Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. No. RIC522818 Dallas Holmes, Judge.
James Curtis & Associates and James E. Curtis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Thompson & Colegate, Susan Knock Brennecke and Virna M. Manuel for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
McKINSTER J.
Plaintiff and appellant Joyce Helsley filed a claim for alleged unpaid overtime hours against her former employer, defendant and respondent Michael Williams, D.V.M., and the employer’s business, Norco Equine Veterinary Hospital. After the California Labor Commission denied her claim, she filed an action for de novo review of the labor commissioner’s decision. After a court trial, the court gave judgment for Dr. Williams. Plaintiff has appealed the judgment; we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff worked for Dr. Williams from approximately 2002 through August 2006, when she was terminated. In 2004, plaintiff became the “practice manager” in Dr. Williams’s equine veterinary practice. As practice manager, she was responsible for many administrative tasks, including ordering supplies, controlling petty cash, entering financial data in client records, screening applicants for employment, and other matters. Plaintiff was also specifically responsible for “administration of staff payroll, maintaining staff hours worked and calling in hours worked by staff members to [a payroll service], maintaining hours worked, holiday sickness and absence leave taken by staff members and record keeping....”
Plaintiff generally worked from about 10 a.m. to 8 p.m., approximately 10 hours a day. She divided her payroll hours between “straight time” (at $17 per hour) and what she called “regular overtime” (payable at time and a half). “Straight time” consisted of an ordinary eight hours of work; “regular overtime” consisted of hours worked in a day, over and above eight hours. Unlike all the other employees, plaintiff refused to use a time card to clock in and out, but kept a written log of her hours. Generally, her “regular overtime” hours were spent at the hospital, but after closing, while she took care of administrative duties, updating records, and so on. Along with other time records for the other employees, plaintiff prepared and submitted time records for herself, for the straight time and regular overtime hours she worked. She was compensated for all those hours, including the “regular overtime” hours.
Some time in early 2005, plaintiff began screening clients’ after-hours telephone calls to the veterinary practice. As early as January or February of 2005, plaintiff volunteered to provide these services. Before May 2005, the after-hours call screening was typically done by the hospital’s doctors, although plaintiff would take the calls if no doctor was available. During normal business hours, an emergency call would ring at the hospital. After 5:00 p.m., the emergency calls would be routed to an answering service, which would then forward the calls to the hospital or the on-call doctor.
Between about February and May of 2005, three of the hospital’s doctors left the practice. Plaintiff testified that, when the last veterinarian quit suddenly one morning, the employer became quite upset. Among other things, he was frustrated at having to handle all of the emergency calls himself. The business was left in straitened circumstances, and the employer feared he might have to close the practice. Plaintiff then offered to screen the calls so the employer would not have to. According to plaintiff, they entered into an oral agreement: plaintiff would continue to screen the emergency calls, but she would not ask to be paid for the on-call overtime hours until after the business improved. However, she was to keep track of her on-call screening hours. Plaintiff understood that the hospital “couldn’t afford it right then, but that if we worked at it, we would get back on our feet again, and when the money was there, I would ask to be paid.”
Unlike all her other payroll records, plaintiff kept no records at the hospital concerning her on-call hours. Rather, she kept the on-call records at home. These consisted of a form that she had created, which she would fill out for each call, reflecting the horse owner’s name, the time of the call, the nature of the call, and the time she had spent on the call. She would then match her forms with the answering service’s faxed call records.
Between August 2005 and August 2006, plaintiff asserted that she had spent over 980 hours of unpaid on-call overtime, over and above her “regular overtime.” In August 2006, the employer terminated plaintiff.
Plaintiff indicated that the oral agreement commenced in May 2005. However, when she filed her claim for unpaid wages, ending as of August 2006 when she was terminated, she discovered that she could claim, at most, one year of unpaid wages; anything more than one year old was time-barred. Thus, the labor commission claim reflected a period of August 2005 to August 2006, although the oral agreement was allegedly made in May 2005.
In 2008, approximately two years later, plaintiff filed her claim for the alleged unpaid on-call overtime. The labor commissioner denied plaintiff’s claim for unpaid overtime, because she was unable to provide documentation to substantiate her claim of hours worked.
