Opinion
C/A 8:22-cv-04148-HMH-JDA
01-17-2024
Decorian L. Heath, Plaintiff, v. Brian Sterling, Director; Charles Williams, Warden; John Palmer, Deputy Warden; Harouff, Captain; Amy Enloe, Nurse Practictioner, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants [Doc. 26] and a motion for temporary restraining order filed by Plaintiff [Doc. 37]. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the Greenville County Court of Common Pleas at case number 2022-cp-23-05546 on September 16, 2022. [Doc. 1-1.] On November 18, 2022, Defendants removed the action to this Court [Doc. 1] and, on January 6, 2023, Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint [Doc. 11].
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on September 16, 2022. [Doc. 1-1 at 34-35 (enveloped marked as received by prison mailroom on September 16, 2022).]
On March 17, 2023, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 26.] That same day, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 27.] Plaintiff's response in opposition was entered on the docket on June 22, 2023. [Doc. 50.] Defendant's filed a reply on June 27, 2023. [Doc. 52.]
On April 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order. [Doc. 37.] Defendants filed a response in opposition on April 28, 2023. [Doc. 41.] Both motions are ripe for review.
The facts in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Complaint. [Doc. 1-1 at 6-18.]
Plaintiff is a state inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is currently incarcerated at the Perry Correctional Institution (“Perry”). [Doc. 1-1 at 6.] Plaintiff was transferred from the Broad River Correctional Institution (“Broad River”) to Perry on November 29, 2021. [Id. at 8 ¶ 1.] Upon arriving at Perry, Plaintiff was housed in a certain cell but later moved to a new cell. [Id. at 8 ¶ 2.] Once in his new cell, Plaintiff noticed several issues, including that the desk area had been removed and the bed frame had been replaced with a five-inch concrete slab. [Id.] Plaintiff also noticed that the window in his cell was completely covered over by sheet metal that blocked Plaintiff's view of the natural surroundings. [Id. at 8 ¶ 3.] Plaintiff immediately sought to address the room decor issues by sending written requests and speaking to Warden Williams, Deputy Warden Palmer, and Captain Harouff. [Id. at 8 ¶ 4.]
Plaintiff alleges that, because the concrete slab is so low to the ground, it forces him to sit in a “‘V' position,” causing him to suffer pain in his lower back. [ Id. at 9 ¶¶ 7-8.] Plaintiff informed the Warden of these conditions. [ Id. at 9 ¶¶ 6-7.] Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that his mattress was removed by Captain Harouff for three days in April 2022, resulting in him having to sleep on bare concrete and causing his back pain to worsen. [Id. at 10 ¶ 13.]
Plaintiff contends he “has been suffering severe and constant pain.” [Id. at 10 ¶ 17.] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Enloe, a nurse practitioner, denied him timely medical treatment. [Id. at 10 ¶ 18.] Plaintiff's physical pain and suffering was accompanied by psychological harm. [Id. at 11 ¶ 19.] He began to have suicidal thoughts and was placed on crisis intervention on May 10, 2022, for forty-five days. [Id. at 11 ¶¶ 20-21.] Plaintiff started seeing things and hearing voices and was treated by mental health staff members Boyd and Wyantt. [Id. at 11 ¶¶ 22-24.] After forty-five days in crisis intervention, Plaintiff was transferred to the crisis stabilization unit at Broad River and placed on medication. [Id. at 11 ¶ 27.]
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts what amounts to three general claims. First, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for gross negligence alleging that Defendants violated a duty of care under state law (the “gross negligence claim”). [Id. at 12, 16 ¶¶ 30, 43-44.] Next, Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims related to various purported unconstitutional conditions of confinement including the removal of his bed frame and replacement with a concrete slab, the removal of the desk area, the covering of his window with metal, and the illumination of his cell with light for twenty hours per day (the “conditions of confinement claims”). [ Id. at 12-13 ¶¶ 32-35, 15-16 ¶¶ 42, 45.] Finally, Plaintiff asserts an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need related to his back pain as a result of the concrete slab and his mental health care related to the conditions of his confinement (the “medical deliberate indifference claim”). [Id. at 14-15 ¶¶ 36-41.]
