Opinion
Civil No. 3:20-CV-1008
10-13-2020
ABEL HELB, Plaintiff, v. ANGELA HOOVER, et al., Defendants.
(Judge Mariani)
( ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Factual Background
This is one of a number of cases recently filed by immigration detainees challenging the conditions of their confinement, which have been referred to the undersigned for case management. The case began in a curious fashion. It was filed on the plaintiff's behalf by another detainee who purported to be bringing an action on behalf of dozens of other persons, including this plaintiff.
At the outset, to the extent that one detainee sought to file pleadings and purported to act on behalf of other pro se plaintiffs, these filings were improper. As non-lawyer pro se litigants, each of these detainees is only authorized to represent his own interests in his case and is not empowered to "represent" the interests of other unrepresented parties. This rule is, first, prescribed by statute: "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis added). In keeping with this statutory language, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has long instructed that "a nonlawyer appearing pro se [is] not entitled to play the role of attorney for other pro se parties in federal court." Osei-Afriyie by Osei-Afriyie v. Med. Coll. of Pennsylvania, 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding father not authorized to represent the legal interests of his children in federal court, and vacating judgment that had been entered against unrepresented children); see also Lutz v. Lavelle, 809 F. Supp. 323, 325 (M.D. Pa. 1991) ("It is a well-established principle that while a layman may represent himself with respect to his individual claims, he is not entitled to act as an attorney for others in a federal court"); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (requiring that all pleadings, motions, and submissions to federal courts be signed by an attorney of record, or by the unrepresented party himself or herself).
Because one detainee had improperly attempted to file this action on behalf of a host of other unrepresented parties, there was a second flaw in these initial filings. None of the multiple plaintiffs named in the initial pleading had filed motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, or paid the filing fee, as required by law.
In addition, a review of the docket disclosed a third and fundamental flaw in this case. The only operative pleading filed in this case was a collective motion for a temporary restraining order filed on behalf of all detainees. Thus, no individual plaintiff had filed a civil complaint setting forth that plaintiff's specific complaints or claims.
Upon review of these eccentric and inappropriate filings, the clerk lodged these filings as separate cases under each individual putative plaintiff's name, and these civil actions were then referred to the undersigned. Recognizing the chaotic state of the record in these cases, on June 23, 2020, we entered a case management order designed to create some measure of order out of this chaos, which directed the plaintiff to take a series of actions by July 24, 2020. That order provided as follows:
In order to ensure that this litigation proceeds forward in an orderly fashion, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1. On or before July 24, 2020, each individual plaintiff must pay the filing fee prescribed by law, or submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
2. In addition, on or before July 24, 2020 each individual plaintiff must submit a complaint to the court describing that plaintiff's claims. However, we instruct each plaintiff that this "complaint must be complete in all respects. It must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to the [pleadings] already filed." Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). Therefore, each individual plaintiff's complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), set forth in averments that are "concise, and direct," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1), and stated in separately numbered paragraphs describing the date and time of the events alleged, and identifying wherever possible the participants in the acts about which the plaintiff complains.
3. Each complaint must be a new pleading which stands by itself as an adequate complaint without reference to any other pleading already filed. Young v. Keohane, 809 F. Supp. 1185, 1198 (M.D. Pa. 1992). The complaint should set forth plaintiff's claims in short, concise and plain statements, and in sequentially numbered paragraphs. It should name proper defendants, specify the offending actions taken by a particular defendant, be signed, and indicate the nature of the relief sought. Further, the claims set forth in the complaint should arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and they should contain a question of law or fact common to all defendants.(Doc. 5) (Emphasis added).
4. The Court further places each plaintiff on notice that failure to comply with these directions may result in the dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . The Court also notifies each plaintiff that, as a litigant who may seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis, your complaint may also be subject to a screening review by the Court to determine its legal sufficiency. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
5. Finally, to the extent that any plaintiff is seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, each individual plaintiff should include a motion seeking such relief along with his or her motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and complaint.
We knew that Helb received this directive from the court because he sought to evade the requirements of our order. On July 6, 2020, Helb submitted a letter to the court indicating that he wished to forego the requirement of filing a complaint and submitting a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis through the expedient of consolidating his case with that of another pro se plaintiff. (Doc. 6). The following day, July 7, 2020, we denied this request notifying Helb that his proposal was legally inappropriate and instructed Helb that "the plaintiff is ORDERED to comply with the scheduling orders previously entered by this court." (Doc. 7).
