Summary
In Henderson v. General Motors Corp., 152 Ga. App. 63, 262 S.E.2d 238 (1979), the plaintiff sought to recover under a strict liability theory solely economic damages sustained when a parking gear pin broke, causing the breakdown of the transmission of the plaintiff's automobile.
Summary of this case from Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp.Opinion
58422.
SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 5, 1979.
DECIDED OCTOBER 25, 1979.
Breach of warranty. Fulton State Court. Before Judge Moran.
Henry M. Henderson, for appellant.
Byron Attridge, Nolan C. Leake, R. Marcus Lodge, for appellee.
Appellant, the purchaser of a previously owned automobile which was manufactured by appellee, filed a two-count amended complaint seeking to recover damages allegedly sustained when the automobile's parking gear pin broke, causing the breakdown of the automatic transmission. Appellant brings this appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee as to both counts of her complaint. We affirm.
1. Count 1 of appellant's complaint sets forth a claim for breach of implied warranty. The trial court properly granted summary judgment as to this count.
By the express terms of the sales contract, warranty (implied and express) coverage was afforded for 12 months or 12,000 miles of use (whichever was earlier) from the date the car was delivered to the first retail purchaser. The evidence on summary judgment shows without contradiction that warranties had expired prior to the sale of the car to appellant. Thus, even if the warranties were transferable to appellant, recovery will not lie under an implied warranty theory. General Motors Corp. v. Halco Instruments, Inc., 124 Ga. App. 630 (3, 4) ( 185 S.E.2d 619).
2. Count 2 of appellant's amended complaint represents a claim for recovery under Code Ann. § 105-106. Essentially, appellant alleged that the vehicle was defective when sold by appellee and these defects had proximately caused damage to the automatic transmission. The injuries claimed are solely economic damages arising from the damage to the allegedly defective product itself and unaccompanied by other property damage or personal injury from the use of the product. See generally Long v. Jim Letts Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 295 ( 217 S.E.2d 602), as to economic damages. See Alfred N. Koplin Co. v. Chrysler Corp.,
49 Ill. App.3d 194 ( 364 N.E.2d 100), noting that "economic loss" has been defined as "`damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits — without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property...' [Cit.]" 364 N.E.2d 100, p. 103.
Since the damages sought by appellant stemmed solely from economic losses, the court properly held that an action for recovery under a strict liability theory would not lie. Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 141 Ga. App. 671 (2) ( 234 S.E.2d 123). Compare Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Const. Co., 142 Ga. App. 225 (2) ( 235 S.E.2d 664), where "the plaintiff's strict liability action [was] not predicated solely upon his economic loss..." Id., p. 228.
Accordingly, since appellee has breached no statutory duty owed to appellant by reason of Code Ann. § 105-106, the court properly granted summary judgment as to appellant's claim under this theory.
Judgment affirmed. Deen, C. J., and Carley, J., concur.