For his relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and a transfer to a different facility. [Id. at 17 ¶¶ 46-50.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by
governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cnty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because granting a motion for preliminary injunctive relief “requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or refrain from acting, in a certain way[,] [t]he danger of a mistake in this setting is substantial.” Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
The current standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief is set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under Winter, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate:
1) he is likely to succeed on the merits,
2) he will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not granted,
3) the balance of equities favors him, and
4) the injunction is in the public interest.555 U.S. at 20; see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Winter requires that each preliminary injunction factor “be 'satisfied as articulated.'” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff'd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). To succeed, Plaintiff must satisfy all four of these requirements. Pashby, 709 F.3d at 320-21. Therefore, the movant bears a heavy burden in seeking a preliminary injunction. Id. at 321.
DISCUSSION
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants move for summary judgment on several grounds. As to Plaintiff's federal law claims-the conditions of confinement claims and the medical deliberate indifference claims-Defendants argue that (1) Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to certain claims [Doc. 26-1 at 3-9]; (2) Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment and/or sovereign immunity in their official capacities [id. at 9-11]; (3) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support an Eighth Amendment violation as to his claims concerning the installation of the concrete slab and removal of his mattress [id. at 11-15]; (4) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support an Eighth Amendment violation as to his claim concerning the metal window covering and illuminated cell for 20 hours per day [id. at 15-16]; (5) Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to show he suffered a serious medical condition to which Defendants were deliberately indifferent as to his claim regarding medical treatment [id. at 16-24]; (6) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief as to Defendants Stirling, Williams, and Palmer [id. at 24-27]; and (7) Defendants are protected by qualified immunity in their individual capacities [id. at 27-29]. As to Plaintiff's state law claim for gross negligence, Defendants argue that (1) state law bars personal liability in the circumstances alleged by Plaintiff [id. at 29]; (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief which may be granted as to his gross negligence claim [id. at 29-30]; (3) Defendants are entitled to discretionary immunity as to Plaintiff's allegations concerning his back pain and psychological harm resulting from the installation of a concrete slab in his cell [id. at 31-32]; (4) Defendants are entitled to protection under the public duty rule [id. at 32-34]; and (5) Plaintiff cannot establish that he has sustained any damage proximately caused by Defendants as the result of gross negligence regarding his medical condition [id. at 34-35]. The Court will address each relevant argument in turn below.
This spelling of Defendant Stirling “reflects the proper spelling of this party's name,” as explained by Defendants in their summary judgment brief. [Doc. 26-1 at 1 n.2.]
Plaintiff's Federal Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts two federal law claims-a conditions of confinement claim and a medical deliberate indifference claim. As noted, Defendants offer multiple grounds to support their motion for summary judgment. The Court begins by discussing Defendants' exhaustion arguments, which the Court concludes warrants the grant of summary judgment as to most of Plaintiff's federal law claims. The Court will then briefly address Defendants' remaining arguments for granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's federal law claims that were properly exhausted.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Custis v. Davis, 851 F.3d 358, 361 (4th Cir. 2017). The PLRA's exhaustion requirement is mandatory and “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). The exhaustion requirement applies even if the relief sought in the civil action is not available in the administrative proceedings. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). Moreover, the exhaustion requirement applies whether the action was filed in federal court or was filed in state court and later removed to federal court. Blakely v. Ozmint, No. 4:04-22942-MBS, 2006 WL 2850545, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 29, 2006).
Exhaustion is defined by each prison's grievance procedure, not the PLRA; a prisoner must comply with his prison's grievance procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). An inmate's failure to “properly take each step within the administrative process . . . bars, and does not just postpone, suit under § 1983.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002); see also White v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding dismissal of an inmate's complaint because the inmate failed to proceed beyond the first step in the administrative grievance process); but see Jones, 549 U.S. at 219-24 (rejecting “total exhaustion rule” and holding that when presented with a complaint containing exhausted and unexhausted claims, courts should “proceed[ ] with the good and leave[ ] the bad”). Courts within the District of South Carolina have found an inmate exhausts his administrative remedies when he completes all steps of a prison's grievance procedure, and that § 1997e(a) does not require inmates to further appeal to South Carolina's Administrative Law Court. See, e.g., Ayre v. Currie, No. 05-3410, 2007 WL 3232177, at *7 n.5 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2007); Charles v. Ozmint, No. 05-2187, 2006 WL 1341267, at *4 n.3 (D.S.C. May 15, 2006).