Plaintiff then filed the instant petition in the trial court, seeking de novo review of her labor claim. At a court trial, plaintiff testified as indicated above, and provided evidence of on-call hours, cross-referenced to answering service faxed notes, for July 2005; July 2005 was, however, a month which was outside the scope of the claim period. The records for all the months within the claim period had been seized by police as part of another investigation.
In addition to plaintiff’s testimony, Dr. Williams and his wife testified at trial. Dr. Williams denied that there was ever an oral agreement for compensation; rather, plaintiff volunteered to take on additional on-call duties, which she had done before May 2005 on a once-a-week, purely voluntary, unpaid basis.
Annette Collins, plaintiff’s roommate, testified on plaintiff’s behalf that she had overheard plaintiff and Dr. Williams talking about arrangements to handle the after-hours calls after the last doctor had quit: Dr. Williams would handle the dire emergencies, and plaintiff would handle the rest. Collins did not hear any financial terms discussed, but did hear Dr. Williams say that he “didn’t know how he would ever repay her.” Collins also heard Dr. Williams make similar remarks at other times thereafter.
The trial court ruled that plaintiff had not proven that she made an enforceable contract with Dr. Williams, for specific payment for specific services. Plaintiff refused to clock in and out, which “fits with her entire demeanor and her entire way she treated this job.” Plaintiff had admitted there was no special agreement as to what she would be paid if any of the on-call days fell on a holiday. Plaintiff selected a number—time and a half—as the rate for her claim, but that in itself indicated to the court that no agreement had ever been reached about compensation. When plaintiff was asked in her trial testimony whether it was possible that Dr. Williams expected her to continue to volunteer her on-call services, plaintiff admitted, “Anything is possible.” She agreed that there was no discussion as to what she would be paid. Dr. Williams was heard by more than one person to say, “I don’t know how I’ll ever pay you, ” which was also consistent with there being no understanding or agreement that plaintiff would be paid anything. Plaintiff had indicated that she was to keep track of her time and, when business got better, then she would ask to be paid, but the evidence at trial was that the business never did improve. The court ruled, “even there, ... there was nothing as to amount agreed upon and nothing as to dates. And when you don’t agree on how much under a contract, and when you don’t agree on when the payment is to be made, the law says that you don’t have an enforceable contract. And unjust[] enrichment, quasi contract, quantum meruit doesn’t help you.... [¶]... And for that reason I’m ordering judgment for defendant.”
Plaintiff appeals, urging that, although the court found no express oral contract, it erred in failing to apply quasi contract principles to the case.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
Ordinarily, the appellate court’s authority to review a trial court judgment “begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination [of the trier of fact.]” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.)
The key issue here, however, is whether the doctrine of quasi contract, quantum meruit, or unjust enrichment can apply under the facts as found. That is, on an agreed state of facts, whether a legal principle has been properly or erroneously applied is a matter of law, which we review independently. (Cf. County of San Bernardino v. Calderon (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1106 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two] [“The construction of a statute and its applicability to undisputed facts are questions of law which we review de novo.”].)
II. Plaintiff Was Not Entitled to the Reasonable Value of Her Services
Plaintiff urges that the trial court found her a credible witness, and indeed believed that she worked at least some, if not most, of the claimed on-call hours. There was also evidence that, during the claims period, there were other veterinarians who came into the practice, who did take and respond to on-call emergencies, and those doctors were paid for their services. Under the circumstances that plaintiff did work which benefitted the employer, and which the employer paid others to perform, the employer would be unjustly enriched if not required to pay plaintiff also for performing the same services.
“[A] cause of action for unjust enrichment is not based on, and does not otherwise arise out of, a written contract. Rather, unjust enrichment is a common law obligation implied by law based on the equities of a particular case and not on any contractual obligation. [Citation.] Whether termed unjust enrichment, quasi-contract, or quantum meruit, the equitable remedy of restitution when unjust enrichment has occurred ‘is an obligation (not a true contract [citation]) created by the law without regard to the intention of the parties, and is designed to restore the aggrieved party to his or her former position by return of the thing or its equivalent in money.’ [Citation.] ‘The so-called “contract implied in law” in reality is not a contract. [Citations.] “Quasi-contracts, unlike true contracts, are not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the performances in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations created by law for reasons of justice.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] ‘[A]n individual may be required to make restitution if he is unjustly enriched at the expense of another. [Citation.] A person is enriched if he receives a benefit at another’s expense. [Citation.] The term “benefit” “denotes any form of advantage.” [Citation.] Thus, a benefit is conferred not only when one adds to the property of another, but also when one saves the other from expense or loss. Even when a person has received a benefit from another, he is required to make restitution “only if the circumstances of its receipt or retention are such that, as between the two persons, it is unjust for him to retain it.” [Citation.]’” (F.D.I.C. v. Dintino (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 333, 346-347.)
