Summary
holding that jury's finding that defendant was not negligent rendered erroneous submission of responsible third party immaterial because once jury found that defendant's negligence did not proximately cause the accident, its finding that responsible third party's negligence did cause accident "could not have altered the effect of the verdict"
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No. 14-06-00582-CV
Opinion filed May 20, 2008.
On Appeal from the 190th District Court Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 04-62389.
Panel consists of Justices FOWLER, FROST, and SEYMORE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this personal injury case arising from a traffic accident, appellant, Juan Jose Hernandez, sued appellee, Adbedlsalam Atieh, for negligence. After the jury found Atieh's negligence, if any, did not cause the accident, the trial court entered judgment that Hernandez take nothing. In a single issue, Hernandez contends the trial court erred by allowing Atieh to designate a responsible third party after the close of evidence, but before the case was submitted to the jury. Concluding the designation did not result in reversible error, we affirm.
Because the dispositive issue is clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. BACKGROUND
On November 16, 2003, Hernandez was a passenger in the back seat of a vehicle driven by Hector Sisa when the flat-bed tow truck Atieh was driving hit Sisa's vehicle from the rear. The accident occurred at the interchange of I-45 and I-10 in Houston. Aside from these facts, the parties presented differing versions of the accident and the conversation immediately afterwards.
According to Atieh, he was traveling twenty to twenty-five miles per hour, it was "sprinkling," and traffic was heavy. As Atieh was approaching the exit from I-45 north to I-10 west, he was in the second lane from the left — one of two left lanes from which a driver may exit to I-10. At the time, Sisa's vehicle was to the right of Atieh's truck, in a lane designated only for drivers continuing on I-45. Sisa abruptly pulled in front of Atieh's truck and suddenly stopped. Although Atieh braked, his truck hit the rear of Sisa's vehicle.
After the accident, Osman Mustafa, a passenger in Atieh's truck, communicated with Sisa and Hernandez in Spanish. Atieh testified he did not talk with them because he does not speak Spanish. At trial, Mustafa essentially supported Atieh's version of the accident and the events afterwards.
According to Hernandez, he was riding in the back seat with his wife and had his left arm behind his wife's headrest. Sisa's vehicle was in the far left lane as it approached the exit to I-10. As he was exiting to I-10, Sisa either stopped or slowed considerably because of heavy traffic, and Atieh's truck unexpectedly struck their vehicle. Hernandez did not see Atieh's truck before the collision and was therefore unaware of its movements before the collision. After the accident, Atieh exited his truck, apologized, and stated he would pay for the damage to Sisa's vehicle. Eventually, Hernandez received medical treatment for shoulder injuries allegedly sustained in the accident.
In November 2004, Hernandez sued Atieh, alleging multiple theories of negligence. In March 2006, the case was tried to a jury. In his live pleading, Atieh requested "the Court and Jury to consider the relative damages and conduct of the parties and all tortfeasors, including Plaintiff, and accord Defendant full benefit of Texas Civil Practice Remedies Code Chapter 33." Atieh also alleged, among other defenses, (1) the incident was caused by parties or instrumentalities over which Atieh had no control, and (2) "another person, persons or instrumentalities were the sole proximate cause of the accident in question and/or the injuries and damages alleged." He did not specify Sisa as a responsible third party.
Hernandez also sued Atieh's employer and the owner of the tow truck, but non-suited these defendants before trial.
On March 6, the last day of trial, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: We're on the record. Let the record reflect the jury is not present in the courtroom. However, all counsel are present in the courtroom.
MR. BECKCOM [Hernandez's counsel]: Your Honor, I just want to make it clear for the record that with respect to the driver of the SUV, Mr. Sisa, he is —
THE COURT: Just one second. Just one second.
MR. BECKCOM: He is not going to be a proper party to be submitted on the jury charge, and we've got a trial brief to that effect. So I just want to make very clear that we are not trying his negligence by consent in this case.
Now, they have got some defenses of unavoidable accidents, sudden emergency. So I — I guess that some of this evidence of what happened is relevant to those issues. But as to Mr. Sisa's negligence, we are not trying that by consent.
THE COURT: Okay.
. . . .
MR. MEYNIER [Atieh's counsel]: Do you want me to respond to their motions? This is the first that I've heard of this one.