To survive a motion for summary judgment asserting he failed to exhaust, an inmate is required to produce evidence in response to the motion that refutes the claim that he failed to exhaust. See Hill v. Haynes, 380 Fed.Appx. 268, 270 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that “to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must produce competent evidence sufficient to reveal the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial”); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24 (stating that once the party seeking summary judgment demonstrates there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue).
The SCDC Inmate Grievance System was succinctly summarized as follows in a recent case in this District:
The current policy, adopted on September 1, 2023, can be found online by visiting SCDC's website for polices and procedures at http://www.doc.sc.gov/policy/policy-listing and selecting the link for GA-01.12 from the drop-down menu under “General Administration (GA)” (last visited Jan. 16, 2024).
SCDC provides inmates with a procedure through which they may file grievances on issues related to their confinement, including actions of staff members toward an inmate. The grievance process is set forth in SCDC Policies/Procedures, “Inmate Grievance System.” To summarize the process, generally, an inmate must first submit a Request to Staff Member Form (“RTSM”) or Automated Request to Staff Member (“ARTSM”). Thereafter, the inmate must file a Step 1 Grievance Form (10-5), setting forth the issue grieved. Inmates may then appeal an SCDC decision as to the Step 1 Grievance by filing a Step 2 Grievance Form (10-5A). SCDC's response to a Step 2 Grievance is considered the final Department decision on an issue.Wiley v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 4:22-cv-2343-SAL-TER, 2023 WL 9111416, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 30, 2023) (citations to the Inmate Grievance System, SCDC Policy No. GA-01.12, omitted), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2024 WL 71624 (D.S.C. Jan. 5, 2024). In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants have provided the affidavit of Felicia McKie, who is the Agency Inmate Grievance Coordinator/Branch Chief within the Office of General Counsel for SCDC. [Doc. 26-6 at 1 ¶¶ 1-2.] McKie's affidavit provides a similar summary of the SCDC Inmate Grievance System to that noted above along with additional details concerning the required steps an inmate must take. [Id. at 1-3 ¶¶ 4-13.] McKie's affidavit also provides a summary of Plaintiff's grievances filed in relation to the claims asserted in this case. [Id. at 3 ¶¶ 22-26.] Additionally, McKie has attached to her affidavit copies of Plaintiff's grievances filed in relation to the claims asserted in this case. [Doc. 26-7.]
Here, Defendants argue with respect to all of his federal law claims except his Eighth Amendment claims for cruel and unusual punishment arising out of the replacement of his bed frame with a concrete slab and the removal of his mattress for a period of three days that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. [Doc. 26-1 at 8.]
The record establishes that Plaintiff filed two grievances at both Step 1 and Step 2.First, Plaintiff filed a Step 1 Grievance at Number PCI-0079-22 (the “0079 Grievance”) on February 23, 2022. [Doc. 26-7 at 4.] In the 0079 Grievance, Plaintiff complained “about the [beds] in D-Dorm being a five inch slab that cause[s] inmates to sit in the V-position[,] which places stress in the lower back[,] causing pain.” [Id.] The Warden denied the 0079 Grievance, informing Plaintiff that there was no evidence to suggest that SCDC was subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment and that, while special considerations were provided to inmates with ADA accommodations, Plaintiff made no mention of any such conditions in his grievance. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff then filed a Step 2 grievance for the 0079 Grievance stating the following as his reason for the appeal:
Plaintiff also filed a Step 1 Grievance at Number PCI-0009-22 on January 7, 2022, complaining about the beds in D-Dorm being a five-inch slab that causes inmates to sit in the “V-position.” [Doc. 26-7 at 1.] That grievance was processed and returned to Plaintiff because he failed to state what “Action Requested” he wished to accomplish. [Id.] Plaintiff was instructed that he could correct the error and resubmit the grievance on a new form by February 26, 2022. [Id.] Plaintiff's resubmitted Step 1 Grievance was given the new Number of PCI-0079-22, which is detailed above. [See Doc. 26-6 at 3 ¶ 22.]
I'm writing this grievance about the [beds] in D-dorm being a (5) inch slab [that's] causing inmates to sit in the V-position[,] which places stress on the lower back [causing] pain. No other lock-up unit (B or C) dorm [has] (5) inch slabs. They have regular beds, which is also discrimination. I do qualify under the (ADA) guidelines being in mental health L3 ....[Id. at 6.] This Step 2 grievance was denied on August 22, 2022. [Id.] The Warden's response noted that ADA guidelines addressed wheelchair accessible cells with proper bed height accommodations and Plaintiff had made no claims in his initial grievance of suffering from ADA-related issues. [Id.]
