Opinion
EP-04-CA-402-DB.
April 10, 2006
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a "Motion To Dismiss," filed in the above-captioned cause on December 16, 2005, by Defendant Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). On December 27, 2005, Plaintiff David Henderson filed a Response, through which Plaintiff requests that the Court deny Defendant's Motion and allow him to amend his Complaint. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's request, which the Court construes as a Motion to Amend, should be denied. Further, for the reasons explained herein, the Court determines that Defendant's Motion should be granted, and the instant cause dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Because the Court presently considers Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, it takes the factual allegations of Plaintiff's Complaint as true and resolves any ambiguities or doubts regarding the sufficiency of the claim in favor of Plaintiff. See Den Norske Stats Oljeselskap As v. HeereMac Vof, 241 F.3d 420, 424 (5th Cir. 2001) (accepting all factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true where it considered a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
This is a case brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, et seq. In August 1993, Plaintiff met with FBI Agent Sykes Houston ("Agent Houston") in the FBI's Austin office. During their meeting, another agent blocked the door, and Agent Houston told Plaintiff that he would be killed. On January 18, 1995, Plaintiff filed a claim for $48,000,000.00 against the FBI, stemming from Plaintiff's interaction with Agent Houston. Plaintiff's claim was denied by letter dated July 13, 1995.
Plaintiff does not specify that his action is brought under the FTCA. Yet, because the United States cannot be sued at all without the express consent of Congress, see United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990), and the only waiver of sovereign immunity is to those included in the FTCA, the Court implies that Plaintiff's cause of action is brought under the FTCA. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (instructing that pleadings filed by a pro se plaintiff should be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.)
Plaintiff's Complaint asserts that the FBI never responded to his claim. However, the record contains a copy of the letter denying Plaintiff's administrative claim.
On September 19, 1995, Plaintiff filed suit against then-Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, then-Central Intelligence Agency Director, John Deutch, then-Department of Agriculture Secretary, Dan Glickman, then-Attorney General, Janet Reno, then-Treasury Secretary, Robert Rubin, then-Defense Secretary, William Perry, then-Foreign Service Grievance Board Executive Secretary, Karl Sprick, then-National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, and then-FBI Director, Louis Freeh, in the Eastern District of Virginia, cause number CA-95-1291-A ("the Virginia case"). In the Virginia case, Plaintiff asserted several causes of action, among them a claim against then-FBI Director Louis Freeh for Agent Houston's August 1993 statements. On November 16, 1995, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Virginia case pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). The Eastern District of Virginia granted the motion as to several of Plaintiff's claims, including the one based upon Agent Houston's August 1993 statements. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against then-FBI Director Louis Freeh.
It is unclear whether the claim against then-FBI Director Louis Freeh was dismissed with or without prejudice.
Henderson v. Christopher, 106 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1997).
On October 28, 2004, Plaintiff filed an "Application To Proceed In Forma Pauperis," which the Court granted on May 10, 2005. Subsequently, the Clerk of the Court filed Plaintiff's "Complaint For Damages." Therein, Plaintiff asserts that Agent Houston "threatened Plaintiff with death," that he filed an administrative claim for the incident, and that the FBI never responded to his claim. Finally, Plaintiff requests that the Court award him the $48,000,000.00 he demanded in his administrative claim. The instant Motions followed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant's instant Motion requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint because it is barred on res judicata grounds, because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant, as he is not the proper party, or because it is barred by the laches doctrine. Through his Response, Plaintiff asserts that this suit is not barred on res judicata grounds. Further, Plaintiff requests that the Court grant him leave to amend his Complaint so that he may cure his Complaint by naming the United States as a defendant. The Court construes Plaintiff's request as a Motion to Amend. The Court first addresses Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, before turning to Defendant's Motion. I. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend
Through the instant Motion, Plaintiff prays that the Court allow him to amend his Complaint. Whether to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend pleadings rests in the sound discretion of the district court. James v. McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc., 988 F.2d 583, 587 (5th Cir. 1993). The decision to grant leave is by no means automatic. Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1993). Rather, courts may consider several factors including undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice to the opposing party, and the futility of amendment. Rolf v. City of San Antonio, 77 F.3d 823, 828 (5th Cir. 1996). Here, it is clear that Plaintiff seeks to amend his Complaint to skirt one of the asserted bases of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. As such, Defendant would be prejudiced were the Court to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint. While pro se plaintiffs are afforded a certain degree of leniency toward their pleadings because they proceed without counsel, see Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, the Court pauses to note that Plaintiff is very well acquainted with the legal system — Plaintiff has filed no fewer than eleven lawsuits in federal courts nationwide, all resolved against Plaintiff. Plaintiff has burdened enough courts with frivolous litigation. The Court will not afford Plaintiff the opportunity to drag this case on by amending his Complaint. Moreover, as explained below, allowing Plaintiff to amend his Complaint would be futile as the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this cause. As such, the Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend should be denied. II. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Through his instant Motion, Defendant asserts three separate grounds on which the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's complaint: (1) res judicata; (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction over Defendant, as he is not the proper party; and (3) laches. The Court does not dismiss the Complaint on any of these grounds. Rather, the Court, of it own accord, concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this cause because Plaintiff failed to comply with the FTCA's limitations period. See Johnston v. United States, 85 F.3d 217, 218 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that the FTCA's time limitations are jurisdictional, and, thus, can be raised at any time or even sua sponte by the court).
That is not to say that the Court did not consider Defendant's asserted grounds for dismissal. To the contrary, because Plaintiff has been so litigious, the Court would like to dismiss the instant Complaint on res judicata grounds. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a subsequent action when "a prior action involving the same parties and the same cause of action reached final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction." Agrilectic Power Partners, Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 20 F.3d 663, 664-65 (5th Cir. 1994). Res judicata applies when: (1) there was a previous final judgment on the merits; (2) the prior judgment was between identical parties or those in privity with them; and (3) there is a second action based on the same claims as were raised in the first action. Smith v. Waste Mangement, 407 F.3d 381, 386 (5th Cir. 2005). There is little question that this suit is based on the same claim litigated against then-FBI Director Louis Freeh in the Virginia case. However, Defendant failed to provide the Court with sufficient evidence regarding whether the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed that claim with or without prejudice. Because the record is unclear whether the case was dismissed with prejudice, and because Plaintiff disputes that it was, the Court is unable to establish that there is a judgment on the merits between these parties or those in privity with them. See Smith, 407 F.3d 386.
Through his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a cause of action against Defendant in his official capacity as the Director of the FBI. In so doing, he essentially seeks to sue the United States. As explained above, because the FTCA establishes the sole means for suing the United States for torts, the Court presumes Plaintiff's claim is brought under the FTCA. For the Court to possess subject matter jurisdiction over this action, Plaintiff must have complied with the FTCA's statute of limitations. See Johnston, 85 F.3d at 218 n. 2. The FTCA's limitations period requires claimant both to file an administrative claim within two years of his cause of action's accrual, and to file suit within six months of denial of the administrative claim. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b) (West 1994); see also Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir. 2001). Here, Plaintiff filed his administrative claim on January 18, 1995, within the two years after the incident with Agent Houston permitted by statute. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(b). Plaintiff's claim was denied by letter dated July 13, 1995. While the record is unclear on what date the denial letter was mailed, it is clear that the denial letter was mailed. Pursuant to § 2401(b), Plaintiff had six months from the day the denial letter was mailed in which to institute a law suit against the United States. See id. at § 2401(b). Plaintiff filed an "Application To Proceed In Forma Pauperis," to commence this lawsuit on October 28, 2004, more than nine years after the date on the denial letter. There can be no doubt that Plaintiff failed to comply with the FTCA's limitations period. As a result, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this cause. See Johnston, 85 F.3d at 218 n. 2.
CONCLUSION
In light of the following, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend should be denied. Further, because Plaintiff failed to comply with the FTCA's limitations period, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion should be granted.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff David Henderson's Motion to Amend is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Robert Mueller's "Motion To Dismiss" is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff David Henderson's Complaint against Defendant Robert Mueller is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that all other pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.