Summary
In Haught, firefighters of the city of Dayton filed a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, seeking an injunction restraining the city from laying-off or removing them from employment.
Summary of this case from Gannon v. PerkOpinion
No. 72-598
Decided April 18, 1973.
Municipal corporations — Civil service — Firemen laid off — Injunction to enjoin layoffs — Not available, when — Adequate remedy at law available — Appeal to Common Pleas Court — Charter provision that civil service board decision final, without effect — R.C. 143.27.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County.
In September 1971, 52 employees of the city of Dayton, Department of Fire, in the civil service classification "Fire-fighter," were laid off because of a decrease in the city's operating revenue. Those 52, with the least time in service, were laid off in accordance with city of Dayton Civil Service Rule 24, which read:
"Whenever * * * for any reason a layoff is necessary * * * the employees to be laid off shall be those * * * who have the least service time in positions affected."
Shortly thereafter, funds were made available to the city for their reemployment under the provisions of the federal Emergency Employment Act of 1971 (EEA). One of the conditions governing the usage of these funds, however, was that the laid-off employees had to be unemployed for at least 30 days before the federal funds could be used to rehire them. Since the 52 had not been unemployed for 30 days when the federal money became available, and since the city was unsuccessful in its efforts to obtain a waiver of that requirement, the firemen were forced to wait out that period of time before being rehired. The city then reemployed all 52 in the classification "Firefighter EEA," to signify that they were being paid with funds received from the federal government.
By February 1972, the continued decline of the city's operating revenue necessitated a further reduction of 15 in the number of "Firefighters." Although EEA money was also available to rehire this latter group, they too were first subject to the 30-day unemployment requirement. For that reason, the city found itself in an unusual predicament. While the 15 would be serving their qualifying period off the payroll, the 52 who had been forced to make the transition earlier, although lower in seniority in the city's service, would remain on the payroll. Although the 52 were being paid with federal funds, the situation represented an apparent violation of the technical restriction of Rule 24. In order to avoid that problem, the Dayton Civil Service Board amended Rule 24, effective February 9, 1972, to provide that "those employees working in the `(EEA)' classification shall be permitted to work regardless of their relative city-wide length of service."
On February 24, 1972, 10 of the 15 in the second group, appellees herein, filed a complaint in the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County seeking to enjoin the city from laying off or removing them from employment. They urged that they would sustain "irreparable damage in terms of lost wages, loss of seniority, impairment of their contractual rights as guaranteed by the Ohio and United States Constitution, denial of equal protection of the laws, denial of their rights guaranteed by Article XV, Section 10, Ohio Constitution as well as the rights guaranteed to them by the Ohio Legislature under Section 143.28 Ohio Revised Code."
The Court of Common Pleas, after a hearing at which no transcript was made, denied the prayer for a temporary and permanent injunction and dismissed the cause "for the reason that there exists an adequate remedy at law."
In the interim before the appeal of that judgment was heard, the 15 were laid off for 30 days, rehired with federal funds as "Firefighter EEA," and were placed in seniority above the 52 earlier qualifiers in the EEA classification.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court, holding, inter alia, that:
"* * * We can conceive of no adequate remedy at law, much less any administrative appeal, under Chapter 2506 R.C., which will secure these [seniority rights, credit toward sick leave, vacation time, retirement benefits, lost wages, etc.] rights.
"Furthermore, an administrative appeal is inapplicable and unavailable, because such an appeal, provided in Chapter 2506 R.C., will not lie from a legislative action. * * *"
The cause is before this court pursuant to our allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Skilken Kidd and Mr. Ralph A. Skilken, Jr., for appellees.
Mr. James W. Drake, city attorney, Mr. H. Donald Hawkins, Mr. Wm. Patrick McGuinn and Mr. James F. Bauhof, for appellants.
Although the Court of Common Pleas dismissed this cause "for the reason that there exists an adequate remedy at law," the record does not indicate the remedy to which that court was alluding. The Court of Appeals assumed that the remedy was an appeal from the amendment of Rule 24 by the Dayton Civil Service Board, under R.C. Chapter 2506, to the Common Pleas Court. On the other hand, appellants contended that the remedy referred to was an appeal of the allegedly wrongful layoffs, first to the Dayton Civil Service Board, as provided by the Dayton City Charter, and then, if unsuccessful to the Common Pleas Court pursuant to Chapter 2506.
R.C. 2506.01 provides, in part, that:
"Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau, commission, department or other division of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed by the Common Pleas Court of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is located. * * *"
While we agree with the Court of Appeals that R.C. 2506.01 does not present a procedure by which an amendment of the civil service rules may be challenged ( Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371; Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369), it may be utilized, under the facts at bar, to further the contest of an allegedly wrongful dismissal.
In M.J. Kelley Co. v. Cleveland (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 150, 153, 290 N.E.2d 562, approving and following Fortner, supra, it was held that in order for the act of an administrative board to be appealable under R.C. 2506.01, such act must be the product of "quasi-judicial proceedings." "Quasi-judicial proceedings" were defined as those in which the function under consideration involves the exercise of discretion and requires notice, a hearing and the opportunity for the introduction of evidence.
In the instant case, the Charter of the city of Dayton prescribes that the Civil Service Board function in just such a manner. Section 101 provides for an appeal from a dismissal, reduction or suspension by certain appointing authorities, and commands the board to "define the manner, time and place by which such appeal shall be heard."
Section 104 empowers the board to subpoena the attendance of witnesses and the production of pertinent books or papers, and to administer oaths in investigations relative to such hearings. The charter further specifies that the decision of the board shall be final.
The proceeding outlined in the Dayton City Charter is clearly quasi-judicial and is what R.C. 2506.01 was enacted to supplement. See State, ex rel. Steyer, v. Szabo (1962), 174 Ohio St. 109, 186 N.E.2d 839; State, ex rel. Fagain, v. Stork (1963), 174 Ohio St. 330, 189 N.E.2d 69.
Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that these ten appellees had an adequate remedy at law and that the prayer for a temporary and permanent injunction was properly denied.
Injunction is an extraordinary remedy, equitable in nature. Perkins v. Quaker City (1956), 165 Ohio St. 120, 133 N.E.2d 595; Crabtree v. Bd. of Education (1970), 26 Ohio App.2d 237, 270 N.E.2d 668. An action in equity, seeking an extraordinary remedy, will not lie so long as there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State, ex rel. Pressley, v. Indus. Comm. (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631; State, ex rel. Durek, v. Masheter (1967), 9 Ohio St.2d 76, 223 N.E.2d 601; Meeker v. Scudder (1923), 108 Ohio St. 423, 140 N.E. 627; State Board of Health v. Greenville (1912), 86 Ohio St. 1, 42, 98 N.E. 1019; Salem Iron Co. v. Hyland (1906), 74 Ohio St. 160, 167, 77 N.E. 751; Chapman v. Lee (1887), 45 Ohio St. 356, 13 N.E. 736.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the order of the Common Pleas Court dismissing this cause is reinstated.
Judgment reversed.
O'NEILL, C.J., HERBERT, STEPHENSON, STERN and W. BROWN, JJ., concur.
CELEBREZZE and P. BROWN, JJ., dissent.
STEPHENSON, J., of the Fourth Appellate District, sitting for CORRIGAN, J.