Second, Plaintiff filed a Step 1 Grievance at Number PCI-0211-22 (the “0211 Grievance”) on May 2, 2022. [Id. at 7.] In the 0211 Grievance, Plaintiff complained that his mattress was taken for 72 hours, from April 8 to April 11, without him being given an all-in-one or control cell blanket such that he had to lay on a 5-inch concrete slab with only his sheet and blankets. [Id.] On May 25, 2022, the Warden determined that the 0211 Grievance was resolved noting that Plaintiff “did not provide an obtainable Action Requested” on his Step 1 grievance form and that it appeared he had received a mattress as of April 11. [Id. at 8.] Plaintiff then filed a Step 2 grievance for the 0211 Grievance, essentially stating the same concerns as the Step 1 grievance, but noting “for the Action request: I request Cpt. Harouff be suspended and I also have [a] separation placed on him.” [Id. at 9.] This Step 2 grievance was denied on September 1, 2022, on the basis that records showed Plaintiff was misusing his mattress “by destroying the seams to make a clothing line which is not authorized by SCDC” and again noted that Plaintiff had received a replacement mattress on April 11, 2022. [Id.]
Based on these two grievances, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has exhausted only the following two claims: (1) Plaintiff's claim that having a concrete slab in place of a bed frame in D-Dorm constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and (2) Plaintiff's claim that removing his mattress for three days constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. [Doc. 26-1 at 8; see also Doc. 26-6 at 3 ¶ 26.] Because Plaintiff filed no other grievances with respect to the other claims in his Complaint, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the following issues asserted in the Complaint: (1) that the window in Plaintiff's cell is covered by a piece of sheet metal; (2) that Plaintiff had a pre-existing back issue which was made worse by sitting in a “V-position” on the concrete slab; (3) that Plaintiff suffered “severe and constant pain” since November 30, 2021; (4) that Plaintiff had been denied proper and timely medical treatment; (5) that his pain and suffering caused psychological harm; (6) that Plaintiff began to have suicidal thoughts caused by Defendants' acts; (7) that Plaintiff suffers panic attacks; and (8) that Plaintiff is subjected to twenty hours a day of constant illumination. [Doc. 26-1 at 8; see also Doc. 266 at 3 ¶ 26.]
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that any and all claims other than the two claims noted above-the replacement of Plaintiff's bed frame with a concrete slab and the removal of his mattress for three days-were not properly exhausted when Plaintiff filed this action. Because exhaustion is mandatory and Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to whether he exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the allegations in the Complaint, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's federal claims based on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The Court will now address Defendants' arguments for summary judgment as to the exhausted claims.
In his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that he filed his claim in the state court of common pleas and that the rules for exhaustion are different for claims filed in state court. [Doc. 50 at 3-4.] Plaintiff's argument is without merit. “Plaintiff was required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the PLRA irrespective of whether the action was initially brought in state court and later removed to federal court.” Blakely, 2006 WL 2850545, at *2 (explaining that “Plaintiff's argument that the PLRA exhaustion requirements apply only when a prisoner sues in federal court is without merit” because the “statute does not make such a differentiation”); see also Gibbs v. Ozmints, No. 3:08-cv-3955-PMD, 2010 WL 2926164, at *7 (D.S.C. July 23, 2010) (“Plaintiff is required to exhaust his administrative remedies irrespective of whether the action was brought in state court and later removed to federal court or was originally brought in federal court.”), aff'd, 421 Fed.Appx. 272 (4th Cir. 2011).
The undersigned further notes that these same bases for granting summary judgment would also apply to Plaintiff's non-exhausted claims, even if he had properly exhausted them.
Eleventh Amendment Immunity
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's official-capacity claims against them should be dismissed on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity and/or sovereign immunity. [Doc. 26-1 at 9-11.] The Court agrees.
Plaintiff does not appear to address this argument in his response to the motion for summary judgment, except that he makes a confusing, passing reference to bringing his claims against Defendants in their individual capacities. [Doc. 50 at 2 (“Plaintiff state in his claim that Defendants were individual capacities in which he state every individual act which Plaintiff state in the Complaint.”).] Thus, it appears to the Court that Plaintiff does not intend to pursue any official-capacity claims against Defendants.