Despite this clear admonition from the court, this July 24 deadline passed without any action by the plaintiff to comply with our direction by filing a complaint or motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, on July 30, 2020, we recommended that this case be dismissed without prejudice. (Doc. 8).The district court adopted this Report and Recommendation on September 17, 2020, and ordered the plaintiff to submit an amended complaint and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis within 21 days. (Doc. 10). On October 1, 2020, the order was returned as undeliverable. As a pro se litigant, Helb's failure to maintain an address where he could be reached itself violated the rules of this court; specifically, Local Rule 83.18, which provides that:
LR 83.18 Appearance of Parties Not Represented by Counsel.
Whenever a party by whom or on whose behalf an initial paper is offered for filing is not represented in the action, such party shall maintain on file with the clerk a current address at which all notices and copies of pleadings, motions or papers in the action may be served upon such party.
In the absence of action by the plaintiff to comply with our orders, litigate this case, or provide us with any means by which we may communicate with the plaintiff, it is impossible for us to evaluate the merits of this case or authorize service of the complaint. In short, the plaintiff's inaction and failure to comply with this court's order now wholly frustrates our efforts to adjudicate this case. On these facts, this case should be dismissed with prejudice.
II. Discussion
This case is now subject to dismissal with prejudice for at least two reasons.
First, while our prior screening analysis called for dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute, the Court provided the plaintiff a final opportunity to further litigate this matter by endeavoring to promptly file a proper amended complaint. Having concluded that this pro se complaint was flawed in multiple and profound ways, we followed this course recognizing that, in civil rights cases, pro se plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp., 482 F.3d at 253, unless it is clear that granting further leave to amend would be futile, or result in undue delay. Alston, 363 F.3d at 235.
Thus, in this case, the plaintiff was given this opportunity to further amend his complaint but has now forfeited this opportunity through his inaction. In this situation, where a wholly deficient complaint is dismissed without prejudice but the pro se plaintiff refuses or declines to timely amend the complaint, it is well within the court's discretion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice given the plaintiff's refusal to comply with court directives. Indeed, the precise course was endorsed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F. App'x 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007). In Pruden, the appellate court addressed how district judges should exercise discretion when a pro se plaintiff ignores instructions to amend a complaint. In terms that are equally applicable here, the Court observed that:
The District Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice and allowed [the pro se plaintiff] twenty days in which to file an amended complaint. [The pro se plaintiff] failed to do so. Because [the pro se plaintiff] decided not to amend his complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed [the pro se plaintiff's] complaint with prejudice. See In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 704 (3d Cir.1996). The District Court expressly warned [the pro se plaintiff] that the failure to amend his complaint would result in dismissal of the action with prejudice. "[I]t is difficult to conceive of what other course the court could have followed." Id. (quoting Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 455 (3d Cir.1994)).Pruden v. SCI Camp Hill, 252 F. App'x 436, 438 (3d Cir. 2007).
Therefore, consistent with the prior practice of this court, it is recommended that the complaint now be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous without further leave to amend. See, e.g., Moore v. Primeramo, No. 4:17-CV-990, 2017 WL 5474548, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:17-CV-990, 2017 WL 5473461 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2017); Williams v. Harry, No. 1:16-CV-01759, 2017 WL 3454410, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2017) (Kane, J.); Washington v. U.S.P. Canaan Kitchen/FBOP, No. 1:15-CV-849, 2015 WL 4663188, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2015) (Kane, J.); Wicks v. Barkley, 3:12-CV-02203, 2013 WL 5937066 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2013) (Mariani, J.); Davis v. Superintendent, SCI Huntingdon, 3:12-CV-01935, 2013 WL 6837796 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2013) (Mariani, J.).
Further, under the Local Rules of this Court, the plaintiff should be deemed to have abandoned this lawsuit by failing to provide the court with an address where he can be reached, a direct violation of Local Rule 83.18. This on-going violation of Local Rule 83.18 permits the court to find that he has abandoned this litigation. In this circumstance, dismissal of this action for failure to abide by court orders or the rules of this court, and failure to prosecute, is fully justified. See, e.g., Juaquee v. Pike County Corr. Facility Employees, 3:12-CV-1233, 2013 WL 432611 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2013); Kuhn v. Capitol Pavilion, 1:11-CV-2017, 2012 WL 5197551 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 2012); Educ. Mgmt. Services, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 1:10-CV-00441, 2012 WL 2389874 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2012); Olguin v. Burgerhoff, 1:12-CV-0003, 2012 WL 1580935 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2012); Nowland v. Lucas, 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2012); Binsack v. Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney's Office, 3:08-CV-1166, 2011 WL 5840314 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2011); Washington v. Columbia County Prison, 3:CV-10-45, 2011 WL 98547 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2011). These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 83.18 by providing an address where we can communicate with this litigant. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 83.18 and deem the plaintiff to have abandoned this litigation.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous for failure to state a claim.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.
Submitted this 13th day of October 2020.
S/Martin C . Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge