Opinion
Civ. No. 02-885 (JNE/RLE)
December 8, 2003
John G. Westrick, Esq., and Charles J. Welter, Esq., Westrick McDowall-Nix, P.L.L.P., for Plaintiffs
Thomas Malone, Esq., Barna, Guzy Steffen, Ltd., for Defendants Todd Bork, B S Tree Company, and Bork Tree Farm
ORDER
Landowners Karen and Larry Helwig brought this action against their former lessees, B S Tree Company and Bork Tree Farm, and Bork Tree Farm's owner, Todd Bork, for trespass, interference with prospective business advantage, and debt. The case is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment by B S Tree, Bork Tree Farm, and Bork (collectively, Defendants). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the motion in part.
Also before the Court is the Helwigs' Motion to Deny Defendants' Request for Sanctions. The Court grants this motion.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 1986, the Helwigs leased approximately 96 acres of land in Pine County, Minnesota, to B S Tree for purposes of planting, managing, and harvesting Christmas trees. The Lease Agreement (Agreement) included a 10-year lease and an optional 2-year extension. B S Tree agreed to pay "$1.50 for each tree harvested at the time of harvest . . . on or before the 1st day of the new year following each harvest." B S Tree planted trees in 1986 and 1988. In 1988, Bork Tree Farm took over the operations of B S Tree. Upon the Agreement's expiration, the Helwigs allowed Defendants to continue to use the land.
By letter dated January 18, 2000 (Termination Letter), the Helwigs terminated their relationship with Defendants:
We appreciate your assistance over the years but, we do not wish to extend the contract nor have any more trees removed.
This letter informs you that all contracts, both formal and informal written or verbal, between Bork Tree Farm INC/BS Tree Company and Mr. and Mrs. Larry Helwig have terminated as of January 18, 2000. As such, the lessors, Mr. and Mrs. Helwig request that you remove the tree stumps from harvested trees, and vacate the premises.
With the exception of returning the land to its original status, your company no longer has any obligation to plant, manage, harvest or excavate said property. Mr. and Mrs. Helwig ask that you leave the . . . property in the condition agreed upon in the original contract and that you not plant, manage, harvest or excavate any trees upon receiving this notification.
Approximately one week after receiving the letter, Defendants ground up the remaining trees and stumps on the Helwigs' land.
II. DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," and must identify "those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party satisfies its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to respond by submitting evidentiary materials that designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court must look at the record and any inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
A. Trespass
"Trespass encompasses any unlawful interference with one's person, property, or rights, and requires only two essential elements: a rightful possession in the plaintiff and unlawful entry upon such possession by the defendant." Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen's Club, Inc., 624 N.W.2d 796, 805 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001). The Helwigs allege that Defendants committed a trespass by destroying the trees after January 18, 2000. Defendants raise two arguments in support of their motion on this claim.
First, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on the trespass claim because the Helwigs ordered them to leave the land as an open field. Defendants rely on statements in the Termination Letter directing them to return the land to its original status and to leave the land in the condition specified in the Agreement. Though the Agreement does not specify the condition in which Defendants were to leave the land upon its termination, it is undisputed that the land's original status was an open field.
Defendants' selective quotation of the Termination Letter does not entitle them to summary judgment. The statement upon which Defendants rely is preceded by a request to remove tree stumps and vacate the land, and is followed by an instruction not to "harvest or excavate any trees." Moreover, the Helwigs open the letter by stating that they "do not wish to . . . have any more trees removed." Defendants fail to reconcile their interpretation of the letter with the Helwigs' instructions not to remove any trees. Accordingly, the Court denies the motion on this claim insofar as it relies on the letter to establish that the Helwigs ordered Defendants to leave the land as an open field.
Next, Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on the trespass claim because they retained the right to harvest the trees under the doctrine of emblements. The parties first dispute whether Christmas trees constitute emblements. The Minnesota Supreme Court set forth the following test to determine whether a "product of the soil" is anemblement:
If the purpose of the planting is not the permanent enhancement of the land itself, but merely to secure a single crop, which is to be the sole return for the labor expended, the product would naturally fall under the head of "emblements." On the other hand, if the tree, bush, or vine is one which requires to be planted but once, and will then bear successive crops for years, the planting would be naturally calculated to permanently enhance the value of the land itself, and the product of any one year could not be said to essentially owe its existence to labor expended during that year; and hence would be classed among "fructus naturals," and the right of emblements would not attach.Sparrow v. Pond, 52 N.W. 36, 36-37 (Minn. 1892). Here, it is undisputed that Defendants did not plant the trees to permanently enhance the Helwigs' land or to reap crops from the trees. Instead, they planted and managed the trees for the purpose of harvesting the trees themselves. In other words, they planted the trees for the purpose of securing a single crop: the trees. Application of Sparrow to the undisputed facts of this case reveals that the trees planted by Defendants constitute emblements.