In any case, as employees of the State of South Carolina, Defendants are all entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity as to any claims for money damages asserted against them in their official capacities. The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution divests this Court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit for damages brought against the State of South Carolina, or its officials in their official capacities, by a citizen of South Carolina or a citizen of another state. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). As noted in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 n.9 (1984), a state must expressly consent to suit in a federal district court. The State of South Carolina has not consented to suit in a federal court. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act (“SCTCA”), SC Code § 15-78-20(e), expressly provides that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suit only in a court of the state of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another state. See McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741, 743 (S.C. 1985) (abolishing sovereign immunity in tort “does not abolish the immunity which applies to all legislative, judicial and executive bodies and to public officials who are vested with discretionary authority, for actions taken in their official capacities”), superseded by statute, SC Code § 15-78-100(b), as recognized in Jeter v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 633 S.E.2d 143 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121 (“[N]either pendent jurisdiction nor any other basis of jurisdiction may override the Eleventh Amendment.”). Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the claims alleged against them in their official capacities to the extent Plaintiff intends to assert any such claims against them.
Conditions of Confinement Claims
As noted, Plaintiff asserts certain conditions of confinement claims. [Doc. 1-1 at 12-13 ¶¶ 32-35, 15-16 ¶¶ 42, 45.] As discussed, Plaintiff has exhausted only the following two claims: (1) his claim that having a concrete slab in place of a bed frame in D-Dorm constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and (2) his claim that the removal of his mattress for three days constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment as to both claims because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support an Eighth Amendment violation. [Doc. 26-1 at 11-16.] The Court agrees.
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” imposes certain basic duties on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). These include maintaining humane conditions of confinement, including the provision of adequate medical care and “reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “In order to make out a prima facie case that prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must show both ‘(1) a serious deprivation of a basic human need; and (2) deliberate indifference to prison conditions on the part of prison officials.'” Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable conditions.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Rather, “[o]nly extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement.” De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003).
Thus, to prevail on a challenge to his conditions of confinement, an inmate “must satisfy a two-part test, consisting of both an objective and a subjective inquiry, for liability to attach.” Raynor v. Pugh, 817 F.3d 123, 127 (4th Cir. 2016). “[The] objective inquiry requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). The subjective inquiry requires an inmate to “show that the prison official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind, which, in this context, consists of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 127-28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As to Plaintiff's claim regarding the installation of a concrete slab, the undersigned concludes that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff has not alleged a condition of confinement “so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk.” Id. at 127. Living conditions in a prison are often less than ideal and a prisoner “cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.” Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 (7th Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Eighth Amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons and only deprivations that deny the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities are sufficiently grave so as to provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. See Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff has failed to allege any such deprivation with respect to the concrete slab serving as a bed.
Further, the Fourth Circuit has noted that “the penological justification supporting a challenged condition is relevant in a conditions of confinement case,” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 362 (4th Cir. 2019), as amended (May 6, 2019), such that the “existence of some valid penological purpose . . . could negate any presumption that prison officials were acting with malicious or sadistic intent in subjecting a prisoner to a particular condition,” Mason v. Talley, No. 1:21-cv-1118-LMB-JFA, 2023 WL 2619160, at *11 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2023), appeal dismissed, No. 23-6483, 2023 WL 5666452 (4th Cir. Sept. 1, 2023). See also Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th 926, 941 n.5 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Absence of penological purpose plays a part in [conditions of confinement inquiries], as it helps establish that corrections officers acted with culpable mental state rather than for justifiable reasons”); Lopez v. Robinson, 914 F.2d 486, 490 (4th Cir. 1990) (looking to “institutional competence” and penological objectives to decide whether “prison administrators' conduct constitutes deliberate indifference”).