This is the crux of plaintiff’s claim: that the circumstances are such that it is unjust for Dr. Williams to retain the benefits that were conferred by her services.
None of the cases cited by the parties are particularly apposite on the issue. Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor (1985) 471 U.S. 290, 295 (Alamo Foundation), concerned whether the Fair Labor Standards Act (“the Act”) could apply to a commercial activity operated by a religious entity. “An individual who, ‘without promise or expectation of compensation, but solely for his personal purpose or pleasure, worked in activities carried on by other persons either for their pleasure or profit, ’ is outside the sweep of the Act. [Citation.]” (Alamo Foundation, at p. 295.) The issue, as stated, was the applicability of the Act, and made the quoted statement in the context of defining the characteristics of an operation subject to the Act. To apply the Act required that there be (1) an enterprise engaged in commerce, and (2) employees. A volunteer without promise of payment, for the volunteer’s own purpose or pleasure, is not an employee under the Act.
Here, there is no question that the veterinary practice was a commercial enterprise or that plaintiff was an employee. Alamo Foundation has little of interest to say on the issue of quasi contract.
Plaintiff’s other cases, Walling v. Portland (1947) 330 U.S. 148 and Rogers v. Schenkel (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F.2d 596, were also cases which considered whether certain persons were classified as employees for purposes of the Act. Walling held that railroad yard brakeman trainees were like students at a school, and not employees. The trainee brakemen neither received nor expected any remuneration, they were working for their own advantage, and the railroad received no immediate advantage from any work done by the trainees. (Walling, at pp. 150-153.) In Rogers, the plaintiff had worked in a plating company owned by his friend, for the purpose of aiding in the war effort. The plaintiff insisted at various times that his work was voluntary and that he did not want payment. The appellate court concluded that, notwithstanding that the plaintiff worked in a for-profit company, he was not an employee under the Act. (Rogers, at pp. 597-598.)
Plaintiff urges, in reliance on these cases, that she was not acting solely for her own purpose or pleasure, she was not a trainee or student, her acts conferred some advantage on the business, and she had not expressly disavowed wages. As noted, however, the issue in each of the cases was whether the person was an employee for purposes of the Act. There was is no such issue here: plaintiff was clearly an employee of Dr. Williams. The Fair Labor Standards Act cases are inapplicable.
Similarly, Dr. Williams’s reliance on Dinosaur Development, Inc. v. White (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1310 is not wholly apposite either. There, the court considered the question: “If an agency of local government conditions its approval of a subdivision plan submitted by landowner A on the construction of a road from the nearest public thoroughfare to the adjacent landlocked property of landowner B, can A require B to shoulder a portion of the road’s construction costs? Our holding, which is limited to the peculiar situation presented, is that A does not have a cause of action against B for restitution.” (Id. at pp. 1312-1313.) In Dinosaur Development, the action of landowner A in constructing the road conferred an incidental benefit on landowner B, but the road construction primarily served the interest of landowner A. Ultimately, even if the benefit conferred on landowner B came about as a result of landowner B’s request or demand, the benefit was compelled by the action of the governmental entity which had the power to approve landowner A’s development, and to place reasonable planning conditions on that approval. The benefit to landowner B was, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, rendered incidental to landowner A’s project, and there was thus no unjust enrichment to landowner B requiring restitution. The uniqueness of the circumstances in Dinosaur Development makes that case of questionable value in resolving the issue here.
As to the issue of whether the circumstances show that it was unjust for Dr. Williams to retain the benefits of plaintiff’s labor, plaintiff argues (by analogy to her cited cases) that the evidence here showed that she contemplated and expected compensation, and that she had not, unlike the plaintiff in Rogers, disavowed wages as part of a patriotic volunteer effort. However, there was evidence that also showed that, at least up to May 2005, plaintiff had affirmatively undertaken on-call screening duties purely voluntarily. She agreed that she had no claim, and expected no compensation, for any on-call hours before May 2005. Where the evidence conflicted was on the issue whether the volunteer agreement had changed as of May 2005. Plaintiff testified that it had; Dr. Williams testified that it had not.
