Opinion
No. 98 C 3943
November 30, 2000
Memorandum Opinion and Order
Lawrence E. Head ("Head") filed a three-count complaint before this court. Head alleged that the defendant Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees ("Board") violated his procedural due process and liberty rights as set forth in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, Head's complaint included a breach of contract claim under state law. This court retained pendant jurisdiction over this latter claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Summary judgment was granted in the Board's favor on all counts of Head's suit. See Head v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, No. 98 C 3943, 1999 WL 759512 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 1, 1999). Upon appeal to the Seventh Circuit, this court's dismissal of the federal due process and liberty claims was affirmed. The dismissal of Head's state law breach of contract claim, however, was reversed and remanded. See Head v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2000). Subsequent to the dismissal of the federal claims, Head's state law breach of contract claim is all that remains of this lawsuit. The Board now moves to dismiss that state-law claim. For the reasons stated herein, this court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Head's breach of contract claim. The Board's motion is accordingly granted.
Pendent jurisdiction is a matter of the court's discretion, not of a plaintiff's right. Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trustees of the Mich. City Area Sch., 978 F.2d 403, 415 (7th Cir. 1992). "[T]he general rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving them on the merits." Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1998). Only when the the "balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine — judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity — point to a federal decision of the state law claim on the merits" should the district court retain jurisdiction. Id. A district court is given board discretion in determining whether to dismiss a pendent state-law claim. Vukadinovich, 978 F.2d at 415 (applying abuse of discretion standard for review of dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c));Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 728 (observing that the refusal to exercise pendent jurisdiction is "almost unreviewable, especially when all federal claims have been dropped from the case before trial and only state law claims remain") (citing Huffman v. Hains, 865 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1989)).
In the instant case, the plaintiff has not presented any compelling circumstances that would justify the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over this case. See, e.g., Rothman v. Emory Univ., 123 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1997) ("The present case presents a good example where a federal court properly exercised its discretion to retain jurisdiction over a state-law claim because the primary issue underlying [the plaintiff's pendent state-law claim] were already decided [in the previously adjudicated federal case] and thus it was abundantly clear how [the plaintiff's] state claim should be decided."); Disher v. Info. Resources, Inc., 873 F.2d 136, 140-41 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that the assertion of a valid federal defense would preclude the relinquishment of federal jurisdiction); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing the running of the statute of limitations as a "conventional reason against relinquishing pendent jurisdiction"). The plaintiff maintains that the past two years expended litigating this matter will be lost if this case is to be refiled in state court. This argument alone, however, is unpersuasive as a matter of law. See Kennedy, 140 F.3d at 728 ("While the parties claim the case should remain in federal court because the district judge was familiar with both the facts and the law of the case and the parties have undertaken discovery, these considerations are not adequate to make us `second-guess' the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction.") Head's other point is much more convincing, but not in the sense intended by the plaintiff. Head argues that his breach of contract claim raises "a novel question as to the superiority of a contract over a subsequently enacted state statute." Pl. Answ. at 1. "The case has some measure of significance," Head adds, "to the 560 school facilities in which school administrators serve with the same exact form of contract." Id. at 2. Indeed, the issue presented by Head's breach of contract case delves into a state-law question with significant implications for state-run schools. As such, this case poses an issue particularly suited for resolution in the state courts. See Centres, 148 F.3d at 699 (stating that "cases involving difficult and unresolved issue of state law or matters of local practice may well be adjudicated more accurately and more expeditiously in state court"). Therefore, Head's breach of contract claim is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) .
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that the "district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction."
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's pendent state-law breach of contract claim is granted. Plaintiff's pendent state-law breach of contract claim is dismissed without prejudice. This case is closed.