Here, Defendants have produced evidence showing that the beds in the D-Dorm at Perry were changed from metal to cement in 2019 for specific policy reasons including: “[l]ess metal to be used for weapons”; “[s]afer for forced cell movement teams”; “[i]nmates are tearing them out of the floors”; “[f]ewer hiding places for contraband”; [l]ower beds make it more difficult to reach lights (still within ADA regulations)”; and to “[l]imit likelihood of self-harm.” [Doc. 26-4.] The transition from metal beds to cement beds was made, in large part, to ensure inmate and correctional officer safety. [Id.] In other cases in this District presenting identical allegations to those in the Complaint filed in this case, it has been determined that “[t]his clear penological justification for the condition of confinement at issue [i.e., transitioning from metal beds to cement beds] indicates that Defendants lacked the subjective deliberate indifference required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” Green v. Sterling, No. 2:22-cv-02552-BHH-MGB, 2023 WL 6638717, at *14 (D.S.C. July 13, 2023), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 6172248 (D.S.C. Sept. 22, 2023).
As to Plaintiff's claim regarding the removal of his mattress for three days, “numerous courts have held that depriving an inmate of a mattress for short periods of time does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.” Joyner v. Patterson, No. 0:13-cv-2675-DCN, 2014 WL 3909531, at *6 (D.S.C. Aug. 11, 2014), aff'd, 597 Fed.Appx. 748 (4th Cir. 2015) (collecting cases); see also Harris v. FNU Connolly, No. 5:14-cv-128-FDW, 2016 WL 676468, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 18, 2016) (“Courts have held that, absent additional egregious factors, sleeping on the floor without a mattress for a short time period is not per se unconstitutional.”), aff'd, 667 Fed.Appx. 408 (4th Cir. 2016). Indeed, “a cursory review of . . . cases in the Fourth Circuit confirms that short term mattress deprivations, such as those alleged in this case, do not amount to Eighth Amendment violations.” Willis v. Clark, No. 3:12-cv-03452, 2012 WL 5397115, at *6 (S.D. W.Va. Oct. 9, 2012) (collecting cases and noting that the plaintiff's “complaints that he was deprived of a sleeping mat for 17 hours each day while on suicide watch and once for 41 hours straight, even if true, do not amount to violations of his Eighth Amendment rights”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 5397113 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 5, 2012).
The undersigned notes that, although “merely being deprived of a mattress for a short period of time . . . does not amount to a per se violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights where there is no resulting serious injury,” “being deprived of a mattress for several months could, under some circumstances, rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Thompson v. Patterson, No. 9:10-cv-2381-HFF-BM, 2011 WL 5024344, at *5 (D.S.C. July 14, 2011), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 5024303 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2011). Here, as explained above, Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence demonstrating such circumstances to establish a constitutional violation.
Here, the undersigned concludes that the removal of Plaintiff's mattress for a period of three days is insufficient to establish a deprivation of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” or a “basic human need[],” particularly where Plaintiff has failed to identify any resulting serious injury. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347. The evidence provided by Defendants shows that Plaintiff's mattress was removed after he mutilated the mattress and used it to make a clothesline, which is a violation of prison policy. And Plaintiff was provided with a new mattress three days after his damaged mattress was removed. Based on these uncontroverted facts in the record, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy either the objective or subjective prongs of an Eighth Amendment claim. Significantly, Plaintiff has not presented evidence on summary judgment that the alleged deprivation of a mattress for three days resulted in serious physical or psychological harm to him or that Defendants' conduct exposed him to a substantial risk of such harm. See Putney v. Likin, 656 Fed.Appx. 632, 637 (4th Cir. 2016) (noting the district court should consider not just actual harm but also the risk of harm posed by depriving someone of a mattress for the particular length of time alleged). Although Plaintiff alleges that he suffered back pain and psychologic issues because of the deprivations alleged in this case, the medical records provided to this Court fail to reflect any significant problem with Plaintiff's back or the diagnosis of a serious back condition as discussed in the section below. See Thompson, 2011 WL 5024344, at *5.
Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary dismissal as to Plaintiff's conditions of confinement claims because he has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim. In sum, Plaintiff's federal law claims are each subject to summary judgment in favor of Defendants for the reasons stated.
