Opinion
CASE NO. 3:21cv1126-MCR-ZCB
2023-01-10
Louis C. HASKINS, II, Plaintiff, v. USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
Brent Fritzalton Bradley, Kinsey Troxel Walborsky etc., Pensacola, FL, John Edgar Booth, Walborsky Bradley & Fleming PLLC, Pensacola, FL, for Plaintiff. Kansas Renee Gooden, Boyd & Jenerette PA, Miami, FL, Matthew David Cavender, Amanda Leigh Kidd, Boyd & Jenerette PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant.
Brent Fritzalton Bradley, Kinsey Troxel Walborsky etc., Pensacola, FL, John Edgar Booth, Walborsky Bradley & Fleming PLLC, Pensacola, FL, for Plaintiff. Kansas Renee Gooden, Boyd & Jenerette PA, Miami, FL, Matthew David Cavender, Amanda Leigh Kidd, Boyd & Jenerette PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant. ORDER M. CASEY RODGERS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Louis C. Haskins, II, filed suit in state court seeking a declaratory judgment as to the availability of uninsured/underinsured motorist ("UM") coverage under a policy issued to him by Defendant USAA Casualty Insurance Company ("USAA"). USAA removed the case to this Court, and cross motions for summary judgment are pending. Having fully reviewed the matter, the Court finds that USAA's motion is due to be granted and Haskins's motion denied.
Background
USAA issued a Florida Auto Policy, No. 00250 68 89C 7105 1 ("Policy"), to Haskins as the named insured, which listed two covered automobiles and was in effect from September 1, 2017, through March 1, 2018. The Policy provides bodily injury liability coverage (Part A) of up to $200,000 per person plus an equal amount of UM coverage (Part C), each subject to various terms and conditions. In relevant part, the Policy's UM Coverage provides bodily injury damages that "a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle." ECF No. 12-1 at 21 (Policy at 18 of 34). The Policy broadly defines an "Uninsured Motor Vehicle" as "a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type" but expressly excludes vehicles "[d]esigned mainly for use off public roads while not on public roads." ECF No. 12-1 at 20-21 (Policy at 17-18 of 34). The liability coverage similarly excludes damages for bodily injury caused by vehicles "designed mainly for use off public roads," ECF No. 12-1 at 10 (Policy at 7 of 34), but also provides that damages resulting from the use or maintenance of any vehicle that is not the "covered auto" are excluded unless the vehicle is "used in the business of farming or ranching," ECF No. 12-1 at 8-9 (Policy at 6 of 34).
Haskins listed a 2002 Nissan Pathfinder and a 2013 Volkswagon Tiguan as covered autos.
On September 30, 2017, while the Policy was in effect, Haskins was injured by a tractor pulling a hay baler, while visiting his friend, Gary Buchanan, who owned the tractor and the rural property where the accident occurred. Buchanan's tractor was not insured, and Haskins sought UM benefits under his own Policy. USAA denied UM coverage for Haskins's bodily injuries related to this accident.
The material undisputed facts include that the accident occurred in a hayfield on Buchanan's 150-acre parcel of rural property, where Buchanan has a single-family residence with a dental lab and a horse barn/workshop. Buchanan works from his home as a dental lab technician. At the time of the accident, he had been maintaining the tractor and baling hay for his horses; the tractor was towing a hay bale wagon. Buchanan testified that he uses the tractor to bale hay only for his wife's horses, not for commercial sale, and he said he has "maybe six" cows — "[e]nough to keep our ag exemption." ECF No. 12-4 at 23. Buchanan said he does not consider himself a farmer—an opinion also shared by Haskins. A Property Appraiser's Office record submitted by Haskins, however, shows that Buchanan received an agricultural tax exemption and a "cropland" classification as to 33.6 acres (and 8 acres as a rural residence), pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 193.461, for the year when this accident occurred. ECF No. 13 at 26-27.
