductions, it could have done so—but it did not. Id. at 226 (noting that a legislative definition that a word "means"—versus "includes"—a particularized item or concept, courts will apply the definition strictly).
Plus, it seems unlikely that the Legislature intended that state workers would hand over large contributions of their personal funds only to have them inure to the state upon the workers’ untimely deaths prior to vesting; no text directly supports such an ostensibly unfair result. Imagine if a member made one monthly contribution of $300 but contributed $60,000 via a lump sum prior to her death; it stretches statutory interpretation to its breaking point to conclude, as the State argues, that it gets to retain all accumulated financial contributions the member made, including a massive lump-sum contribution, returning only a de minimis monthly contribution to death beneficiaries. Nothing in the text or purpose of the statutory language at issue shows a legislative intent for such an inequitable result.
In sum, a plain and fair reading of the applicable statutes leads me to conclude, as the hearing officer did, that Hernandez is entitled to not only the monthly contributions that her mother made via payroll deductions, but also the $22,943.81 that her mother contributed from her personal funds before her untimely death.