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Hempstead Bank v. Reliance Mortgage Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
May 26, 1981
81 A.D.2d 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)

Summary

disqualifying attorney in action to recover based on promissory note where plaintiffs counsel had specific and personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the promissory note in question

Summary of this case from Galerie v. M T Bank Corp.

Opinion

May 26, 1981


In an action to recover payment based on a promissory note and guarantee, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated September 10, 1980, which denied their motions to dismiss the action for failure to join indispensable parties and to disqualify the law firm representing plaintiff. Order modified by deleting therefrom the provision denying the defendants' motion to disqualify the law firm representing plaintiff and substituting therefor a provision granting said motion. As so modified, order affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The facts reveal that plaintiff's attorney has specific and personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the promissory note in question. Although we cast absolutely no aspersions upon him in this hotly contested case, it is undisputed that he was present at the negotiations for the note and is the subject of some of defendants' accusations concerning duress. Although plaintiff may not intend to call this attorney as a witness, defendants categorically state that they will do so. Even if defendants renege, however, it is difficult to see how plaintiff could avoid calling him in circumstances where an unfavorable inference might be drawn from his failure to appear (see Noce v Kaufman, 2 N.Y.2d 347, 353). Accordingly, plaintiff's counsel's law firm must be disqualified from the case (see Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-102, subd [A]). Hopkins, J.P., Damiani, Lazer and Thompson, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Hempstead Bank v. Reliance Mortgage Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
May 26, 1981
81 A.D.2d 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)

disqualifying attorney in action to recover based on promissory note where plaintiffs counsel had specific and personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the promissory note in question

Summary of this case from Galerie v. M T Bank Corp.

In Hempstead Bank v. Reliance Mortgage Corp., 81 A.D.2d 906 (2nd Dept. 1981), for example, the attorney had "specific and personal knowledge" of the promissory note that was the subject of the action, was himself "the subject of some * * * accusations," and was so involved in the facts that were the subject of the suit that it was difficult "to see how [the client] could avoid calling him in circumstances where an unfavorable inference might be drawn from his failure to appear."

Summary of this case from Chidekel v. Cabrini Medical Ctr.
Case details for

Hempstead Bank v. Reliance Mortgage Corp.

Case Details

Full title:HEMPSTEAD BANK, Respondent, v. RELIANCE MORTGAGE CORPORATION et al.…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: May 26, 1981

Citations

81 A.D.2d 906 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)

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