According to Buchannan, when Haskins came by to watch him bale hay. When Haskins arrived, Buchanan was finishing changing a fuel filter on the tractor. When he turned the key to check for leaks, the tractor took off unexpectedly (apparently already in gear), and ran over both of them, causing injury to Haskins. See ECF No. 12-4 at 18.
Haskins also testified that Buchanan, who has been his friend for over 20 years, is not a farmer, and was baling hay for his own horses at the time of the accident; Haskins said he considered this a "[n]oncommercial use." ECF No. 12-3 at 20-21.
Both Haskins and USAA agree that summary judgment is appropriate on this record because there are no material disputes of fact, but they disagree as to which party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Briefly stated, the disagreement centers on whether Haskins is entitled to UM coverage based on his assertion that Buchanan's tractor was "[a] vehicle used in the business of farming." ECF No. 12-1 at 9 (Policy, Part A, at 6 of 34). USAA argues that the circumstances do not support coverage under this or any other provision.
Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of establishing on the record that there is no genuine dispute of fact and that the plaintiff has failed to establish an element essential of the claim. See Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If this burden is satisfied, then the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and "designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing each motion and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-movant "to the extent supportable by the record." Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)). Also, "[a] mere 'scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party." Brooks v. Cnty. Comm'n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990)). The same standards are applied to cross-motions for summary judgment, which are considered separately. See generally Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Sec'y of State for State of Ala., 992 F.3d 1299, 1317 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) ("Cross-motions for summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed." (quoting Bricklayers Int'l Union, Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975)).
See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting the case law of the former Fifth Circuit before October 1, 1981, as precedent in this Circuit).
Florida law controls this insurance coverage case and requires that the terms of an insurance policy must be construed "according to their plain language." Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Macedo, 228 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla. 2017). "[A]ny ambiguity which remains after reading each policy as a whole and endeavoring to give every provision its full meaning and operative effect must be liberally construed in favor of coverage and strictly against the insurer." Id. (quoting Wash. Nat'l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943, 948 (Fla. 2013)). A policy is ambiguous, however, only if a term is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation—one providing coverage and another limiting coverage. Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 29 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2010). Exclusionary clauses are generally strictly construed in a manner that affords the broadest coverage. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Williams, 998 So. 2d 677, 678 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009).
UM coverage is statutorily required in Florida. See Fla. Stat. § 627.727. It "is designed for the protection of injured persons, not for the benefit of insurance companies or motorists who cause damage to others." Young v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 753 So. 2d 80, 83 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So.2d 429, 430 (Fla. 1971)) (emphasis omitted). The statute provides that the limits of UM coverage "must be not less than the limits of bodily injury liability insurance purchased by the named insured," Fla. Stat. § 627.727(2); it is "intended to provide the reciprocal of liability coverage." Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Willis, 235 So. 3d 1041, 1043 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018); Young, 753 So. 2d at 83. Thus, to comply with the UM statute and public policy, an insured must "receive the same recovery that would have been available had the tortfeasor been covered by an automobile liability policy that complied with the Financial Responsibility Law" under Chapter 324 of the Florida Statutes. Willis, 235 So. 3d at 1043. Additionally, courts have determined that if liability coverage beyond the Financial Responsibility Law is purchased, the same limits must be available through the UM coverage, see id. at 1044-45, because public policy precludes the UM coverage from being " 'whittled away' by exclusions and exceptions" that are not present in the liability coverage. Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229, 238 (Fla. 1971). "An insurance policy may contain other general conditions affecting coverage or exclusions on coverage as long as the limitations are unambiguous and 'consistent with the purposes of the UM statute.' " Willis, 235 So. 3d at 1043 (quoting Varro v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 854 So. 2d 726, 728-29 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)).
The Florida Supreme Court has explained the public policy underlying the UM statute as follows:
The public policy of the uninsured motorist statute . . . is to provide uniform and specific insurance benefits to members of the public to cover damages for bodily injury caused by the negligence of insolvent or uninsured motorists and such Statutorily fixed and prescribed protection is not reducible by insurers' policy exclusions and exceptions any more than are the benefits provided for persons protected by automobile liability insurance secured in compliance with the Financial Responsibility Law.Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229, 233-34 (Fla. 1971).
