Opinion
Case No. 04-196 ADM/JSM.
May 4, 2005
Mark J. Schneider, Esq. and Jeffrey Gray, Esq., Rondoni Schneider, Ltd., Golden Valley, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Plaintiff.
Jason M. Hiveley, Esq., Iverson Reuvers, LLC, Bloomington, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 22, 2005, oral argument before the undersigned United States District Judge was heard on the City of Brooklyn Park ("Brooklyn Park"), Sgt. Steve Palmquist ("Palmquist"), Officer Thomas Minster ("Minster") and Officer Bruce Shores' ("Shores") (collectively "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 16]. In her Complaint [Docket No. 1], Martha Jean Hayes ("Hayes" or "Plaintiff") alleges Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by using excessive force in contravention of her Fourth Amendment rights. In addition, Plaintiff asserts a failure to prevent claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 and a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' Motion is granted.
Palmquist, Minster and Shores will collectively be referred to as "Officers."
At oral argument, Plaintiff withdrew her Monell claims that Brooklyn Park violated her civil rights by maintaining customs, patterns and practices that promoted or tolerated the use of excessive force and by providing inadequate police training. As a result, these claims will not be addressed.
II. BACKGROUND
For purposes of the instant Motion, the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmovant. See Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995).
At approximately 8:40 p.m. on January 30, 2002, Hayes, a 59 year old woman, was stopped by Brooklyn Park Police Sgt. Palmquist for traveling through a red light at the intersection of Zane and 63rd Avenue in Brooklyn Park. Palmquist Aff. [Docket No. 21] ¶¶ 1-5; Hayes Dep. (Schneider Aff. [Docket No. 29] Ex. A) at 39. Hayes was traveling with her 19 year old niece, Tuesday Sheppard ("Sheppard") at the time of the incident. Sheppard Dep. (Hiveley Aff. [Docket No. 19] Ex. F) at 8, 17. After taking Hayes' driver's license and insurance information, Palmquist returned to his squad car to run routine checks. Palmquist Aff. ¶¶ 11-12. He was informed by Hennepin County Dispatch that Hayes had an outstanding warrant for driving without a license. Id. ¶¶ 13-14 Palmquist requested confirmation of the warrant and asked Hayes whether her license had been cancelled. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. She denied driving after cancellation. Id. ¶ 16; see Squad Car Videotape ("Video") 1178 (Palmquist Aff. Ex. B) 20:43. Officer Minster arrived around the time the warrant was confirmed and Officer Shores arrived shortly thereafter. Palmquist Dep. (Hiveley Aff. Ex. B) at 20; Shores Dep. (Hiveley Aff. Ex. C) at 20-21.
Audio and video of the traffic stop were recorded by cameras located in Palmquist and Minster's squad cars. Palmquist Aff. ¶ 65. Minster's squad car videotape is identified on the tape as SQ 1186 ("1186") while Palmquist's squad car videotape is identified as SQ 1178 ("1178"). Although the time stamp for 1186 is 20 seconds faster than 1178, one time stamp in hours and minutes will represent the approximate time for both videos.
Palmquist then returned to Hayes' vehicle and informed her "there is an active warrant for your arrest . . . for driving after cancellation. Video 1178, 20:49. Although Hayes replied she "did not drive after cancellation," Palmquist again stated "there's a warrant for your arrest so we're going to have to take you in to deal with that." Id. at 20:50; Palmquist Aff. ¶ 21. He then asked, "Why don't you step out of the car for me." Video 1178, 20:50. Hayes became agitated and refused to leave the car. Palmquist Aff. ¶¶ 22, 26; Video 1178 and 1186, 20:50-51. Hayes later claimed she became frightened and "froze" when she was told there was a warrant for her arrest. Hayes Dep. at 49. Although the Officers repeatedly directed her to step out of the car, she did not comply and continued to argue and deny they had a warrant for her arrest. Video 1178 and 1186, 20:51. Palmquist then stated "Step out of the car, you're under arrest, do you understand me."Id. Hayes yelled "No!," to which Palmquist asked "[do] you want me to take you out of the car?" Id. Hayes responded: "I don't give a fuck what you do." Id.
At this point, the officers began to forcefully remove Hayes from the car, while advising her to get out of the car and that she was under arrest. Id. Hayes told the Officers "Don't pull on me." She was told multiple times to "stop fighting," "step out" and "put your hands behind your back." Id. at 20:51-52. Sheppard can also be heard telling her aunt to "stop fighting."Id. at 20:51. Hayes was eventually pulled from the vehicle, perhaps in part by her hair, and taken to the pavement. Id.; Hayes Dep. at 49-50; Palmquist Aff. ¶¶ 31-33. During this time, Hayes repeatedly cursed at the Officers and shouted profanity. Video 1178 and 1186 at 20:51-52. Hayes was then handcuffed and twice directed to stand up. Id. at 20:52; Palmquist Aff. ¶ 37. She refused both times, saying "Oh fuck you, you pick me up goddamn you" and "I ain't getting up, no this mother fucker broke my bottom lip, fuck you mother fucker" among other profane statements. Video 1178 and 1186 at 20:52.
The Officers eventually pulled Hayes to her feet and escorted her to the passenger side of Palmquist's squad car. Id at 20:52-53; Palmquist Dep. at 29-30; Palmquist Aff. ¶ 39. Hayes contends Palmquist accomplished this process by dragging her. Hayes Dep. at 51. At this time, Palmquist was struck in the chin by Hayes' right elbow and kicked in his left leg as he attempted to conduct a pat search. Palmquist Dep. at 29, 30-31; Palmquist Aff. ¶ 41; Minster Dep. (Hiveley Aff. Ex. E) at 37-39. Palmquist cursed at Hayes not to "fucking hit" him and forced her down onto a snowbank. Video 1178 and 1186, 20:53; Palmquist Dep. at 31; Palmquist Aff. ¶ 42. He also stated "Now you're under arrest for assault. That's not real smart." Video 1186, 20:53. Once in the snowbank, Hayes claims the Officers violently twisted her arm and kicked and beat her while she was on the ground. Hayes Dep. at 52. During this process, Sheppard exited the car and observed Hayes and the Officers for some time before she was told to get back in the vehicle. Video 1186, 20:52-54. The Officers discussed whether they should place Hayes in hobble straps, but she eventually appeared to calm down. Video 1186, 20:53; Palmquist Aff. ¶ 43. After a short time, the Officers picked Hayes up out of the snowbank and told her to "get in the car" and "put your feet in the car" before she eventually entered the squad car. Video 1178 and 1186, 20:54-55; Palmquist Aff. ¶¶ 45-48. Palmquist then brought Hayes to the Hennepin County Adult Detention Center ("ADC"). Palmquist Aff. ¶ 49. En route, Palmquist asked Hayes "how bad's your lip?" to which she replied "I never in my life done nothin' wrong." Video 1178, 20:59. She also claimed that Palmquist had pulled her hair out. Id. After arriving at the ADC, Palmquist and Hayes remained in the squad car awaiting booking. The videotape does not record Plaintiff complaining about any injuries or requesting medical attention. Video 1178, 21:00-46; see also Palmquist Aff. ¶ 59. However, Hayes claims she repeatedly asked Palmquist to take the handcuffs off because her right arm was injured. Hayes Dep. at 53-56.
Once in the booking area, Hennepin County Deputy Sarah Blonk-Buck ("Blonk-Buck") instructed Hayes to face the wall while she conducted a pat search. Blonk-Buck Aff. [Docket No. 20] ¶¶ 1-2; ADC Incident Report (Blonk-Buck Aff. Ex. 1). Blonk-Buck noticed Hayes seemed to be supporting herself against the wall using her left shoulder and asked if she was going to be okay. ADC Incident Report. Hayes responded yes. Id. When Blonk-Buck noticed Hayes make a similar attempt to support herself, she again asked if Hayes was going to be okay. Id. Hayes said yes, but stated "My hands hurt, can you just take these things off."Id. Blonk-Buck told Hayes she first needed to finish the pat search but placed her black leather jacket over her shoulders.Id. Blonk-Buck then noticed Hayes looked as if she was trying to hold in a sneeze and again asked her if she was okay. Id. When Hayes responded she was going to throw up, Blonk-Buck gave her a receptacle. Id. As Hayes became sick, she appeared to faint and went limp. Id. Although Blonk-Buck attempted to support Hayes, she fell backwards to the ground. Id.; Palmquist Aff. ¶ 57. When Hayes recovered, Blonk-Buck asked her why she thought she was sick and Hayes responded she had been trying to lose weight. ADC Incident Report. Blonk-Buck, under the direction of Nurse Cindy Davis and with the help of another officer attempted to sit Hayes upright.Id. Hayes cried out "my arm, my arm, I can't sit up with my arm." Id. When she was eventually placed in an upright position and her jacket was removed, there was blood on Hayes' right shirt sleeve. Id. After rolling back her sleeve, it appeared Hayes' arm was broken. Id.; Palmquist Aff. ¶ 58. Hayes remembers throwing up, fainting and falling but does not remember the sequence or details of the events. Hayes Dep. at 60-63.
While Hayes was waiting for an ambulance, Blonk-Buck asked her why her lip was so puffy. She replied "the cops did that, because I wouldn't get out of the car and they pulled my hair out; I ain't never done nothin' wrong." Id. At the hospital, Hayes was diagnosed with a fractured arm, contusion and swelling of her lower lip and abrasion of her left temple, and had multiple extensions of hair pulled out of her head. Medical Records of Martha Jean Hayes from Hennepin County Medical Center (Schneider Aff. Ex. D).
Hayes ultimately pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of resisting arrest. In her Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, she stated:
I am pleading guilty because on 1-30-02 within the City of Brooklyn Park, Hennepin County, I did the following: I was stopped by a police officer while driving. There was a warrant outstanding for my arrest. I was advised of the existence of the warrant. The officer attempted to take me into custody. I resisted that effort by refusing to get out of my car.
Hennepin County Criminal Court Case History (Hiveley Aff. Ex. G); Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty (Hiveley Aff. Ex. H).
Hayes filed the instant Complaint claiming, inter alia, the Officers infringed her Constitutional right to be free from excessive force. She asserts the Officers broke her arm during the traffic stop. Defendants claim Hayes' arm was broken as a result of her fall in the ADC booking area.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall issue "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not "rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial." Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
B. Admissions
On July 9, 2004, Defendants served Plaintiff with a Request for Admissions, which asked Plaintiff to admit the following statements:
1) she failed to exit the car when told to do so;
2) she never got out of the car until she was removed;
3) she resisted efforts to remove her;
4) she was told by the passenger in her car to stop fighting;
5) she fell to the ground at the Hennepin County Jail;
6) she broke her arm when she fell at the jail; and
7) her injuries were caused by her.
Defendants' Request for Admissions (Hiveley Aff. Ex. J). On October 29, 2004, considerably past the 30 day time period imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff denied Defendants' Request for Admissions in an unsigned and undated response. Response to Defendants' Request for Admissions (Hiveley Aff. Ex. K). No signed response was filed. Given Plaintiff's untimely and unsigned response, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds each matter for which an admission was requested is deemed admitted.
C. Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff sues Palmquist, Minster and Shores in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging excessive force in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Defendants seek summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. "Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, state actors are protected from civil liability when `their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Sexton v. Martin, 210 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a two-step inquiry. First, the court must determine whether, "[t]aken in the light most favorable to the parties asserting the inquiry, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); see also Parks v. Pomeroy, 387 F.3d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 2004). If a violation is found, the court must then ask whether "the right was clearly established." Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."Id. at 202.
1. Constitutional Violation
Defendants first argue that Plaintiff failed to state an actionable § 1983 claim because she only alleges Defendants' actions, "under color of state law, violated and deprived Plaintiff of her clearly established and well-settled civil rights to be free from use of excessive and unreasonable force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Compl. ¶ XV. Although Plaintiff, in Paragraph II of her Complaint, states that she "brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution . . .," Defendants claim Plaintiff failed to plead an actionable § 1983 claim by alleging a violation of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979) ("standing alone, section 1983 clearly provides no protection for civil rights since . . . section 1983 does not provide any substantive rights at all.") The Court finds Plaintiff has alleged a sufficient violation of her constitutional right to be free from excessive force to state an actionable § 1983 claim.
Although Plaintiff's Complaint alleges Defendants' use of excessive force violated the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has held that excessive force claims involving police officers should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard rather than the "substantive due process" approach of the Fourteenth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also Saucier v. Katz, 121 S. Ct. 2152, 2158 (2001). Therefore, the Court will confine its analysis of Plaintiff's excessive force claim to the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard.
"The right to be free from excessive force is a clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures of the person." Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 542, 544 (8th Cir. 1996). However, "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Neither party contests that Hayes was seized as defined by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16 (1968). The relevant inquiry, then, is "whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable under the particular circumstances." Greiner v. City of Champlin, 27 F.3d 1346, 1354 (8th Cir. 1994). This inquiry must be evaluated from the viewpoint of a reasonable officer on the scene, irrespective of the officer's underlying intent or motivation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395-97. Reasonableness of force depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Id. at 396-97. An officer's use of force is "judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Id. at 396. "The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation."Id. at 396-97.
The circumstances of the instant case demonstrate that the Officers did not use excessive force in removing Hayes from her vehicle. Hayes was repeatedly told to get out of the car because she was under arrest. She responded by refusing to follow Palmquist's orders, arguing with Palmquist and cursing at the Officers. When Palmquist eventually asked Hayes "[do] you want me to take you out of the car?" she responded: "I don't give a fuck what you do." Video 1178 and 1186, 20:51. Only then did the Officers use force to remove Hayes from the car. During her removal, the videotape shows that Hayes continued to resist and curse at the Officers. Even accepting Hayes' allegations that the removal process involved pulling her by her hair and splitting her lip, the videotape indicates the Officers used an objectively reasonable amount of force in removing and controlling Hayes.
The Officers subsequently lifted Hayes to her feet and attempted to transport her to Palmquist's squad car. During this time, the videotape shows Hayes continued to struggle and hysterically shout profanity at Palmquist and the other Officers. After Palmquist was struck by Hayes' elbow, he forced her down onto a snowbank along the side of the road. Hayes alleges, at this time, the Officers began "twisting her arm . . . and kicking and beating her while she was on the ground." Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Opp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. [Docket No. 28] at 2. Although the Officers deny these allegations, Hayes argues the issue raises a material factual dispute sufficient to survive summary judgment. The Court disagrees. The videotape, although dark and difficult to observe, does not show the Officers twisting her arm or "kicking and beating" Hayes while she lay in the snowbank. Furthermore, the videotape shows Sheppard exited the car and was in a position to observe the Officers' conduct while Hayes was in the snowbank. At her deposition, Sheppard stated that she had a clear view of Hayes and the Officers from the time Hayes was forced into the snowbank until she was picked up and placed in the squad car. Sheppard Dep. at 49. Sheppard testified that she never saw the Officers kick or strike Hayes.Id. at 48-50.
Additional evidence also suggests Plaintiff's arm was not broken at the traffic stop. Although Hayes immediately shouted at the Officers for breaking her bottom lip and for pulling her hair out, she never claimed her arm was broken or asked for medical attention during the lengthy period of time between her arrest and her booking. In addition, by failing to sign the response to Defendants' Request for Admissions, Plaintiff is deemed to have admitted that she broke her arm at the jail and not at the traffic stop.
Finally, assuming, arguendo, Hayes' arm was broken during the traffic stop, the videotape evidence does not indicate such an injury was the result of the officers using objectively unreasonable force. Officers are entitled to use reasonable force to accomplish the arrest of a resisting subject and to maintain control of someone who is struggling while under arrest. There is no indication that the quantum of force employed was unreasonable under the circumstances. As a result, the Court finds the Officers did not violate Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and they are entitled to qualified immunity.
2. Reasonable Under Clearly Established Law
The qualified immunity doctrine provides an additional level of deference for an officer's actions beyond the objectively reasonable standard used to determine whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. Thus, an official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the facts indicate a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231 (1991). The doctrine acknowledges that it is sometimes difficult to determine how the objectively reasonable standard will be applied to the specific factual circumstances confronting the officer.Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. "An officer might correctly perceive all of the relevant facts but have a mistaken understanding as to whether a particular amount of force is legal in those circumstances. If the officer's mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable, however, the officer is entitled to the immunity defense." Id.
The Court has held the Officers' conduct was objectively reasonable and did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. However, assuming, arguendo, the Officers used excessive force in removing Hayes from her vehicle and transporting her to the back of Palmquist's squad car, the Court finds, at a minimum, reasonable officers could disagree about the appropriate level of force to be used during the arrest of Hayes, an actively resisting subject with an outstanding arrest warrant. See Expert Report of William Micklus (Hiveley Aff. Ex. I) (finding the Officers acted reasonably in arresting Hayes). As a result, the Officers are also entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Hayes' § 1983 claim.
D. Conspiracy Claim
Plaintiff also alleges "defendants conspired to violate the Plaintiff's civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983." To establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show:
that the defendant conspired with others to deprive him or her of a constitutional right; that at least one of the alleged co-conspirators engaged in an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and that the overt act injured the plaintiff. . . . [T]he plaintiff is additionally required to prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege.Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999). "Speculation and conjecture are not enough to prove a conspiracy exists." Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1206 (8th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff argues the Officers entered into a conspiracy to deprive her of her Fourth Amendment rights when they began to use excessive force against her and no officer acted to prevent such action. However, there is no evidence the Officers discussed depriving the Plaintiff of her constitutional rights or decided to use excessive force. Due to her resistance, the Officers briefly discussed placing Plaintiff in hobble straps. In addition, after Plaintiff was placed in the squad car, one of the Officers asked Palmquist if he was all right. Video 1178, 20:56. Otherwise, there is no indication the Officers discussed Plaintiff amongst themselves. Furthermore, the Officers did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. As a result, Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie § 1983 conspiracy claim and her claim must be dismissed.
E. Failure to Prevent Claim
Finally, Plaintiff alleges, "[t]he defendants, knowing of the unconstitutional activities being committed by the other defendants against the Plaintiff, and having the power to prevent such acts, neglected and refused to do so in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986." Compl. ¶ XVII. However, it is well established that "[a] section 1986 claim must be predicated upon a valid section 1985 claim." Gatlin v. Green, 362 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir. 2004); Jensen v. Henderson, 315 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. Garber, 800 F.2d 188, 191 (8th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff's Complaint fails to include a § 1985 claim. As a result, Plaintiff's § 1986 claim must be dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 16] is GRANTED, and
2. Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.