As to Plaintiff's claims regarding the other conditions of confinement, even if he had exhausted such claims-which he did not-Defendants would nevertheless be entitled to summary judgment. As noted, the Eighth Amendment does not mandate comfortable prisons and Plaintiff has failed to show any deprivation that would constitute the denial of the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities to be sufficiently grave to support a claim under § 1983. See Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166. And, it is well settled that the allegations made by Plaintiff-no desk/sitting/writing area; a cell window completely covered by a metal plate that blocks a view of the natural surroundings; and bright lights that are left on for 20 hours a day-do not establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See, e.g., Banner v. Anderson, No. 6:21-cv-03738-JD-KFM, 2022 WL 2068866, at *4 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2022) (“[P]laintiff's allegations-that his cell window isn't to the outside so he can see the sun . . . fail to rise to the level of a constitutional violation”) Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 1537320 (D.S.C. May 16, 2022); McCoy v. Budz, No. 8:19-cv-01421-TLW-JDA, 2019 WL 8807862, at *4 (D.S.C. June 28, 2019) (finding a claim that the “lights are kept on in the rooms 24 hours a day, seven days a week” did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 2541950 (D.S.C. May 19, 2020); Wright v. Lassiter, No. 1:18-cv-90-FDW, 2018 WL 4186418, at *4 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2018) (finding that allegations that “Plaintiff is unable to view outside his window due to a metal plate” and that “[t]here is no desk or chair to write or draw” are “inadequately severe to deny the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities”). The same is true for Plaintiff's medical deliberate indifference claims, which are also unexhausted entitling Defendants to summary judgment on that basis alone. Further, Defendants have submitted Plaintiff's redacted medical records [Doc. 26-3], which show that Plaintiff was afforded extensive medical and mental health care to address his needs. Plaintiff has forecasted no evidence that would support an inference that any Defendant believed Plaintiff was not receiving adequate care or was otherwise deliberately indifferent to his medical condition or to the risk of a constitutional injury. Thus, Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims even if he had properly exhausted those claims.
Additionally, because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-66 (2014) (stating that for qualified immunity to attach to a defendant, either the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right and/or the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation). Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff's federal law claims should be dismissed for the reasons stated, the Court declines to address Defendants' remaining arguments.
Plaintiff's State Law Claim
Next, the Court turns to Plaintiff's state law claim for gross negligence. As noted, Defendants offer five reasons why they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claim: state law bars personal liability, Plaintiff fails to allege facts to state a claim for relief, Defendants are entitled to discretionary immunity, the public duty rule applies, and Plaintiff cannot establish that he has sustained any damage proximately caused by Defendants. [Doc. 26-1 at 29-35.]
Plaintiff's state law claim can be heard by this Court through the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction, which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal law claims. Federal courts are permitted to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), however, if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, courts look at “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). Here, exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate in light of the Shanaghan factors. Given the overlapping nature of Plaintiff's federal and state law claims, the undersigned concludes that, in light of considerations of judicial economy and as a matter of convenience and fairness to the parties, the Court should not decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and instead should dispose of Plaintiff's state law claim.
A negligence claim under South Carolina law consists of three elements: “(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by a negligent act or omission; and (3) damage proximately resulting from the breach.” Doe 9 v. Varsity Brands, LLC, - F.Supp.3d -, No. 6:22-cv-3509-HMH, 2023 WL 4191782, at *16 (D.S.C. June 26, 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “‘Gross negligence is the intentional, conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do.'” Fecas v. S.C. Dep't of Lab., Licensing & Regul., No. 2:17-cv-3225-RMG, 2018 WL 461139, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 18, 2018) (quoting Clyburn v. Sumter Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 17, 451 S.E.2d 885, 887 (S.C. 1994)). Gross negligence “is distinguished from simple negligence as not just the failure to exercise due care, but the failure to exercise even ‘slight care.'” Id. In light of the record before the Court, the undersigned concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim for the reasons below.
As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that the SCTCA is the exclusive remedy for such a tort and that such a claim can be brought against only an appropriate governmental entity:
This chapter constitutes the exclusive remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity. An employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty is not liable therefor except as expressly provided for in subsection (b).S.C. Code § 15-78-70(a). The SCTCA further provides that, even if an employee is named in an action brought under SCTCA, the agency or political subdivision for which the employee was acting must be substituted as the party defendant. S.C. Code § 15-78-70(c). “Under the [SCTCA], an employee of a governmental entity who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty is generally not liable, and the plaintiff must sue the governmental agency itself.” Roberts v. City of Forest Acres, 902 F.Supp. 662, 671 (D.S.C. 1995). Thus, “to the extent Plaintiff may have alleged any state law tort claims arising under the SCTCA against the [i]ndividual Defendants, that claim is barred. Rather, SCDC is the proper party.” Singleton v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 9:22-cv-00940-JD-MHC, 2023 WL 5155937, at *8 (D.S.C. July 12, 2023), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 5155729 (D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2023). In sum, Plaintiff's state law tort claim for gross negligence is not properly asserted against the individual named Defendants and they are entitled to dismissal of that claim against them.
