Opinion
Case No. 00-10180-BC
November 26, 2002.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner, Larry Ray Hathaway, a state inmate at the Macomb Correctional Facility in New Haven, Michigan, filed this pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner asserts that his convictions are tainted by constitutional error, and that the Michigan Department of Corrections is detaining him in violation of the laws of the United States. The Court finds that the errors which the petitioner has identified implicate only state law, and that they did not render the trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny the petitioner due process. The Court therefore will deny the petition.
I.
In 1996, a jury in Mason County, Michigan convicted the petitioner of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.84, and conspiracy to commit assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.157a. The convictions arose from charges that the petitioner conspired with Tammy Matthews to injure Scott MacArthur and that the petitioner subsequently beat up MacArthur one night in Ludington, Michigan. The testimony at trial established that, on October 16, 1995, Tammy Matthews lured Scott MacArthur to a park where the petitioner, who was hiding in the woods, beat MacArthur for having a brief relationship with Matthews before discovering that Matthews was the petitioner's girlfriend. Matthews testified that she suggested the assault to the petitioner so that he would stop beating her. The petitioner's defense was that there was insufficient evidence of an intent to do great bodily harm and that, at most, he was guilty of assault and battery.
The trial court sentenced the petitioner as a fourth habitual offender to two concurrent terms of ten to twenty-five years in prison for the crimes. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the petitioner's convictions in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, People v. Hathaway, 1998 WL 1991590 (Mich.App. May 29, 1998), and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, People v. Hathaway, No. 112645 (Mich.Sup.Ct. March 30, 1999).
The petitioner signed and dated his habeas petition on March 31, 2000. He alleges that:
(1) the trial court deprived him of due process and his right to a fair trial by admitting into evidence testimony concerning his prior conviction and other "bad acts;"
(2) the trial court deprived him of his right to a fair trial and impartial jury when the court permitted the prosecutor to admit evidence of the co-conspirator's conviction for the same offense; and
(3) the prosecutor deprived him of due process and compulsory process when he filed an untimely notice of intent to charge him as a habitual offender.
The respondent argues that the Court should deny the petition on the grounds that the petitioner did not raise his claims as federal constitutional issues in state court and that, even as presented here, his present claims involve only state law matters.
II.
A threshold question is whether the petitioner exhausted state remedies for his claims. The doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies requires state prisoners to fairly present their claims to the state courts before raising those claims in a federal habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (c); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); McMeans v. Brigano, 228 F.3d 674, 681 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 958 (2001). In Michigan, this means that petitioners must raise their claims before both the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court before raising them on habeas review. Mohn v. Bock, 208 F. Supp.2d 796, 800 (E.D.Mich. 2002). As stated in Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982), "[i]t is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts . . . or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made." A claim is "fairly presented" to the state courts if it "(1) relie[s] upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2) relie[s] upon state cases employing federal constitutional analysis; (3) phras[es] the claim in terms of constitutional law or in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific constitutional right; or (4) allege[s] facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law." McMeans, 228 F.3d at 681.
The petitioner presented his three claims to the Michigan Court of Appeals and to the Michigan Supreme Court as state-law claims. He did not phrase his claims in constitutional terms or in terms sufficiently particular to bring to mind a specific constitutional right. He relied entirely on state law to present his arguments, and the state decisions cited did not employ federal constitutional analysis. He also did not allege facts well within the mainstream of constitutional law. The Court concludes that the petitioner did not "fairly present" his claims to the state courts.
Normally, the failure to exhaust state court remedies requires dismissal of the entire petition. Lyons v. Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 333 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982)). However, the failure to exhaust state remedies is not an absolute bar when, as here, the federal claims are plainly meritless and it would be a waste of time and judicial resources to require additional court proceedings. Lyons, 188 F.3d at 333. Accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy, the Court will excuse the exhaustion requirement and proceed to address the merits of the petitioner's claims.
III.
The petitioner's claims are reviewed against the standards established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). This Act altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Because the petitioner's application was filed after that date, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct."); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous.").
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases. . . .
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000).
With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 409, 410-11. See also Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 418 (6th Cir. 2002).
A.