THE COURT: No. I think he's just making them to preserve his record, and then we'll consider them at the proper time.
MR. BECKCOM: Yes. Just to preserve the trial by consent issue. Very clear about that.
MR. MEYNIER: Well, I know we're on the record, so obviously, I'm going to oppose that and we believe that that's happened. It's already happened because they have discussed that at length, as we have, without objections throughout the —
THE COURT: Discussed what at length? It's not clear to me what you are objecting to.
MR. MEYNIER: Mr. Sisa's cause of this accident. We believe that he has been pled in our answer, and they did not object under the Texas Civil Practice [sic] Remedies Code within 15 days. And so the Court —
THE COURT: You named him as a responsible third party in your answer?
MR. MEYNIER: We designated everybody under the Civil Practice [sic] Remedies Code subject to that and cited the specific code as —
THE COURT: My question is, sir: Did you designate Mr. Sisa as a responsible third party and follow designation of responsible third party?
MR. MEYNIER: We believe we did. And we also discussed him —
THE COURT: You said, we believe we did?
MR. MEYNIER: Yes.
THE COURT: Yes or no? Is he named as a responsible third party?
MR. MEYNIER: We designated all responsible third parties. We did not identify him specifically.
THE COURT: That was my question is: Did you designate Mr. Sisa as a responsible third party?
MR. MEYNIER: Your Honor, we believe in connection with the request for disclosures we also named him.
THE COURT: Is it — can I just ask you to answer my question? You can make all of these many other arguments about why you think he's designated or why you think they have notice, but did you file a designation of responsible third party and name Mr. Sisa as a responsible third party pursuant to the Remedies Code?
MR. MEYNIER: His name was not specified in that initial answer, no.
THE COURT: So the answer is no. Okay. But you believe you filed other documents that gave them notice?
MR. MEYNIER: Yes.
By written motion filed the same day, and orally after the parties had rested, respectively, Atieh (1) requested leave to designate Sisa as a responsible third party and (2) requested a trial amendment to that effect. Hernandez objected to the request and objected to including Sisa on the jury charge. Hernandez argued that the amendment contravened Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.004 and constituted prejudicial surprise.
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.004 provides in relevant part:
(a) A defendant may seek to designate a person as a responsible third party by filing a motion for leave to designate that person as a responsible third party. The motion must be filed on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds good cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later date.
. . . .
(f) A court shall grant leave to designate the named person as a responsible third party unless another party files an objection to the motion for leave on or before the 15th day after the date the motion is served.
(g) If an objection to the motion for leave is timely filed, the court shall grant leave to designate the person as a responsible third party unless the objecting party establishes:
(1) the defendant did not plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading requirement of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; and
(2) after having been granted leave to replead, the defendant failed to plead sufficient facts concerning the alleged responsibility of the person to satisfy the pleading requirements of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
. . . .
(l) After adequate time for discovery, a party may move to strike the designation of a responsible third party on the ground that there is no evidence that the designated person is responsible for any portion of the claimant's alleged injury or damage. The court shall grant the motion to strike unless a defendant produces sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the designated person's responsibility for the claimant's injury or damage.
Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 33.004 (Vernon Supp. 2007).
The trial court overruled Hernandez's objection and permitted the trial amendment. Hernandez submitted, and the trial court refused, a jury charge requesting a negligence finding solely with regard to Atieh.
In Question No. 1 of the jury charge, the trial court submitted both Atieh and Sisa as persons whose negligence may have proximately caused the accident. A non-unanimous jury answered the question as follows:
Did the negligence, if any, of any of the persons named below proximately cause the occurrence in question?
Answer "Yes" or "No."
(a) Adbedlsalam Atieh [NO]
(b) Hector Sisa [YES]
If, you have answered "YES" to Question No. 1 for more than one of those named below [Atieh and Sisa] then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer Question No. 2.
