Summary
affirming dismissal because "no useful purpose would be served by directing this action to proceed to judgment" where parties stipulated there were no non-trust-fund assets available
Summary of this case from Wycoff v. Grace Community ChurchOpinion
No. 21875.
Decided October 24, 1966.
Action by plaintiff to recover damages allegedly sustained by him due to the negligence of the hospital. Judgment for defendant.
Affirmed.
1. HOSPITALS — Eleemosynary Purposes — Judgment — Satisfaction — Trust Fund — Negligence. Hospital, as eleemosynary institution, existing solely for religious, charitable and educational purposes, could not be required to satisfy plaintiff's judgment out of its trust fund in action where plaintiff was allegedly injured due to hospital's negligence.
2. CHARITIES — Immunity — Criticisms — Legislature. Those seeking to amend the law pertaining to the doctrine of charitable immunity should address their criticisms and comments to the legislature as Supreme Court is unwilling to overrule past decisions sustaining the doctrine.
Error to the District Court of the City and County of Denver, Honorable George McNamara, Judge.
Clarence A. Decker, for plaintiff in error.
Saunders, Snyder Ross, M. E. MacDougall, for defendant in error.
Robert E. Hemenway, hereinafter referred to as the plaintiff, commenced this action against The Presbyterian Hospital Association seeking to recover damages allegedly sustained by him due to the negligence of the hospital. After the filing of an answer in which the allegations of negligence on the part of the hospital were denied, the parties entered into a stipulation which, in pertinent part, was as follows:
"2. An additional defense, inherent in the issues as formed, as agreed, shall be presented in the following form:
"'The Defendant is an eleemosynary institution existing solely and entirely for religious, charitable and educational purposes; at the time at which the claim made in this action arose Defendant had no insurance to cover said claim; at and since the time of the claim it has had no assets and has now no assets, nor is it empowered to hold or have any assets, except for the above mentioned purposes; and has not and is not authorized to have, receive or take any monetary profits.'
It is agreed that said facts as stated in said defense are true.
"3. The defense next above stated presents a matter of law which the parties desire to have settled as a preliminary matter and before presentation of facts with respect to the claims of negligence made on behalf of Plaintiff since a ruling by the court that said defense is adequate would be made the subject by Plaintiff of an appeal to the Supreme Court. The cost of such an appeal would be much smaller than if that point, together with all other points in a full fact trial, were presented to the Supreme Court. The Plaintiff is financially unable to bear large expenses in connection with this litigation.
"4. It has been agreed between the parties that briefs on the law regarding the above mentioned defense will be presented to the court in the hope and expectation that a ruling on the matter of law involved can be made separately and prior to any further proceedings herein."
Briefs were filed upon the points of law presented by the above stipulations and on April 23, 1965, the trial court entered findings and judgment which included pertinent portions of the written stipulations of the parties. The court further adjudged:
"That any judgment obtained against the defendant institution, if satisfied, would necessarily deplete the trust fund of said institution.
"That the issues of law in the instant case are essentially the same as the issues of law in Brown v. St. Luke's Hospital Association, 85 Colo. 167, 274 P. 740. In this particular case it also appeared that a judgment against the charitable trust would deplete its trust funds, and at page 173 the Supreme Court said:
"'We . . . hold that where the testimony affirmatively discloses a charitable trust, and a judgment against said trust, if satisfied, will deplete the trust fund, under such circumstances, a plaintiff cannot maintain an action against such a defendant.'
This case has never, according to the understanding of this Court, been overruled.
"That in the case of Michard v. Stratton Home, 144 Colo. 251, 355 P.2d 1078, the Supreme Court concluded that a judgment obtained against a charitable institution cannot be satisfied out of the trust funds of said institution, Counsel for both plaintiff and defendant have agreed by Stipulation that satisfaction of any judgment obtained in the instant case would necessarily deplete the trust fund of the defendant institution.
"That the result of the rulings in the Brown and Michard cases above referred to indicate that any further litigation in the present matter would be completely useless as the trust fund of the defendant is not available for the satisfaction of any judgment plaintiff might obtain and there are no other funds available for such a purpose, nor can such funds come into existence in the future."
Judgment was entered dismissing the action.
Under the broad coverage of the stipulation in the instant case (which goes far beyond the factual situation that was present in Michard v. Stratton Home, supra) no useful purpose would be served by directing this action to proceed to judgment. It is clear that any judgment that might be obtained by plaintiff could never be satisfied unless this court in this case refuses to be governed by the rule of state decisis.
Counsel for plaintiff readily concedes that if the judgment is to be reversed it will be necessary for this court to overrule its decisions in the cases mentioned by the trial court in its findings. This we are unwilling to do. The following language from the opinion of this court in Faber v. State of Colorado, 143 Colo. 240, 353 P.2d 609, is equally applicable here:
"We recognize that there have been numerous criticisms of the rule applied in this case, emanating from various legal writers, judges and students of the law. However, their criticisms and comments should be addressed to the legislature where constitutional authority rests to amend the law. Jerauld County v. Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 76 So. Dak 1, 71 N.W.2d 571; Maffei v. Incorporated Town of Kemmerer (Wyo.), 338 P.2d 808; Lee v. Dunklee, 84 Ariz. 260, 326 P.2d 1117; Garrett v. Escambia County Hospital Board, 226 Ala. 201, 94 So.2d 762."
The judgment is affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FRANTZ and MR. JUSTICE PRINGLE dissent.