In Willis, the court found that a UM exclusion of coverage for a non-owned golf cart on a public road contravened public policy because the golf cart would have been covered under the liability insurance. 235 So. 3d at 1043. The court held that although the Financial Responsibility Law does not require liability insurance for a vehicle designed mainly for use off public roads, such as a golf cart, because the plaintiff in Willis in fact had purchased liability coverage for such a vehicle when used on a public road, reciprocal UM coverage was required. Willis, 235 So. 3d at 1044.
The parties agree there is no dispute of fact. Turning to the terms of Haskins's UM Policy, it is plain that Haskins is a covered person, but the tractor does not fit the definition of an "Uninsured Motor Vehicle," which expressly excludes a vehicle that is "[d]esigned mainly for use off public roads while not on public roads." ECF No. 12-1 at 21. Buchanan's tractor was designed mainly for use off public roads, and the accident occurred in a hayfield.
However, as noted above, UM coverage must be reciprocal to the liability coverage purchased, even if the liability coverage purchased exceeds the amount required by the Financial Responsibility law. Willis, 235 So. 3d at 1043-45. USAA does not dispute that reciprocal coverage is required but argues that the provision does not apply to the circumstances of this case. Here, the liability coverage excludes the "ownership, maintenance, or use of . . . [a]ny vehicle that is not your covered auto unless that vehicle is . . . used in the business of farming or ranching." ECF No. 12-1 at 9 (emphasis added). The phrase, "[a] vehicle used in the business of farming," is not specially defined in the policy, and consequently, Haskins argues it must be construed in his favor. But the fact that an operative term is not specifically defined "does not, by itself, create an ambiguity." Macedo, 228 So. 3d at 1113 (quoting Botee v. S. Fid. Ins. Co., 162 So.3d 183, 186 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015)). "When a term in an insurance policy is undefined, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and courts may look to legal and non-legal dictionary definitions to determine such a meaning." Id. (quoting Botee, 162 So. 3d at 186). The plain language requires that the injury was caused by vehicle used in a farming business. The ordinary dictionary meaning of "business" connotes a commercial venture, as opposed to, and distinguishable from, personal use that involves a mere farming activity by one who is not in the business of farming, or a hobby. The parties do not argue that the phrase is ambiguous, and the Court concludes it is not. It is therefore not enough to argue, as Haskins does, that the tractor was used for a farm activity of baling an agricultural farm crop (hay) for hobby horses absent proof that the use was part of an overall farming business.
The parties agree that Florida's Financial Responsibility Law did not require Buchanan to insure the tractor.
The usual or ordinary meaning of "business," as given in Webster's Dictionary, includes a "commercial or mercantile activity engaged in as a means of livelihood;" or "a commercial or sometimes industrial enterprise;" or "dealings or transactions especially of an economic nature." https://www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/business.
USAA also argues that the Court must consider the use to which the vehicle was being put at the time of the accident to determine coverage. According to Haskins, this would impermissibly add a restriction that USAA failed to expressly include in the Policy. The Court disagrees. As noted by USAA, Florida courts construing similar auto exclusions related to the "use and maintenance" of a vehicle, have concluded that "[t]he use to which the vehicle was being put at the time of the injury governs the applicability of the exclusion." Cesarini v. Am. Druggist Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (citing cases). Under this authority, considering the use to which the vehicle was put at the time of the occurrence does not re-write the policy, as Haskins contends, and consequently, his argument that he is entitled to coverage as a matter of law because a tractor can be used in the business of farming or because this tractor was previously used in a farming business falls short. Use of the vehicle at any other time would have no relevance to the accident in dispute.