The trial court rendered a take nothing judgment on the jury's verdict, and Hernandez filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Hernandez appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
In a single issue, Hernandez argues the trial court erred in allowing Atieh to designate a responsible third party after the evidence was closed and before the jury was charged. In the trial court, Hernandez's counsel argued, "I'm not saying that necessarily they couldn't argue [Sisa is the person who caused the sudden emergency or whatever], but the evidence is now closed. And it's very, very clear what you have to do to get a party submitted under these circumstances in the jury charge." In this court, Hernandez complains, "Atieh did not timely move to designate Sisa as a responsible third party under the clear language of the Responsible Third Party provision and therefore Sisa should not have been included on the jury charge." Thus, although Hernandez rests his argument on Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.004, his complaint is directed at inclusion of the question of Sisa's negligence in the jury charge. Assuming, without deciding, that inclusion of the question of Sisa's negligence was error, we conclude the error was harmless.
In this simple negligence case, we are presented with ample evidence of third party liability on the part of the driver of a vehicle occupied by appellant who elected not to sue that driver. The trial court implicitly found "good cause" for late filing of the designation of responsible third party even though Atieh filed his written designation after the evidence was closed. Because we resolve this issue based on the harmless error rule, we do not address whether defendants in civil cases may file designations of responsible third parties after the evidence is closed.
We reverse for error in the jury charge only, if after considering the record as a whole, including the pleadings, the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety, we conclude the error probably caused rendition of an improper verdict or probably prevented the appellant from presenting the case to the appellate court. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1; Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass'n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex. 1986); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Redding, 56 S.W.3d 141, 149(Tex.App.-Houston[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). Submission of an improper jury question can be harmless error if the jury's answers to other questions render the improper question immaterial. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. 1995). We consider a jury question immaterial when its answer can be found elsewhere in the verdict or when its answer cannot alter the effect of the verdict. Id. Submission of an immaterial issue is not harmful error unless the submission confused or misled the jury. Id. When determining whether a particular question could have confused or misled the jury, we consider its probable effect on the minds of the jury in the light of the charge as a whole. Id.
Here, the jury's finding with respect to Atieh rendered submission of Sisa's negligence immaterial. Once the jury found Atieh's negligence, if any, did not proximately cause the accident, its finding that Sisa's negligence did proximately cause the accident could not have altered the effect of the verdict. See id. at 751-52 (holding that any error in submitting claimants' deceased, in addition to defendant, in jury charge was harmless; once jury found defendant was not negligent, its finding that deceased was negligent could not have altered the effect of the verdict); Sell v. C.B. Smith Volkswagen, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 897, 903 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding, even if trial court erred in submitting issues on contributory negligence, such error would not warrant new trial because jury did not find defendants liable on primary negligence issues).
Considering the charge in its entirety, we further conclude submission of the question on Sisa's negligence could not have misled or confused the jury. The court instructed the jury, "There may be more than one proximate cause of an event." The court also instructed the jury to allocate percentages of negligence only if it found the negligence of both Atieh and Sisa proximately caused the occurence (i.e., more than one of the persons named). Therefore, the jury was not misled into believing it had to choose between finding Atieh negligent or finding Sisa negligent.
Finally, the record as a whole demonstrates the submission of the inquiry on Sisa's negligence did not cause rendition of an improper verdict. Throughout the trial, Atieh questioned witnesses to establish Sisa had improperly changed lanes, cutting in front of Atieh's vehicle and stopping suddenly. Therefore, we cannot conclude the mere presence of Sisa in the jury question caused the jury to find no liability on Atieh's part.
In sum, designation of Sisa as a responsible third party with the resultant submission of his name in the negligence question was not reversible error. We overrule Hernandez's sole issue.
If Hernandez is suggesting submission of a responsible third party in the jury charge is per se reversible error when that party was not timely designated under Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 33.004, we disagree. Hernandez relies on Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378 (Tex. 2000); and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Redding, 56 S.W.3d 141 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). In Casteel, the supreme court concluded error in submitting, over timely and specific objection, a single broad-form liability question that commingled valid and invalid liability grounds, was harmful because the erroneous submission prevented the appellant from isolating the error and presenting its case on appeal. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d at 388. In Redding, this court extended the Casteel rationale to a broad form damages question that commingled valid and invalid measures of damages. Redding, 56 S.W.3d at 154-55. Unlike Casteel and Redding, the present case does not involve a broad-form question. Instead, the jury was instructed to make separate findings regarding Atieh and Sisa; and, as discussed above, the negative finding regarding Atieh rendered submission of the question regarding Sisa harmless.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.