The authorities upon which the Helwigs rely to argue that Christmas trees are forestry products, not agricultural products, do not require a different conclusion. In Northern States Power Co. v. Williams, 343 N.W.2d 627 (Minn. 1984), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Christmas trees constitute timber for purposes of a statute classifying real property for taxation purposes. Id. at 631-32. The court "did not have sufficient information" to distinguish farming from Christmas-tree production, and deemed the inquiry "irrelevant" to the issue before it. Id. at 634. In light of this disclaimer, the Court finds Williams inapposite.
The same conclusion in warranted with respect to the provisions of Minn. Stat. ch. 88 (2002), cited by the Helwigs. Minnesota Statutes § 88.01 defines timber to include "trees, saplings, bushes, seedlings, and sprouts from which trees may grow, of every size, nature, kind and description." Id., subd. 5. The definition applies for the purposes of chapter 88. Id., subd.
1. That chapter does not address whether Christmas trees constitute emblements. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 88.02-.22 (Wildfire Act); id. §§ 88.641-.648 (regulating the harvest, transport, and sale of decorative trees). Accordingly, the Court finds the Helwigs' reliance on provisions of chapter 88 misplaced.
Having concluded that the trees planted by Defendants constitute emblements, the Court turns to whether Defendants are entitled to the trees under the doctrine of emblements. "Under the common law doctrine of emblements, if a crop is planted by one rightfully in possession of land, and the person unexpectedly loses possession before harvest, he still has ownership rights to the crops he planted." Gallager v. Nelson, 383 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986). The tenancy must be of uncertain duration, and the termination must be through no fault of the lessee. Id. at 425-26. "The doctrine is premised on the policy of avoiding waste of land and the equity that a tenant should be entitled to the crops or their value since it was his labor that produced them." Id. at 425.
In this case, it is undisputed that Defendants rightfully possessed the land when they planted the trees. As to the tenancy's duration, the Helwigs assert that Defendants leased the land for a fixed term. This observation, though correct, is irrelevant. The relevant inquiry is the status of Defendants' tenancy at its termination. Defendants became tenants at will by continuing to use the land after the Agreement's expiration with the Helwigs' permission. See Thompson v. Baxter, 119 N.W. 797, 798 (Minn. 1909). A tenancy at will qualifies as a tenancy of uncertain duration for purposes of the doctrine of emblements. Gallager, 383 N.W.2d at 426. With regard to the tenancy's termination, the Helwigs assert that Defendants' conduct terminated the tenancy because Bork stated at a meeting in 1999 that he no longer needed the Helwigs' land. Bork's statement, however, did not terminate the tenancy. Defendants continued to use the land with the Helwigs' permission until receiving the Termination Letter. Thus, the tenancy was terminated through no fault of Defendants.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Helwigs, the record reveals that Defendants were entitled to remove the trees from the Helwigs' land under the doctrine of emblements. See id. Consequently, the Helwigs did not rightfully possess the trees and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the trespass claim.
B. Interference with prospective business advantage
The Helwigs allege that Defendants interfered with the Helwigs' prospective business advantage by intentionally destroying the trees to prevent the Helwigs from entering into a forestry contract with Defendants' competitors. To establish a claim for interference with prospective contractual relations under Minnesota law, a plaintiff mist prove that the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with the plaintiffs prospective contractual relations. United Wild Rice, Inc. v. Nelson, 313 N.W.2d 628, 632-33 (Minn. 1982). For the reasons set forth in the discussion of the trespass claim, Defendants owned the trees and were entitled to remove them from the Helwigs' land. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Helwigs, the record reveals that Defendants did not improperly interfere with the Helwigs' prospective contractual relations.
C. Debt
The Helwigs assert that Defendants are liable under the terms set forth in the Agreement for the trees removed after January 18, 2000. Defendants first argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because the Helwigs ordered them to leave the land as an open field. The Court rejects this argument for the reasons set forth in the discussion of the trespass claim. Defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because the Helwigs' "only contractual right to Defendants' Christmas trees was $1.50 per tree harvested and sold." The Court rejects this argument because it mischaracterizes the Agreement. The Helwigs are entitled to "$1.50 for each tree harvested at the time of harvest . . . on or before the 1st day of the new year following each harvest." The Agreement does not specify that a tree must be sold for the Helwigs to be paid. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion on this claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons stated above, IT
IS ORDERED THAT:
1. The Helwigs' Motion to Deny Defendants' Request for Sanctions [Docket No. 18] is GRANTED.
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 13] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
3. The Helwigs' claims for trespass and interference with prospective business advantage are DISMISSED.