Opinion
Civil Action No. SA-04-CA-1040-XR.
August 23, 2005
ORDER
On this date, the Court considered Friedrich Air Conditioning Company, Ltd.'s ("Friedrich") Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 17).
Background
This lawsuit was initially filed on October 7, 2004 in state court and removed. Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Friedrich as a punch press operator and suffered an occupational injury on March 11, 2003. Friedrich has "opted out" of the Texas Worker's Compensation Act and is a nonsubscriber. Plaintiff sued, alleging that Friedrich was negligent by supplying improper equipment, failing to maintain their equipment, and failing to provide a safe workplace.
Friedrich timely removed this case on November 16, 2004, alleging that Plaintiff's claim was completely preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185. Friedrich argues that pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), it has been agreed by the Union that any occupational injuries would be administered by a Company Work-Related Injury Program. Friedrich further asserts that any disputes regarding the CBA, including Plaintiff's claim, is subject to a mandatory grievance process and arbitration.
No motion for remand was filed, and now on July 18, 2005, Friedrich files its motion for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of law, Plaintiff's claim is completely preempted by the LMRA, and accordingly summary judgment is proper as to Plaintiff's negligence claim.
Analysis
A. Terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
Article XIV, Section 2 of the CBA states:
Injury arising out of and in the course of employment will be administered under the provisions of the Friedrich Air Conditioning Company Work-Related Injury Program dated May 15, 1991, Revised July 1, 1993.
Article XV of the CBA states all employees are required to comply with all safety policies and practices established by the Company. This article also provides for the creation of a joint company and union safety committee to study safety matters and make recommendations.
Article VII, Section 1 of the CBA details a grievance procedure that is required to be followed. In the event that no satisfactory settlement of a grievance is reached, Article VIII provides for a mandatory arbitration process.
B. Terms of the Work-Related Injury Plan
The Plan provides an eligible employee with coverage for certain Covered Charges and partial wage continuation benefits. Paragraph 3.6 of the Work-Related Injury Plan states that an injured employee must sign a Release in order to be a Participant.
C. Undisputed Facts
Friedrich re-adopted its Work-Related Injury Plan on July 1, 1993. Plaintiff was first employed by Friedrich in 1995. He worked there for about three months. He returned to employment with the company in 2002. The CBA became effective January 15, 2003 and is to remain in effect until January 14, 2008. Plaintiff suffered an occupational injury on March 11, 2003. Plaintiff was offered and accepted certain Plan benefits.
Plaintiff, however, states that he has not received all the medical benefits he believes are necessary as a result of his injuries.
D. LMRA preemption
"Section 301 of the LMRA vests jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear claims for violations of labor contracts. The Supreme Court has long recognized that Section 301 preempts state-law claims, whether sounding in contract or tort, where the resolution of the state-law claim `depends upon the meaning of the collective-bargaining agreement.'" Navarro v. Excel Corp., 48 Fed. Appx. 481 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).
Section 301 provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
In Navarro, the plaintiff worked as an "arm-boner" in a meat-packing plant. She alleged that the repetitive movements required by her job caused her to develop carpal-tunnel syndrome. She filed a negligence action in state court against her employer, complaining that Excel negligently failed to provide a safe workplace by not following various ergonomic guidelines for reducing stress injuries. Excel removed the case to federal court, stating that as a nonsubscriber to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, it provided benefits for occupational injuries according to a collective-bargaining agreement. The CBA's disability plan required an employee to waive her right to sue in return for Excel's providing a claims procedure for disability benefits. The district court granted summary judgment for Excel on the grounds that Navarro's state-law claim was preempted by the LMRA. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, finding that adjudicating Navarro's negligence claim would require a court to interpret or apply the terms of the CBA. The CBA required "Excel to create safety and grievance committees, allow paid rest periods, and give employees protective equipment. Procedurally, the CBA provides compensation and remedial procedures, including arbitration, to resolve workplace injury claims. Even though Navarro's complaint does not allege a breach of the CBA, a court still would have to determine the scope of Excel's duties and Navarro's remedies under the CBA in order to define the scope of Excel's legal duty for purposes of a negligence claim."
The same result was reached by the Fifth Circuit in Cupit v. Walts, 90 F.3d 107 (5th Cir. 1996). In addition, earlier this year, this Court analyzed another challenge to Friedrich's Plan and found preemption. See Coronel v. U.S. Nat. Resources, Inc., 2005 WL 831843 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (J. Furgeson); see also Dearing v. Sigma Chemical Co., 1 F. Supp. 2d 660 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (Employee's complaint, alleging that employer negligently exposed her to dangerous chemicals and hazardous waste, required interpretation of CBA, which assigned to employer duty to provide protective equipment and appropriate education and training in health and safety).
A close reading of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 83 F.3d 96 (5th Cir. 1996), also leads to the conclusion that Plaintiff's claim herein is preempted. In Richter, the plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that his negligence claim was not preempted, stating "it is not substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of the CBA." Id. at 97. Disagreeing, the Fifth Circuit stated: "The CBA at issue provides the exclusive remedy for settling disputes involving negligence on the part of the Company, and provides that `in any proceeding concerning an injury . . . sustained in the course of employment . . . the Company further agrees to waive its common law defenses,' thus the application of state law requires interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement. Moreover, the CBA itself adopts the Texas Workers' Compensation Act in determining the benefits and compensation available to employees, therefore, a decision on Richter's state claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Id. at 97-98.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that he injured his right elbow "while working in a cramped, unsafe workplace." He was informed by his physician that "his hands and fingers had become severely damaged from the repetitive manual labor he performed while in Defendant's employ." Plaintiff alleges that "Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care, which Defendant breached by failing to make the working conditions reasonably safe and by failing to warn Plaintiff of the serious physical injuries and damages that could result from working as a punch press operator." Plaintiff further outlines that Defendant was negligent because it "supplied improper equipment," "failed to properly maintain equipment," and "failed to provide a safe work environment."
Although the parties dispute whether or not Plaintiff signed any Release in order to become a Plan Participant, it is not controverted that Plaintiff received some Plan benefits despite the alleged absence of a signed Release. Nevertheless, that it not the true question in this case. Plaintiff argues this case as if it were a challenge to a nonsubscriber plan in a non-union setting. Given Plaintiff's allegations as alleged in his Petition, the question is whether Plaintiff's "state claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." Whether or not Plaintiff worked in a cramped and unsafe work space, and whether Defendant "supplied improper equipment" or "failed to properly maintain equipment" is "inextricably intertwined" with consideration of the terms of articles XIV and XV of the CBA.
E. Failure to exhaust remedies
The grievance-arbitration procedures of a collective-bargaining agreement must be exhausted before an employee may file suit to enforce contractual rights. Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1967). Although Plaintiff asserts he attempted to initiate a grievance with his union steward, and the union failed to process the grievance, Plaintiff has not asserted that he has attempted to initiate any grievance and arbitration process with Friedrich. Accordingly, dismissal is proper.
Conclusion
Plaintiff's negligence claim is preempted by the LMRA. Plaintiff has failed to initiate any grievance and arbitration process with Friedrich as required by the CBA. Plaintiff's claim is DISMISSED. Plaintiff's "Special Exceptions Objections to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment" (docket no. 21) are Overruled. The Clerk is ORDERED to prepare a Judgment consistent with this Order.