SCDC is not a party to this action.
Next, even if the Court were to reach the merits of the gross negligence claim, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support such a claim. [Doc. 261 at 20.] The Court agrees.
Plaintiff's cursory allegations concerning his gross negligence claim are nothing “more than labels and conclusions” and a “naked assertion” of gross negligence that, “without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). Plaintiff has offered only “[t]hreadbare recitals” of a cause of action, but failed to plead sufficient factual matter to show that his claim has facial plausibility. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). As such, Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim for relief that is plausible against Defendants for gross negligence. And, Plaintiff has failed to forecast any evidence to support such a claim to satisfy his burden in light of Defendant's evidence in support of their motion for summary judgment.
Further, as argued by Defendants, even if Plaintiff had stated a claim for gross negligence, they are entitled to discretionary immunity as to Plaintiff's allegations concerning the installation of a concrete slab in his cell. [See Doc. 26-1 at 31-32.] Defendants have provided a Memorandum dated January 12, 2018, issued by Warden Scott Lewis concerning the “[c]hanging [of] metal beds to cement beds in RHU compound.” [Doc. 26-4.] Warden Lewis, “[a]fter much thought and deliberation,” requested permission to change metal beds to cement beds in the RHU compound at Perry for a number of reasons including: “[l]ess metal to be used for weapons”; “[s]afer for forced cell movement teams”; “[i]nmates are tearing them out of the floors”; “[f]ewer hiding places for contraband”; [l]ower beds make it more difficult to reach lights (still within ADA regulations)”; and to “[l]imit likelihood of self-harm.” [Id.] Warden Lewis's request was approved and the work was completed on August 22, 2019. [Id.; see also Doc. 26-5.]
Defendants contend that, “[b]ecause the concrete slabs were placed in the RHU cells by way of a calculated, discretionary decision, Defendants are protected by sovereign immunity from any potential liability flowing from that decision.” [Doc. 26-1 at 32.] The Court agrees. Defendants have produced evidence to satisfy their burden of proof that the decision to replace metal bed frames with concrete slabs was a deliberated, calculated decision afforded to the discretion of prison authorities and that the reason for the decision was to ensure the safety and security of prisoners and corrections personnel. Such a decision fits squarely within the discretionary immunity from liability for negligence under the SCTCA. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 598 S.E.2d 728, 731 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing discretionary immunity under the SCTCA). In sum, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's state law claim.
“To establish discretionary immunity, the governmental entity must prove that the governmental employees, faced with alternatives, actually weighed competing considerations and made a conscious choice. Furthermore, the governmental entity must show that in weighing the competing considerations and alternatives, it utilized accepted professional standards appropriate to resolve the issue before them.” Jacobs v. S.C. Dep't of Mental Health, No. 3:20-cv-543-JMC-PJG, 2020 WL 5077636, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims on the grounds discussed above, the Court will not address Defendants' remaining arguments.
Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.
Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
Plaintiff has filed a document which is construed as a motion for temporary restraining order and/or for a preliminary injunction. [Doc. 37.] In his motion, Plaintiff contends he has been collecting certain papers, including affidavits from other inmates, to be used as exhibits in support of his summary judgment brief. [Id.] Plaintiff contends that his papers have been confiscated and he was written up for possessing contraband for possessing the papers. [Id.] As such, Plaintiff requests that the Court issue an order permitting him to possess the documents. [Id.] Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that they are not impeding his ability to present his case or to provide relevant information in support of his claims. [Doc. 41 at 2.] Defendants further contend that Plaintiff's documents are not relevant to his claims and that he has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. [ Id. at 2-3.]
Plaintiff's motion should be denied as moot as the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted and the case be dismissed. Further, Plaintiff is not entitled to a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction because he has not shown that he can satisfy the test articulated in Winter. Critically, Plaintiff cannot show he is likely to succeed on the merits for the reasons already explained. Accordingly, because Plaintiff has failed to make a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims, his motion should be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
In light of all the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' motion for summary judgment [Doc. 26] be GRANTED, that Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order [Doc. 37] be DENIED, and that the case be DISMISSED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.