The petitioner's first claim alleges that the trial court deprived him of due process and a fair trial when it permitted Tammy Matthews to testify concerning the petitioner's prior conviction and other "bad acts." The petitioner contends that the only purpose in admitting the evidence was to inflame the jury. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that
"errors in the application of state law, especially rulings regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence, are usually not to be questioned in a federal habeas corpus proceeding." Cooper v. Sowders, 837 F.2d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1988). Generally, state-court evidentiary rulings cannot rise to the level of due process violations unless they "offend some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43, 116 S.Ct. 2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977)); see also Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967).Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 989 (2001); see also Clemmons v. Sowders, 34 F.3d 352, 357 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that "[h]abeas review does not encompass state court rulings on the admission of evidence unless there is a constitutional violation"). The Supreme Court has declined to hold that similar "others acts" evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352-53 (1990). Such matters are more appropriately addressed in codes of evidence and civil procedure than under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 352.
Even assuming that the petitioner's claim is cognizable here, the state courts' determination — that testimony about the petitioner's prior conviction and other "bad acts" was admissible — was not entirely unreasonable. The disputed evidence came from Tammy Matthews, who testified that the petitioner had abused her and also informed her about his history of violence toward other people. See Trial Tr., vol. III, at 425. More specifically, Matthews explained that the petitioner had been convicted of abusing a former girlfriend and that he admitted having abused still another girlfriend, as well as stabbing a man and using a baseball bat on people who allegedly wanted to beat him. See id. at 425, 445-47, 454-55. Earlier in the trial, Matthews described her own abuse at the hands of the petitioner. See Trial Tr., vol. III, at 393, 396, 400, 407-08.
The prosecutor stated that the evidence was admissible under Mich. R. Evid. 404(b) to show the basis for Tammy Matthews' conduct and fear of the petitioner. See Trial Tr., vol. III at 425-26, 431. The trial court determined that the evidence was material, relevant, and more probative than prejudicial because it bore on Matthews' credibility because it explained why she would or would not act in concert with the petitioner. See id. at 432, 439-43.
The state court of appeals stated that evidence of the petitioner's prior conviction and time spent in jail for the current offenses was properly admitted to show that the petitioner had tried to influence Tammy Matthews' testimony. The court of appeals noted that the trial court instructed the jury to disregard any comment about the petitioner being in prison. See Trial Tr., vol. III, at 454. At the close of the case, the trial court also charged the jury not to conclude from evidence of the petitioner's crimes or improper acts that he was a bad person or likely to commit crimes. The trial court stated that the jurors could consider the evidence only to determine if Tammy Matthews had reason to fear the petitioner. Trial Tr., vol. IV at 648.
The court of appeals also agreed that evidence of the petitioner's prior violence helped establish a reason that the co-conspirator (Tammy Matthews) feared the petitioner, conspired with the petitioner, and initially lied about the incident after the assault. The court of appeals found that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to the petitioner. The court of appeals noted that the evidence was brief, without detail, simply pointed to the co-conspirator's knowledge of the violence, and did not "turn the focus of the trial away from the instant assault and toward [the petitioner's] character." Hathaway, No. 198439, at 2. This analysis was appropriate and correct, since under Michigan evidence law, as with federal law, "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Mich. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence is admissible for other purposes, such as "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case." Ibid.
The court of appeals concluded that the evidence was properly admitted as relevant evidence under Mich. R. Evid. 401 (defining "relevant evidence") and incorrectly concluded that there was no need to analyze the evidence under Mich. R. Evid. 404(b). However, the court of appeals, perhaps unwittingly, had already performed the analysis required by Rule 404(b), albeit summarily. Although the evidence involved crimes and other acts of misconduct which were not charged in this case, the evidence was offered for a proper purpose, that is, other than to prove the petitioner's bad character; it was relevant to a matter actually in issue; it's probative value was not outweighed by the prejudice that might result from the jury drawing the improper inference that the defendant possessed a bad character; and the trial court gave an instruction limiting the jury's use of the evidence to that permitted by state law. The court of appeals' determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the standard applied by the state in reviewing issues relating to the admissibility of evidence, was not unreasonable. Moreover, an abuse of discretion generally is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. See Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding no authority for the proposition that, when a state court abuses its discretion in denying a defendant's motion to withdraw a waiver of jury trial, the result violates the United States Constitution); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 871 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that "[q]uestions of degree — like questions about the proper use of `discretion' — lack answers to which the labels `right' and `wrong' may be attached" and that, "[w]hen the subject is painted in shades of grey, rather than in contrasting colors, a responsible, thoughtful answer reached after a full opportunity to litigate is adequate to support the judgment"), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
This Court concludes that evidence of the petitioner's prior conviction and other acts of violence did not violate a fundamental principle of justice. Accordingly, the state courts' adjudication of the petitioner's claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor did the state courts' conclusions result in an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Even if admission of the disputed evidence amounted to a constitutional violation, the error could not have "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The alleged error also was harmless because the evidence of the petitioner's guilt of the charged offenses was overwhelming. Scott MacArthur identified the petitioner at trial as the man who previously punched him and kicked him in the head and ribs. Tammy Matthews corroborated MacArthur's testimony by explaining how she and the petitioner planned and executed the crime.