On the question of whether the agreement between the parties had changed—a determination of credibility on disputed facts—we must defer to the trial court’s findings, where supported by substantial evidence. (Cf. Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1024 [appellate court defers to the trial court’s credibility determinations]; see also Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479, fn. 4, overruling Hurtado to the extent it made a distinction between deferring to factual findings based on oral testimony in declarations.) Substantial evidence consisted of the testimony of both parties that plaintiff had affirmatively agreed to serve as a volunteer in the past. Dr. Williams testified that there was no change in the agreement, in terms of compensation, on or after May 2005. This view was corroborated by Collins, who heard Dr. Williams say on multiple occasions that he did not know how he would ever be able to repay plaintiff, implying that no payment was, or could have been, contemplated. As between the parties, then, the circumstances were that it was not unjust for Dr. Williams to retain a benefit that plaintiff had knowingly bestowed as a volunteer.
“The mere fact that a person benefits another is not of itself sufficient to require the other to make restitution therefor.” (Rest., Restitution, § 1, Comment c; see Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Dev. Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 134.) Where a party “confers benefits on another officiously, i.e., by unjustified interference in the other’s affairs, [the party] is not entitled to restitution.” (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, § 1020, p. 1109.) But officious intermeddling is not the only circumstance in which restitution is denied. “It is even more obvious that, where the plaintiff acts in performance of his or her own duty or in protection or improvement of the plaintiff’s own property, any incidental benefit conferred on the defendant is not unjust enrichment.” (Ibid.) Here, the matter is neither wholly one nor the other; although plaintiff’s actions here did benefit Dr. Williams, she also acted to a large measure in her own interest. According to plaintiff, her offer to take all of the on-call hours was “[p]robably... my idea, because he was going to close the doors if not.” Plaintiff acted to protect her own continued employment as much as anything else.
“Where one person renders services to another from which the latter derives benefit, ordinarily an obligation arises to pay their reasonable value.” (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 1036, p. 1127.) However, “[t]o entitle the plaintiff to recover, the circumstances must be such as to warrant the inference that it was the expectation of both parties during the time that the services were rendered that compensation should be made. Proof may be made that they were actually intended to be gratuitous; or special circumstances such as kinship may be shown, from which it may sometimes be inferred that no payment was contemplated.” (1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Contracts, § 1037, p. 1128.)
The circumstances here support the notion that, although they conferred some benefit on Dr. Williams, plaintiff’s actions were gratuitous, or at least that both parties did not intend or understand that compensation was contemplated. Plaintiff had already been doing some of the on-call work on a voluntary basis for a number of months before May 2005. She admitted that those services were gratuitous. The evidence showed that both parties understood at the time of the supposed agreement that the condition of the business would not support compensating plaintiff for her on-call time. Other evidence showed that the condition of the business did not improve thereafter. Plaintiff was also compensated in her regular wages, throughout the claim period, for some portion of the on-call work she performed. Although plaintiff had some documentation concerning on-call hours in July 2005, outside of the claim period, she had none pertaining to the claim period itself. Just as there was no way to substantiate a contract claim, there was no way to substantiate what services had been performed to support a claim of donated benefit or unjust enrichment. In addition, the evidence also established that plaintiff was a longstanding family friend of Dr. and Mrs. Williams, and had known them socially for over 20 years. All the circumstances, taken together, provide substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that there was no unjust enrichment, and that plaintiff’s services were voluntary.
That is, plaintiff normally worked approximately 10 hours per day, from 10:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., or perhaps later. At 5:00 p.m., the hospital was closed for ordinary business. Yet plaintiff would often still remain on the premises performing her regular tasks, such as updating client billing records with that day’s entries. When after-hours calls (client calls after 5:00 p.m.) were received while plaintiff was still at the hospital, she often answered these emergency calls herself. Plaintiff, as noted, was responsible for submitting payroll records, including her own, and she was compensated in her regular pay (either as “straight time” or as “regular overtime”) for on-call messages handled while she was at the hospital as part of her regular work day, notwithstanding that it occurred after normal business hours of the veterinary practice.
DISPOSITION
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that plaintiff was not entitled to restitution in quasi contract for her on-call services. The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: HOLLENHORST Acting P.J., MILLER J.