Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:99-CV-2277-D
January 29, 2001
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
In this pro se prisoner civil rights case, plaintiff asserts various constitutional claims and a state-law defamation claim. Defendants move to dismiss the claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the court grants the motion.
I
Plaintiff Billy Donnell Heath ("Heath") was convicted in Hunt County, Texas on two counts of burglary of a habitation and sexual assault. Both victims were taken to a local hospital after the alleged offenses, where a doctor examined them. Heath was not provided with a copy of the hospital records or rape kits pertaining to the victims. Pursuant to a court order, he was compelled to give hair, blood, and saliva samples. Heath filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various government officials, police officers, and his former attorney.
This case has a somewhat extensive procedural history that need not be recounted at length. In short, on October 3, 2000 Heath filed an amended complaint in response to the court's order adopting in part the magistrate judge's findings and conclusions. Specifically, the court held although many of Heath's claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), his claim that he had a present Fourteenth Amendment due process right to the production of certain police records was not necessarily barred by Heck. In light of Heath's pro se status and the ambiguity of his pleadings, the court granted Heath leave to file an amended complaint.
Heath alleges in his amended complaint several constitutional violations arising from the investigation and prosecution of him, and pertaining to his ongoing attempts to obtain certain police records. Heath maintains that the state withheld exculpatory evidence in the form of doctor and hospital reports regarding one of the victims. He also contends that the police officers made false statements in support of an arrest warrant and a warrant authorizing the collection of saliva, semen, hair and blood samples, and that one officer used improper techniques in questioning him. Heath also asserts that the prosecutor made false statements to the grand jury. In addition to these constitutional violations, Heath alleges a state-law defamation claim, contending that the officers and prosecutor intentionally and recklessly made false statements to the public concerning Heath's involvement in the crimes.
Defendants Hunt County District Attorney Duncan Thomas ("Thomas"), Hunt County District Clerk Ann Prince ("Prince"), and Hunt County Sheriffs Officer Janie Simpson ("Simpson") move for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In a separate motion entitled a "motion to strike," defendant Richard Bosworth ("Judge Bosworth"), Senior District Judge, 354th Judicial District of Hunt County, joins the other defendants' motion to dismiss. Although defendants filed their motion on October 13, 2000 and Judge Bosworth filed his motion on October 25, 2000, Heath has not responded to the motions within the time permitted by the local civil rules. The court now turns to the motions on the merits.
Judge Bosworth also moves to strike Heath's amended complaint on the ground that Heath has failed to comply with Rule 5. In view of the court's order today granting defendants' motion to dismiss on the merits, the court denies the motion to strike as moot.
II
Heath's complaint asserts a due process claim based on defendants' present failure to disclose exculpatory evidence. Heath alleges that this evidence includes witness and victim statements as well as medical reports from the victims.
For the purposes of deciding defendants' motion to dismiss, the court takes as true the facts alleged by Heath in his complaint. See Royal Bank of Canada v. FDIC, 733 F. Supp. 1091, 1094 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (Fitzwater, J.). The court draws all inferences in favor of Heath, the nonmovant. Id.
In Heck the Supreme Court held that "a state prisoner's claim for damages is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if' a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,' unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has previously been invalidated." Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). Before Heath filed his amended complaint, the court noted that it was not clear whether Heath's request for the production of documents was an implicit attack on the validity of his conviction or sentence. See Order of Sept. 1, 2000 at 1. Several aspects of Heath's complaint and his objections to the magistrate's findings and recommendations implied that he was attacking the validity of his conviction. For example, Heath cited Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring government to disclose exculpatory evidence during criminal prosecution), and he sought compensatory damages for his confinement. See id. The amended complaint, however, does not rely on Brady and seeks no compensatory damages. Furthermore, the cases that defendants cite hold only that Heck bars § 1983 actions for the past refusal to produce or preserve exculpatory evidence. See Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 103 (5th Cir 1996); Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1994). The court is willing to conclude, therefore, that Heath's claim that he has a present right to the production of exculpatory evidence is not necessarily barred by Heck.
This conclusion does not mean, however, that Heath has stated a claim on which relief can be granted. Heath has failed to provide the court with any legal authority for the viability of a right to the post-conviction production of exculpatory evidence. In the court's September 1, 2000 order, it noted that it agreed with the magistrate judge's distinction of Jackson v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 631 F. Supp. 150 (N.D. III. 1986). Jackson, which upheld an inmate's request for his own parole file, specifically indicated its reliance on parole board rules rather than the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See id. at 151. Furthermore, as the magistrate judge noted, Texas state law limits the release of such records. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 420.031(e) (Vernon 1997) ("Evidence collected . . . may not be released unless the survivor of the offense or a legal representative of the survivor signs a written consent to release the evidence."); id. § 552.028 (government agencies not required to comply with inmate's request for information). In light of the lack of support in case law and state statutory law for a right to the post-conviction production of exculpatory evidence, the court dismisses Heath's first claim.
In a related claim, Heath asserts that new exculpatory evidence has been discovered. Looking to the substance of his claim, however, Heath does not contend that this evidence has arisen since his conviction. Rather, he complains that an allegedly exculpatory report from the Texas Department of Public Safety Laboratory in Garland, Texas was not provided to him at trial. Such a claim is essentially a Brady claim. As the magistrate judge has noted, Brady does not apply to the civil context. Having concluded that Heath has not provided any authority in support of a right to view such records, the court dismisses this claim.
III
Heath's remaining constitutional claims are barred by Heck. First, Heath asserts that police officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by intentionally and recklessly including false statements in the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant and the warrant to obtain Heath's blood, hair, semen, and saliva samples. A claim that officers did not have probable cause to arrest Heath and illegally obtained incriminating evidence against him necessarily calls into question the validity of his conviction. See Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding claim for Fourth Amendment false arrest violation barred by Heck). Similarly, Heath's claim that the prosecutor violated Heath's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by intentionally and recklessly making false statements to the grand jury is also barred by Heck. See Torres v. Hynes, 2000 WL 1052075, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 2000) (holding § 1983 claim for unfair grand jury presentation barred by Heck).
IV
Finally, Heath asserts a "Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment due process claim of defamation." P. Am. Compl. ¶ 4. Under Texas law, however, statements made during the course of or in relation to a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged, and therefore are not subject to defamation actions. See Matta v. May, 118 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1997). To the extent, therefore, that Heath is asserting a state-law defamation claim, his claim is dismissed.