B.
The petitioner's second claim alleges that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that Tammy Williams, his co-conspirator, pleaded guilty to the same offense for which he was on trial. The petitioner contends that the evidence tainted the jury.
The petitioner has not cited, and the Court has not found, any Supreme Court decision that prohibits the admission into evidence of a co-conspirator's guilty plea. Federal cases generally deal with the issue as a matter of federal criminal procedure, rather than as one grounded on constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Brant v. Scafati, 301 F. Supp. 1374, 1379 (D.Mass. 1969).
In Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960), the Supreme Court stated that the potential prejudice of a codefendant pleading guilty in the presence of the jury is obvious. In that case, a criminal defendant was denied appointment of counsel at trial. Retained counsel for a codefendant agreed to represent the petitioner and a third defendant as long as their interests did not conflict. However, midway through the joint trial, the codefendant who had retained the attorney pleaded guilty in the jury's presence. Counsel then withdrew, leaving the petitioner and the remaining co-defendant without the assistance of counsel. The question before the Supreme Court was whether "[t]he prejudicial position in which the petitioner found himself when his codefendant pleaded guilty before the jury raised problems requiring professional knowledge and experience beyond a layman's ken." Id. at 703-04. The Supreme Court concluded that the denial of counsel under these circumstances deprived the petitioner of due process of law. However, the Supreme Court did not say that the codefendant's guilty plea itself violated constitutional principles. Instead, the Supreme Court relied on North Carolina decisions as foundation for the rule that, in order to cure the prejudice resulting from a codefendant's guilty plea, a trial court should instruct the jury that the evidence may not be used to determine the defendant's guilt. See id. at 702-03. As previously explained, "[h]abeas review does not encompass state court rulings on the admission of evidence unless there is a constitutional violation." Clemmons, 34 F.3d at 357; see also Brant, 301 F. Supp. at 1379 (stating that "whatever prejudice, if any, stemmed from the trial court's having permitted the petitioner's codefendant to plead guilty in the jury's presence during the trial without having given cautionary instructions, was not so great as to have been of federal constitutional importance").
Even assuming that the admission into evidence of a codefendant's guilty plea raises a federal constitutional issue, a writ of habeas corpus would not be necessarily warranted. Admittedly, evidence of a codefendant's guilty plea may encourage a jury to "infer that the remaining codefendants, who have not changed their pleas, are nevertheless guilty." United States v. Kimbrew, 380 F.2d 538, 540 (6th Cir. 1967). The evidence "impinges on a defendant's right to be tried solely on the evidence." United States v. Binger, 469 F.2d 275, 276 (9th Cir. 1972).
Generally, the guilty plea or conviction of a co-defendant or co-conspirator is not admissible at trial, and such guilty pleas and convictions are never admissible as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt. However, guilty pleas and convictions may be introduced into evidence if the co-conspirator or co-defendant testifies at trial, so that the factfinder will have appropriate facts on hand to assess the witness's credibility. When a guilty plea or conviction is introduced into evidence, [a] court is required to give a cautionary instruction to the effect that the jury may use the conviction or guilty plea only to determine the testifying witness's credibility.United States v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 454 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
It appears that credibility was a principal purpose for offering evidence of the co-conspirator's conviction in this case. The co-conspirator, Tammy Matthews, testified that she had pleaded guilty and been convicted of the conspiracy for which the petitioner was on trial. She said that she pleaded guilty because she was guilty and that the plea bargain called for a sentence of forty-eight to eighty months in prison or one year in the county jail for testifying against the petitioner. See Trial Tr., vol. III, at 462.
