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Henry v. Collins

U.S.
Mar 29, 1965
380 U.S. 356 (1965)

Summary

holding that chief of police is public official

Summary of this case from Phillips v. Ingham County

Opinion

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI.

No. 89.

Decided March 29, 1965.

Together with No. 90, Henry v. Pearson, also on petition for writ of certiorari to the same court.

After his arrest for disturbing the peace, petitioner stated that it was "the result of a diabolical plot" in which respondents, a County Attorney and a Chief of Police, were implicated. Respondents brought suits for libel and obtained jury verdicts. The judgments are reversed since the jury might well have understood the instructions to permit recovery on a showing of intent to inflict harm, rather than intent to inflict harm through falsehood. The Constitution permits recovery by these public officials only for a false statement made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, followed.

Certiorari granted; ___ Miss. ___, 158 So.2d 28, and ___ Miss. ___, 158 So.2d 695, reversed.

Robert L. Carter, Barbara A. Morris, Jack H. Young and Frank D. Reeves for petitioner in both cases.

W. O. Luckett for respondents in both cases.



The petitions for certiorari are granted. The judgments are reversed.

After petitioner's arrest on a charge of disturbing the peace, he issued a statement to the effect that this arrest was the result of "a diabolical plot," in which respondents, the County Attorney and Chief of Police of Clarksdale, were implicated. Respondents brought suits for libel and obtained jury verdicts. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed. ___ Miss. ___, 158 So.2d 28; ___ Miss. ___, 158 So.2d 695.

The following instructions requested by the respondents, approved by the trial judge, were read to the jury:

"The court instructs the jury for the plaintiff that malice does not necessarily mean hatred or ill will, but that malice may consist merely of culpable recklessness or a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights and interests of the person defamed."

The jury, was also instructed, at respondents request, that

". . . [I]f you believe from the evidence that defendant published a false statement charging that his arrest . . . was the result of a diabolical plot . . ., you may infer malice, as defined in these instructions, from the falsity and libelous nature of the statement, although malice as a legal presumption does not arise from the fact that the statement in question is false and libelous. It is for you to determine as a fact, if you have first determined from the evidence that defendant published the statement in question and that it is false, whether or not the statement in question was actually made with malice."

The jury might well have understood these instructions to allow recovery on a showing of intent to inflict harm, rather than intent to inflict harm through falsehood. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73. "The constitutional guarantees . . . [prohibit] a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made . . . with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-280.

For the reasons set out in their respective concurring opinions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293-305, and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79-88, MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG concur in reversal of these judgments, not merely for error in the instructions read to the jury, but on the ground that it would violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments to subject petitioner to any libel judgment solely because of his publication of criticisms against respondents' performance of their public duties.


Summaries of

Henry v. Collins

U.S.
Mar 29, 1965
380 U.S. 356 (1965)

holding that chief of police is public official

Summary of this case from Phillips v. Ingham County

applying Sullivan standard to a statement by an arrestee

Summary of this case from Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox

treating a "county attorney" as a public official, albeit without discussion of the status determination

Summary of this case from Mandel v. Bos. Phx., Inc.

In Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965), the Court emphasized its interpretation of an "intent to inflict harm through falsehood."

Summary of this case from Pape v. Time, Inc.

In Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965), the Supreme Court applied the New York Times doctrine to the Chief of Police of Clarksdale, Mississippi. The Chief was an appointed officer.

Summary of this case from Pape v. Time, Inc.

In Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965), the Supreme Court itself applied the requirements of New York Times v. Sullivan to a law enforcement officer.

Summary of this case from Roche v. Egan

In Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965), the Court in a short per curiam opinion applied New York Times where an individual who had been arrested by a police chief charged in a letter to a deputy sheriff and in a statement read to several wire services that the arrest was a "diabolical plot."

Summary of this case from Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf

In Henry v. Collins (380 U.S. 356, supra) — not cited in the Rosenbloom footnote — the Supreme Court applied the Times standard in an action by public officials against a private citizen.

Summary of this case from Trails West v. Wolff

In Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 992, 13 L.Ed.2d 892 (1965), an appointed chief of police and in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597 (1966), an appointed recreational area director were held to be "public officials" by the United States Supreme Court.

Summary of this case from Bienvenu v. Angelle

stating that "public official" includes county attorney and chief of police

Summary of this case from Schofield v. Gerda

In Henry v. Collins (1965) 380 U.S. 356 [13 L.Ed.2d 892, 85 S.Ct. 992], a per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court assumed that one of the defendants, a county attorney, was a "public official" within the New York Times rule.

Summary of this case from Weingarten v. Block

In Henry, an individual who had been arrested by the chief of police sent a letter to the county deputy sheriff and read a statement to several wire services (which statement was published in several newspapers) which charged that the arrest was a "diabolical plot".

Summary of this case from Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co.
Case details for

Henry v. Collins

Case Details

Full title:HENRY v . COLLINS

Court:U.S.

Date published: Mar 29, 1965

Citations

380 U.S. 356 (1965)

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