Applying this interpretation of the policy to the undisputed circumstances of the case, the Court concludes that the tractor is not covered by Haskins's UM Policy. At the time of the accident, Buchanan was a dental technician and was not in the business of farming; the only business on the property was his dental lab. Regardless of the presence or absence of an agricultural classification as to a portion of his property, it is undisputed that at the time of the accident, he was baling hay for personal use—to feed his wife's horses, not for sale or to support a farming business. Although Buchanan testified that he keeps enough cows ("maybe 6") to maintain his ag exemption, he also testified that if his wife did not have horses, he would not have the tractor and that he was baling hay for the horses.
Haskins argues that the appraisal alone, showing an agricultural classification and tax exemption, is enough to prove that Buchanan's tractor was used in the business of farming because a tax appraiser's decision in Florida is entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Crapo v. Gainesville Area Chamber of Com., Inc., 274 So. 3d 453, 457 n.1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019) ("Because tax appraisers are constitutional officers, their decisions are clothed with a presumption of correctness.") (citing Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d 368, 371 (Fla. 1977)). The agricultural lands classification statute requires the property appraiser, on an annual basis, to "classify for assessment purposes all lands within the county as either agricultural or nonagricultural," and this "may require" the taxpayer to submit information "to establish that such lands were actually used for a bona fide agricultural purpose." Fla. Stat. § 193.461(1), (3)(a). The statute provides that "[o]nly lands that are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes" receive the agricultural classification and defines "bona fide agricultural purposes" as "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land." Fla. Stat. § 193.461(3)(b). In addition, Haskins argues that the Policy should be construed consistent with other Florida statutes, under which Buchanan is considered a farmer, see Fla. Stat. § 322.01(19) (defining a "farmer" under Florida's motor vehicles law as "a person who grows agricultural products"), and his land is considered a farm, see Fla. Stat. § 823.14(3)(c) (defining "farm" as "the land, buildings, support facilities, machinery, and other appurtenances used in the production of farm or aquaculture products" for purposes of Florida's Right to Farm Act).
USAA argues that definitions provided in statutes unrelated to the UM statute and Financial Responsibility Law are immaterial to a proper interpretation of this UM Policy. USAA further argues that the property appraisal record showing an agricultural exemption on a portion of Buchanan's property is likewise immaterial because the plain language of the statute indicates only that the property appraiser "may" request information to show that the lands were actually used for a bona fide agricultural purpose. Fla. Stat. § 193.41(3)(a).
The Court agrees with USAA that the various definitions of farmer or farm throughout the Florida Statutes are immaterial to an interpretation of the UM Policy language at hand, and the matter of what Buchannan represented to the State of Florida for purposes of a tax classification may be different from what he actually was doing on his property for purposes of this case at the time of the accident. There is no evidence as to whether Buchanan was asked to provide any information in support of his actual use of the property to obtain the classification or whether the accident occurred on a portion of land classified as agricultural "cropland." But there is evidence that Buchanan, and even Haskins himself in his own deposition, conceded that Buchanan's farm activity was a noncommercial use and that Buchanan is not in the business of farming. The appraisal and unrelated statutory definitions do not provide a basis for UM coverage in this case, and USAA is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
While there is no expert testimony offered to interpret this record and all of the codes that appear on it, USAA concedes in its Reply Brief for purposes of this motion that the face of the appraisal shows 33.6 acres were classified as "cropland" and 8 acres were zoned as a rural single-family residence. ECF No. 14 at 3. USAA argues that according to this record, Haskins's repeated assertions that Buchanan's 150-acres were subject to an agricultural property tax exemption must not be credited, and the Court agrees.
The parties do not identify the appraisal as presenting a question of fact, and Buchanan was not questioned about the exemption in his deposition. Even if this is considered a fact issue, it does not present a material question of fact on this record because a reasonable juror could not find based on the appraisal alone, unexplained by any expert testimony, and given the absence of any proof that Buchanan was actually engaged in commercial farming, that Buchanan was using the tractor "in the business of farming."
Accordingly, Defendant USAA's Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 12, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Haskins's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 15, is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED this 10th day of January 2023.