Michigan courts have struggled with the conflicting purposes such testimony presents. The immediate prejudice to a defendant at first led the Michigan Supreme Court to develop a virtual per se rule against the admission of testimony that a codefendant had pleaded guilty. See People v. Lytal, 415 Mich. 603, 612, 329 N.W.2d 738, 742 (1982). However, when the co-felon's guilty plea is part of an agreement which includes a promise of leniency as an inducement to testify against the defendant, as here, the plea and agreement is powerful impeachment evidence which the defendant may wish to bring forth, and which the prosecutor may desire to discuss with the witness on direct examination in order to blunt its potentially damaging effect on his witness' credibility. See People v. Rosengren, 159 Mich. App. 492, 502, 407 N.W.2d 391, 395 (1987). The "dilemma" was resolved by a rule which allows a prosecutor to question a co-felon witness about her guilty plea agreement when the defendant does not waive his right to cross-examine on that same subject. See People v. Manning, 434 Mich. 1, 450 N.W.2d 534 (1990).
In this case, the petitioner did not object to the testimony challenged here. He also did not ask for a limiting or cautionary jury instruction regarding Matthews' guilty plea, and the trial court did not give one. The trial court did instruct the jurors that evidence of one or more witnesses' past convictions could be considered with other evidence when deciding whether to believe the witnesses. The trial court went on to acknowledge Tammy Matthews' guilty plea and admitted involvement in the crime for which the petitioner was charged. The court did not say that evidence of Matthews' guilty plea could be used only to determine her credibility and not as evidence of the petitioner's guilt. See Trial Tr., vol. IV, at 649-50.
The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded on review of the petitioner's claim that evidence of Matthews' guilty plea was properly admitted. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the petitioner "gave no indication that he wanted to forego impeachment of the co-conspirator with the plea agreement" and the fact that "the jury was instructed regarding use of the evidence of her conviction." Hathaway, No. 198439, at 2-3.
This conclusion is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. The evidence against the petitioner, as summarized above, was overwhelming. The question presented involved the application of state rules of evidence. The trial court's descretionary decision did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Under the circumstances, no substantial federal right of the petitioner was affected by the evidence. Kimbrew, 380 F.2d at 540.
The petitioner's second claim therefore does not entitle him to habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
C.
The petitioner's third and final claim is that the prosecutor deprived him of due process and compulsory process when he filed an untimely supplemental information charging the petitioner with being an habitual offender, fourth offense. Although the petitioner has couched his claim in constitutional terms, the real basis for his claim is an alleged violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.13(1), which provides:
In a criminal action, the prosecuting attorney may seek to enhance the sentence of the defendant . . . by filing a written notice of his or her intent to do so within 21 days after the defendant's arraignment on the information charging the underlying offense or, if arraignment is waived, within 21 days after the filing of the information charging the underlying offense.
A perceived error of state law is not a basis for habeas corpus relief. Pulley v. Harris, 465
U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Austin v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 298, 300 (6th Cir. 2000). Federal courts may grant the writ of habeas corpus only if the petitioner "is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a). Accordingly, claim three, which alleges a mere violation of state procedural law which enhances a sentence for a career offender, is not cognizable on habeas corpus review.
The petitioner contends that the state court's decision resulted in an unreasonable determination of the facts, which is not particularly pertinent since no federal right is impacted by that determination. The Michigan Court of Appeals made the following findings of fact:
An arraignment was scheduled for November 7, 1995, but [the petitioner] signed a waiver of arraignment instead and viewed the information on this day. On November 15, 1995, the prosecutor filed the notice of intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on the third offense and the felony information was filed. On December 1, 1995, the amended notice of intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on a fourth offense was filed. Both the original notice and amended notice of intent to seek an enhanced sentence were filed within twenty-one days of the filing of the information, as required by MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085.Hathaway, No. 198430, at 3.
These findings are supported by the record, which indicates that the original notice of intent dated November 15, 1995, was filed on the same day as the information. The amended notice of intent dated December 1, 1995, was filed within 21 days of the November 15, 1995 information. The state court's conclusion — that the original notice of intent and amended notice of intent were filed within twenty-one days of the information — was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. The petitioner has no right to habeas relief on the basis of his third claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
IV.
The petitioner's first two claims lack merit because he has not shown that the state court's adjudication of those claims resulted in a decision that was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, any Supreme Court decision or an unreasonable determination of the facts. The petitioner's third claim is not cognizable on habeas corpus review, and the state court's adjudication of the claim similarly did not result in an unreasonable determination of the facts.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.